Border Security Issues After 9/11
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Transcript Border Security Issues After 9/11
Border Security Issues
After 9/11
November 5, 2003
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RAND October 30, 2003
The ‘Border’ is Complex
Passenger traffic through numerous
international airports
Goods and commercial traffic through
national ports
Traffic over land borders
Summary observations
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RAND October 30, 2003
We Worry about a Variety of Things
Actions
Crime, including people smuggling and drug
smuggling
Terrorism
Goods and people
Weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction
and disruption
Contraband, including drugs, stolen goods and goods
evading taxes
People, including potential terrorists
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Airports
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RAND October 30, 2003
Key Airport Issues
Work done on:
Physical security (including hardening doors, arming
pilots, transfer of the security function to public
sector)
Passenger screening and profiling (before airport
entry or boarding plane)
More work needs to be done on:
Passenger screening and profiling (before entering the
country)
Air cargo and airport personnel security measures
Cost effective positive identification (biometric) issues
Contraband detection
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Ports
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RAND October 30, 2003
Cargo Containers Have Revolutionized
Global Trade
Cargo containers are the standard for
shipping merchandise
Millions of containers in use
Ports optimized to handle container ships
Easy transition to ground transportation
modes
The number of containers passing through US
ports is expected to increase 2-3 fold over the
next 15-20 years
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RAND October 30, 2003
Cargo Containers Have Revolutionized
Global Trade
US logistics costs dropped from 16.1% of
GDP in 1980 to 10.1% in 2000
Annual savings in logistics of foreign trade
approximately $150B
Security threats and US countermeasures
could reverse these savings
Shipping costs are sensitive to container costs and
security measures
Inventories costs are sensitive to supply uncertainty
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Work done on:
Key Port Issues
Projecting the border outward
“Know your customer” programs
Much remains to be done on:
Port personnel
Contraband detection
Inspection rates, regimes
Cost effectiveness analysis
Understanding how the pieces work together through
simulation modeling
Commercial shipping will be transformed by 9/11 in the same
way air travel was transformed by hijackings
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RAND October 30, 2003
A Common “Vision” of
Secure Ocean Commerce
Trusted suppliers at origin of cargo being placed in containers
Secure container locks, with tamperproof alarms
Accurate manifests, suitably protected
Improved visibility of cargo containers throughout supply chain
Vetted personnel at all transshipment locations
Secure warehouses
International cooperation on security procedures and practices
International sharing of intelligence data
Assertion: Security motives might enable supply chain improvements that
can reduce current logistics costs, even up to 20-30 percent - a “winwin” scenario
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Land Borders
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RAND October 30, 2003
Key Land Border Issues
Land borders have most of the same issues
as ports and airports, plus:
Problems of wide open spaces to patrol
and control
Research from criminal justice shows that a
very large percentage of deported criminals
reenter the US within a year
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RAND October 30, 2003
Lessons from Drug Policy
History suggests border control will be very
difficult
Drug prices and availability difficult to
affect with border control efforts
Integration of border control with other
strategies (defense in depth) is necessary
Economic concerns are valid and very large
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Summary Observations
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RAND October 30, 2003
Focus on More Effective Resource Allocation
Likelihood of Weapon Importation Across Border Type
People
Nuclear
Radiological
Chemical Biological Conventional
Airports
High
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Ports
Med.
High
High
Low
Med.
Low
Land
Borders
High
High
High
Low
High
Low
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RAND October 30, 2003
Focus on More Effective Resource Allocation
Likelihood of Weapon Importation Across Border Type
People
Nuclear
Radiological
Chemical Biological Conventional
Airports
High
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Ports
Med.
High
High
Low
Med.
Low
Land
Borders
High
High
High
Low
High
Low
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There are Also Questions of
Relative Resource Allocations
With limited resources, where are our dollars best
spent?
Preventing attacks
Hardening targets against attacks
Improving response against attacks
We can mis-allocate resources if we think about
threats too generically or the ‘port problem’ in
isolation. For example:
In absolute terms, it makes little sense to think
about inspecting cargo for smallpox because of the
difficulty in finding and identifying it
In relative terms, better and less expensive policies
such as vaccination of health care workers are
available
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Challenges Can Only be Met Collectively
National governments
Concerns: trade flows,
attacks, security
measures
Data: threats; level of
effort; security
procedures
Local governments:
Concerns: facility
revenues,
consequences of
attacks
Data: users’ price
sensitivity and
willingness to
substitute; security
procedures
Private sector
Concerns: security
costs and impact on
business
Data: profit margins,
security expenditures
Trade associations
Concerns: impact on
members; government
regulation
Data: industry
procedures and trends
Public
Concerns: ease of
travel and movement,
cost of goods
Data: travel patterns
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RAND October 30, 2003
Challenges Can Only be Met Collectively
Private sector
Concerns: security
costs and impact on
business
Data: profit margins,
security expenditures
Trade associations
Concerns: impact on
members; government
regulation
Data: industry
procedures and trends
Public
Concerns: ease of
travel and movement,
cost of goods
Data: travel patterns
No single party controls all of the relevant information. Parties need to
collaborate to support an integrated assessment
National governments
Concerns: trade flows,
attacks, security
measures
Data: threats; level of
effort; security
procedures
Local governments:
Concerns: facility
revenues,
consequences of
attacks
Data: users’ price
sensitivity and
willingness to
substitute; security
procedures
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RAND October 30, 2003