Pharmacoeconomic input to Australian drug subsidy
Download
Report
Transcript Pharmacoeconomic input to Australian drug subsidy
1
Applying economic evaluation to drug
subsidy decisions:
an Australian perspective
Adriana Platona
Director
Pharmaceutical Evaluation Branch
[email protected]
2
Australian system
Universal
access through Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme for over 50 years
Cost-effectiveness
evaluation mandatory for
decisions about funding of pharmaceuticals since
1993
Experience
from >1,150 PBAC decisions involving
economic evaluation
Is
the system it perfect?
3
NO,
JUST THE BEST!
To
provide timely, reliable and
affordable access for the Australian
community to necessary and costeffective medicines
– Equity of access AND value for money
4
Australian health care system
Federal
government - Canberra
– subsidises community-based services
State/territory
governments
– provide public hospital services (partially funded by
federal government via transfer payments)
Coordinated care?
Coordinated policies for drug purchasing ?
Tendering occurs in hospitals, nationally for
vaccines, but not for PBS
5
Major community programs
Medicare
Benefits Schedule
– medical, pathology, diagnostic, imaging services
– Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC)
Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme (PBS)
National Immunisation Schedule
– Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC)
Current
work – improve coordination
– In decisions eg for hybrid technologies, drugs requiring
molecular testing
– In processes MSAC 12-18 months; PBAC 17 weeks
6
The 17 week PBAC cycle
Manufacturer
prepares application
Submission is evaluated 10 weeks
Technical sub-committees – Economics, Drug
Utilisation
Occasional PBAC initiates reviews
–
–
–
–
ATRAs vs ACE
Herceptin metastatic breast cancer
Clopidogrel for stable angina in patients undergoing stenting
Current work: rheumatoid arthritis
fee currently charged for evaluation – proposal to
introduce cost-recovery
Independent review of PBAC decisions
No
7
Forecast DoHA Expenditure
2008/09 Au$billion
7.3
13.9
7.3
Pharmaceutical
Benefits
Aged and
Community Care
Healthcare
Agreements
Medicare Benefits
Other
13.6
9.7
8
9
PBS cost to government
6000
Au$ billion
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Concessional
General
19
94
19 -95
95
19 -96
96
19 -97
97
19 -98
98
19 -99
99
20 -00
00
20 -01
01
20 -02
02
20 -03
03
20 -04
04
20 -05
05
20 -06
06
-0
7
Millions of scripts
10
Volume of PBS prescriptions
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Concessional
General
11
Regulatory and reimbursement
1.
Marketing approval from TGA “registers”
drug
– efficacy, safety, quality
2.
PBAC “recommends”
– comparative effectiveness, comparative safety,
comparative costs
– www.health.gov.au or www.pbs.gov.au
» PBAC Outcomes and Public Summary Documents” ;
PBAC agenda published 6 weeks prior to meeting
Minister
“declares”
12
Current work
Strategic
collaboration between regulatory
clinical evaluation and reimbursement clinical
evaluation
- For methodological issues: eg. surrogate outcomes,
molecular targeting
- Processes
- Better use of scarce evaluation resources
13
All major submissions have an
economic analysis
New
drug
Major
change to current restriction
14
Major submissions 1991-2008
20
07
20
05
20
03
20
01
19
99
19
97
19
95
subsequent
no eco eval
1st eco eval
19
93
19
91
#
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Types of economic evaluation in
manufacturers initial submissions
Number: 38 67 47 62 58 61 61 47 51 46 36 36 49 49 52 49 809
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
To
ta l
15
c/ma
partial
c/ea
c/ua
16
PBAC
does not have a single threshold for the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)
Strength of economic evaluation depends on
quality of clinical data!
Weak clinical data means uncertain ICER
17
Activity Indicators for the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme
18
Activity indicators
19
Uncertain
ICER can be managed through
better data and/or lower price
frequently backed up by legal contracts (deed of
agreement) between government and drug
company about jointly managing the risks in
financial expenditure
a few examples of CED in practice
20
Cost-Effectiveness: benefits
“Outcomes-based
reward system” – buy health
outcomes
Cost-justification - not legal to pay a higher price
unless a drug has better efficacy or better safety
over the comparator
Robust, consistent decision-making
Basis for greater transparency
BUT not always a cost-containment tool
21
Current PBAC Guidelines
Current PBAC Guidelines URL:
– http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.ns
f/Content/pbacguidelines-index
– 2008 (version 4.3)
No
minimum standard for clinical data
(Complex decisions for drugs for orphan indications)
Promote
comparability across submissions
Transparent inputs and methods of analysis
22
6 sections to a major submission
A:
context
– restriction and comparator
B:
clinical evaluation
C: details of inputs into economic
evaluation
D: economic evaluation – structure and
results
E: utilisation and financial implications
F: quality use of medicines, risk-sharing
arrangements and other relevant factors
23
A: context of submission
Requested
restriction
– aim is to identify and restrict in those likely to
benefit most
– Problematic when discordance between
regulatory and reimbursement indications arise
Main
comparator
– pragmatic: “the therapy prescribers would most
replace in practice”
– can be a product which is generic
24
B: clinical evaluation – EBM
approach
Hierarchy
of preferred sources of evidence
– direct randomised trial(s)
– indirect comparisons: two sets of randomised
trials involving common reference
– non-randomised studies
– expert opinion
Minimise
systematic and random error
25
Issues with cost-minimisation
Usually
based on indirect comparison which introduces
uncertainty
– Trials not always comparable
– Minimum clinical important differences not always justified
(partly related to lack of coordination and insufficient details
for decisions made by regulatory authorities)
– See expert reports on www.pbs.gov.au
The
new products simply asks for the same price of the
comparator, not a reduced price
Although applications claim that one product replaces
another with small financial expenditure – often not true
26
Superiority vs noninferiority
Treatment effect over comparator
Treatment effect over comparator
Better
Better
?
Superior
x
?
Noninferior
x
x
0
Drug B
Drug A
0
x
MCID
Drug D
Drug C
Worse
Worse
27
C: Translating trial evidence
New section in the Guidelines
Request a more explicit set of connections
between the clinical and economic evaluations
Identify and investigate whether translation
issues arise and the impact on ICER
1.
–
2.
3.
applicability, extrapolation or transformation
Facilitate independent verification
Relate results to the economic evaluation
28
Guidance on translation
Applicability
of trial results to Australian patients
– critical issue for HIV drugs, diabetes drugs
– subgroup analyses where justified
Extrapolation
beyond trial horizon
– What assumption is made about the treatment effect beyond
the trial
Transformation
of trial outcomes
– surrogate to final outcomes
– utility valuation
29
Surrogate to final outcomes
3 steps to a more convincing transformation
Association between surrogate and final
1.
–
–
TE on surrogate predicts TE on final
2.
–
–
3.
typically epidemiological (longitudinal) studies
plus biological reasoning
requires randomised trials
eg vit D analogues for renal disease
Rationale to accept this prediction given the
mechanism of action of the proposed drug
30
Association – what we get
Final
outcome
Association
Eg Framingham in
CVD
Projected
(inferred)
difference in
final outcome
Detected difference in
surrogate outcome
Surrogate
outcome
31
Trial-based predictions – what we would
like to get: capture uncertainty
Prediction bound
Difference
in final
outcome
Relationship
Prediction bound
95% CI of
relationship
95% CI of
relationship
Difference in
surrogate outcome
32
Surrogate to final outcomes
Extremely
complex technical area
Large area of uncertainty for ICER
Need randomised controlled trials
Enthusiasm for biomarkers as surrogate outcomes
– Smaller, faster trials
– But quantification of benefits uncertain
– Implications for safety assessment?
– Needs early and strategic engagement of regulatory and
reimbursement agencies
33
D: economic evaluation
Select
between noninferiority and superiority
– for noninferiority
» select between cost-minimisation and cost analysis
– for superiority
» purely trial-based or
» “stepped” evaluation – each step is linked with an area of
section C
More
extensive sensitivity analyses
– broad assessment of uncertainty – REMAINS AN
ISSUE
– probabilistic sensitivity analysis has a role (new)
34
Valuation of outcomes
CUA
preferred
Utilities from the same trials as the treatment effect
using MAUI
No preference for a particular MAUI – rare to have trial
based
Choice experiments: SG, TTO accepted
Critical issue: framing bias in scenarios, interpretation
of utility gain
QALYs not always useful - paucity of reliable research
about the trade-offs individuals are prepared to make
for children, end-of-life
35
Other supplementary analyses
accepted in the base case – only in
sensitivity analyses
Not
» production changes
» carer impacts
36
Summary of current issues
Early
and strategic engagement of regulatory and
reimbursement agencies
Better coordination for drug-device/drug-test
products
Economic evaluation is only one component for
pharmaceutical policy in Australia
Published prices vs real effective prices
High costs medicines
Risk sharing arrangements
CED
37
Pricing policies
For brand medicines or vaccines, after positive PBAC
recommendation that drug is cost-effective – consideration by
PBPA
PBPA – Health, Industry, consumer, pharma industry
Declaration about cost of production
Profit margin approx 25-30% acceptable
Lower uptake of generics than in most other OECD countries –
remains an issue
Until 2006, through cost-minimisation, generics entrant had the
same price as the already available branded product
Financial benefit of generics accrued to pharmacy not federal
government
38
Pricing policies
Mandatory
12.5% price reduction when generic becomes
available
1 August 2007, two separate formularies
– F1 – single brand medicines
– F2 – multiple brands; price reductions from 1 August 2009
» F2A – 2% price reduction for three years
» F2T – one-off 25% price reduction
– No links between the F1 and F2 – some anomalies
» Alendronate – risedronate; SSRI but not venlafaxine; simvastatin
but not atorvastatin or rosuvastatin
disclosure – aims to claw-back discounts by
manufacturers to pharmacy
Price