International Price Comparisons 1999
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Transcript International Price Comparisons 1999
Drug Importation in the US: Lose-Lose for
US and Foreign Consumers
Patricia M. Danzon PhD
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
http://hc.wharton.upenn.edu/danzon/index.htm
Effects of Legalizing Drug Importation are Highly
Uncertain
Legalizing importation => massive wholesaler/pharmacy
involvement => system wide adjustment
Current savings to individual consumers overstate system-wide
savings
Aggregate savings to US consumers less than revenue loss to
manufacturers
Key issues
– Mismatch of products
– Supply restrictions on launched products
– Foreign price increases or non-launch on new products
– Intermediaries capture much of the savings
1. Mismatch of Compounds and Presentations Reduces
Potential for Importation
Sample = Top 249 molecules, by US Unit Volume
70%
61%
62%
61%
60%
50%
42%
40%
35%
37%
33%
35%
33%
31%
33%
30%
21%
20%
17%
14%
16%
15%
10%
10%
Sample percent of sales
Matched with US, by presentation
Source: Danzon and Furukawa, Health Affairs, Oct. 2003
S
U
K
U
M
EX
IC
O
N
LY
JA
PA
A
M
ER
G
IT
A
NY
CE
N
HI
LE
C
FR
A
C
AN
A
DA
0%
2. Manufacturer Supply Restrictions of Launched
Products
Manufacturers may restrict supply to exporting countries
– Supply restrictions are common in EU, and legal
• Provided manufacturer acts unilaterally (Bayer Adalat case)
How much of limited supply will wholesalers/pharmacies export?
– Some shortages reported in Canada
Even if 20% of EU + Canada volume is shipped to US, would
only supply 20-30% of US volume
– And only for matching drugs
US Dominates Global Sales:
Due to High US Volumes, Not Just Prices
2003
% Growth Constant $
World Audited Market
US$ Bill
% Share
2003
CAGR
98-02
Latin America
$17.4
3.7%
+5.5
-2.8
Asia/Africa/Australia
$33.8
7.2%
+9.3
+11.0
Japan
$52.4
11.2%
+3.4
+4.0
Europe (All)
$134.5
28.8%
+9.4
+8.8
North America
$229.5
49.1%
+11.1
+15.2
Worldwide
$467.9
100.0%
+9.3
+10.4
10 Key Markets
$389.2
83.2%
+9.1
+11.3
EU (15)
$116.3
24.9%
+8.0
+8.4
Source: IMS Health Incorporated
Per Capita Unit Volume By Molecule Age:
Months Since Global Launch. Relative to U.S. (US = 100)
120%
115%
97%
100%
91%
91%
78%
80%
72%
58%
65%
62%
60%
53%
44%
42%
40%
PA
24 months or less
12%
4% 3%
25 to 60 months
Source: Danzon and Furukawa, Health Affairs Oct. 2003.
Note: UK consumption upward biased by a few respiratory products.
Total
K
LY
A
IT
G
E
R
M
A
N
N
C
Y
E
E
H
IL
C
FR
A
C
A
N
A
D
A
0%
N
5%
1%
X
IC
O
6%
2%
M
E
22%
20%
32%
25%
JA
26%
U
44%
3. Manufacturers May Try to Raise Foreign Prices
---But Resistance Is Likely
Foreign price control systems aim to stabilize drug spending and
health spending as a percent of GDP
– Controls on prices, reimbursement, drug budgets etc.
– Health policy is fiscal policy in national/social health systems
Foreign prices are already roughly in line with income in
industrialized countries (Danzon and Furukawa, HA 2003)
Price Indexes for Top 249 Compounds, by
US Volume, 1999 Data. US = 100.
140%
127%
120%
94%
100%
86% 87%
78%
80%
80%
70%
67%
60%
40%
20%
Note: United States equals 100%.
Molecule
UK
O
IC
EX
M
JA
PA
N
LY
IT
A
G
ER
M
A
NY
CE
AN
FR
IL
E
CH
CA
NA
DA
0%
Price Indexes Relative to Per Capita
Income Differentials (1999)
600%
528%
529%
500%
400%
300%
200%
104%
100% 67%
0%
CANADA
78%
CHILE
141% 127%
118%
110%
93%
87%
80%
86%
70%
FRANCE
GERMANY
Price index (molecule-indication)
Note: United States equals 100%.
ITALY
JAPAN
MEXICO
125%
94%
UK
Price index normalized by income
(b) Delay and Non-launch of New Drugs ex-US if
Low Prices
Countries that are unwilling/unable to pay higher prices may see
fewer/delayed product launches
If importation threat is large, manufacturers would rationally be
less willing to launch ex-US at low prices
– US market vs. loss of foreign sales
– Feasible pricing range varies by product, importer costs etc.
Countries with Lower Prices have Fewer Launches,
Longer Launch Lags (Danzon, Wang and Wang 2003)
We estimate the effects of price on launch delay, controlling for
market size , per capita income, etc.
Sample: launch of 85 NCEs launched in 1994-1999
14 EU countries, plus Australia, Canada, Czech, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, S. Africa, Switzerland, and USA
IMS data on prices and volumes
Findings
Countries with lower prices have longer launch lags and fewer
launches
EU countries that are major PI exporters have longer delays,
controlling for expected price and volume
Kaplan-Meier estimates of cumulative launch probability for selected
countries
90%
80%
Cumulative Launch Probability
70%
60%
USA
GERMANY
UK
SPAIN
50%
FRANCE
ITALY
PORTUGAL
JAPAN
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Month since Global Launch
Countries with a significantly longer delays/fewer launches,
relative to UK, controlling for price and volume
0.80
0.70
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
nd
er
la
da
Sw
itz
an
a
C
or
wa
y
N
ol
la
nd
H
o
ic
M
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ec
G
re
ai
n
Sp
a
Af
ric
ia
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h
um
st
ra
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So
Au
Be
lg
i
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Fr
an
ly
Ita
ze
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C
d
la
n
Po
al
al
N
ew
Ze
rtu
g
n
Po
pa
an
d
0.00
Ja
Hazard Ratio (vs UK)
0.60
c. US Price Pressure from Medicare May
Narrow Differentials
Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) to deliver drug benefit
through private PBMs
– Each PBM must have at least 2 drugs in each class
Medicare to define classes
– Broad definition of classes => older drugs compete with newer
drugs within a classes
Discounts could be large in crowded therapeutic classes
PBMs may demand same discounts for their private plans
4. Middlemen will Capture Some of Any Savings
from Importation
If only a fraction of US demand can be sourced abroad, who will
capture the savings?
– Pharmacy chains and GPOs that buy direct
– PBMs may “clawback” some savings from pharmacies
Cash-paying customers are unlikely to benefit
EU experience confirms that middlemen capture much of the
savings from parallel trade
The Global Social Welfare Perspective:
Differential Pricing Increases Social Welfare,
Compared to Uniform Pricing
1. Differential Pricing => Wider Use of Existing Drugs (Static
Efficiency)
Low-income markets can only afford drugs at low prices
2. Differential pricing is an efficient way to pay for R&D (Dynamic
Efficiency) \
Higher income countries should contribute more to R&D than
low income countries (Ramsey Pricing)
3. Equity
Pricing related to income is equitable, by most criteria
Importation undermines differential pricing => bad public
policy
Conclusions
Drug importation in the US will yield small savings for US
consumers
But loss of access for foreign consumers
Lower industry revenues => less R&D
Affordability of drugs in US should be addressed by insurance
with smart benefit design, not importation that undermines
differential pricing