Transcript Ch3 PPT

The Socialist Era, 1949-1978:
Big Push Industrialization
and Policy Instability
The Chinese Economy :
Transitions and Growth
By B. Naughton, Ch 3
1
2
參考書籍

吳敬璉《當代中國經濟改革：探索中國經濟順利轉
型的秘密》
Ch 1 改革問題的提出
Ch 2 中國大陸改革戰略的演變

蔡昉、林毅夫《中國經濟：透析全球最大經濟體，
掌握大陸市場經營契機》
Ch 1 地理條件、自然資源與人口
Ch 2 勞動力資源及其配置
3
地區劃分
胡煥庸提出：璦琿-騰沖人口地理分界線
東南地區人口密集（土地佔43%，人口佔94%）
西北地區人口稀少（土地佔57%，人口佔6%）
 31省、自治區、直轄市：
東部：北京、天津、河北、遼寧、上海、江蘇、浙
江、福建、山東、廣東、海南。
中部：山西、吉林、黑龍江、安徽、江西、河南、湖
北、湖南。
西部：內蒙古、廣西、重慶、四川、貴州、雲南、西
藏、陝西、甘肅、青海、寧夏、新疆。

4
人口簡述
 總人口：1,321,290,000
(2007年年末)
 2005年7月已超過13億人
 佔世界人口20% (1950s佔30%)
 1979年正式實施一胎化
 人口金字塔接近橄欖形
（勞動年齡人口比重大）
5
Ch3: Outline
1. Big push development strategy
2. Command economic system in China
3. Policy Stability
4. Legacies of the socialist period
6
1. Big push development strategy
Big push development strategy：
國家在經濟上扮演積極的介入角色。
 以重工業優先發展 (hevey-industry-priority) ，
忽略自身勞動力豐富的比較優勢。
 Fig 3.1: Investment as a share of GDP:
30-40%,其中多於80%在重工業。

7
蔡、林
Ch2:改革前的勞動就業制度
改革以前的中國經濟體制模式是重工業優先發展，為維持重工業
優先發展，相對應勞動力配置與就業體制的特點與後果：
(1) 重工業資本密集度高，吸納勞動力就業能力弱，城鄉勞動力佔有
資源嚴重不均等。
(2) 發展重工業不符合比較優勢，壓低城鎮職工低工資水平。國有企
業是唯一就業場所，工資統一，抹平具有不同人力資本稟賦的職
工之間的報酬。維持低物價，輔以住房、醫療、教育、幼托等福
利。
(3) 為維持城鎮低物價，農產品採統購統銷政策，壟斷農產品流通。
(4) 保障城鎮勞動力的全面就業，城鎮職工福利受惠者人數需受限，
因此實行城鄉勞動力市場的分割，農村實行人民公社體制，1958
年起進而實施戶籍制度，以阻斷人口和勞動力資源在城鄉間自由
流動。勞動力的產業轉移則由勞動、人事部門計畫調配，自發性
的勞動市場不存在。

8
Table 3.1 Two constrasting
industrialization strategies
Basic strategy: hevey-industry-priority
 Saving done by Govt and state-owned enterprises
 Investment decision: Govt
 Source of demand growth: domestic industries
and govt investment projects
 Household income: slow growing
 Cordination by plan
 Openness to world: low

9
2. Command economy
 由政府直接分配資源，無市場力量存在。
 Fundamental
characteristics:
(1) Govt owned all large factories and
transportation and communciation enterprises. In
the countryside, agricultural collectives took
over ownership of the land and management of
the farm economy.
10
Command economy:
Fundamental characteristics
(2) Planners issued commands that assigned
production targets to firms and directly allocated
resources and goods among different producers.
Prices lost their significance as the primary
signal that directed resource allocation. Finances
were used to audit and monitor performance, not
to drive investment decisions.
11
Command economy:
Fundamental characteristics
Material balance planning (物資平衡計畫) was the main
technique used to run the economy.
Planners simply assigned “quantities” and ignored “prices.”
(3) While the govt neglected the micro allocation role of
prices, it controlled the price system and set relative
prices to channel resources into govt hands and into Big
Push industrialization.
毛澤東「三年超英、十年超美」號召
12
Big Push industrialization
In 1953, the govt established compulsory procurement
of grain 穀物強制收購 from farmers. Farmers are
forced to meet procurement quotas at low fixed prices.
 Factory products were expensive and farm products
were cheap.

價格剪刀差（台灣的肥料換穀）
Wages are kept low and stable.
 Labor mobility was virtually nonexistent.

13
Big Push industrialization
The govt imposed strict controls over labor, especially
on labor movement and on remuneration. Migration to
urban area was tightly restricted.
 Employment in state enterprises stayed in a given
enterprise for life, sometimes passing jobs on to their
children.
 The state-owned industrial enterprises were extremely
profitable (not efficient). Their surpluses mad up the
main source of govt revenue, used to mobilize the
resources for Big Push industralization.

14
Command economy:
Fundamental characteristics
(4) The gov’t and communist party reinforced their
control of the economy through a hierarchical
personnel system, in which the communist party
controlled managerial career paths, and thus the
ultimate incentive structure.
15
Command economy:
Fundamental characteristics
Control over financial flows and credit was also
exerted from the top, especially through a state
monoply banking system (monobank):
The financial system was “passive.”
 The Household could decide how to allocate its
budget.
 The typical state-owned enterprise had very little
authority. Small firms were more important in
China’s industrial structure than in Soviet Union.

16
Command economy:
Fundamental characteristics
 China’s
system was less centralized, especially
after financial decentralization in the 1970s
（財政包幹制）, local govt had substantial
leeway in making economic development
decisions.
 Ideological and social control was especially
tight.
17
3. Policy Stability




Shifts in economic policy often came with sharp political
conflict.
Fig 3.2 Growth of Investment: 5 cycles of political and
economic mobilization.
5 successive waves of rapid investment growth(*): leap
forward: Each leap forward corresponds with a period of
political mobilization and institutional transformation.
Typically, each leap was followed by a phase of
retrenchment, consolidation, and slower investment
growth. 「一放就亂、一管就死」的循環。
18
Sub-periods
(1). 1949-1952：Economic recovery
*(2). 1953 and 1956：The twin peaks of the first fiveyear plan
(3). 1956-1957：Retrenchment
“The Hundred Flowers”百花齊放、百家爭鳴
*(4). 1958-1960：The Great Leap Forward大躍進
(5). 1961-1963：Retrenchment: Crisis and
Readjustment
19
Sub-periods
*(6). 1964-1966：Launch of the third front:
A new expansion hijacked by radicalism.
(7). 1967-1969：Retrenchment:
The Cultural Revolution
*(8). The Maoist Model: a New Leap in 1970.
(9). 1972-1976：Retrenchment:
Consolidation and Drift
*(10). 1978: The Leap Outward and the end of Maoism.
(11) A final point: the Third Plenum and the beginning of
economic reform
20
(1). Economic recovery: 1949-1952






Wartime damage to industry and agriculture had been substatial, and
hyperinflation was raging .
Korean War in 1950, and then a trade boycott againist China.
Tight control of the budget and money supply brough inflation under control
by the end of 1950. Industry and agriculture were both rehabitilitated fairly
smoothly.
In the country, the party pushed through a redical land reform. Land was still
owned privately by households, but ownership of land was largely equalized.
In urban area the new govt took over many factories. The govt’s own
investment was focused on the Northeast heavy industries, which was cruital
to the Big Push development strategy.
By the end of 1952, economic recovery and rehabilitation had become a
resounding success. The time had come to launch socialist industralization
nationwide.
21
(2). Twin peaks of the first five-year plan:
1953 and 1956










The first Five-Year Plan: 1953-1957
The Soviet Big Push strategy and the command economy were copied
wholesale.
1952土地改革、韓戰結束，開始向社會主義的急速過渡：消滅資產階級
消滅資本主義工商業。
1953: a monopoly compulsory agriculture procurement was adopted. Virtually
all these projects were built in inland regions or in the Northeast. The Soviet
Union provided massive training and technical assistance across broad.
1954-55: inflation threated  moderate
1955-56: “High Tide of Socialism”– the transformation to public ownership
was abruptly pushed through.
All peasants joined agricultural collectives.
Private factories and shops were turned into collectives or “joint public-private”
factories.
Private ownership was virtually extinguished.
1956: the first year that China operated a fully socialist economy.
22
(3). Retrenchment:
The Hundred Flowers of 1956-1957
Agriculture output stagnated.
 Call for open political discussion, a movement labeled
the “Hundred Flowers”孫治方、顧淮提出市場取向改革。
 Suggest a more moderate and market oriented path.
 But Mao Zedong suddenly attacked liberal critics and
sent 800,000 intellectuals to labor camps, and then
turned it in a dramatically new and ominous direction.

23
(4). The Great Leap Forward:
1958-1960.
The Great Leap Forward (GLP):大躍進
---The most dramatic, peculiar, and utlimately tragic period in the
history of the PRC. The largest famine of the 20th century.
(1)毛澤東「大躍進」兩項基本內容：「以糧為綱、全面發展」
「以鋼為綱、帶動一切」訂定不切實際的高指標。
A “walking on two legs” technology policy: backward steel mills.
大煉鋼鐵中興建「小土群」和「小洋群」冶煉設施。
(2) 1958- Communes (人民公社) were established in the
countryside. A large scale combination of governmental and
economic functions. 採取「公共食堂」、「五包」、「十包」
（包吃、穿、治病、死葬、結婚、教、住、烤火費、理髮、
看戲看電影）等「各取所需」。

24
The Great Leap Forward:1958-1960
(3) Material incentives and monetary rewards were
rejected. Free markets in the countryside were shut
down.
經濟效率大幅下降、只有邀功請賞的浮誇數據，毛
澤東還擔心糧食多了怎麼辦，提出「敞開肚皮吃
飯」、「休耕制」。
(4) Decentralized decision making
吳敬璉 Ch 2行政性分權「體制下放」：向各級政府
放權讓利。各級政府爭奪資源大戰，工農業生產秩
序一片混亂。
25
The Great Leap Forward:1958-1960
A simple intensification of the Big Push strategy:
Resources (labor and land) were transformed from agriculture to
industry. And more procurement of grain.
 But most of output was unusable junk and local food shortages
emerged.
A new Anti-Rightist campaign: 彭德懷
 Catastrope in 1961-62: Relatively poor weather in 1960 exacerbated
the food crisis. Full-blown famine in rural area, and most severe in
inland provinces. Cumulative excess mortality reached 11% of the
population of Sichuan.
 1958年末後果開始浮現：生產下降、大批工商企業虧損、生活必
需品不足，經濟陷入嚴重困難。1959年「廬山會議」毛澤東從糾
左轉向反右，造成經濟上繼續「躍進」 ，和第二次「共產風」 ，
使經濟危機更深化。1958-61全國普遍發生飢荒，鄉鎮地區廣泛出
現因營養不良的浮腫病，農村地區因飢荒死亡人數以千萬計。
26
 電影“活著”

(5). Retrenchment: Crisis and
Readjustment,1961-1963.
The communes were dramatically restructured, to place
more responsibility for agricultural production on
smaller groups of households.
 To concentrate production in a smaller number of
relatively efficient plants.
 大躍進中招之則來的3000萬農村工，揮之則去全部
退回農村。城市工業進行「關、停、併、轉」的調
整。
 Draft plan for industrial base in coastal regions, but not
realized.

27
(6). Launch of the third front: A new
expansion hijacked by radicalism,1964-1966.
Mao pushed for the construction of the “Third Front”
「第三陣線」 : a massive construction program
focused on inland provinces.
 工業轉移到偏遠地區，特別是大西部，政策如今被
視作環境大災難。
 Construction of factories and railroad lines in China’s
southwest provinces, particularly Sichuan and Guizhou.

28
(7). Retrenchment:The Cultural Revolution,
1967-1969.
In August 1966, Mao launched “Cultural Revolution”
 Leftist political period: 1966-1976
 Political disruption (Red Guard): 1967-1969
 From an economic standpoint, the Cultural Revolution
was not a particular important event. The focus of
economic construction continued to be the Third Front.
 But the relationship with Soviet Union had continued to
deteriorate.

29
(8). The Maoist Model:
a New Leap in 1970.
A new leap forward focused on the Third Front
 Made to develop rural and urban industry simultaneously: No massive
diversion of resources from agriculture, but investment surged and
consumption was restrained as all efforts went to industrial construction.
 Maoist Model have 5 variant elements from Soviet system:
(1)Pervasive militarization of the economy: priority to national defense-related
investment.
(2) Rural industries were encouraged, particularly the “Five small industries”
(3) Relative autarky was practiced to be self-sufficiency.
(4) Absence of material incentives (bonuses or piece rates). Few markets of any
kind for farmers and no markets for grain.
(5) Market-driven labor mobility virtually ceased. Migration and Urbanization
halted.

30
(9). Retrenchment: Consolidation and Drift,
1972-1976.







Too many non-productive projects
Pressure on food supply
1971整肅林彪
1972: Nixon’s visit
Zhou Enlai (周恩來) took the lead in introducing a new, more
moderate course: less investment or shift to the coastal area.
Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) were back to the power in 1974 but
ejected from the power in 1976. Political struggles prevented a
thorough reorientation of Chinese policy.
The deadlock was finally broken by the death of Mao in Sep
1976. The Gang of Four (四人幫) was sent to prison.
31
(10). The Leap Outward:
1978 and the end of Maoism
Hua Guofeng staked his prestige on a massive
investment push, framed as a 10-year plan for the 19751985.
 Infeasible and the entire leap-forward strategy collapsed.
 The Dec 1978 “Third Plenum” of the 11th Central
Committee (11屆三中全會) initiated a new era: the
return of Deng Xiaoping with the contemporary period
economic reform.

32
4. Legacies of the socialist period
 The
legacy of political instability
 The shortcomings of the development
strategy
 Human capital base
33
The legacy of political instability




無一貫政策，造成經濟不穩定與政策循環。
A system that set all the strategic and systemic settings to
maximize the flow of resources into industrialization.
It ran into fundamental problem: the inability of agriculture to
rapidly generate adequate food surpluses, combined with the
weak capacity of the system to generate productive employment
for its abundant labor.
The policy of contracting farm output to households, which was
the critical reform breakthrough in the early 1980s, acutally had
its roots in Anhui Province in 1962-1963.
34
The shortcomings of
the development strategy
(1) Consumption was neglected: shortage of basic
consumer goods.
Pricing policy was against consumption.
Urban-rural differential was significant. Growth in
services (retail sector) was neglected: little quality
improvement and few new products introduced.
 From 1955 until 1980s ration coupons were
required for the purchase of grain and cotton cloth.
35
The shortcomings of
the development strategy
2. Because most industry was capital intensive and
services were neglected, new labor requirements were
modest and employment creation was relatively low.
Underemployment, particular in rural areas, remained a
serious problem.
3. By concentrating on capital- and technology- intensive
heavy industries, China ignored to exploit laborintensive consumer goods industries in whish it had
comparative advantages. The economic return was
often low and the industrial growth rate showed a
tendency to decelerate.
36
Human capital base
The investment in basic human capital, basic health and
primary education, was a positive appraisal.
 Even through the Cultural Revuluntion shut down the
university system for years, primary education spread
significantly during the same period, and illiteracy
declined rapidly. Strong entry-level health care
institutions in the countryside were built up during the
same period.
 Basic industrial skills were widespread in the
population.

37
參考：吳敬璉《當代中國經濟改革》
Ch 1 改革問題的提出


1945毛澤東：拿資本主義的某種發展去替代外國帝國主義和本國封建主
義的壓迫，不但是一個進步，而且是一個不可避免的過程。
1952土地改革、韓戰結束，開始向社會主義的急速過渡：消滅資產階級
消滅資本主義工商業。批評劉少奇右傾。
1952-55:不到三年完成了集中計畫經濟體制。
 1953擴大國有制，私人（工商業）所有制改為集體所有或國有制（全行
業公司合營）。
 1955組織中國農村「社會主義高潮」廢除農民家庭農場制度（個體農民
消失），實施合作化，發動「併大社」，1958年實施人民公社。
38
吳敬璉
Ch 1 經濟改革問題的提出
1950年代中期計畫經濟體制剛在中國建立，就遭到
眾多批評：
 1956-57：「百花齊放、百家爭鳴」
孫治方、顧淮提出市場取向改革。
 陳雲：計畫生產為主、自由市場為輔。
 1958第一次經濟改革：向下級政府和企業下放權力：
「行政性分權」 。

39
吳敬璉
Ch 2 中國大陸改革戰略的演變
1. 行政性分權：1958-1978 (Naughton: Ch3)
2. 增量改革：1979-1993 (Naughton: Ch4)
3. 整體推進：1994至今(Naughton: Ch4)
40
吳敬璉 Ch 2
行政性分權：1958-1978
1958年經濟管理體制改革的重點：
向各級政府放權讓利（不願向企業和職工放權讓利）
---體制改革被定義為「體制下放」 。
 1957年9月發動「大躍進」，為躍進運動準備體制基礎，把
部份權力自中央政府下放給地方行政機關：
計畫權、企業管轄權、資源分配權、基礎建設項目審批權、
投資和信貸管理權（投資包幹制度）、財政權和稅收權（中
央與地方收入分成）、勞動管理權。
 也採取一些向企業放權讓利措施。

41
「體制下放」造成的經濟混亂及其救治





毛澤東「三年超英、十年超美」號召，各級政府爆發各自為政、自成體
系的各地區、各部門、各單位爭奪資源大戰，工農業生產秩序一片混亂。
1958年末後果開始浮現：生產下降、大批工商企業虧損、生活必需品不
足，經濟陷入嚴重困難。
1959年「廬山會議」毛澤東從糾左轉向反右，造成經濟上繼續「躍進」 ，
和第二次「共產風」 ，使經濟危機更深化。1958-61全國普遍發生飢荒，
鄉鎮地區廣泛出現因營養不良的浮腫病，農村地區因飢荒死亡人數以千
萬計。
1960年陳雲掛帥改革，收回下放權力，1963年大體得到恢復。
社會主義只能採取行政命令配置資源，類似1958年「體制下放」改革重
演多次，1971年周恩來主持的「批林整風」和鄧小平主持的「全面
整頓」都進行了經濟管理體制的重新集中化。

「體制下放」造成混亂與隨後重新集中，形成「一放就亂、一管就死」
的循環。
42
吳敬璉：對「體制下放」的經濟分析
1. 分權的計畫經濟是比集權的計畫經濟還要差的計畫
經濟。
2. 唯一出路是進行市場改革取向。
3. 行政性分權在短期有調動下級政府積極性的作用，
但會損害政令統一、促成地方保護主義。1980年
代中期，地區間互相封鎖、分割市場、對本地企
業實行保護主義，已形成中國統一市場形成的重
大障礙。
（如：上海、武漢兩地互徵收轎車附加許可費和銷售稅，來保
護本地生產者）
43