Transcript Small Questions

Sociology’s three big questions
and
THREE SMALL DUTCH QUESTIONS
Wout Ultee
Interuniversity Center for Sociology (ICS) at
Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
Presentation at the
Danish Institute for Social Research
Copenhagen, Denmark
December 11-12, 2003
1
THE FIRST SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
LEAVING CHURCH
2
IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY
DUTCH SOCIETY CONSISTED
NOT SO MUCH OF CLASSES LAYERED
FROM TOP TO BOTTOM
BUT OF RELIGIOUS PILLARS
RISING UP NEXT TO EACH OTHER
THOSE PILLARS SHAKE SINCE THE 1960S
WHY?
3
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF
SCIENCE
4
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF
SCIENCE
RISING
GENERAL
LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
5
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF
SCIENCE
RISING
GENERAL
LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
RELIGIONS
WITH FEWER
MAGICAL
MEANS OF
SALVATION
6
NEW QUESTIONS ON RATIONALIZATION
RATIONALIZATION
RISE OF
SCIENCE
RISING
GENERAL
LEVEL OF
EDUCATION
RELIGIONS
WITH FEWER
MAGICAL
MEANS OF
SALVATION
LEAVING
CHURCH
7
PERCENTAGES FROM THE DUTCH CENSUS AND
FROM SURVEYS
CATH LIBPROT ORTHOPROT REST NONE
1930
34
37
8
5
14
1947
36
34
9
4
17
1960
38
31
9
4
19
1971
39
25
9
3
24
1983
36
19
8
5
32
1990
33
17
8
5
38
1997
32
15
7
6
39
8
PUZZLING FINDING:
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE
PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS IN THE
NETHERLANDS ROSE A BIT
BETWEEN 1960 AND 1971,
WHEREAS ‘EVERYBODY’ KNOWS
THAT PRIESTS AND LAITY LEFT THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THRONGS?
9
TIME-SERIES OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA ARE
MISLEADING ABOUT INDIVIDUAL CHANGE
FOR CLOSED POPULATIONS, THEY ONLY TELL
ABOUT NET CHANGES
THEY ARE PARTICULARY MISLEADING IF
COHORT CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE
IN THE NETHERLANDS THE CATHOLIC
BIRTH RATE WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT
OF OTHER DENOMINATIONS (INCLUDING NO
DENOMINATION)
10
DUTCH POPULATION BY ABSOLUTE NUMBER 1960-1971,
ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ( * 1000) ACCORDING TO CENSUS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE DATA
CATH LIBPROT ORPROT NONE
CENSUS 1960
4,634
3,240
1,069
2,102
BIRTHS 60-71 +
1,115
587
277
538
DEATHS 60-71 -
387
391
93
136
NET MIGRATION -
49
7
7
6
OTHER LOSSES -
178
354
21
-569
5,274
3,076
1,225
3,079
CENSUS 1971
11
THERE IS NO DUTCH CENSUS ANYMORE
WHAT IS MORE, LOSSES SHOULD BE PINNED DOWN
ON AGE OP PERSONS WITH KNOWN YEAR OF BIRTH
NIJMEGEN-GROUP 1998 3M-MAC DATA SET
RANDOM SAMPLE SURVEY OF DUTCH POPULATION
DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A
MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)?
DID YOU EVER CONSIDER YOURSELF AS A
MEMBER OF A CHURCH (if yes, which one)?
WHEN DID YOU STOP CONSIDERING
YOURSELF AS A MEMBER OF A CHURCH?
12
IT IS KNOWN FROM CROSSSECTIONAL SURVEYS THAT
PEOPLE WITH MORE
EDUCATION ARE LESS LIKELY
TO BE A CHURCH MEMBER
ARE THEY ALSO MORE
LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
AND IF SO, WHY IS THIS SO?
HYPOTHESES WERE TESTED
WITH PARAMETERS FROM
EVENT-HISTORY MODELS FOR
1998 3M-MAC DUTCH DATA
13
IN SIMPLE MODELS PERSONS WITH MORE
EDUCATION (AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE)
ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
LIBERAL PROTESTANTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO DO
SO THAN CATHOLICS, AND ORTHODOX
PROTESTANTS ARE EVEN LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE
CHURCH
14
GENERAL HYPOTHESIS
BEHAVIOUR DETERMINED BY
MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES
EDUCATION PROVIES A MOTIVE
FOR LEAVING CHURCH
AUXILIARY ASSUMPTIONS
RELIGIOUS MARKETS OFFER
OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEAVING
CHURCH
AND FAMILIES AND STATES LIMIT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOING SO
15
SINCE STARK
THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH
IS BIG IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
THIS NAME IS A MISNOMER
IANNACONE NOW ADVERTISES WITH THE LABEL
MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION
16
THE LABEL MARKET THEORY OF RELIGION IS
TOO BAD SINCE THE U.S. QUESTION IS ABOUT
FREE MARKET VERSUS STATE RELIGION
AND THAT WAY OF FRAMING THE QUESTION
MISPLACES THE EMPHASIS FOR THE NETHERLANDS
SINCE THE QUESTION THERE IS ABOUT
THE FAMILY PLUS THE STATE
VERSUS THE MARKET
IN THE NETHERLANDS, THE STATE FULLY FUNDS NOT
ONLY ITS OWN SECULAR SCHOOLS, BUT ALSO
PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC (AND WHATEVER) SCHOOLS
17
MARKET HYPOTHESES TESTED
AND CORROBORATED;
FINDINGS
IF IN A PROVINCE THE PERCENTAGE OF THE
POPULATION THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO A CHURCH
IS HIGHER,
CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
IF IN A PROVINCE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF
EDUCATION OF THE POPULATION IS HIGHER,
CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
18
FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CORROBORATED
CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO WENT
TO CHURCH MORE FREQUENTLY ARE
LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
CHILDREN OF PARENTS WHO VOTED LEFT-WING,
ARE MORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
CHIILDREN OF PARENTS WITH A HIGHER STANDARD
OF LIVING, ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
19
MORE FAMILY HYPOTHESES TESTED;
SURPRISING FINDING ABOUT CHILDREN
FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED MARRIAGES
CHILDREN FROM RELIGIOUSLY MIXED
MARRIAGES ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE
CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM
RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES
CHILDREN FROM MARRIAGES WITH ONE NONRELIGIOUS PARENT, ARE MORE LIKELY TO
LEAVE CHURCH THAN CHILDREN FROM
RELIGIOUSLY HOMOGAMOUS MARRIAGES
20
FAMILY PLUS STATE HYPOTHESIS
TESTED AND PARTLY CORROBORATED;
FINDINGS:
PERSONS WHO ATTENDED A PROTESTANT
SCHOOL ARE LESS LIKELY TO LEAVE
CHURCH THAN CHILDREN WHO WENT TO A
PUBLIC SCHOOL; PERSONS WHO WENT TO A
CATHOLIC SCHOOL ARE MORE LIKELY TO
DO SO
POSSIBLE EXPLANATION: LOCALLY
PROTESTANT SCHOOLS FACED
MORE COMPETITION FROM
SECULAR SCHOOLS THAN
CATHOLIC SCHOOLS?
21
HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY
OF OPPORTUNITIES AND MOTIVES
TESTED AND CORRBORATED
PERSONS WHO LEFT THEIR PARENTAL HOME AT AN
EARLIER AGE AREMORE LIKELY TO LEAVE CHURCH
IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR
PARENTS WENT TO CHURCH MORE OFTEN, THEN
THEIR CHANCES OF LEAVING CHURCH ARE HIGHER
IF PERSONS LEFT HOME EARLIER AND THEIR
EDUCATION WAS HIGHER, THEN THEIR CHANCES OF
LEAVING CHURCHES ARE HIGHER
22
THE HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE INTERPLAY
OF MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES
ACCOUNTED FOR A LARGE PART OF THE
SIMPLE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND LEAVING CHURCH
23
THE SECOND SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
WORKING WIVES AND
THEIR HUSBANDS
24
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
CONNUBIUM
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION
AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
25
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
CONNUBIUM
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION
AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
26
QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNUBIUM,
(WHO MARRIES WHOM, HOMOGAMY)
INEQUALITY
COHESION
CLOSURE
ISOLATION / TIES
MOBILITY
CONNUBIUM
CONVIVIUM
ARE PART OF THE INEQUALITY QUESTION
AND PART OF THE COHESION QUESTION
27
BOURDIEU ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF
THE REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY, THE
TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGES FROM
ONE GENERATION TO THE NEXT
BOURDIEU FORGOT
IT TAKES A MAN AND A WOMAN
TO MAKE A CHILD
AND BYPASSED THE QUESTION OF
THE RECONSTITUTION OF
INEQUALITY BY WAY OF
CONNUBIUM
28
IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT IN ALL
COUNTRIES OF THE HIGHLY
INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD
COUPLES TEND TO CONSIST OF
MEN AND WOMEN WITH THE
SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION
IT IS LESS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE
LABOUR MARKET POSITION OF
SPOUSES (EMPLOYED, NONEMPLOYED)
TENDS TO BE THE SAME TOO
29
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
30
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
31
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
32
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS
MARRIAGES
33
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS
MARRIAGES
EDUCATIONAL
HOMOGAMY
34
THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON CUNNUBIUM
CONNUBIUM
CROSS-CLASS
MARRIAGES
EDUCATIONAL
HOMOGAMY
(NON)EMPLOYMENT
HOMOGAMY
35
AT FIRST SIGHT IT IS NOT PUZZLING THAT
LABOUR MARKET POSITIONS OF HUSBANDS
AND WIVES TEND TO BE THE SAME
EDUCATION MAKES FOR LESS UNEMPLOYMENT
AND IF SPOUSES HAVE THE SAME LEVEL OF EDUCATION,
THEN (NON)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY IS A
BY-PRODUCT OF EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
36
HOWEVER, ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM
CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES LIKE
NATIONAL LABOR FORCE SURVEYS
MAKES CLEAR THAT
(UN)EMPLOYMENT HOMOGAMY
PERSISTS AFTER CONTROLLING FOR
EDUCATIONAL HOMOGAMY
AND ALSO AFTER CONTROLLING FOR
THE LOCAL LABOUR MARKET
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
37
THAT IS, PROCESSES OF MUTUAL
REINFORCEMENT ARE GOING ON
HYPOTHESES ON PARTNER-EFFECTS
HUSBAND-EFFECTS ARE STRONGER
THAN WIFE-EFFECTS
PARTNER-EDUCATION MAKES FOR
MORE EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY
AND FOR LESS EMPLOYMENT EXIT
PARTNER-INCOME MAKES FOR LESS
EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY AND FOR
MORE EMPLOYMENT EXIT
38
HOW TO STUDY PARTNER EFFECTS?
1993 3M-MAC DUTCH DATA-SET
WITH EDUCATIONAL HISTORY,
(NON)EMPLOYMENT HISTORY AND
INCOME HISTORY
NOTE THAT AN ASSOCIATION IN CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA
BETWEEN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT MAY RESULT
FROM LOW-EDUCATED PERSONS BEING FIRED MORE OFTEN
OR FROM THEM BEING REFUSED A NEW JOB MORE OFTEN,
OR FROM BOTH
39
FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT WITH
HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME AS
TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A
MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
AN EMPLOYED WIFE IS LESS LIKELY TO
EXIT EMPLOYMENT
IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO DO SO
IF HER HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND
INCOME ARE HIGHER
40
FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT EXIT
WITH WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A
TIME- DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN A
MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
AN EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE
LIKELY TO EXIT EMPLOYMENT
IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND LESS LIKELY IF HIS WIFE’S
EDUCATION IS HIGHER
41
FINDINGS ON WIFE’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY
WITH HUSBAND’S EDUCATION AND INCOME AS
TIME - DEPENDENT COVARIATES IN A MULTIVARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
A NON-EMPLOYED WIFE IS MORE LIKELY
TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT
IF HER EDUCATION IS HIGHER
SHE IS MORE LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF HER
HUSBAND’S EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND SHE IS LESS LIKELY TO RE-ENTER IF
HER HUSBAND’S INCOME IS HIGHER
42
FINDINGS ON HUSBAND’S EMPLOYMENT RE-ENTRY WITH
WIFE’S EDUCATION AS A TIME-DEPENDENT COVARIATE IN A
MULTI-VARIATE EVENT-HISTORY ANALYSIS
A NON-EMPLOYED HUSBAND IS MORE
LIKELY TO RE-ENTER EMPLOYMENT
IF HIS EDUCATION IS HIGHER
AND HIS CHANCES OF RE-ENTRY DO NOT
DEPEND UPON THE EDUCATION OF HIS WIFE
43
THE THIRD SMALL DUTCH QUESTION
COMPULSORY
SCHOOLING AND
EDUCATIONAL
MOBILITY
44
DID THE EXTENSION OF STATE
COMPULSORY SCHOOLING
RESULT IN LESS DOWNWARD
EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY?
CHANGES IN THE
NETHERLANDS DURING THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
45
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
46
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
FATHERSON CLASS
MOBILITY
47
ONCE MORE THE PROBLEM OF INEQUALITY
INEQUALITY
CLOSURE
MOBILITY
FATHERSON CLASS
MOBILITY
FATHER-SON
AND FATHERDAUGHTER
EDUCATIONAL
MOBILITY
48
Previous Research on the
Netherlands:
Educational mobility increased
according to:
loglinear
models with
educational distributions fitted with
trend constraints on
uniform association and
diagonal densities
49
Present research: data

Stacked data file from 31 surveys
 21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25
 Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts (1900-1974)
 Father’s education 4 categories (low – high)
 Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories
(low – high)
50
Present research:
hypotheses

Four hypotheses from the field of
stratification
 One from each generation of
stratification studies
51
Zero-generation
non-hypothesis
There is a linear downward trend in
uniform association and diagonal density
52
First-generation
hypothesis
A rising standard of living makes for lower
uniform association and lower diagonal density
53
Second-generation
hypothesis
Raising the age at which compulsory
schooling ends makes for lower uniform
association and diagonal density
54
Third-generation
hypothesis
Raising the age at which compulsory
schooling ends does not alter the
density in the diagonal cell for the
highest level of education
55
Embedding the four hypotheses
in general sociology
How to derive macro hypotheses from
micro hypotheses?
56
First-generation
hypothesis derived
going to school depends upon financial resources
people differ in financial resources
financial resources have increased and they have
become more equally distributed in the course of time
57
Second-generation
hypothesis derived
apart from individual actors there is an all powerful
corporate actor: the state
and the state has raised the age of compulsory schooling
Coleman about corporate actors
58
Third-generation
hypothesis derived
Highly educated parents deploy strategies
compensating for state policies raising the age at
which compulsory schooling ends
Bourdieu about compensatory strategies
Elias about a spiraling process as a competitive outcome
59
Graph 1 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Men
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
1
2
3
4
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
60
Graph 2 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Men
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
61
Graph 3 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Men
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
62
Graph 4 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Men
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
63
Graph 5 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Women
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
1
2
3
4
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
64
Graph 6 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Women
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
65
Graph 7 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Women
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
66
Graph 8 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Women
Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory Schooling
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
cohort specific association
GDP per Capita
1950
1960
1970
linear trend
Age Compulsory Schooling
Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohort
Homogeneous equal scalings for education
67
Testing the third-generation
hypothesis more severely

How do macro variables influence
uniform association and diagonal
densities?
 Uniform association and diagonal
densities derived from odds ratios
 Odds ratios made up from an odds for
moving up and an odds for moving
down
68
Hypotheses about odds

Raising the age at which compulsory schooling
ends, increases the odds for moving up.
 But what does it do to the odds for moving down?
 Few states ever sought to increase the odds for
moving down.
69
Observed Odds: Upward Move from Level 1 to Level 4
intergenerational educational mobility
8
10
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
upward trend
0
2
4
6

1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
1950
1960
1970
dots proportional to sample size
70
Observed Odds: Downward Move from Level 4 to Level 1
intergenerational educational mobility
.8
1
Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974
no trend or a downward trend
0
.2
.4
.6

1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
birth cohort
1950
1960
1970
dots proportional to sample size
71
TO BE CONTINUED
THE LONG-RUN AIM OF THE
EXERCISE IS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE NOTION THAT
THERE EXIST CULTURAL
RESOURCES (NEXT TO
FINANCIAL RESOURCES) IS
SUPERFLUOUS
72
A BONUS COMPARATIVE QUESTION
DOES EMPLOYMENT OF
MIGRANTS DEPEND UPON
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN,
COUNTRY OF DESTINATION
AND SETTING (THE
INTERPLAY OF COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN AND COUNTRY OF
DESTINATION)?
73
DATA FOR 18 HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES IN THE 1990s
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SWEDEN
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
74
DATA ARE FROM THE EUROPEAN
UNION LABOUR FORCE SURVEY
PLUS THE PUBLIC USE SAMPLE
OF THE CENSUS IN AUSTRALIA,
CANADA AND THE USA
AND SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT
SURVEYS IN BELGIUM, GERMANY,
ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND UK
75
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
AGE
DURATION OF STAY
LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY
76
THE DISTINGUISHED ORIGINS
CHINA, ITALY, PHILIPPINES,
POLAND, TURKEY AND 182 OTHERS
NAMES RECODED INTO MEASURES
FOR POLITICAL SUPPRESSION,
AND PREDOMINANCE OF
CHRISTIANITY
77
THE NAMES OF THE DESTINTIONS
WERE RECODED INTO
THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF A
POINT SYSTEM FOR MIGRANTS
AND THE PARTICIPATION OF
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN
GOVERNMENT
78
SETTING VARIABLES WERE
GINI ORIGIN / GINI DESTINATION
GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTINATION
GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE
RELATIVE GROUP SIZE
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF GROUP
79
CONTROL VARIABLES
LABOUR FORCE ACTIVITY OF
NATIVES
NATURE OF SURVEY
(MIGRANTS OVERSAMPLED)
80
TO BE EXPLAINED ARE
INSIDE – OUTSIDE LABOUR FORCE AND
EMPLOYMENT – UNEMPLOYMENT
BOTH FOR MALES AND FEMALES
APPLIED WERE
MULTI-LEVEL
MODELS
81
RESULTS AFTER THE CONTROLS
THERE ARE THE
EXPECTED
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS
OF AGE, DURATION
OF STAY, EDUCATION,
LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY
82
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN COUNTRY
OF DESTINATION MAKES FOR MORE
ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT,
POLITICAL SUPPRESSION IN
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR LESS AND
CHRISTINITY THERE FOR MORE
ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT
83
SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE SETTING
EFFECTS WERE FOUND FOR
GDP ORIGIN / GDP DESTIONATION
AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE
84
MERGING NATIONAL FILES
INTO A SUPER-FILE HELPS
ANSWERING QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE ECONOMIC
POSITION OF MIGRANTS
85
this presensation liberally quoted from studies I undertook in
the course of the years with several Dutch scholars:
WIL ARTS
WIM JANSEN
WIM BERNASCO
JAN LAMMERS
JOS DESSENS
RUUD LUIJKX
JAAP DRONKERS
ARIANA NEED
HENK FLAP
WILMA SMEENK
HARRY GANZEBOOM
JEROEN SMITS
NAN-DIRK DE GRAAF
FRANK VAN TUBERGEN
PAUL DE GRAAF
WILLFRED UUNK
JOHN HENDRICKX
MAARTEN WOLBERS86
EXACT REFERENCES CAN BE FOUND ON MY WEB SITE,
WHERE MY PRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN POSTED TOO
http://www.socsci.kun.nl/maw/sociologie/ultee
Email: [email protected]
87