Transcript From *Star Wars* to the War on Terror

American Public Opinion Polarization
on
Defense Policy
Donald M. Gooch




Public Perception: Red vs. Blue
Academic Debate: Social Issues
Polarization Puzzle: Myth or Madness?
Gaps in the literature:



Non-social issues (i.e. economic, foreign policy, etc.)
Empirical definition of polarization
Determinants of polarization

Define Polarization





Theoretically
Empirically
Examine the Polarization of Public Opinion on
Defense Spending
Assess the relationship between Polarization
on Defense Spending Public Opinion and
trends in actual Defense Spending
Assess other factors that could cause
polarization in the distribution of opinion on
Defense Spending





Polarization is not divisiveness or “angry” politics.
Polarization is not an increase in “heated rhetoric.”
Polarization as a concept is the relative distribution
of opinion in the American electorate along either
single or multiple issue dimensions.
A “polarized” opinion distribution is the
distribution of opinion relative to a “theoretical
maximum” (DiMaggio, 1996).
Polarization as a process refers to the change in the
distribution of opinion relative to this maximum or
a prior distribution of opinion over some specified
period of time.
Figure 2.1: Polarized Elites? Are Elites Located Distant from Median Voter and the Mass of Voters?
If the distribution of
voters is normal and
centrist, then the party
elites have moved away
from voters
If the distribution of
voters is bimodal, then
the party elites are
located with their
respective constituents
XMED
Republican Party Elites
Democratic Party Elites
Fiorina’s Normal Distribution of voter ideal points
Bi-Modal Distribution of voter ideal points
Median Voter Position
POLICY

Variation (Standard Deviation)

Central Tendency (Means)

Bimodality (Kurtosis)
TABLE 3.1: ILLUSTRATION OF POLARIZATION NOT REFLECTED IN AVERAGE POSITIONS IN A HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION
TIME PERIOD 1
TIME PERIOD 2
TIME PERIOD 3
Distribution of Pop.
Distribution of Pop.
Distribution of Pop.
Population (n=8)
Opinion on X Issue
Opinion on X Issue
Opinion on X issue
Citizen 1
0
0
5
Citizen 2
0
1
5
Citizen 3
0
2
5
Citizen 4
0
5
5
Citizen 5
10
5
5
Citizen 6
10
8
5
Citizen 7
10
9
5
Citizen 8
10
10
5
MEAN
STAND. DEV.
5.000
5.345
5.000
3.780
5.000
0.000
Source: Compiled by the Author.

The Cold War

“Let me share with you a vision of the future which
offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to
counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with
measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very
strengths in technology that spawned our great
industrial base and that have given us the quality of
life we enjoy today…a shield that could protect us
from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family
from the rain“
 - Ronald Reagan, 1983

The New World Order

Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world
in which there is the very real prospect of a new world
order… A world where the United Nations, freed from
cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision
of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for
human rights find a home among all nations.
 - George H. W. Bush, 1991

"I know…that the United States cannot--indeed, we
should not--be the world's policeman, and I know this is a
time, with the Cold War over, that so many Americans
are reluctant to commit military resources and our
personnel beyond our shores."
 -William J. Clinton, 1994

The War on Terror

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute
an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction,
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.
 - George W. Bush, 2002



Partisan Model. Public opinion polarization on issues is conditioned by
the reactions of the electorate to the partisanship of those in control of
government policy. In particular, partisans of the opposite party are
more likely to polarize in response to the other party in control of the
policy agenda.
Policy Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to the actual
implemented policy and changes in the levels or status of that policy. If,
for example, defense spending increases, then the public polarizes or
depolarizes relative to the change in the status quo and their preferred
level of defense spending.
Events Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to exogenous
shocks to the system, relatively independent of the current policy makers
or their policy prescriptions. These events independently affect the
average issue positions of the public. For example, the September 11th
attacks could produce a significantly higher preferred level of defense
spending.

Actual Defense Spending, % GDP

Average Defense Spending Public Opinion

Bimodality of Defense Spending Public Opinion

Foreign Policy Periods
Equation 7.2: Z-Score for Defense Spending
ZDS =
Where:
= the ith observed value of defense spending for year.
= the ith mean value of defense spending for year.
= the ith standard deviation of defense spending for year.
FIGURE 7.6: BIMODALITY TREND IN MASS OPINION ON DEFENSE SPENDING, 1980-2008
1
Clinton
Administration
0.8
0.6
G.W. Bush’s
‘Axis of Evil’
Speech
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
Reagan’s
‘Star Wars’
Speech
Berlin Wall
Comes Down
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
Reagan’s
‘Evil Empire’
Speech
Bush’s
‘New World Order’
Speech
War in
Iraq
-1
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
DEFENSE KURTOSIS
FIGURE 7.7: DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1980-20031
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Clinton
Administration
Berlin Wall
Comes Down
Defense Spending % GDP
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
September 11th
Attacks
FIGURE 7.10: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) & DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE) IN WAR & PEACE, 1980-2008
3
NEW WORLD
ORDER
COLD WAR
IRAQ WAR
2
Berlin Wall
Comes Down
1
0
Glasnost
Perestroika
-1
Persian Gulf
War
-2
September 11th
Attacks
DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z)
DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT (-Z)
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
-3
FIGURE 7.11: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) ACTUAL DEFENSE SPENDING % GDP (Z-SCORE), PUBLIC OPINION ON
DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE), 1980-2008
3
2
1
Status Quo on
Defense Spending
0
Status Quo on
Defense Spending
-1
-2
-3
0
8
9
1
1
8
9
1
2
8
9
1
3
8
9
1
4
8
9
1
5
8
9
1
6
8
9
1
7
8
9
1
8
8
9
1
9
8
9
1
DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z)
0
9
9
1
1
9
9
1
2
9
9
1
3
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
5
9
9
1
6
9
9
1
DEFENSE MEAN (Z)
7
9
9
1
8
9
9
1
9
9
9
1
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
3
0
0
2
4
0
0
2
5
0
0
2
6
0
0
2
DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT (-Z)
7
0
0
2
8
0
0
2



Defense Spending Public Opinion tracks with
actual defense spending.
Defense Spending Public Opinion is responsive
to presidential administrations.
Defense Spending Public Opinion is
determined by actual Foreign Policy events.

Basic Models:
Defense Spending  Public Opinion Polarization on Defense Spending
 Defense Spending +Party  Public Opinion Polarization on Defense Spending


Full Model


DS + P + Foreign Policy Period  POP on DS
Full Model w/ Interactions:

DS + P + DS*P + FPP*P + FPP*DS  POP on DS
CODING SCHEME FOR FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD & PRESIDENTIAL PARTY VARIABLE
CATEGORIES
VALUE
PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
REPUBLICAN
1
DEMOCRAT
0
FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD
COLD WAR
0
NEW WORLD ORDER
-1
WAR ON TERROR
1
VARIABLES
ADS
PPA
FPP
ADS*FPP
Basic Model
Defense
Defense
Spending (M) Spending (K)
-
23%
+
74%
Basic Model 2
Defense
Defense
Spending (M)
Spending (K)
+
+
47%
-
78%
Full Model
Defense
Defense
Spending (M)
Spending (K)
Full Model w/ Int
Defense
Defense
Spending (M)
Spending (K)
-
+
-
+
-
+
+
67%
+
82%
---
+
---
+
---
---
+
ADS*PPA
PPA*FPP
+
78%
+
85%
TABLE 7.2: DEVIATION MODELS REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS (%GDP) ON DEF. SPENDING PUBLIC OPINION.
Parameter
MODEL:
Intercept
Estimate
(S.E.)
(S.E.)
R2
N
DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN)
0.000
-0.478 ***
.229
29
(0.166)
(0.169)
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS)
* significant at .10 level
** significant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
0.000
(0.859)
0.859 ***
(0.099)
.737
29
TABLE 7.4: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING & PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMIN ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.
MODEL:
DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN)
-1.029
(0.333)
DEFENSE
SPEND
-0.810 ***
(0.173)
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS)
0.435
(0.213)
0.999 ***
(0.111)
* significant at .10 level
** significant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
Intercept
PARTY
1.356 ***
(0.398)
R2
.467
N
29
-0.573 ***
(0.256)
.780
29
TABLE 7.5: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.
MODEL:
Parameter
Standard
Estimate
Error
DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN)
Intercept
-0.357
0.320
Actual Defense Spending
-0.826 ***
0.140
Party of Presidential Administration
0.626 *
0.372
Foreign Policy Period
0.687 ***
0.178
PR > |F|
R2
N
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS)
Intercept
Actual Defense Spending
Party of Presidential Administration
Foreign Policy Period
PR > |F|
R2
N
* significant at .10 level
** significant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
<.0001
.666
29
0.736 ***
0.235
0.992 ***
0.103
-0.899 ***
0.274
0.307 **
0.131
<.0001
.820
29
TABLE 7.6: REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FPP ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION WITH INTERACTIONS
MODEL:
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN)
Intercept
-2.014 ***
0.489
Actual Defense Spending
-1.283 ***
0.506
2.197 ***
0.504
Party of Presidential Administration
Foreign Policy Period
---
---
ADS*PPA
0.606
0.508
ADS*FFP
0.533 **
0.217
FPP*PPA
0.850 ***
0.167
PR > |F|
R2
N
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS)
Intercept
Actual Defense Spending
Party of Presidential Administration
Foreign Policy Period
ADS*PPA
< .0001
.775
29
0.270
0.397
1.218 ***
0.410
-0.484
0.409
---
---
-0.158
0.412
ADS*FFP
0.387 **
0.176
FPP*PPA
0.427 ***
0.135
PR > |F|
R2
N
* significant at .10 level
** significant at .05 level
***significant at .01 level
<.0001
.852
29