Transcript Power Point - The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

TOPIC 7
The Model at Work
(Reference Slides – I may or may not talk about all of this depending
on time and how the conversation in class evolves)
Note: In terms of the details of the models for changing G,
consumer confidence, oil prices, and TFP – it is better to use the
supplemental notes.
To Sum Up: What is an Equilibrium?
SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM: AD = SRAS and IS = LM



The Labor Market need not be in equilibrium
We need not be at the potential level of GDP Y*
If Y<Y* we are in a recession, if Y>Y* the economy could be
overheating
LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM: AD = SRAS = Y* and IS = LM = Y* and Nd = Ns = N*


By definition, the labor market will clear
By definition, we will move to Y*
.
• Reference: Supplemental Notes 9, 10
2
Road Map
•
•
•
•
Recessions may be driven by:

demand shocks (e.g. current recession)

supply shocks (e.g. oil shocks)
P and Y co-move positively
P and Y move in opposite directions
How to get out of a recession?
1. Self-Correcting Mechanism
2. Monetary Policy
3. Fiscal Policy
Brief History of the Fed policy: from output targeting to Taylor Rule
o http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2007/200718/200718pap.pdf
Should the Fed react to asset price bubbles?
3
Example 1: Loss in Consumer Confidence
• Consider a loss in consumer confidence as in 1991 (and in the current recession!)
• Change in expectations about the future can have dramatic effects even if not founded!
• What does a loss of consumer confidence affect?
– Potentially no effect on labor demand:
If A hasn’t really changed (only
perceived change).
– Consumption changes and the AD and IS curves shift
– Some effect on labor supply (income effect): If believe PVLR decreased
• Assumptions we will make for the following example:
1. No income effect on labor supply (labor supply does not move)
2. No actual change in A or Af (from the perspective of firms).
3. Consumers are standard PIH, no liquidity constrained, and non-Ricardian
4
Consumer Confidence: 1978M1 – 2016M9
5
Consumer Confidence: 1978M1 – 2016M9
Low Consumer Confidence
6
Consumer Confidence: 1978M1 – 2016M9
“Irrational Exuberance”??
7
Example 1: Graphical Representation – Decline in
Consumer Confidence (C(.))
Assume we start at Y*
P
SRAS(W0)
P0
AD(C0)
Y*0
r
Y
LM(P0)
IS(C0)
Y*0
Y
8
Example 1: Decline in Consumer Confidence (C(.))
Loss of Consumers’ Confidence (short run)
P
P0
P1
SRAS(W0)
0
x
AD(C0,M0)
C
AD(C1,M0)
Y1
Y
LM(M0,P0)
Y*0
r
LM(M0,P1)
0
x
1
IS(C0)
IS(C1)
Y1
Y*0
Y
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Self-Correcting Mechanism
What would happen in the long-run after a negative shock if there was no policy?
•
A Self-Correcting Mechanism will bring the economy back to the potential Y*
• How? Workers would like to work more, so firms at some point will decrease nominal
wages, so that the labor market goes back to equilibrium!
•
As nominal wages decrease, it is cheaper to produce and the SRAS will shift to the right!
• As wages decrease, prices decrease, the real value of money supply increase and the LM
shifts to the right!
•
As M/P increases, the equilibrium interest rate has to decrease, stimulating I and C!
10
Example 1:
Use Self Correcting Mechanism to Get Back to Y*
Loss of Consumers’ Confidence (self-correcting mechanism back to)
P
P0
P1
P2
SRAS(W0)
SRAS(W1): W1 < W0
0
x
1
Y1
r
2
AD(C0,M0)
AD(C1,M0)
Y
Y*0= Y*2
LM(M0,P0)
LM(M0,P1)
0
x
LM(M0,P2)
1
2
Y1
IS(C0)
IS(C1)
Y*0 = Y*2
Y
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Example 1 (alternate):
Use Monetary Policy To Get Back to Y*
Loss of Consumers’ Confidence (in short run – same as before)
P
P0
P1
SRAS(W0)
0
x
AD(C0,M0)
1
AD(C1,M0)
Y1
Y
LM(M0,P0)
Y*0
r
LM(M0,P1)
0
x
1
IS(C0)
IS(C1)
Y1
Y*0
Y
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Example 1 (alternate):
Use Monetary Policy To Get Back to Y*
Loss of Consumers’ Confidence (have Fed get us back to Y* by increasing M)
P
P0=P2
P1
SRAS(W0)
0
x
AD(C0,M0) = AD(C1,M1)
1
Y1
r
AD(C1,M0)
Y
Y*0= Y*2
LM(M0,P0)
LM(M0,P1)
0
x
LM(M1,P0)
1
2
Y1
IS(C0)
IS(C1)
Y*0 = Y*2
Y
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Fed Policy versus Self-correcting Mechanism
•
The Fed may decide to conduct an expansionary monetary policy (increase
M) to fight the recession
•
Benefit: Prevent deflationary pressures ; speed up recovery
COMPARISON:
1. Real variables go back to the same long run equilibrium (both Fed or selfcorrecting mechanism)
2. BUT prices and nominal wages behave differently: risk of inflation!
3. Fed can increase the speed of adjustment …
14
Example 2: Increase in Oil Prices
• Consider a negative supply shock: an increase in the oil price (as in 1974 and 1979)
• If oil prices increase, firms produce less with same N and K (it is like a decrease in A!)
• What does a permanent increase in oil prices affect?
–
–
–
–
Effect on supply: both SRAS and LRAS (Y*) shifts to the left
Labor demand shifts to the left: MPN decreases
Labor supply shifts a bit to the right (income effect): PVLR is lower
I decreases (MPK lower) and C decreases (PVLR lower): AD and IS shift left
• Assumptions for the following example:
1. No income effect on labor supply (labor supply does not move)
2. Consumers are standard PIH, no liquidity constrained, and non-Ricardian
15
Example 2: Graphical Representation
(we will do this in class)
Responsible (partially) for the 1975 and 1979-1980 recession (OPEC I and II)
P
SRAS(W0, Oil0)
P0
AD
Y
Y*0
r
LM(P0)
IS
Y*0
Y
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Analyzing Demand and Supply Shocks
•
DEMAND SHOCK: unemployment and prices move in opposite directions if
there are no policies!
•
Example: loss in consumer confidence (negative), increase in M (positive)
•
SUPPLY SHOCK: unemployment and prices to move in the same direction if
there are no policies!
•
Example: oil shocks (negative) or increase in productivity (positive)
•
A negative supply shock is BAD!!!
STAGFLATION: increase in inflation + increase in unemployment
17
Reviewing The Data
From our first lecture:
1.
Some falls in GDP were associated with no increase in prices.
2.
Some falls in GDP were associated with large increase in prices.
Do our theories reconcile these facts?
– YES! Demand shocks explain (1)
– YES! Supply shocks explain (2)
Study Note: You should really understand the difference between demand
shocks (things that primarily affect AD) and supply shocks (things that
primarily affect AS) on the economy - their implications are much
different!
18
A Look at U.S. Inflation: 1970M1 – 2016M9
19
Reinterpreting the Business Cycle Data 1970-2016
1970 recession:
Inflation increasing at start of recession!
Supply shock: oil price + productivity + misguided Fed policy
1981 recession:
Dramatic decrease in inflation at start of recession
Demand shock: Volker (Fed starts to worry about inflation!)
1990 recession:
Little increase in inflation/but low level of inflation
Demand shock: fall in consumer confidence
Rapid growth in mid 1990s: No inflation
Positive Supply shock: IT revolution
2001 recession:
No inflation
Demand shock: firms overconfidence: inventory adjustment
2008 recession:
Inflation first up and then down. Supply: oil shock
Demand: credit crunch, confidence loss, drop in wealth
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The Fed in the ’70s: push inflation
• After the negative supply shocks in the mid/late ’70s, the Fed adopted a
policy mainly based on fighting the recession by increasing M
• The Fed believed that the potential level of output was still Y0*
• The Fed tried to bring Y back to the wrong potential, Y0* instead of Y1*!
• This pushed prices up and then, through the adjustment of the labor market,
wages even higher!
• This pushed the SRAS in, pushing inflation up! Say back to Y1*.
•
But the Fed wants to go to Y0*, so increases M again…
• Amplifying mechanism: if workers expect high inflation they will try to get
higher nominal wages!
21
New Fed view: Inflation Targeting
• Late ’70s: inflation was out of control also because of bad Fed policies!
• Friedman: the Fed has to control inflation! Reset, expected inflation rates.
•
1982: Volker Recession
• Cold turkey money cut to reduce inflation and change individuals’
perception of Fed policy (not try to stabilize output at the expense of inflation!)
• Cut inflation from double digits to 4%!
• However, this caused a short deep recession (Fed decreased M and shifted
AD and IS dramatically to the left such that inflation expectations fell).
22
On unemployment and inflation…
•
In the short run, the SRAS tells us that if output is high, or unemployment low,
typically prices are high!
•
If Y<Y*, or u>u*, output stabilization policies tend to generate inflation…
•
If Y=Y*, or u=u*, but P high, inflation control policies generate a recession…
•
Phillips curve = relationship between inflation and unemployment: one-toone relationship with the AS!
•
Phillips discovered a negative correlation between unemployment rate and
inflation rate across time in the 1950s (Phillips curve);
•
Old Keynesians in the 1960s: there is a stable, exploitable trade-off between
the rate inflation and unemployment. Maybe can permanently lower
unemployment at the cost of permanently higher inflation!
23
Friedman: evidence killed it!
•
Milton Friedman in 1968: the long run Phillips Curve is vertical at u*.
•
This is because the LRAS is vertical at Y*!
•
•
•
•
Vindicating evidence: the Phillips Curve broke down after 1970, as the Fed was
trying to push Y above Y*
Over time in the U.S., higher money growth just lead to more inflation and no
higher real GDP
Across countries, higher money growth just leads to more inflation and no
higher real GDP.
If anything, in the long run, real GDP appears to be hindered by high levels of
inflation!
24
To sum up …

In the SHORT RUN there is a tradeoff between the unemployment rate and
inflation rate changes:
•
Inflation tends to fall in years following U > U*.
The cost of a permanently lower inflation rate is a
temporarily higher unemployment rate.
•
Inflation tends to rise in years following U < U*.
The cost of temporarily lowering the unemployment rate
is a permanently higher inflation rate.

In the LONG RUN the unemployment rate is fixed at u* and any monetary
policy will have only effects on the inflation rate
25
Goals of the Fed
•
The Fed wants to set r so that
–
–
•
inflation target:  =  * (2% inflation).
The Fed wants to raise r when
–
–
•
output/unemployment target: Y = Y* or U = U*
Y > Y*, U < U*, N > N*
 >*
The Fed wants to lower r when the opposite conditions hold.
26
Rules vs. Discretion
•
Should a central bank have a specific policy rule?
•
Rules may be explicit and mandated by law
–
•
Rules may be implicit and known by all economic agents
–
•
Money should grow at 4% per year (Friedman preferred rule).
The Fed will target the inflation rate at 2-4% per year and natural
unemployment rate.
The Fed uses a discretionary rule. The members of the bank vote on a
monetary policy at each meeting. Policy is not dictated by some explicit rule.
27
Benefits of Rules
If the Central Bank is committed to keep inflation under control…
•
•
•
•
Inflation temptation is powerless!
Creates a more stable economic situation: individuals and firms can
anticipate the central bank actions. No surprises!
Discretion may help the Central Bank to be more flexible …
BUT allows the Bank to think too much - the economy is so complex that
Fed policy can have delayed impact and is usually initiated too late!
o Central Bank actions can often be ‘destabilizing’ (Freidman, Lucas:
both prefer simple rules)
28
The Taylor Rule
John Taylor of Stanford University said that the Fed’s behavior under Greenspan (19872006) and Bernanke (today) is well-described by:
Taylor Rule: i = r* + πe + aπ*(πe - π*) + ay *(Y - Y*)/Y*
with aπ + ay =1. In particular Taylor assumes aπ = ay =.5.
i = the nominal federal funds rate
r* = the real fed funds rate target (this is the r consistent with Y=Y*)
πe = expected inflation
π* = target inflation
Y = real GDP
Y* = potential real GDP
(Y-Y*)/Y* is the output gap or GDP gap. A positive output gap means overheating and
potentially rising inflation (labor markets will demand higher wages).
Taylor used r* = 2% and π* = 2%. The Taylor Rule explains about 2/3 of quarterly
variation in the fed funds rate since 1987.
29
Notes on the Taylor Rule
• This does NOT mean that Bernanke uses this ‘rule’, it is just that Fed behavior
looks very similar to this rule.
• Furthermore, Fed tends to smooth interest rates relative to the Taylor Rule:
i = .6*(last quarter’s actual i) + .4*(Taylor Rule i)
• Studies have found that other G7 Central Banks (e.g., the Bundesbank) have
also followed versions of a smoothed Taylor Rule
• Read the speeches by Bernanke or Greenspan to see the Fed’s take on such
subject (on my teaching site)
• The Fed has become quicker to act to gain credibility…in this recession, the
Fed has acted preemptively!
30
Fed Timing
Recession Begins
First Fed nominal rate cut
December 1969
11 months later
November 1973
13 months later
July 1981
4 months later
July 1990
5 months later
December 2007
4 months earlier!
31
Hawks and Doves
•
How does the Fed balance price stability ( =  *) and full employment (U =
U*) when they conflict? (when  >  * and U > U* at the same time)
•
Hawks put more weight on  * (and have lower values for it):
–
–
U.K., Canada, New Zealand.
Bundesbank before; European Central Bank now!
•
Doves put more weight on staying near U* (and have higher  *)
•
Greenspan and Bernanke tend to put the same “weight” on each
•
Current Recession: unusual shock to y
(Liquidity Trap),
for almost any weight, i goes to 0!
32
Did the Fed do something wrong?
•
During the expansion after 2001, the economy did not seem to overheat,
output was around potential Y* and inflation was stable
•
However, at the same time, housing prices were rising steadily ….
•
Greenspan did not do anything, according to the Taylor Rule: i should not
change if output and inflation are around target.
•
Should the Fed have reacted to the housing bubble? Should the Taylor
rule include asset prices (S)?
i = r* + πe + aπ*(πe - π*) + ay *(Y - Y*)/Y* + aS *(S - S*)
•
Bernanke and Gertler answer: NO!
33
Other Limitations of Policy (Monetary and Fiscal)
Some caveats about Monetary and Fiscal Policy:
NOT AN EXACT SCIENCE –
o
o
o
o
How much stimulus is necessary to move the economy to Y*
Where is Y*?
Policy Creates uncertainty as economic agents try to anticipate
Fed/Government rules
Long and variable lags!
Some argue avoid using no stabilization policy (just a simple Quantity Theory
representation) or suggest using very simple rules.
Some research says that every sustained period of large inflation is due to the
Fed!
34
When Does Policy Not Work?
•Vertical IS Curve: What if firms don’t respond to interest rate changes (they think
future economic conditions are going to be bad or interest rates will be lower in the
future or the banking system has problems making loans)?
•Monetary Policy Becomes Dampened.
•Central bank becomes powerless because nominal rates are already so low!
(Deflationary periods).
•Keynesian Liquidity Trap: Japan today
35
A Look At Liquidity Traps
Krugman’s “Babysitting the Economy” (See: #2 from Reading List)
Nominal Interest Rates Are Bounded At Zero!
People believe that there will be deflation in the future!
Real Interest Rates are Large and Positive.
Fed Would like to cut rates (to stimulate Y (shift out AD) which will put upward pressure on
prices), but nominal rates cannot go below zero!
The Fed is helpless. How do they stimulate when they cannot cut rates?
This describes the situation in Japan during the late 1990s. Japan has experienced deflation
AND nominal rates are close to zero. Central Bank of Japan is helpless.
36
Demand Side Effects of Deflation
Deflation can make borrowers - either consumers or firms, worse off.
As we saw early in the course, unexpected inflation makes borrowers better off. They
expected to pay a certain real rate and when inflation is higher and the nominal rate is fixed,
the real rate they pay is lower (in terms of lost purchasing power).
Key Insight: If the economy experiences unexpected deflation, the opposite happens-borrowers are paying more in terms of lost real purchasing power when there is unexpected
deflation. Borrowers, both consumers and firms, will essentially be poorer. (Even though,
there is another side of the market - somebody’s got to lend to them, this could still have large
effects on consumption and investment). This demand side effect of deflation is called ‘debt
overhang’ or ‘debt deflation’. <<Note, even the government is paying higher than expected
real rates on their debt>>.
Even if the deflation is expected, large transfers can occur from borrowers to lenders because
nominal interest rates are bounded by zero (shuts down lending channels).
37
Change in Prices versus Inflation
Labor Markets are forward looking! Change in prices become dynamic.
Two Examples:
• Supply Pull Inflation: Accommodating supply shocks can lead to persistent
inflation (the Fed in the mid and late 70s). Workers see this, and adjust.
• Demand Push Inflation: Policy makers try to permanently keep the economy
above its potential level. Wages keep adjusting.
38
Housing Bubble
•
Bernanke and Gertler argument:
•
•
•
the Fed should care about asset prices only if they have macro effects
if the housing bubble had macro effects you should see output or
inflation react (standard demand shock)
BUT then standard Taylor rule would suffice
•
However, it seems that the housing bubble had macro impact when it burst!
•
It could be that asset price bubbles are problematic because agents tend to
leverage too much and then a crisis can occur if the bubble bursts
•
Is monetary policy the right tool to control a bubble? Can you even do it?
39
Worries about Deflation
• Deflation can make borrowers - either consumers or firms, worse off.
• As we saw early in the course, unexpected inflation makes borrowers better
off. They expected to pay a certain real rate and when inflation is higher and the
nominal rate is fixed, the real rate they pay is lower
• If the economy experiences unexpected deflation, the opposite happens:
borrowers are paying more in terms of real purchasing power.
• Borrowers, both consumers and firms, will essentially be poorer (even though,
there is another side of the market, this could have large effects on C and I)
• This demand side effect of deflation is called ‘debt overhang’ or ‘debt
deflation’. <<Even the government pays higher than expected rates on their debt>>
40
What Should We Have Learned?
•
In the short run, output is away from its potential Y*
•
Shocks to the aggregate demand make P and U move in opposite directions
•
Shocks to the aggregate supply make P and U move in the same direction
•
In the short run there is an inflation-unemployment trade-off!
•
Stabilization policies to fight recessions can increase inflation and inflationtargeting policies can increase unemployment
•
In the ’70s the Fed overdid stabilization policies, generating inflation spiral
•
After that clear need for the Fed to keep inflation under control!
•
Taylor rule seems to describe well the Fed policy since the ’80s
41