Coping with the Crisis: Policies to protect workers
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Transcript Coping with the Crisis: Policies to protect workers
COPING WITH CRISES:
POLICIES TO PROTECT WORKERS
The World Bank
PRMPR
LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS
During 2009, the economic crisis turned into a jobs
crisis
In the developed countries, pool of unemployed estimated to
have increased by 15 million in 2009 (ILO, 2010)
In developing countries: primarily lower earnings because
of lower hours worked, and a probable shift towards low
productivity, low pay jobs and more underemployment
(Khanna, Newhouse and Paci, 2010)
Labor is the main channel through which shocks are
transmitted to households
Especially in poorer countries
Especially for the poor in those countries
2
WHY POLICY INTERVENTIONS?
Short-term responses to crisis may have
important long term effects (Paci, Revenga and Rijkers,
2010)
Households coping responses
Persistence (low pay traps and labor market scarring)
Firm creation and destruction
Affecting the most vulnerable
Optimal responses differ depending on channel
e.g. unemployment insurance (reductions in
employment) vs. cash transfers (reductions in wages)
Existing policies and institutions have an impact
on adjustment patterns (Paci, Khanna and Newhouse,
2010)
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WHY POLICY INTERVENTIONS?
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL EFFECTS:
DAMAGE TO HUMAN AND PHYSICAL CAPITAL
Household coping responses can have negative
long-term effects on welfare:
Take children out of school
Spend less on health and nutrition
Sell productive assets e.g. livestock
Loss of jobs destroy firm-worker human capital
gains
Unemployment persistence
Low pay traps and labor market scarring
4
WHY POLICY INTERVENTIONS?
FIRM LEVEL EFFECTS:
CREATIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE DESTRUCTION?
Schumpeterian creative destruction – resources
reallocate from inefficient to more efficient firms
But assumes perfect markets
Risk of excessive cleansing
Efficient production arrangements are more
vulnerable to credit constraints
Innovative firms also more vulnerable
Jobs created in crisis are less productive, pay less,
last less
Risk of excess churning
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WHY POLICY INTERVENTIONS?
EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
A crisis that started in the OECD countries but
quickly spread to developing countries because of
Lower exports demand
Credit crunch
Lower remittances and less new migration
Within developing countries, past crises suggest
rapid contagion from the directly hit sectors to
other parts of the economy and ultimately
affecting the most vulnerable
Mexico: rural farm workers saw a 17% income
reduction
Indonesia: earnings fell by 40% across the board
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WHAT HISTORY TELLS US ABOUT POLICY
Custom tailor policy responses. These should
depend on
Type of shock and adjustment mechanisms
Fiscal space
Capacity and political economy constraints
Comprehensive policy packages beat piecemeal
interventions
Synergy and complimentarity
Easier to expand existing programs than start
from scratch during crisis
“on the run” policies have weak targeting
difficulties associated with implementing incentive
compatible packages from scratch
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CONSTRAINTS AND TRADE-OFFS
Policy constraints
Labor market information lacking
Fiscal space limited
Institutional and political economy constraints
Policy trade-offs
Short-term assistance vs. long-term structural reform
Financial sector, labor market regulation
Support those most immediately affected or protect
the most vulnerable and chronically poor
Rapid contagion of crisis
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TAXONOMY
Protecting what/whom?
Protecting
Firms/Employ
ment
Directing
support or
acting on
labor market
imperfections
?
Providing
direct support
Rectifying
market
imperfections
Payroll
tax
holidays,
wage
subsidies,
reduction in hours
worked,
selfemployment
assistance
Alleviate
credit
constraints,
reform
labor
market regulation
Protecting
Workers/Earnings
and
Earnings
potential
Social
protection
policies:
unemployment
insurance,
public
works
programs,
cash transfers
Training programs,
conditional
cash
transfers (CCTs), job
search assistance
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POLICY RESPONSES
1. Protect employment directly
Tax holidays, wage subsidies
Constraint: high costs per job created and political economy
constraints (opposition from unions)
Self-employment assistance programs
more promising when targeted at particular groups such as women
and older individuals
2. Addressing labor market imperfections in the credit
market
Avoiding a credit crunch
Microfinance schemes
In Indonesia, micro-finance institutions (MFIs) appear to have
been very resilient to the East Asian crisis
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POLICY RESPONSES
3. Social protection of those hit by the crisis
Extended unemployment benefits
Public works
requires time and substantial fiscal and institutional capacity to implement,
monitor and target
most common response to the current crisis (ILO, 2009)
Targeted cash transfers
IF labor market adjustments take place through earnings rather than the
quantity of jobs THEN: relatively low administrative costs and do not
distort prices.
In contrast, they cannot rely on self-selection, and political pressures may
potentially make a scaling back of temporary programs impossible once the
crisis is over.
4. Promoting human capital accumulation and employability
Conditional cash transfers
But where cash transfer programs are not in place, conditional schemes
take longer to implement than unconditional schemes; poorly designed
schemes can exclude the most vulnerable
Training programs
Can help enhance worker productivity
PREPARE, PRESERVE, EXPAND POLICIES
THAT WORK
Luck favors the prepared
Designing, implementing and evaluating sound
policies ex ante:
Prudent fiscal management -> resources for response
Reliable labor market information systems -> make
informed choices, monitor and evaluate
Flexible labor market regulations
Well functioning credit markets
SOUND SAFETY NET SYSTEMS -> can be expanded
Hopefully NOW we’ll see: increased global effort to
put in place efficient policy systems and high
frequency data to monitor labor market outcomes.
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WHAT HAPPENED IN
THIS CRISIS?
LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS IN THE
CURRENT CRISIS
Higher
impact on earnings than on job
creation
Increasing underemployment and shift
into low productivity sectors which offer
less work and lower earnings
Lower earnings in ‘formal’ and higher paying
sectors
Increased labor supply in informal, lower
paying sectors -> lowering earnings further
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IN SELECTED MICS HOURS WORKED AND
EARNINGS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE
Number of
countries
Change in total wage bill
2 Year Pre
Crisis
Average
Postcrisis
Difference
between Post
and Pre Crisis
28
9.4
1.1
-8.3
Percent change in employment
41
2.0
-0.1
-2.1
Percent change in earnings
.
31
6.7
1.3
-5.4
Percent change in wages
14
5.1
5.8
0.6
Percent change in hours.
14
1.4
-4.3
-5.6
Contribution to change in wage
bill growth
% due to
employment
% due to
earnings
26%
Contribution to change in
earnings growth
%due to real
wages
74%
%due to hours
-20%
20%
60%
100%
THE FALL IN PRODUCTIVITY MAY BE THE RESULT
OF A SECTORAL SHIFT IN EMPLOYMENT
al
e
g
ur
in
m
an
uf
ac
t
ct
io
n
try
co
ns
tru
&
In
du
s
re
ta
il
ty
iv
i
w
ho
le
s
du
ct
pr
o
tra
de
ic
e
se
rv
rv
se
iv
ity
hi
gh
s
ic
es
es
ic
Se
rv
pr
od
uc
t
lo
w
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
-6
-4
-2
0
Change in growth
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1
2
-.5
Growth in employment and change in growth of employment across sectors
sectors
Crisis YoY Growth
Change in growth
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
How to protect earnings (not only jobs)?
Preliminary evidence suggests that effective
policy packages should include earnings and
income support.
Responses
in European OECD countries
include
partial unemployment insurance,
expanding cash transfers to poor workers
temporary wage subsidies.
These may be priority interventions in those
countries where hours and earnings
adjustments dominated.