Transcript The Implications of the Recent Economic Crisis on Fertility in Greece

7th Demographic Conference of "Young Demographers "
Faculty of Science, Charles University in Prague
11 th and 12 th February 2016,
Prague, Czech Republic
Pavlos Baltas, Postdoctoral researcher
Department of Statistics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Byron Kotzamanis, Professor
Laboratory of Demographic and Social Analyses, University of Thessaly, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Anastasia Kostaki, Professor
Department of Statistics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Prague, 11 February 2016
Introduction (1)
A systematic review of past economic recessions occurred in developed countries
confirms that social and economic crises often have serious effects on fertility
while, beyond national differentiations, these effects have certain characteristics,
e.g.
 a weak effect on cohort fertility;
 a postponement on the timing of first birth, closely related to a late marriage or
union;
 a close relationship between unemployment and age-specific fertility.
The sensitivity of fertility behavior to economic crises is less marked in countries
with longstanding family policies and strong social security systems.
The recent social and economic recession in Greece took place under different
social conditions than many recessions in the past. More women than ever are
participating in the labor market, most couples use reliable contraception that
enables them to postpone childbearing, while social security and health costs are
burdened from the rapidly expanding numbers of elderly.
All these factors can affect reproductive decisions and potentially aggravate the
negative effects of the recession on fertility.
This work, using the latest available official data of Greece, provides an
investigation of the impact of the current economic crisis on fertility levels, as well
as the evolution of these levels through time.
Introduction (2)
 From the theoretical point of view, the issue that fertility 'reacts' positively in
times of economic growth and “negative” in economic recessions has been
discussed for over two centuries.
 The literature mentions that fertility follows the cycles of the economy, while
in times of economic downturn and uncertainty in the labor market, people are
led to postpone childbearing, to adjust their family planning.
 The literature suggests that economic downturns have an effect in changing
fertility calendar, i.e. postponement of births, which results in reducing the
total fertility rate and the number of children.
 In contrast of the above theory some authors claim that the acquisition of a
child in economic good times increases the "opportunity cost" for a woman.
Introduction (3)
However the current economic crisis is characterized by significant
differences compared with the previous ones.
• First of all, it is the most intense and longest crisis than all the previous
ones, while the current conditions are significantly different in
comparison to crises of previous decades (in 20s or even in 70s).
• The welfare state is much more developed than it was for 50 or 100
years ago,
• The percentage of women in the labor market and their educational
level are significantly higher than in the past decades,
• contraception tends to be generalized, and
• The mean age of the first childbearing is much higher than before.
Data and Methods
The empirical data, provided by the Observatoire de Démographique Européenne (ODE/INED)
and the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT).
These are,




Number of births by age of mother,
Number of births by age of mother and order of birth,
Mean population sizes of women in reproductive ages by age,
GDP and Unemployment Rate.
Although we have long time series for our analysis, we should note that the period from the
onset of the crisis and beyond is relatively short (five years only, 2010-2014), while not yet
available by ELSTAT data on births of 2015. This does not facilitate the investigation of potential
impacts of the crisis on fertility.
Using the empirical data as described above, simple and complex classical demographic indicators
are calculated, those are,
 Fertility rates by age of mother,
 Fertility rates by age of mother and order of birth,
 Total annual fertility rate (synchronic analysis),
 Mean age of mothers of childbearing (for all births and by order).
Economic Indicators: GDP and Unemployment Rate
Figure 1: Greece, GDP (2001-2014)
250000
240000
230000
220000
210000
190000
180000
170000
160000
150000
140000
130000
120000
110000
Year
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
100000
2001
GDP (in millions euro)
200000
Economic Indicators: GDP and Unemployment Rate
Figure 2: Greece, Unemployment Rate (2001-2014)
Figure 3: Greece, Women Unemployment Rate by agegroup (2001-2014)
90.0
90
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-44
Total
Men
80.0
80
Women
Women 15-44
70.0
70
60
50.0
50
Year
Year
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
0
2009
0.0
2008
10
2007
10.0
2006
20
2005
20.0
2004
30
2003
30.0
2002
40
2001
40.0
2001
(%)
(%)
60.0
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 4: Greece, 1951-2014, Births (absolute numbers) and Crude Fertility Rate (0/00)
170000
24.0
165000
23.0
160000
22.0
155000
21.0
150000
20.0
Births
145000
17.0
CFR
130000
16.0
125000
15.0
120000
14.0
115000
13.0
110000
12.0
105000
11.0
100000
10.0
95000
9.0
90000
8.0
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
Births
135000
18.0
Year
CFR (00/0)
140000
19.0
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 5: Greece, 1956-2014, Total Fertility rate versus mean age of childbearing (all births)
32
2014
31
2009
30
Age
29
1956
1999
28
27
1987
26
1981
25
24
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0
Children/woman
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 6: Greece. Age-Specific Fertility Rates (1960-2013)
200.0
180.0
160.0
140.0
100.0
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
180.0
160.0
140.0
120.0
00/0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
60.0
40.0
40.0
20.0
20.0
0.0
0.0
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
80.0
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
00/0
200.0
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Year
Year
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 7: Greece, completed fertility in successive ages for chosen years.
2.75
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2014
2.50
2.25
2.00
Children/woman
1.75
1.50
1.25
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Age
Source : ODE, traitement : auteur
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 8 : Greece. Distribution of births by order (1960-2014).
100%
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
2014
2011
2008
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
0%
The evolution of period fertility in Greece
Figure 9: Greece, Total fertility rates differentiated by
birth order (1960-2014)
Figure 10: Greece, Mean Age of Mother by birth order
(1960-2014)
1.10
1.00
35.0
34.0
1st order
33.0
0.90
32.0
31.0
0.80
3rd order
30.0
0.70
0.60
2nd order
0.50
Age
29.0
28.0
2nd order
27.0
26.0
0.40
All orders
25.0
3rd order
0.30
24.0
1st order
23.0
0.20
22.0
4th + order
21.0
0.00
20.0
Year
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
0.10
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
Children x order/woman
4th + order
Year
The Implications of the Recent Economic Crisis on Fertility
Figure 11: Greece, TFR 2004-2014 and GDP (one year
before)
2.0
Figure 12: Greece, TFR 2004-2014 and Unemployment
Rate of women 15-44 (one year before)
250000
75
240000
GDP
1.9
2.0
70
1.9
230000
1.8
65
220000
1.8
60
210000
55
1.7
1.7
TFR
180000
1.5
170000
1.4
160000
150000
1.3
TFR
45
40
1.5
35
1.4
30
25
1.3
140000
1.2
130000
20
1.2
15
120000
1.1
10
1.1
110000
Year
Year
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
0
2005
1.0
2004
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
100000
2005
1.0
5
(%)
Unemployment
Rate (Women
15-44)
1.6
TFR
190000
2004
TFR
1.6
50
GDP (in millions euro)
200000
The Implications of the Recent Economic Crisis on Fertility
Figure 13: Greece , Total, difference (in%) between the age specific fertility rates in 2009 compared to 2004 and 2014.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%
-60%
-70%
-80%
-90%
-100%
Figure 14: Greece , 1st order ,difference (in%) between the age specific fertility rates in 2009 compared to 2004 and 2014.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%
-60%
-70%
-80%
-90%
-100%
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Δ2004-2009
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Δ2009-2014
Figure 15: Greece , 2nd order, , difference (in%) between the
age -specific fertility rates in 2009 compared to 2004 and 2014.
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
-10.0%
-20.0%
-30.0%
-40.0%
-50.0%
-60.0%
-70.0%
-80.0%
-90.0%
-100.0%
Δ2004-2009
Δ2009-2014
Figure 16: Greece , 3nd + order, , difference (in%) between the age
-specific fertility rates in 2009 compared to 2004 and 2014.
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
-10.0%
-20.0%
-30.0%
-40.0%
-50.0%
-60.0%
-70.0%
-80.0%
-90.0%
-100.0%
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Δ2004-2009
Δ2009-2014
15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Δ2004-2009
Δ2009-2014
The Implications of the Recent Economic Crisis on Fertility
Figure 17: Greece. Evolution of Age-Specific Fertility Rates 2009=100 (2004-2014)
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
30
2008
29
2007
28
2006
27
2005
26
2004
25
Figure 18: Greece. Evolution of 1st order Age-Specific Fertility Rates 2009=100 (2004-2014)
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
30
2008
29
2007
28
2006
27
2005
26
2004
25
The Implications of the Recent Economic Crisis on Fertility
Figure 19: Greece. Evolution of 2nd order Age-Specific Fertility Rates 2009=100 (2004-2014)
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
30
2008
29
2007
28
2006
27
2005
26
2004
25
Figure 20: Greece. Evolution of 3rd + order Age-Specific Fertility Rates 2009=100 (2004-2014)
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
2004
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
30
2008
29
2007
28
2006
27
2005
26
2004
25
The impact of economic crisis to fertility, first conclusions
 The available data indicate that the recent economic crisis is affecting in priority women
under 30 years old (extreme high unemployment) regardless of birth order. However, this
crisis coincided with a previous trend of increasing the mean age at the childbearing, started
in the mid ‘80s. This trend has resulted at 2014 to an extremely high average age at
childbearing (30 years for the first child). Therefore, any continued postponement of
childbearing to higher ages during the years of crisis (probable on the basis of international
experience) will possibly lead to unavoidable fall of fertility of younger generations (i.e.
those who were born after 1985) as, even if women of those generations aim to acquire one,
two, three or more children, a part of them will not succeed it (any replacement is
problematic as child conception is a function of age and decrease rapidly after 30 years old).
 Therefore, in a country like Greece, where childbearing occurs almost entirely within
marriage with both partners employed, it was important for most women of these
generations to have a relatively stable work before their first marriage and their first child
acquisition. Given the extreme high unemployment rate in the age groups 20-34, this fact is
not valid for a part of this population group, resulting to the collapse of the first marriage
rates in recent years. As a direct result, we observe a further increase both of the percentage
of unmarried women in younger generations and also of the average age at the first
marriage. Both of them (the second in combination with the postponement of marital
births) will inevitably lead to a further decline of the total fertility rate of younger
generations of women (those born after 1985).
In Conclusion
 According to the international bibliography, in countries with strong social policies and
especially policies supporting family and childbearing the negative effects of the crisis are
diminished. In Greece, at the beginning of the crisis, the welfare state was not
particularly developed and, at the same time, it was extremely inefficient. In this context,
family and childbearing aid measures were very limited, focused almost exclusively on
the large families (>3 children) and in some cases these measures were inefficient.
 The recent measures (those adapted in the first half of the current decade) were usually
horizontal, while available policies resources shrank significantly while their
rehabilitation is not expected in the near future.
 All these facts does not allow some optimism concerning the reversal of fertility decline
of younger generations which, as expected, that they are going to spend a significant part
of their reproductive life in crisis conditions.
Pavlos Baltas, Postdoctoral researcher
Department of Statistics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Byron Kotzamanis, Professor
Laboratory of Demographic and Social Analyses, University of Thessaly, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Anastasia Kostaki, Professor
Department of Statistics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece.
Email: [email protected]
Prague, 11 February 2016