Transcript rent seeking - Website Staff UI

RENT SEEKING & PUBLIC CHOICE
 TRANSFORMASI
KONSEP EKONOMI
KLASIK KE DALAM EKONOMI
POLITIK
 3 KONSEP INCOME (PENDAPATAN):
Profits (Keuntungan)
Wages (Upah)
Rents (Sewa)
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A. PROFITS
 RISK
CONTENT
 REAL GROWTH OF WEALTH IN THE
ECONOMY
 REPRESENTS ENTREPRENEURSHIP
 INNOVATION AND EFFICIENCY
 THE MOST DIFFICULTS
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B. WAGES
 REPRESENT
NO RISK
 FEE OF SERVICES
 PROPORTIONAL TO PRODUCTIVITY
 CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN PERSONS
 VALUE OF PERSONS
 HUMAN CAPITAL
 TALENTS, ETC
 EASIER THAN PROFITS
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C. RENTS
 MONEY
FOR USE OF CAPITAL
ASSETS
 EASIEST KIND OF INCOME
 NO EFFORTS LIKE INCOME OF
PROFITS WITH RISK OR WAGES WITH
INVOLVEMENT OF PERSONS AND
TALENTS
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THREE LEVEL OF CONCEPT
 EASIEST
INCOME IS PREFFERRED
 RENTS IS AN EASIEST INCOME
 RENT IS PREFFERED RATHER THAN
WAGES AND PROFITS
 THIS HUMAN MOTIVES IS CALLED
RENT SEEKING MOTIVES
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TRANSFORMATION OF MEANING &
CONCEPT IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
 MOTIVASI
JALAN PINTAS TERGAMPANG
DALAM BISNIS NORMAL DENGAN
INCOME MELALUI RENTE (SEWA) TIDAK
BERMAKNA NEGATIF SEPANJANG ASET
YANG DISEWAKAN MERUPAKAN HAK
MILIKNYA YANG SAH
 NOTHING WRONG DENGAN USAHA
MELALUI TIGA JENIS PENDAPATAN
TERSEBUT
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MASALAH MUNCUL KETIKA MOTIF
INI PINDAH KE DOMAIN PUBLIK
 MOTIOVASI
RENT SEEKING DILAKUKAN
DENGAN MENGGUNAKAN KEKUATAN
KEKUASAAN UNTUK KELOMPOK
KEPENTINGAN KECIL
 KEKUASAAN BUKAN ASET MILIK
SEKELOMPOK KECIL TERSEBUT TETAPI
MILIK PUBLIK ATAU RAKYAT BANYAK
 KEKUASAAN DIPAKAI MENYIMPANG
KARENA DIPAKAI OLEH SEGELINTIR
ORANG
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KESIMPULAN
PENGUSAHA ATAU SEGELINTIR ORANG
YANG MENGGUNAKAN KEKUASAAN
(ASET PUBLIK) UNTUK DIRINYA SECARA
INDIVIDU DISEBUT RENT SEEKERS
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RENT SEEKERS:
 SEEK
SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE
GOVERNMENT IN POWER
 AT THE EXPENSE OF ALL OTHERS
COMMUNITY
 A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF THE
SOCIETY
 COSTING TAXPAYERS IN LARGE
AMOUNT OF PUBLIC MONEY
 POLITICAL PARASITISM
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RENT SEEKING:
 THE
EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES
 FOR UNCOMPENSATED TRANSFER OF
GOODS AND SERVICES
 FROM ONOTHER PERSON OR PERSONS
TO ONE’S SELF AS THE RESULTS OF
AFAVOURABLE DECISION ON SOME
PUBLIC POLICY
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EXAMPLE OF RENT SEEKING
BEHAVIOUR:
 INCLUDE ALL
OF VARIOUS WAYS BY
WHICH INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS
LOBBY THE GOVERNMENT FOR TAXING,
SPENDING AND REGULATORY POLICIES
 CONFER FINANCIAL BENEFITS OR
OTHER SPECIAL ADVANTAGES
 AT THE EXPENSE OF THE TAXPAYERS
OR OF CONSUMERS OR OF OTHER
GROUPS POF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHICH
THE BENEFICIARIES MAY BE IN
COMPETITION
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RENT SEEKING DAN KASUS
 An
autocrat who seeks to maximize
personal financial return favors an
inefficiently large public sector and distorts
other public sector priorities more than does
an autocrat who seeks to maximize national
income.
 One explanation for Africa's failure to
develop is the weakness of its public
institutions: rent-seeking and corruption at
the top of government.
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 A kleptocrat
whose decision
variable is the level of government
intervention in the economy will
select an excessive level of
intervention, in which national
income is less than optimal.
 Like all monopolists, the kleptocrat
seeks productive efficiency except
where inefficiency creates extra
rents.
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 Facing
a kleptocrat, citizens prefer
a smaller than optimal-sized
government but get one that is too
big.
 A kleptocrat may need to permit
lower-level officials to share in
corrupt gains thus introducing
additional costs. He or she will then
favor a smaller government than if
subordinates could be perfectly
controlled.
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Rent:
profits from passive
ownership (as opposed to
profits from productive activity).
The classic example of an input
in fixed supply is land
economists often think of rents
as the returns to the ownership
of land.
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Legal
entitlements in fixed
supply can also provide `rents’
to those who own these
entitlements investing in
lobbying to acquire scarce legal
entitlements is called rentseeking.
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Rent-seeking:
if the govt creates
rents by establishing scarce legal
entitlements, then private parties
will invest resources in seeking the
rents from these entitlements.
Manufacturers lobby government
for tariffs to exclude imports.
Professional groups (lawyers,
physicians) lobby for licensing
restrictions.
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Airlines
lobby the government
to regulate the industry to
reduce competition.
Workers lobby the government
for immigration restrictions.
Universities lobby for research
funding.
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Until
1974, the term 'rent
seeking' did not exist.
Kreuger's paper focused
attention on third world mixed
economies in which government
intervention was extensive.
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According
to her estimates, such
losses amounted in 1964 to 7.3
per cent of the national income of
India and to a staggering 15 per
cent of the national income of
Turkey.
Numbers of this magnitude were
sufficient to turn the heads of
even the most left-leaning of the
world's development economists.
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