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Transcript Congressional Budget Office
A Potential Influenza Pandemic:
Possible Macroeconomic Effects and
Policy Issues
Julie Somers
Congressional Budget Office
Prepared for the Ninth Annual
Pipeline Project Conference,
July 15, 2006
CBO’s Mission
Budget projections under current laws and
policies
Analysis of the President’s budgetary
proposals
Estimates of budgetary costs of legislation
approved by Congressional committees
Reports that analyze issues that are
significant for the budget
CBO’s Work on Pandemic
Influenza
December 2005 with update May 2006
Requested by Senate Majority Leader, Frist
Update requested by Frist and Senator
Gregg, Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee
Pandemic Influenza
Background
Influenza pandemics - caused by new flu
viruses that have adapted to efficient
human to human transmission
Three pandemics occurred in previous
century
“Spanish Influenza” in 1918
“Asian Influenza” in 1957
“Hong Kong Influenza” in 1968
Avian Influenza Background
Avian Influenza – large group of different
flu viruses that primarily affects birds
H5N1 strain has pandemic potential
In 1997, H5N1 jumped to humans – 18
cases; 6 deaths
Since then, H5N1 has spread among birds
throughout Asia, to Europe and Africa (229
human cases and 131 deaths)
Possible Macroeconomic
Effects: Assumptions
Severe Scenario
Comparable to pandemic of 1918
Attack Rate = 30%; Case Fatality Rate = 2.5%
90 million infected; 2 million deaths
Mild Scenario
Comparable to pandemics of 1957 and 1968
Attack Rate = 25%; Case Fatality Rate = ~0.1%
75 million infected; 100,000 deaths
Possible Macroeconomic
Effects: Results
Severe Scenario – GDP declines 5%, relative to
baseline
Supply-Side: workers who take ill miss 3 weeks of
work.
Demand-Side: 80% falloff in entertainment industries
(for one quarter); 10% for retail trade and
manufacturing
Mild Scenario – GDP declines 1.5%, relative to
baseline
Supply-Side: workers who take ill miss ~4 days of
work
Demand-Side: 20% falloff in entertainment industries;
3% for retail trade and manufacturing
Options to Prevent or Mitigate
Flu Pandemic
Options fall into Four Broad Categories
Detecting and controlling viruses at their
source,
Developing and using vaccines,
Developing and using antiviral drugs and other
medications, and
Building the capacity of the health care system
(facilities, equipment, and people).
Options to Prevent or Mitigate
Flu Pandemic
Risk of Inaction and Risk of Action
Risk of Inaction: Pandemic occurs that could
have been prevented or mitigated
Risk of Action: Cost, diverts resources from
other priorities, and could be damaging by
itself
Challenges in the Flu Vaccine
Market
Vaccine Supply
Vaccine Demand
Vaccine Allocation
Challenges in the Flu Vaccine
Market
Vaccine Supply
Declining numbers of manufacturers,
shortages, slow pace of technical improvement
Egg-based production process requires 6-9
month
Production cannot be scaled up quickly
Challenges in the Flu Vaccine
Market
Vaccine Supply
Vaccines are biologics (made from living cells),
production process vulnerable to
contamination
High regulatory costs
Vaccine non storable – flu strains change from
year to year
Challenges in the Flu Vaccine
Market
Vaccine Demand
Hard to predict from year to year
Smaller than socially optimal
Vaccine Allocation
Priority Groups
CDC rather than market incentives allocates flu
vaccine in times of shortage discouraging the
establishment of reserve capacity
Threat of a pandemic
exacerbates challenges
U.S. demand will jump from ~86 million to
~300 million
Current U.S. domestic production capacity
could produce pandemic vaccine for only 8
million people, less than 3% of the
population.
Production lag → vaccinating survivors
Administration’s plan
Requested $7.1 billion (FY06 – FY08)
Congress provided
$3.8 billion for FY2006
$2.3 billion for FY2007
?? FY2008
Administration’s plan
Stockpile prepandemic vaccines adequate
to immunize 20 million persons against
influenza strains that present a pandemic
threat (Address production lag)
Develop domestic production capacity by
2011 sufficient to provide vaccine for the
entire U.S. population within 6 months of a
pandemic outbreak (Address capacity
limitation)
Stockpiling Prepandemic
Vaccines
8 million doses purchased for $240 million
Not a perfect match, hope for crossprotection
Increase manufacturers’ experience
Rate of stockpiling slow
Shelf life 12 to 18 months – restocked or
used
Develop Domestic Production
Capacity
Egg-Based Vaccine Production
Goal - 20% of future capacity
Would have to increase sevenfold
$531 million of FY2006 funds
Develop Domestic Production
Capacity
Cell-Based Vaccine Production
Goal – 80% of future capacity
Readily scalable
~$1 billion of FY2006 funds
Future funding to companies successful in first
round
Develop Domestic Production
Capacity
Cell-Based Vaccine Production
May take much longer to develop
May delay adoption of better techniques
Adjuvants
DNA-based vaccines
Requires on-going government support
Universal vaccination against seasonal flu
Stockpiles of prepandemic vaccine
Provide seasonal flu vaccine to developing countries
Congressional Budget Office
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