Transcript Political Economy of Corporate Governance of Chinese Firms

Political Economy of Corporate
Governance of Chinese Firms
Chenggang Xu
University of Hong Kong and SNU-WCU
11/06/2012
The Party and China’s Institution
• The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the
backbone of China’s institution
– The Party controls all levels of governments through
personel control
– The legislator, People’s Congress (PC) at all levels of
government, is controlled by the Party
– Appointments of all important posts are controlled by the
Party (e.g., CEOs of banks and large SOEs etc.)
– Local governments controls economic resource
– Party’s role in corporate governance of SOEs
– Party’s role in corporate governance of private firms
The Party and the private sector
• Private sector takes off since the late 1990s, and soon
becomes the driving force of China’s growth
– The output share of private sector in national GDP has increased
from 2.5% in1998 to 47% in 2009
– Silent large scale privatization since 1997
– During 1998-2005 private sector’s output was increased by 20 fold
• However, the Party is losing control over private firms
– In 1995 only 7% of private firms have party organization
– the private sector’s share of CPC member further declined between
1997 and 2002
– The growth rate of the nationwide CPC members in reserve was
negative in this period! A very serious matter to the party’s future
Dramatic growth of China’s Private Sector
Year
Private Industrial Enterprises
Loans to Private enterprises &Individuals
Gross Output
Loans
% GDP
( mil Yuan)
(mil Yuan)
1998
2082.9
2.5%
1999
3244.6
3.7%
2000
5220.4
5.3%
2001
8760.9
8.1%
2002
12950.9
10.9%
2003
20980.2
15.5%
2004
35141.3
22.0%
2005
47778.2
25.7%
2006
67239.8
30.9%
2007
94023.3
35.1%
2008
136340.3
43.1%
2009
162026.2
47.2%
% GDP
471.7
579.1
654.6
918
1058.8
1461.6
2081.6
2180.8
2667.6
3507.7
4221.2
0.57%
0.65%
0.67%
0.85%
0.89%
1.08%
1.30%
1.17%
1.23%
1.31%
1.33%
7117
2.07%
Year
CPC Members
CPC Members in reserve
Total Number (10000)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
5151.7
5279.3
5406.5
5540.7
5703.3
5873.1
6041.7
6187.7
6322.1
6451.7
6574.9
6694.1
6823.2
6960.3
7080.0
7239.1
7415.3
7593.1
7799.5
8026.9
Total Number (10000)
Growth
2.38%
2.48%
2.41%
2.48%
2.93%
2.98%
2.87%
2.42%
2.17%
2.05%
1.91%
1.81%
1.93%
2.01%
1.72%
2.25%
2.43%
2.40%
2.72%
2.92%
177.7
191.7
193.9
203.1
235.8
251.2
253.5
243.2
240.1
232.7
231.2
232.4
241.8
259.0
269.3
286.0
294.7
312.1
Growth
7.87%
1.18%
4.71%
16.11%
6.54%
0.91%
-4.05%
-1.29%
-3.08%
-0.64%
0.50%
4.08%
7.10%
3.97%
6.20%
3.05%
5.88%
Legal/institutional changes on private sector
• As a response, the CPC constitution was amended in 2002
– In year 2000, Jiang Zemin, the Chairman of the CPC, declared that
the CPC should legitimately recruit entrepreneurs at a large scale
– Amendment to CPC Constitution in 2002: entrepreneurs are
recognized as advanced productive force for the first time
• Legal protection of private property rights: Amendment to the PRC
Constitution, 2004
• As a result, 2003 is a turning point for the party to reverse the
declining trend
– Growth rate of CPC members in reserve was increased from -3%
in 2000 and 0.5 in 2002 to 4%
– The private sector’s share of CPC members was increased from
1.7% in 2002 to 3.1% in 2003
– In our sample, the share of party members among entrepreneurs
was increased from 20% in 2000 to 41% in 2006
Some basic questions to be addressed
• The dynamics of the importance of the Party in private
sector
• Given the party is the dominant force in the national
economy,
– Do party-member entrepreneurs enjoy rents associated with their
party-membership capital?
– Associated with the change of the roles of the party in the private
sector, what is the dynamics of rents enjoyed by party-member
private owners?
• What are the implications of political elites’ rents to social
welfare?
– With resource obtained under favorable conditions do they
perform better than others?
A summary of some basic findings
• The party was losing ground in private sector when the sector was at
a jump-start stage; but later regained control in this sector
– From 1995 to 2000, the proportion of entrepreneurs who want to
join the party declined sharply
– The trend was reversed after 2005
• Political rent of party members is negligible when the party is losing
– Firms owned by CPC or PC members do not obtain more
resources than others before 2005
• Associated with the party’s regaining control, political rent becomes
significant
– Firms owned by CPC or PC members obtain significantly more
land and bank loans than others after 2005
• Political rent does not contribute to productivity
– With more scarce resources, CPC and PC member-owned firms
do not perform better than the rest
Entrepreneurs’ perspectives on the Party
and party organization within private firms
Is the entrepreneur a CPC member?
Does the entrepreneur want to join CPC if
he/she is not a member yet?
1995
2000
17%
19.90%
23.6%
14.15%
Did the entrepreneur join the Party
before you startup?
2006
40.50% 41.50%
24.48%
48.25%
84.20%
Does the entrepreneur regard joining
CPC be helpful to improve his/her status?
17.90%
7.80%
35.50%
Does the entrepreneur regard being a
PC member be helpful for his/her status?
33.40%
27.10%
48%
Does the firm have a party organization?
7.05%
17.18%
2869
3073
No. of observation
2010
34.66% 34.55%
3837
4624
Entrepreneurs’ Perceptions on the importance of being
a Party member to their economic status: significant only in 2010
1995
2000
2006
2010
0.14
-0.0146
0.00560
-0.304***
(0.150)
(0.103)
(0.0823)
(0.0681)
0.46***
0.335**
-0.124
0.293***
(0.154)
(0.136)
(0.115)
(0.0947)
0.0753
0.144
-0.194*
-0.245**
(0.114)
(0.102)
(0.112)
(0.111)
0.00440
0.0138**
-0.00220
-0.00707*
(0.00605)
(0.00551)
(0.00511)
(0.00408)
-0.0402***
-0.0223**
-0.0573***
-0.0665***
(0.0149)
(0.0108)
(0.00905)
(0.00736)
-3.42e-08***
-0.0001***
-0.00004***
-0.00002***
(4.32e-09)
(0.00001)
(0.000004)
(0.000002)
-0.00419
-0.261*
-0.0022
-0.004***
En_share
(0.00257)
-0.150
(0.154)
0.00580
(0.00142)
0.0420
(0.00115)
-0.110
En_exp
(0.186)
(0.0895)
(0.0826)
(0.0947)
N
1160
1908
2323
3082
En_CPC
Gender_F
En_Edu
En_age
Firm_age
Firm_size
From political capital to economic capital:
Monetary rents enjoyed by CPC/PC members
• The changes in entrepreneurs’ perceptions on being a party member
raise a question on the dynamics of benefits that party members may
receive
• No observable extra rents for party members in 1995 and 2000
– Firms owned by CPC or PC members were indifferent in
borrowing bank loans from and others in 1995 and 2000.
• Substantial rents enjoyed by CPC/PC members in 2006 and 2010
– Firms owned by CPC and PC members borrowed significantly
more bank loans than those owned by non-CPC or non-PC
members
– Firms owned by CPC or PC members enjoyed significantly
higher chances in obtaining bank loans than other firms
From political capital to economic capital:
Pary-member owners and access to land
• No observable extra rents at earlier periods
– Firms owned by party members and by others were indifferent in
obtaining land in 1995 and 2000
• Both CPC and PC members enjoyed substantial rents in
2006
– For firms owned by CPC and PC members, the land value over total equity ratio
is significantly higher than those of other firms in 2006.
• PC-owned firms are associated with higher ratio of lands in 2010
though statistically not significant (with P-value at 0.12)
• Plausible reason: land prices in 2010 were much too high that
only very top elites would have chances to enjoy the rents
Institutional impediments to
entrepreneurship
• The private sector is the major engine of China’s growth
and entrepreneurship is the future of China
– The share of private firms’ contribution to the Chinese GDP grow
fast from zero in 1980 to more than half in 2011
– The picture in employment is even more striking, counted for 90%
• But private property rights are still insecure, the government
still controls critical aspects of production
– Although entrepreneurs have obtain constitutional protections of
their private property rights since 2004, arbitrary fees were still
imposed to them; courts are not independent
– The government controls the land, credits, and energy etc.
• We discover that these institutional impediments affect
entrepreneurs’ allocation of their time (efforts) substantially
Contracting Institution & Work Time
• China’s courts are not independent from the government
• Evidence: Formal contracting institution in China
discourages productive work
– Ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs who had business disputes settled
by the court chose to work less in total hours
• They work less in management;
• Their PR time is indifferent; but they spend more time in
“study”
– “Study” include political studies and the “party schools”
• Evidence: Private settlement is less damaging
– Ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs who had business disputes settled
privately did not affect their total work time and management time
• They spent more time in PR; but less time in study
Political motive and political elites
• In addition to weak property rights and contracting
institution, there are other sever institutional constraints
– e.g. government intervene allocation of capital, land, energy
– Politically connected entrepreneurs are treated much better
• Many entrepreneurs in our sample reported political motives
– 45% entrepreneurs want to become a Congress member
– 48% of them want to cultivate an intimate relationship with the
government
• Ceteris paribus, politically motivated entrepreneurs spend
more time in PR; but indifferent in other working times
• Ceteris paribus, PC-member entrepreneurs spent more time
in PR
– They have longer working hours; indifferent in other aspects
– They counted for 19% of entrepreneurs in our sample
Concluding remarks
• When the private sector was unimportant, party-member
entrepreneurs did not have rent-seeking opportunities
• The impacts of the CPC declined in the late 1990s
• Party-members’ political rents grow along with the growth of the
private sector and the reform of the Party
– The CPC reformed the Party by recruiting entrepreneurs: ‘Three
Representatives’
– More rent-seeking opportunities become available
• The political rents enjoyed by party-member entrepreneurs do not
contribute to productivity/social welfare
Concluding remarks (2)
• Chinese entrepreneurs reduce their working hours
substantially when the government violate property
rights (e.g. impose fees arbitrarily)
• A substantial percentage of entrepreneurial working
time is allocated to non-productive tasks (PR time)
to remedy the institutional obstacles
Concluding remarks (3)
• They waste more time in dealing with bureaucrats
–
–
–
–
–
When their contract enforcement involves the government
When they make losses
When they expand business;
When they involve M&A; or change corporate governance
When their R&D involves patents
• Given the general insecurity of property rights, nearly half
of the entrepreneurs in our sample have political motives
– These entrepreneurs divert more time in PR than other
entrepreneurs