Transcript Robert Boyer

UNPRECEDENTED
INTERDEPENDENCIES …
BUT STILL CONTRASTED
NATIONAL WAYS OUT OF
THE CRISIS
Robert Boyer
Visiting Professor at International Center for Business and Politics,
Copenhagen Business School
Keynote address to the conference “Reforming the Bretton
Woods Institutions” organized by the Danish Institute for
International Studies, Copenhagen, 16-17 September 2009
INTRODUCTION
Starting from the Robert Wade’s
diagnosis about the three sources of
crisis
The so-called globalization has generated an
unprecedented deepening of division of labour
Financial deregulation has meant an accelerated
innovation and diffusion of new dangerous
products
In the US and UK financialisation has been used
to compensate rising inequalities
Mixing these three mechanisms explain
the specificity of the current crisis
 The end of an historical epoch for American
growth regime and the “post Bretton Woods nonsystem”
 This is the repetition of neither the American
Great Depression nor the Japanese lost decade
 The diversity of capitalisms makes quite difficult
a coordinated response to a structural, systemic
and global crisis
THE LECTURE:
SEVEN STEPS
1. How globalisation has transformed
international relations? A brief
retrospective
2. How financial innovations have finally
destroyed the American finance-led growth
regime.
3. A world wide crisis but quite contrasted
institutional configurations and policy
response.
4. Why governments and regulatory agencies
have been so slow in learning how to cope
with new financial instruments?
5. From new regulatory regimes to the
reconstruction of viable growth patterns.
6. Contrasted interests and path dependent
economic policy styles: a required but
quasi impossible reform of the
international system.
7. About possible scenarios.
I. HOW GLOBALISATION HAS
TRANSFORMED
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS? A BRIEF
RETROSPECTIVE
• The 90s: the United States, Japan
and China and the stability of the
world economy
The Americans: the consumers of last
resort
The Japanese: the savers of last resort
The Chinese: the manufacturers of the
world
Figure 1 - Can two vicious circles make a
world virtuous configuration?
Buys to
China
Invests in
US
Borrows to
in order to finance external
deficit
Tensions on the
global financial
stability
Deindustrializes
Japan
Tensions on Asian
integration
• The 2000s: Still another
configuration for the world
economy
The Americans: the consumers of last
resort…and beneficiary of world excess of
saving
The Japanese: a recovery in response to the
dynamism of Chinese imports of
equipment goods and high-tech
components
The Chinese: the manufacturers … and the
Figure 2 – Towards a duopoly at the world
level?
United States
Consumer of last resort
Center of financial
intermediation
Raw
materials
Trade surplus
Financing of external / public
deficit
The rest of the World
THIRD WORLD: boom of raw materials
EMERGING ECONOMIES:
desindustrialization
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:
financialization and desindustrialization
China
As the engine of
growth in Asia, saver
of the world
Raw materials
• Why the IS-LM model becomes
relevant at the world level
From a closed economy model to the
interaction of two national economies: the
US and China
A lasting overcapacity in manufacturing in
China, hence a pressure towards price wars
An upward drift of the relative prices of oils
and raw materials
• A possible explanation of the Alan
Greenspan puzzle
 Not any increase in long term interest rates in the
US: the consequence of the excess savings of
Asia
 The moderation of core inflation: the definite
impact of Chinese overcapacity in commodities
 The surge of consumption prices: the under
capacity in the production of raw materials
 These are direct consequences of the America /
• A contrario, a drastic challenge of
neoricardian international trade
theory
The mobility of frontier technologies
towards China
The quasi unlimited supply of labor in
China
The size of the potential Chinese
market
The role of increasing returns to scale
Consequently, the emergence of the
hypothesis that manufacturing world
prices are Chinese prices
Ta b le 1
C o m p a ris o n o f th e P ric e s o f th e C h in e s e , Ja p a n e s e , K o re a n , U . S . /E U a n d Lo c a l B ra n d s in A s ia n
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44, 064 P hilips
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34, 551 P hilips
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39, 300
F o rtre s s
40, 715
II. HOW FINANCIAL
INNOVATIONS HAVE FINALLY
DESTROYED THE AMERICAN
FINANCE-LED GROWTH
REGIME
1. At the core of the crisis: the erosion of the
direct responsibility of credit decision
2. The spillover of all the destabilizing
mechanisms not corrected during the
previous crises…
3. The end of a finance-led growth regime…
4. An unprecedented crisis generated by
financial laissez-faire…that diffuses to the
rest of the world
1. At the core
of the crisis:
the erosion of
the direct
responsibility
of credit
decision….
Various financial
entities buy these
derivatives
Need of hedging
Securitisation by
investment banks
Lehman Brothers
Swaps against
credit default
AIG
Deepening of the
gap between
financing and risk
taking
Figure 3 – The hidden
origin of subprime crisis: a
perverse division of labor
within finance
Risk transfer
Externalization
of the risk
Real
estate
buyers
Credit
contract
Mortgage
financial
institution
Incentive to take more risk
Collapse of the
joint
responsibility of
contract
Systemic crisis
….Hence an explosion of subprime
derivatives
Figure 4 – The fast growth of credit derivatives, especially from mortgage
….With a constant deterioration of the quality of
borrowers
Figure 5 – The risk transfer implies a decline in the quality of assets
… This deterioration of quality is permanent of
MBS from 2003 to 2007
Graph 1
Source : Yuliya Demyanyk, Otto Van Hemert (2008), p. 1
… This is not simply the outcome of low
documentation mortgages
Graph 2
Source : Yuliya Demyanyk, Otto Van Hemert (2008), p. 1
2. The spillover of all the destabilizing mechanisms not
corrected during the previous crises…
Financial
stability
policy
CENTRAL
BANK
Low interest
rate
The Central Bank
cannot detect nor
prevent speculative
bubbles
Strong incentives for
Wall Street and CEO
to adopt these
financial
instruments with
respect to their
remuneration
(Enron)
Excessive reliance upon
theoretical models
(LTCM, collapse 1987)
Last Resort
Lender and tutor
of the financial
system
Figure 6 – The
origins of
subprimes
crisis
Collusion of financiers
with politicians in order
not to regulate derivatives
(Enron, subprimes)
Primacy of
investment bank,
large leverage /
fair value
(Northern Rock)
….Hence a general deflation of financial assets
Figure 7 – A transposition of Irving Fisher debt deflation theory
booming
financial
sector
Bankruptcy of Mc Indy
Portfolio
diversification
Derivatives
Collapse of
Bear Stearns
Derivatives
from
Hedge
Funds
derivatives
Financial
instruments
Explosion
of turnover
Public
control over
Fannie Mae –
Freddie Mac
Collapse of
Lehman Brothers
Nationalization
of
A.I.P.
Absorption of
Merrill Lynch
New methods
for risk
assessment
Fast growth of
innovations and
turnover
Progressively the collapse of stocks in
Wall Street diffuses to all financial and
insurance companies
….A quasi-complete freezing of inter-bank credit
Graph 3 –
A first evidence of banking systemic
crisis
Graphique 4 –
Spillover effects by the stock market
Source : Artus Patrick (2008), « La finance peut-elle seule conduire à une crise
grave ? », Flash économie, n° 429, 2 Octobre, Natixis, Paris, p. 2 et 3.
4. An unprecedented crisis generated by
financial laissez-faire…
 Securitization and subprime have been
generating a large overproduction in the
real estate sector
Graph 5 –
A severe recession of real estate
Graph 6 –
A brusque reversal of price of houses
Source : Artus Patrick (2008), « La finance peut-elle seule conduire à une crise grave ? »,
Flash économie, n° 429, 2 Octobre, Natixis, Paris, p. 4 et 6.
 A systemic financial crisis: collapse, bankruptcy,
distrust against banks, creeping public control
Graph 7 –
Markets do not trust anymore banks
Graph 8 –
The public institutions governing the
mortgage market collapse
 The end of a credit led household
consumption boom
Graph 9 –
A very low household saving rate
Graph 10 –
A cumulative debt of households
Source : Artus Patrick (2008), « Plaidoyer pour la création « d’acheteurs d’actifs risqués en dernier
ressort », Flash économie, n° 416, 23 septembre, Natixis, Paris, p. 6 et « La finance peut-elle seule
conduire à une crise grave ? », Flash économie, n° 429, 2 Octobre, Natixis, Paris, p. 3.
 Thus finance will finally destabilize the real
economy, even if non financial corporations were
more careful in debt management
Graph 11 –
American firms debt: learning from past crises
Source : Artus Patrick (2008), « Trois méthodes pour réduire le levier d’endettement », Flash
économie, n° 414, 23 Septembre, Natixis, Paris, p. 2.
III. A WORLD WIDE CRISIS
BUT QUITE CONTRASTED
INSTITUTIONAL
CONFIGURATIONS AND
POLICY RESPONSE
1. THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE:
THE UNITED STATES:
 A typical real estate bubble
 A systemic financial collapse
 An induced recession/depression
 And various spill over among the three
sources of crisis …
….. Hence a quite uncertain profile of the
way out of the crisis
Figure 8 – Three self reinforcing debt deflation-depression spill
over along Irving FISHER’s model keynesian countervailing
programs

Decline in real
estate price

Foreclosure
Delinquencies
The real estate: a sectoral
deflation / depression
A
B
C
B
Collapse of
households
wealth

Decline of stock
market valuation
of banks


Repercussion of the
financial system via
MBS, CDS
The stock-market /
Credit spill over:
asset deflation

E
Reduction of
consumption
Lower
profit
Fall of
investment

Lower income
D
Reduction of
GDP
Overcapacity
The Keynesian
mechanisms
Drastic reduction
of credit supply
Unemployment

Fear of deflation


Price wars
The typical Irving
Fisher deflation
2.THREE TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS
FROM THE US ECONOMY TO THE REST
OF THE WORLD
• The diffusion of the finance led growth model to
other OECD countries : mimicking the American
crisis
• Financial globalization implies a brusque
assessment of risk and this severely hits all the
countries that relied upon the permanent inflow
of foreign capital
• The collapse of the world trade, consequence of
the freeze of inter-bank credit, is spreading the
crisis even to the high performing and virtuous
economies
3. AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF
INTER-DEPENDENCE WHATEVER
THE DIVERSITY OF REGULATION
MODES
C1 : The good pupils of financiarization : A
systemic crisis with a freeze of credit :
UK and Ireland
Table 2 – The difference between producers and buyers of toxic derivatives
Depreciations of financial assets by banks (Mds de $)
C2 : The Asian crisis is repeating itself in
Europe : the danger of a large debt in foreign
currency.
Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania et Ukraine.
Tableau 3 – Europe 2008 : the excess of borrowing in foreign currency
C3 : The victims of the very success of an
export and innovation led growth regime
Sweden, Netherland, Germany and Japan
Table 4 – Countries at the technological frontier
A – Nombre de chercheurs (pour 10000 emplois)
B – Nombre de brevets triadiques (par million
d’habitants)
Source : Artus Patrick (2009) : « Se limiter à règlementer la finance ne résoudra rien »,
Flash Economie, n° 156, 3 avril, Natixis, Paris, p. 10.
Germany and Japan benfit from the growth of NPI
markets
Tableau 5 –Exportations vers l’ensemble des émergents (*)
Source : Artus Patrick (2008) : « Quels vont être les pays qui seront le plus en difficulté après la
crise », Flash Economie, n° 477, 22 octobres, Natixis, Paris, p. 8.
C4 : Rentier economies do continue to exhibit quite
specific macroeconomic regimes
Saudi Arabia, Russia and Venezuela
C5 : Continental economies : the potentiality of a
very large domestic market
India, Brazil, China
C6 : Hybrid economies discomposed by their
international insertion
Latin America (Argentina, Mexico)
C7 : The victims from the disconnection with respect
to the world markets
Most African countries
4. TOWARDS MORE
COMPLEMENTARITY THAN
COMPETITION AMONG THESE
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
Between finance led economies and continental
powers : complementarity for saving and trade
Between continental economies and rentier
countries: complementarity of trade.
 Between innovation and export led regimes and
other configurations: complementarity of
specialization
Figure 9 – How the seven regulation modes interact and coexist
C2
Financial external
dependency
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland
C3
Innovation / export led
Germany, Japan
Trade
C5
Continental powers
Trading
sophisticated goods
China, India, Brazil
Capital flows
Capital,
Mass produced goods
C1
Financial hegemony
US, UK
Capital flows and
trade
Primary resources
Saving
Primary resources
C6
Hybrid and
disarticulated by
international
insertion Argentina,
Mexico
C4
Rentier
Russia, Venezuela, Saudi
Arabia
Competition more than
complementarity
C7
Disconnection from
the world market
Africa
5. FACING SUCH A DIVERSITY,
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
OF NATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR
OVERCOMING THE CRISIS IS QUITE
PROBLEMATIC AND UNLIKELY
 The industrialist models against loose
controls of financial hegemony
 NPI against the old industrialized countries.
 Rentier regimes as unexpected referees in
anticipation of raw material scarcity
IV. WHY GOVERNMENTS
AND REGULATORY
AGENCIES HAVE BEEN SO
SLOW IN LEARNING HOW TO
COPE WITH NEW FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS?
The same sequence repeating itself in
history
A financier invents a new product with promising
profitability.. for him!
… Followers are eager to imitate this strategy :
they create a boom...
Uniformed individuals enter the market and
trigger a bubble…
…So extreme that the speculation is bound to
burst and can even trigger a major economic
crisis
…Then public authorities have to intervene to
restore the viability of the economy
The private innovation is either banned or
reordered via a public control in order to convert
it into a viable financial tool
Figure 10 – A typical sequencing of financial crises
Viability of the
regulated
innovation
New cycle
Regulation by the
government
Lender as a
last resort
Private
innovation
Success
/ High
profit
Rapid
adoption
Entry in the
zone of
financial
fragility
No public
intervention:
collapse of the
innovation
 Computer trading: the October 19th, 1987
Wall Street crash, a first example
Modern portfolio management leads to the
diffusion of computer software for traders…
…This generates a synchronization of selling
orders…
…Hence a collapse of the stock market, but
rapid reaction of the Central Bank
A continuing boom, not at all the repetition of
October 24th 1929 crash
The LTCM collapse: a second
example
The invention of new methods in order to get
high rate of returns while limiting risk…
…A highly leveraged hedge fund without any
regulation or prudential assessment…
…An impressive boom and a brusque collapse
facing an unexpected event
Figure 11 - The collapse of Long Term Capital Management: financial
reorganization under the aegis of the FED but no new regulations
But no new
surveillance
mechanism
Extracting
relevant
information
from past
regularities
New portfolio
management
techniques
No prudential regulations
for Hedge Funds
Very large
leverage effects
Unprecedented
rate of returns
LTCM
collapse
Bailing out by Bear
Sterns
A new
speculative
boom starts
Explosion of
turnover
A highly
unlikely event
Quick FED
intervention
Systemic crisis
threat
But low « value
at risk »
according to
the model
Abyssal
losses
The ENRON story: a third example
The boom of this market reaches its limits, the
reversal of confidence challenges macroeconomic
stability…
…And again the Central Bank is the rescuer of last
resort in order to preserve the viability of the
financial system
 The ENRON story
Figure 12 – A third example: energy derivatives
Energy
derivatives
Potential for
new crisis
A structural
weakness
Unprecedented
profit
Creative
accounting
Bankruptcy
Prevention from
any public control
by lobbying
But not any reform of
accountability
principles
New rules of
accountability
for CEO and
CFO
 The Northern Rock bank run
Figure 13 – A fourth example: rise and collapse of an innovation
Financing by
bonds of
mortgage
loans
High profit /
Rapid capture
of market
shares
More bonds
issued
Banking
run
No reaction
of Financial
Service
Agency
A failed
innovation
Worsening
of the crisis
Conflict between Bank of
England, Treasury, FSA
Nationalization
of Northern
Rock
Initially, Bank
of England
did not bail
out
Search for self
regulation
Systemic
crisis
The subprime mortgage crisis
Figure 14 – A fifth example: The crisis becomes global
Sub-prime
mortgage
Searching for
new
regulations
A systemic
financial
crisis
New and
growing
market
Securitization
shift the risk
Reversal
of the
housing
market
Absence of
public
regulation
Melting down
of the subprime market
Limited
FED
intervention
Unlimited access to
liquidity from FED
Mergers among
banks
Recapitalization by
sovereign funds and
then government
A creeping
banking
crisis
Diffusion of
Non
Performing
Assets (NPA)
V. FROM NEW REGULATORY
REGIMES TO THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF VIABLE
GROWTH PATTERNS
• An impressive list of heterogeneous and ad
hoc proposals
• Policy makers react to highly visible actors
or phenomenon…not necessarily crucial in
the origin of the crisis
• A core hypothesis: look for sets of minimal
but complementary proposals.
Table 6- Two options concerning financial crises: curing them or preventing
them?
Ex post
Merits
Drawbacks
Means
Ex ante
Legitimacy in response to the need to restore
financial stability
Possible reduction of the bailing out
by the Central Bank since crises would
be less frequent and acute
No interference with private profit strategies
during the boom
Less volatility, less inequality
The more severe the crisis, the more passive
public authorities
Clear interference with private right
to manage
Large economic and social costs
Possible erroneous policy by central
bankers
Moral hazard will make next crisis more
severe
Lack of adequate instruments
The Central Bank as a last resort lender
Monetary policy should take into
account financial assets inflation and
financial stability
Public entity in charge of buying back non
performing loans
Common regulation and surveillance
for all financial entities
 De facto Nationalization of some banks or
insurance companies
Ex ante agreement by FSA or SEC
of financial innovations, potentially
dangerous for macro-economic
Restructuring within the financial community
• A significant shift: it is desirable and
possible to prevent financial crises:
farewell to Alan Greenspan’s strategy
• Three broad and coherent strategies in
order to prevent the repetition of the
subprime crisis
Figure
15
Figure 16 – Prevent that a financial crisis might trigger any
major economic crisis by typically macroeconomic tools
and regulations
Figure 17 – Redesigning internally finance, its the
incentives, accounting principles and models in order to
drastically reduce the frequency and severity of major
financial crises
Figure 18 – Collective control of financial private
innovations, highly profitable but that are powerful enough
to destabilize the whole economy
Figure 19 – Finance as a public utility, reinstituting some
power of workers and new deal for international relations
• An economist illusion: politicians should
adopt their optimal plan!
• Much more than a technocratic exercise,
an art of building compromises along
each national style for economic policy.
• Given the strong international interdependencies and externalities,
regulations should be trans-national…
• …But typically national strategies out of
the crisis emerge after September 2008.
• A clear reversal of public opinion:
 49% of American citizens consider
that Wall Street has had a negative
impact upon the real economy
 But 37% disagree and the rest don’t
know
Table 7 – The sub-prime American crisis a major bifurcation in financial system
organization
Components
1. General conception and
vision
2. Key financial products
3. Key actors
4. Nature of public policies
5. Public opinion
6. Implicit accumulation
regime
Before 2007
Financial markets are self
equilibrating
All kinds of derivatives including
« Over the Counter », swaps,
options, derivatives of derivatives
Wall Street investment banks,
Equity Funds, IMF for emerging
countries
« Horizontal » rules levelling off the
playing field
 Financial laisser faire
 Self regulation of markets
« Let us be free to become rich by
financial transactions even if we do
not understand why »
Finance led accumulation…
…for all
The laggards will be the losers
After 2008
Need for vigorous and multifaceted
public interventions in order to
restore the viability of the whole
financial system
Back to basic financial products
Sovereign funds, FED, American
Treasury, Central Banks all over the
world
« Vertical » rules imposed by State
 Nationalizations, public
control, public
participation to capital
 State is the last resort
rescuer
« Protect us from a predatory
finance and guarantee our savings
and pension funds »
Finance has to be supported by all
public interventions: full access to
Central Bank liquidity, public
guarantee of bank capitalization and
inter bank credit….
So called archaic financial entities
are welcomed to bail out Wall Street
investment firms, capitalize IMF….
• But a surprising resilience of Wall Street
and American financial system
 Still large bonuses for failed AIG
company
 Sinking real economy but new surge
of Goldman and Sachs 2009 profits
 Financial lobbies at work to curb
down 17th June Obama’s Plan for reregulating finance.
VI. CONTRASTED
INTERESTS AND PATH
DEPENDENT ECONOMIC
POLICY STYLES: A
REQUIRED BUT QUASI
IMPOSSIBLE REFORM OF
THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM
Table 8 – Diversity of national goals
TYPE
COUNTRIES
OF
REGUL
ATION
United States
C1
United
C1
Kingdom
Germany
C3
Japan
C3
South Korea
C3
Saudi Arabia
C4
Russia
C4
China
C5
India
C5
Brazil
C5
Argentina
C6
Mexico
C6
Turkey
C6
Indonesia
C6
Italia
C3/C6
France
C3/C6
Domestic
Growth
**
*
*
*
**
*
*
***
***
**
**
*
*
*
*
**
NATIONAL GOALS
Industrial Managemen
World
specialisatio
t of rent
Financial
n
Intermediation
***
***
***
***
***
*
*
***
***
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
*
* (Shanghai)
**
**
Table 9 – Contrasted expectations on the G20
COUNTRIES
TYPE OF
REGULATION
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
Japan
South Korea
Saudi Arabia
Russia
China
India
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Turkey
Indonesia
Italia
France
C1
C1
C3
C3
C3
C4
C4
C5
C5
C5
C6
C6
C6
C6
C3/C6
C3/C6
Coordination
of the
national
policies
**
*
*
** (China)
* (Asia)
* (Mercosur)
** (Alena)
* (EU)
**
**
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT G20
Restoration Opening of
Power in the
of financial
the
international
stability
worldwide
organizations
economy
If autonomy
**
***
If autonomy
**
*
***
***
*
**
***
*
*
**
**
*
*
***
**
**
**
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
**
**
**
*
**
* (EU)
**
*
**
*
**
*
**
Figure 20 – Diversity of strategies: a matter of national
interests and style for economic policy
United States
UK
Germany France
Laisser faire
fondamentalism
Republican
experts and
politicians
Mervyn King
initial
statement
Keynesian
spending + Bad
debts resolution
funds
Paulson and
Geithner
Plans
Bank bailing out
but no Keynesian
plan
Partial nationalization Obama
and active Keynesian 2009 plan
policy
Nationalization of
core banks
2008
strategy
Sweden
Help to the
banks and
supply side
plan
Gordon
Brown 2009
plan
Bailing out after
1990s crisis
VII. ABOUT POSSIBLE
SCENARIOS
1. The inability to governments to curb
down the power of finance
 Public debt replaces private credit from
banks
 The excess of liquidity triggers a new
speculative bubble…
 Hence a new and still more severe
financial crisis few years ahead
2. Only broad regulatory
principles at the world level
 A large autonomy of governments in order to
design their own regulations
 A form of regulatory protectionism
especially in the finance sector
 A companion strategy: relying more on the
domestic market
 A renationalisation of anticrisis strategies
3. Is regionalisation an
alternative to globalisation
 Financial globalization is the key feature
 Most global standards actually are American
ones
 The globalization game is played at home
too
The social and economic actors that gain from the
internationalization ask for more favorable status
(lower taxes, privatization,…)
• Importance and deepening of
intra regional trade
SHARE OF INTRA REGIONAL AND INTERREGIONAL TRADE FLOWS OF
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
Origin
North
America
Western
Europe
Asia
North
America
1993 2000
35,6
39,9
Destination
Western
Asia
Rest of
Europe
world
1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000
20,2
19,4
25,0
21,1 19,2 20,6
Total
100
8,0
9,9
68,9
69,1
8,8
7,5
14,3
10,3
100
26,4
26,3
17,6
18,1
46,5
46,6
14,2
9,0
100
Source: 2000 from Fligstein Neil and Mérand Frédéric (2002), p. 13.
1993 from Fligstein (2001), p. 200, Table 9.2.
• The nation state has become too
small, but the world is too diverse
and unbalanced to display an
integrated world governance
 Thus regional trade agreements prosper
The geographical distribution of Regional Trade
Agreements
Existing or being negotiated, 2001
Source: WTO (2002), p. 44
Source: WTO (2002), p. 44
CONCLUSION
C1 –The self regulation of finance and its major
influence upon deregulation triggers an
unprecedented crisis associated to the anomy
in the division of labour in finance
C2 – The US and UK are experiencing the systemic
and structural crisis of a finance led
accumulation that has been triggering a world
wide economic crisis.
C3 – Against the previous motto “The same size for all” a
renewed diversity of economic policies and forms of
capitalism is likely to emerge after this subprime
crisis.
C4 – Whatever future scenarios, 2008 means an epochal
change in the previous form of internationalisation.
C5 – Given the present distribution of power among
national state and the diversity of capitalisms, the
negotiation of a new Bretton Woods is quite unlikely.
C6 – A fully democratic process at the domestic and
international level would probably legitimate
and allow a strong control of civil society over
finance.
C7 – The future is quite open…and last long and
could mix recurring bubbles, de facto renationalisation of economic policy or
regionalisation processes
Background papers of this presentation
Charmes et limites de la financiarisation :
plaidoyer pour un controle social de
l’innovation, à paraître Revue de la Régulation
et Kan.
La faillite de Wall Street : pourquoi les
financiers n’ont-ils rien appris de l’histoire des
crises, Prisme, Centre Cournot, November
2008.
Américanisme et financiarisation : la fin d’une
époque, ouvrage à paraître Albin Michel Paris,
2009.
 Other relevant papers
 “Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative
to Fordism? A preliminary analysis”, Economy and
Society, Vol. 29, n° 1, February 2000, p. 111-145.
 Les crises financières (with Mario Dehove and
Dominique Plihon), Rapport du Conseil d’analyse
Economique, n° 50, La documentation française,
Paris, 2004
 “From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: the
Paradox of the 1990s”, Competition & Change, vol.
9, n° 1, March 2005, p. 7-47.
 “Assessing the impact of fair value upon financial
crisis”, Socio Economic Review, Vol. 5, n° 4,
October 2007, p. 779-807.
Many thanks for your attention
Robert BOYER
CEPREMAP (Paris) – GREDEG (Sophia
Antipolis)
140, rue du Chevaleret 75013 PARIS, France
Tél. : (33-1) 40 77 84 12
e-mail : [email protected]
web site : http://www.jourdan.ens.fr/~boyer/