Transcript Lecture
Thorvaldur Gylfason
Pretoria, South Africa
9-20 July 2007
Definitions, motivations, trends
Aid effectiveness
Theory and evidence
Macroeconomic dangers of aid
Dutch disease
Aid volatility
Policy options in managing aid flows
Preparing for scaling up aid
Monetary policy options
Fiscal challenges and debt sustainability
Strengthening governance
Conclusions and guidelines
Development
aid
Unrequited
transfers from donor to
country designed to promote the
economic and social development
of the recipient (excluding
commercial deals and military aid)
Concessional
loans and grants
included, by tradition
Grant
element ≥ 25%
Development
Public
aid can be
or private
Bilateral (from one country to another)
or multilateral (from international
organizations)
Program, project, technical assistance
Linked to purchase of goods and
services from donor country, or in kind
Conditional in nature
IMF conditionality, good governance
Moral duty
Neocolonialism
Humanitarian intervention
Public good
National
Like education and health care
International
Social justice to promote world unity
UN aid commitment of 0.7% of GDP
World-wide redistribution
Increased inequality word-wide
Marshall Plan after World War II
1.5% of US GDP for four years vs. 0.2% today
People at www.irenkenya.com in Nairobi
disagree
Objectives
Individuals
in donor countries vs.
governments in recipient countries
Who should receive the aid?
Today’s
poor vs. tomorrow’s poor
Aid for consumption vs. investment
Conflicts
Beneficiaries’
needs
Donors’ interests
Aid
is a recent phenomenon
Four major periods since 1950
1950s:
Fast growth (US, France, UK)
1960s: Stabilization and new donors
Japan, Germany, Canada, Australia
1970s:
Rapid growth in aid again due
to oil shocks, recession, cold war
1980s: Stagnation, aid fatigue, new
methods
United
States: largest donor in
volume, but low in relation to GDP
2%
of GDP
Japan:
second-largest donor in
volume
Nordic countries, Netherlands
Major
donors to multilateral programs
Only countries whose assistance
accounts for 0.7% of GDP
EU:
leading multilateral donor
40
35
1985
1990
2000
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia
Oceania
MEDA
Latin America
Europe
12
The
Blair Report and the Sachs Report
called on world community to increase
development aid (particularly for
Africa) to enable developing countries
to attain the MDGs by 2015
2005
G-8 Gleneagles communiqué called
for raising annual aid flows to Africa by
$25 billion per year by 2010
2005 UN Millennium Project called for $33
billion per year in additional resources
For comparison, US gave $20 billion in 2004,
not $70 billion as suggested by UN goal
Aid
fills gap between investment
needs and saving and increases
growth
Poor
countries often have low savings and
low export receipts and limited
investment capacity and slow growth
Aid
is intended to free developing
nations from poverty traps
Example:
Capital stock declines if saving
does not keep up with depreciation
To understand the link between aid
and investment, consider resource
constraint identity by rearranging the
National Income Identity:
Y=C+I+G+X–Z
I = (Y – T – C) + (T – G) + (Z – X)
In words, investment is financed by
the sum of private saving, public
saving, and foreign saving
Rearrange again:
Y+Z=E+X
where E is expenditure
E=C+I+G
Thus, total supply Y + Z equals total
demand E + X
Aid increases recipient’s ability to
import: Z rises with increased X
o Is it feasible to lift all above a dollar a day?
o How much would it cost to eradicate extreme
poverty? Let’s do the arithmetic a la Sachs
o Number of people with less than a dollar a
day is 1.1 billion
o Their average income is 77 cents a day, they
need 1.08 dollars
o Difference is 31 cents a day, or 113 dollars per
year
o Total cost is 124 billion dollars per year, or
0.6% of GNP in industrial countries
o Less than they promised! – and didn’t deliver
Regression
analysis to measure
the impact of aid on
Saving
Investment
Public
finance
Economic growth
Saving
Negative effect on saving
Substitution effect?
Boone, 1996; Reichel, 1995
Positive effect for good performers
E.g., South-East Asia, Botswana
Investment
No impact on private investment
Positive impact for good performers
Public
finance
Uncertain effect on public investment
Positive effect on public consumption
Growth:
Mixed results
Most
early studies showed no
statistically significant impact
Some more recent studies show
negative impact
Bias and endogeneity issues
Need
to distinguish between
different types of aid
Leakages,
cash vs. aid in kind
aid has
sometimes been
compared to natural
resource discoveries
Aid and growth are
inversely related
across countries
Cause and effect
156 countries,
1960-2000
Per capita growth adjusted for initial income (%)
Foreign
r = rank correlation
r = -0.36
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-20
0
20
40
60
Foreign aid (% of GDP)
80
Examples
Rajan
and Subramanian (2005)
No robust relationship between aid and
growth
Burnside
of recent studies
and Dollar (2001)
Aid works in “countries with good policies”
Clemens,
Radelet, and Bhavnani (2005)
Aid works if measured correctly
Distinction between fast impact aid
(infrastructure projects) and slow impact aid
(education)
Financial vs. social returns
Empirical
evidence
Types of aid
Diminishing returns and limits to
domestic absorptive capacity
Interaction with governance and
good policies
Post-conflict situations
Aid
leads to corruption
Aid tends to be misused
Svenson
(2000)
Murshed and Sen (1995)
Aid
is badly distributed, sometimes
for strategic reasons
Alesina
and Dollar (2000)
Collier and Dollar (2002)
Aid
increases public consumption,
not investment
Aid is procyclical
When
Aid
it rains, it pours
leads to “Dutch disease”
Labor
intensive and export industries
contract relative to other industries in
countries receiving high aid inflows
Growth
is perhaps not the best
yardstick for the usefulness of aid
Appreciation
of currency in real terms,
either through inflation or nominal
appreciation, leads to a loss of export
competitiveness
In 1960s, Netherlands discovered natural
resources (gas deposits)
Currency appreciated
Exports of manufactures and services suffered,
but not for long
Not
unlike natural resource discoveries,
aid inflows could trigger the Dutch Disease
in receiving countries
Review
theory of Dutch disease
in two rounds
Demand and supply model
Two-sector model
Demand
effects
Supply effects
Exchange rate volatility
Real exchange rate
Payments for
imports of goods,
services, and capital
Imports
Earnings from
exports of goods,
services, and capital
Exports
Foreign exchange
eP
Q
P*
Devaluation or
depreciation of e
makes Q also
depreciate unless P
rises so as to leave Q
unchanged
Q = real exchange rate
e = nominal exchange rate
P = price level at home
P* = price level abroad
eP
Q
P*
1. Suppose e falls
Then more lira per dollar,
so X rises, Z falls
2. Suppose P falls
Then X rises, Z falls
3. Suppose P* rises
Then X rises, Z falls
Summarize all three by supposing
that Q falls
Then X rises, Z falls
Real exchange rate
Aid leads to appreciation
and thus reduces exports
C
B
A
Imports
Exports
plus aid
Exports
Foreign exchange
Real exchange rate
Oil discovery leads to appreciation
and reduces nonoil exports
C
B
A
Imports
Exports
plus oil
Exports
Foreign exchange
Real exchange rate
Composition of exports
matters
C
B
A
Imports
Exports
plus oil
Exports
Foreign exchange
Dutch
disease is a real phenomenon, not
monetary
Real exchange rate always floats
Recall: Q = eP/P*
Flexible exchange rate regime
Nominal appreciation
Fixed
exchange rate regime
Inflation
Look
at this more closely in two-sector
model of traded vs. nontraded goods
Traded goods (T)
Production frontier (supply)
Nontraded goods (N)
Traded goods (T)
Indifference curve (demand)
Equilibrium
Production frontier (supply)
Nontraded goods (N)
T
Indifference curve (demand)
Price line, slope = -PN/PT = -Q
Equilibrium
Production frontier (supply)
N
Increased demand for N
PN/PT rises (appreciation)
Supply of N increases, supply of T falls
T
T = ON = AE
Slope = -PN/PT N = OA
Cannot add T and N
Convert T into units of N
E
AE/AB = PN/PT
AB = AE(PT/PN) = PTT/PN
Y = N + PTT/PN = OA + AB
Y = N + T/Q
N
O
A
B
N
T
Production frontier: T = a – 0.5bN2
a
E
(2a/b)0.5
Increase in a
Increase in b
Tangency at E:
dT/dN = -bN = -Q
N = Q/b (supply)
N
a and b are
indicators of
efficiency,
inefficiency
Increase in Tmax and Nmax
Decrease in Nmax
T
Indifference curve: U = T + ln(N)
a
E
(2a/b)0.5
Tangency at E:
0 = dT + (1/N)dN
dT/dN = -1/N = -Q
N = 1/Q (demand)
N
T
a
E
Equilibrium at E:
Supply = demand
Q/b = 1/Q
Q = b0.5
(2a/b)0.5
T = a – 0.5b(b-0.5)2 = a – 0.5
N
Supply:
N = Q/b =
b0.5/b = b-0.5
Demand:
N = 1/Q =
1/b0.5 = b-0.5
T
Suppose aid increases
demand for N by q%:
N* = (1+q)/Q = Q/b
Q2 = b(1+q)
Q = [b(1+q)]0.5
N* = (1+q)/[b(1+q)]0.5
= [(1+q)/b)]0.5
dN*/dq > 0
N
T = a – 0.5b[(1+q)/b]-0.5)2 = a – 0.5(1+q)
dT/dq < 0
T
So, in this case,
aid reduces GDP
Without aid:
Y = N + T/Q
= b-0.5 + (a–0.5)b-0.5
= (a+0.5)b-0.5
With aid:
Y = N* + T/Q
= [(1+q)/b)]0.5
+ [a – 0.5(1+q)]/[b(1+q)]0.5
= …N
= [a+0.5(1+q)]/[b(1+q)]0.5
Can we sign dY/dq? Yes!
dY/dq = -0.5bQ-3T < 0
Aid
It
is likely to lead to Dutch disease if
leads to high demand for nontradables
Trade restrictions
Recipient country uses aid to buy nontradables
(including social services) rather than imports
Production
is at full capacity
Production of nontradables cannot be increased
without raising wages in that sector
Aid
is not used to build up infrastructure
and relax supply constraints
Price and wage increases in nontradables
sector lead to strong wage pressure in
tradables sector
Aid
It
is likely to lead to Dutch disease if
leads to high demand for nontradables
Trade restrictions
Recipient country uses aid to buy nontradables
(including social services) rather than imports
Production
is at full capacity
Production of nontradables cannot be increased
without raising wages in that sector
Aid
is not used to build up infrastructure
and relax supply constraints
Price and wage increases in nontradables
sector lead to strong wage pressure in
tradables sector
Aid
spending can take several forms,
with different macroeconomic
implications:
Case
1: Aid received is saved by recipient
country government
Case 2: Aid is used to purchase imported
goods that would not have been
purchased otherwise (grants in kind)
Case 3: Aid is used to buy nontradables
with infinitely elastic supply
Case 4: Aid is used to buy nontradables
for which there are supply constraints
Studies
assessing empirical relevance
of Dutch disease as caused by aid
flows have produced mixed results
Aid
was associated with real
appreciation in Malawi and Sri Lanka
Aid was associated with with real
depreciation in Ghana, Nigeria, and
Tanzania
Aid
is volatile and unpredictable
Aid flows are 6-40 times more volatile than
fiscal revenue
Volatility is largest for aid dependent
countries (Bulir and Hamann, 2005)
Volatility increased in the 1990s
Aid delivery falls short of pledges by over 40%
Reasons
Donors: Changes in priorities; administrative
and budgetary delays
Recipients: Failure to satisfy conditions
Impact of large sudden inflows
Supply constraints in absorbing aid
Real exchange rate overshooting and volatility
Negative impact on export industries
Ratcheting up spending commitments without
adequate consideration of exit strategy
Infrastructure investment without adequate
planning for recurrent expenditure
Impact of aid promised, but not disbursed
Spending commitments cannot be financed
Volatility in money supply, inflation, and
exchange rates
Domestic
sterilization
Sale
of domestic bond instruments
Reserve requirements
Central government deposits
Sale
of foreign exchange
Objectives and economic impact of
policies
Nominal
exchange rate vs. inflation
Domestic interest rates
Options to reduce risk of Dutch disease
Save
resources
Use aid to purchase imported goods
Spend on non-traded sectors with few
supply constraints
Other spending options
Spend on nontradables with supply
constraints
Infrastructure
spending for future growth
Social spending for poverty reduction
Balancing
growth and poverty
reduction
Growth
effects from infrastructure
investment
Targeting spending to the poor
Dutch disease
Improving
NGO
coordination
activities
Subnational government activities
Private sector capacity
Advantages
of grants
Lower
debt burden
Useful for social projects with uncertain or
delayed returns (health care, education)
Advantage
Increase
of concessional loans
total flow of resources
Project allocation
Increase debt management capacity
Useful for projects yielding quick returns
(infrastructure)
Loans
vs. grants
Assessing external debt dynamics
Assessing fiscal debt sustainability
DSA framework for ensuring debt
sustainability
Debt
and debt-service thresholds
Public enterprises; net vs. gross debt;
risk of distress
Strengthening
debt management
Negative
impact on budgeting,
planning, and stabilization
Debt relief vs. aid
Donor commitment and transparency
Respecting conditionality
Flexibility to spend or save
Preventing
aid dependency
Protecting revenues
Composition
Corruption
Tax
The
treatment of aid
scaling down of aid
Private economic activity
Real spending and recurrent spending
Corruption
and economic performance
Impact
on growth
Likelihood of disbursement
Anticorruption
strategies
Reduce
state role
Improve regulatory environment
Punish offenders
Liberalize and reform institutions
Improving
public expenditure
management systems
From
aid fatigue to new initiatives
Aid effectiveness is ambiguous
Positive
results likely with better policies
and governance
Five Primary Guidelines
Minimize risks of Dutch disease
Enhance growth
Promote good governance and reduce
corruption
Prepare an exit strategy
Assess the policy mix
Isard, Lipschitz, Mourmouras, and Yontcheva, 2006,
Macroeconomic Management of Foreign Aid:
Opportunities and Pitfalls, IMF.
Gupta, Powell, and Yang, 2006, Macroeconomic
Challenges of Scaling up Aid to Africa: A Checklist
for Practitioners, IMF.
Rajan and Subramanian, 2005, “Aid and Growth:
What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really
Show?”, IMF Working Paper.
______, 2005, “What Undermines Aid’s Impact on
Growth?”, IMF Working Paper.