3250 Lecture - Monetary Relations
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Transcript 3250 Lecture - Monetary Relations
Unit Six: Global Politics of Money
Dr. Russell Williams
Required Reading:
Cohn, Ch. 6.
Class Discussion Reading:
Niall Fergusson, “The euro's big chance,” Prospect, May 27,
2004.
Benjamin J Cohen and Paola Subacchi, “A One-and-a-half
Currency System,” Journal of International Affairs,
Fall/Winter2008, Vol. 62 Issue 1, pp. 151-163.
Outline:
Introduction - International Monetary System
Central mechanisms
Breton Woods System
Contemporary System
Current Controversies
Further Reading
1) Introduction - International
Monetary System
Why is it important to study this???
Key to facilitating all international exchange
Important domestic politics ramifications
Major site of theoretical debate
Liberals emphasize role of markets in monetary
system
Realists and Historical Structuralists emphasize role
of states in creating/managing system
Current debates?
Should exchange rates float (liberals) or be
“Pegged” (anti-liberals and Keynesians)
2) Three Central Mechanisms:
A)
B)
C)
Exchange Rate System
Balance of Payments
Balance of Payments Adjustment
A) Exchange Rate System:
Exchange Rates/Foreign Exchange Markets
Based on price of one currency in terms of
another
“Price” determined by:
Floating System = supply and demand of currency
Fixed or pegged systems = state intervention
“Ideal Types” of Exchange Rate System:
i) Fixed or “pegged” system: currency pegged in
relation to key (or “benchmark”) currencies or
gold
Gold Standard (19th Century) - states guarantee
value of currency against gold = convertibility
Currencies should not fluctuate in value . . .
Non-Gold standard “pegged” systems
Currencies “fixed” in value against other currencies
States defend currency value through market intervention
Without convertibility speculators may not accept official
exchange rates
“Market Interventions” in a Fixed Exchange Rate
System:
1) Capital controls - Prevent currency trading
and speculation
2) Trading of state reserve currencies
3) Domestic policy adjustment
E.g. Lower or raise interest rates
ii) Floating System/Free-Floating System: States
allow exchange rates to change
Markets determine daily value of currency
Supply and demand
Modern “real world” systems:
i) “Fixed, but Adjustable” exchange rate systems:
States peg rates but can adjust them if necessary
Requires international cooperation to prevent “beggar thy
neighbor” policies
E.g. Breton Woods (1945-1972)/Europe(1974-1990)
ii) “Managed Floating”: (Current “non system”)
Exchange rates float in theory, but, states intervene to reduce
exchange rate changes bad for economy
i.e. Canada since 2005 . . . .
No agreed rates, states make own choices . . .
Can lead to “Manipulative or Dirty Floating” – States artificially
reduce exchange rate through “pegs” etc. for export advantage
Requires Considerable political coordination
E.g. China/US
Key Point: In modern system - states pursue different
approaches, some fix, some float etc.
Why do states choose to “fix” or “float”?
Economic Theory: “The Unholy Trinity”
States have three potential monetary goals:
Fixed exchange rate = Good for firms and international trade
Autonomy over domestic monetary and fiscal policies = Good for
domestic politics . . .
Capital mobility = Access to foreign investment
Economists say you can only have two at once
E.g. Fixed exchange rates and autonomy only if capital mobility
is low
State must control short term “Portfolio Investment” capital flows
(Breton Woods System)
E.g. Autonomy and capital mobility, but exchange rates must
float (Theoretically, the current “non system”)
However do states have autonomy in current system?
Only if they are unconcerned about exchange rates . . .
Three Central Mechanisms:
B) “Balance of Payments”: E.g. US (2003)
“Current Account” and “Capital Account”
Implications:
US is borrowing capital to finance imports
Key
Over long term this will further hurt “Current Account”
US becomes “debtor nation” and foreigners own more US assets
Points:
US account balances, but reveals potential long term
problem
Situation is only sustainable as long as foreigners
perceive the health of the US economy which makes it an
attractive place to invest.
Or as long as people perceive the health of the US dollar . . .
Three Central Mechanisms:
C) Balance of Payments Adjustment:
“Current Account” and “Capital Account”
don’t balance – country has an “imbalance of
payments”
If
E.g.
If no one wants to lend to or invest in US
=Downward pressure on value of US dollar
States
must adjust policies to remedy situation
Adjustment
limited by Exchange Rate System . . .
Balance of Payments Adjustment:
In
a Fixed Exchange Rate System:
Imbalance creates pressure on exchange rate =
States must intervene in market to offset
imbalance
E.g. US problem – current account deficit – leads to
declining interest in US dollar
Options:
1.
“Financing” - Use reserves and IMF lending
Can exceed capacity – under fixed Breton Woods system
states helped one other through IMF lending
Adjust domestic “Monetary Policy” and “Fiscal
Policy”
3. Impose tariffs (!)
2.
Balance of Payments Adjustment:
In a Floating Exchange Rate System:
Imbalance creates pressure on exchange rate,
but adjustment occurs through exchange rate
changes
I.e. US dollar falls relative to other currencies
“Depreciation”
vs. “Appreciation”
Resolves current account deficit – makes:
US
exports cheaper
Foreign imports more expensive
What has happened to the US dollar since 2003????
3) Breton Woods System:
=“Fixed but Adjustable” gold exchange standard: Most
currencies fixed to US dollar which was fixed to gold (35$
an ounce). US guaranteed convertibility
System was Keynesian/Embedded Liberal - wanted
exchange rate stability and domestic policy autonomy
=Stability good for international trade
=Domestic autonomy good for Keynesianism and full employment
“Unholy trinity”????
Balance of payments problems fixed by:
= Capital controls
A) “Financing” (IMF increased reserves available)
B) Agreed exchange rate adjustments
“Devaluation” and “Revaluation”
Option for all states - except the US!
System worked well for a time . . .
Restarted economic globalization (good for liberals)
High growth rates, rapid increases in standards of
living
Good for US allies
Also, good for US as hegemon?
“Seignorage”: Benefits that go to the issuer of
currency
Under system US $ is “global reserve currency”
US firms get to do business in US$ - Reduces risks and
cost of currency volatility
Cheaper to buy foreign goods - No exchange costs
Increased macroeconomic autonomy - People always want
your money (artificially high demand)
Lower inflation
Key financial centre – New York = Source of power?
Problems:
1) Central role of US dollar:
versus “confidence” – “Triffin Dilemma” – one
currency can’t do both
System required US to run capital account deficits
“Liquidity”
Money
must flow out of US to rest of world = US needed trade
surpluses . . . . (Current account problems???)
No
adjustment for US:
US
could not reduce value of currency - Other countries take
advantage (West German and Japan)
Trade and Convertibility problems
2) Globalization:
Growth
of short term financial flows/eroding of capital controls
(1970s)
“Eurocurrencies”/“Euromarkets”/Eurodollars
Increased pressure on fixed exchange rates
E.g.
Major
debate in IPE – Why did this happen?
Technology
or choice of UK and US
Collapse!
French attack on US hegemony (liquidity
versus confidence)
1970s US current account deficit – US
needed to adjust (= needed “Depreciation”)
“Nixon Shocks” (1971)
Ends convertibility to gold
Imposes tariffs to restore trade surplus
Depreciates US dollar
OECD states began to abandon capital
controls and float exchange rates
5) Contemporary System:
Current “Managed Floating” System is confused =
management problems
Major countries “float” currencies (US, EU, UK, Japan,
Canada)
Often intervene to keep currencies in desired ranges
Smaller European states, East Asia, developing nations
often peg currencies
US $ remains key currency of exchange but world is
subjected to challenges caused by US policies
E.g. Current US strategy of “Depreciation”
Problems:
Financial flows bigger then expected
More volatility – rapid shifts in exchange rates
Creates need for private “Hedging”
volatility – Speculative runs on currency
Less autonomy
Not all states float – possibility of manipulative or “Dirty
Floating”
E.g. China
Misalignment and irrationality
E.g. US dollar often overvalued - role as key currency
E.g. Canadian dollar often undervalued - Not clear
why
More
Problems require state management and international
cooperation
Despite floating system states remain important actors in
monetary system
6) Current Controversies:
a) Speculation and exchange rates:
Particular problem for small economies and
developing nations
Solutions?
i) “Tobin Taxes” -restore some state autonomy
ii) World Bank and IMF Reform
More aid for developing nations with short term problems
iii) “Currency Unions”: (E.g. Euro)
Reduces impact of volatility and speculation
“Optimal Currency Area”
Match the coverage of the currency to the area of
economic integration – less “trade” in foreign currency
b) Impact of the “Euro”:
Small states lose or gain autonomy?
Exchange
rate no longer a policy instrument
Limited “say” over Europe-wide policy
E.g. Greece versus Argentina
b) Impact of the “Euro”:
Europe and US dollar? Many predict Euro
will supplant US dollar as key currency
Euro
area is larger economy
US economic problems
Impact?
US will lose seignorage benefits?
Current account deficit harder to finance
Skeptics
suggest US still has advantages
Better financial markets
Europe not a single state – fragmented/less influence
over IMF/World bank
c) China/US Financial Relations:
US
argues Chinese RMB/Yuan pegged too low
relative to US$
Results:
Massive
trade deficit with China = Outsourcing debate
China holding huge US dollar reserves
Inflating value of US dollar?
Large pool of FDI – China becoming a huge capital
exporter
=China following path of Europe and Japan in
1960s?
Arguments:
Use
US power to force revaluation?
US benefits from situation?
Situation is going to take care of itself (US
Depreciation)
D) “Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF)”:
State
controlled investment vehicles
Control large amounts of global finance, but may not
behave like market participants
Transparency
Political agendas
Further Reading:
Eric Helleiner, “Still An Extraordinary Power, But for
How Much Longer? The United States in World
Finance,” in Lawton, and Verdun, eds., Strange
Power: Shaping the Parameters of International
Relations and International Political Economy,
(Ashgate, 2001), pp. 229-247.
Benjamin J. Cohen, “Can the Euro Ever Challenge
the Dollar?,” Journal of Common Market Studies,
41-4 (September 2003), pp. 575-595.
For Next Time:
Unit Seven: Money Problems - The “Debt
Crisis” and Financial Crises
Required Reading:
Cohn, Ch. 11.
Class Discussion Readings:
Sohan Sharma and Surinder Kumar, “Debt Relief –
Indentured Servitude for the Third World,” Race &
Class, 43-4 (April-June, 2002), pp. 45-56.
Kenneth Rogoff, “The IMF Strikes Back,” Foreign
Policy, No. 134, (January/February 2003) pp. 38-46