Transcript Hybr - US-Russia Business Council

Timothy Frye
[email protected]
Classic Approaches: Caricatured
 Putinology
 Clan Politics
 History
Types of Non-Democracies
 Military
 Chile under Pinochet
 Personalist
 Kazakhstan, Russia, Venezuela
 Single Party
 Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico, China

Party can check the leader
Three questions
 How do Personalist Governments Work?
 public opinion
 How Do Personalist Regimes Evolve?
 What is likely to Come Next?
Logic of Personalist Regimes
 Despite seeming chaos of day to day politics….
 Higher Corruption
 Higher Cronyism
 Greater Reliance on Popularity of Leader
Personal Power and Popularity
 Public opinion matters in Personalist regimes
 Popular leaders can deter challengers from within regime and
from without
 Coercion is costly
 Sign of weakness or vulnerability

Building a party takes time and it can turn on you
 Certainly the Case in Russia
What Drives Popularity?
 Do you approve of the political activities of President
Putin?
 Yes
 No
 Crude question – not election, etc.
Economy Predicts Approval
Figure 2. Presidential approval, actual and fitted values from
regressions with just economic perceptions and months in office
8
Yeltsin actual
approval
Average rating on 10 point scale
7
Putin as prime
minister
6
5
Putin actual
approval
4
Fitted values
for Yeltsin
3
2
Fitted values
for Putin
1
0
Jan-91
Jan-93
Jan-95
Jan-97
Jan-99
Jan-01
Jan-03
Jan-05
Jan-07
Source: Author's calculations using VCIOM and Levada Center poll data. Fitted values are predictions from models 7 in
Tables 2 and 3.
2
Dember 2011
Jan-12
Feb-12
Mar-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jun-12
Jul-12
Aug-12
Sep-12
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
1-Jan
1-Feb
1-Mar
1-Apr
1-May
1-Jun
1-Jul
1-Aug
1-Sep
1-Oct
1-Nov
1-Dec
1-Jan
1-Feb
1-Mar
1-Apr
1-May
1-Jun
1-Jul
Aug-14
Sep-14
Oct-14
Nov-14
Dec-14
Jan-15
Feb-15
Until 2012…
Presidential Approval and Economic Growth
10
9
8
7
Approval
6
5
4
3
Growth
1
0
Rally around the flag…
 Will it last?
 Hard to say

US comparisons
 Paradox of anti-Kiev/West peaking
 But little support for sending Russian troops to Ukraine
 Other measures of gov’t less supportive
 Long-term trend
Lying to Pollsters?
 Very Preliminary results suggests it is limited
 Maybe 3-7 percent
More Subtle Approach
 Randomly assign two versions of almost identical
question
 Difference in average responses only due to small
change in question wording
 Fall of 2014
 Survey of 1600 firms in Russia
Half receive Putin Prompt
 From 2012-14 at the initiative of President Putin
many attempts have been made to improve the
business climate. How would you rate the overall
business climate in your region from 2012-14?
 1 better
 2 somewhat better
 3 No change
 4 Somewhat worse
 5 Worse
Other half receive no prompt
 From 2012-14 many attempts have been made to
improve the business climate. How would you rate the
overall business climate in your region from 2012-14?
 1 better
 2 somewhat better
 3 No change
 4 Somewhat worse
 5 Worse
Influence of Putin on perceptions
of the business climate
Change in Business Climate
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
With Putin
Without Putin
Putin’s popularity
 High Approval ratings
 But also limited power to persuade
II. How Do Personalist Regimes
Evolve?
Striking Differences Among Different types of Regimes
All non-democracies 1945-2006
Average Tenure in Office (Years)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Military
Personalist
Single Party Hybrid
Single Party
Average Growth Rate in Year Before Leaving Office
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35
-0.4
-0.45
Military
Personalist
Single Party
How Rulers Lose Office
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
Regular Means
Natural Death
Irregular Means
Post Tenure Fate of Rulers
80
70
60
50
Percent
40
OK
Exile
Jail
Death
30
20
10
0
Military
Personalist
Single Party/Hybrid
Single Party
Implications
 Especially messy when personalist regimes fall
 Leaders anticipate punishment
 Personalist regimes more likely to be involved in
conflict, especially if bordered by other personalist
regimes
III. What Comes Next?
 Previous Regime Type
 Bad News for Russia
 Other Structural Conditions
 Good News
Transitions from Personalist Rule
60
49
50
43
40
PERCENT
35
35
To Democracy
30
To Hybrid Regime
22
20
Autocracy
16
10
0
Military Rule
Personalist Rule
Post Soviet Rulers Long-Lived
 Global average for Personalist Regimes
 Karimov, Nazarbaev,
 Lukashenko
 Aliev and Niyazov
 Akayev,
 Putin
15 years
24 and counting
21 and counting
20 and 16
15
15 and counting
Post-Soviet Eurasia
 Underperforms in terms of Democracy given its wealth
Income and Democracy
Latin America and Eurasia
Democracies in Red
Non Democracies in Black
Latin America
Country
Trinidad and Tobago
Argentina
Chile
Uruguay
Mexico
Panama
Venezuela
Brazil
Costa Rica
Colombia
Peru
Cuba
Suriname
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guyana
Paraguay
Guatemala
Bolivia
Post-Soviet Eurasia
GDP PPP Regime Type
20,301
FlaD
17,376
FlaD
16,171
FlaD
15,469
FulD
15,121
FlaD
13,595
FlaD
12,407
Hybr
11,845
11,562
10,155
10,000
9,900
9,492
9,289
9,003
8,335
7,595
7,541
5,548
5,033
4,843
FlaD
FulD
FlaD
FlaD
Auth
FlaD
FlaD
FlaD
Hybr
FlaD
FlaD
FlaD
Hybr
Hybr
Country
Russia
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Georgia
Armenia
Mongolia
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
GDP PPP
Regime Type
16,687
Auth
14,948
Auth
13,059
Auth
10,216
7,518
7,198
Auth
Auth
Hybr
5,430
5,395
4,509
3,293
2,380
2,039
Hybr
Hybr
FlaD
Auth
Hybr
Auth
Structural Conditions – Good News
 Russia far too rich, educated, and urban to be as
corrupt and non-democratic as it is.
 Russia far richer than other countries that have become
democracies, Spain in 1970s, Poland, Slovenia in 1990s,
 (I think) no authoritarian government has fallen in a
country as rich as Russia and not liberalized its political
system
Economic Inequality in Russia
 High, but not a big obstacle in comparative terms
Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient)
World Bank 2012
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Natural Resource Curse
Natural Resource is a Problem, but manageable
Natural Resource Rents as Share of GDP
World Bank 2012
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Iran
Bolivia
Russia
Chile
Peru
Mexico
South Africa
China
Conclusions
 Personalist regimes

Ironic importance of Public Opinion

Personalist regimes more fragile and transitions more difficult

Mixed prospects with political turnover
Workplace Pressure to vote
 “How many of the following things will affect your job
security, benefits, and income in 2012? Please do not
tell me which of these factors will have an effect, just
tell me how many.”
15% think voting will influence
Table 2: pay
List Experiment
on Clientelistic Exchange in the Russian Workplace
their
income
Control
1. Your job
performance
2. Performance of the
Russian economy
3. Change in trade
with China
1.76
Mean
Items
#
Treatment
1. Your job
performance
2. Performance of the
Russian economy
3. Change in trade
with China
4. Your decision to
vote in the 2011 State
Duma elections
1.91
Personalist Regimes and
Corruption
 Hard to Measure Corruption
 Incentives to lie on surveys
 Corrupt officials hide
 Lot of interesting research on this topic
 Most cutting edge approach to sensitive questions
Why Are Governors Reappointed?
 Political Loyalty
 Vote Share of United Russia
 Economic Performance
 Growth Rates, or Unemployment
Personalist Regimes and Promotion
Russia: Reappointment of Governors post 2004
 Political Indicators Matter, not Economics



UR vote Share predicts reappointment
Size of effect is large
Economic performance plays little role
 China: Promotion of Regional Elites
 Economic Indicators dominate

Growth rates in region good predictor of promotion
List Experiment
 Randomly Assign questions
 Treatment/Control
 How many of these things have you experienced. Not
which ones, but how many
Control
Tell us please which of the following items have you
experienced at least one time in the last 12 months. Please
do not tell us which items, just tell us how many.
1. Went to a police station to register documents
2. Ask a police officer for directions
3. Showed your documents to a police officer who stopped
you on the street
4. Watched a film or television show about the police.
Treatment
Tell us please which of the following items have you
experienced at least one time in the last 12 months. Please
do not tell us which items, just tell us how many.
1. Went to a police station to register documents
2. Ask a police officer for directions
3. Showed your documents to a police officer who stopped
you on the street
4. Watched a film or television show about the police.
5. Gave a bribe to a police officer (a beat cop, a traffic
officer, etc.) in order to avoid an unpleasant situation.
Of those with contact with police
20% said they paid bribes
2
1.8
1.6
Average Response
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Control
Treatment
Half respondents receive this
 Take a look at this list of politicians and tell me for how many you
generally support their activities. Please do not tell us which ones you
support. Just tell us how many.
 Vladimir Zhirinovsky
 Gennady Zyuganov
 Sergei Mironov

 Answer

0 1 2 3
Other half receive this
 Take a look at this list of politicians and tell me for how many you
generally support their activities. Please do not tell us which ones you
support. Just tell us how many.
 Vladimir Zhirinovsky
 Gennady Zyuganov
 Sergei Mironov
 Vladimir Putin
 Answer
0 1 2 3 4
 Difference in mean response = true support for Putin
More subtle measure
 Sample of 600 businesspeople in 2008
 4 slightly different question about joining the WTO
 Randomly assign which respondent gets what question
 Simply change who recommends joining the WTO
 Only thing that can account for difference in the
responses is the change in wording
Two versions
 President Medvedev thinks that Russian
membership in the WTO will help develop the
economy. To what extent do you support Russian
joining the WTO?
 Prime Minister Putin thinks that Russian
membership in the WTO will help develop the
economy. To what extent do you support Russian
joining the WTO?
The persuasive power of
economists
 Most Russian economists thinks that Russian
membership in the WTO will help develop the
economy. To what extent do you support Russian
joining the WTO?
 Most Western economists thinks that Russian
membership in the WTO will help develop the
economy. To what extent do you support Russian
joining the WTO?
Putin’s Persuasive Powers 2008
Similar Questions in December 2011
 Prime Minister Putin thinks that Russian
membership in the WTO will help develop the
economy. To what extent do you support Russian
joining the WTO?
 To what extent do you support Russian joining the
WTO?
Results December 2011