Transcript Insert Title

A Quick Review of the Cyclical Indicators
A Look at MV=PQ
GaveKal Research
Presentation to Euro92
Alain Madelin
Septembre 25 2003, Paris
GaveKal Research
An Expansionist Monetary Policy=M is Going UP
Liquidity expanding on a global scale
Money Supply Growth (M2) in Major Countries
GaveKal M Indicator & US Bond Market
22.5
9
18.0
16.0
20.0
7
14.0
12.0
17.5
5
10.0
8.0
3
12.5
Rebound in China, US, & EMU M2 growth
10.0
7.5
6.0
4.0
YoY % Change
M Indicator
YoY % Change
15.0
1
-1
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-3
-6.0
-8.0
5.0
-5
-10.0
-12.0
2.5
-7
-14.0
-16.0
Mild rebound in Japan M2 growth
0.0
97
98
USA M2 Annual Growth
Japan M2 Annual Growth
Euroland M2 Annual Growth
China M2
99
00
01
02
03
-9
-18.0
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
USA government bond index in local currency all matur. daily
GaveKal Indicator of Liquidity (M)
•
Central banks all around the world have been printing money aggressively to either fight off the deflation/depression
demons (USA, UK, EMU…) or to prevent their currencies from rising too quickly (Japan, China, India…). The recent
level of monetary activism is reflected by the up-tick in our Global M Indicator.
•
An expanding global money supply is usually good for stocks and bad for bonds. In light of the major central banks’
activism, the recent behaviour of bond and equity markets is understandable.
GaveKal Research
3
V is Rebounding very Strongly
The GaveKal Velocity (V) Indicator & Vix Index
16
10.0
14
12.5
12
•
With the continued
contraction in quality
spreads and the pick-up
in bank lending, we do
not fear a new
contraction in velocity.
•
The question today is
not whether velocity will
once again collapse, but
whether the velocity
rebound is already
priced into the market?
17.5
8
20.0
6
22.5
4
25.0
2
27.5
Vix Index
Indicator
Our velocity indicators
bottomed in September
2002 and returned to
positive territory in
March 2003.
15.0
Irrational exuberance
10
0
-2
30.0
32.5
-4
35.0
-6
37.5
-8
-10
•
40.0
Velocity Falling
42.5
-12
45.0
-14
47.5
-16
50.0
99
00
01
02
03
Velocity Indicator
USA CBOE Volatility (VIX) index, close daily
GaveKal Research
4
No inflation Risk on the Horizon.
GaveKal P Indicator & USA ECRI Future Inflation Gauge
10.0
125
•
Our P indicator
indicates that there
will be very little
inflationary pressures
over the coming
months.
•
As such, central
banks will be able to
continue their
anchoring of short
rates and their
aggressive printing of
money.
P Indicator leads by four months
7.5
R= 0.84
120
5.0
115
1992=100
2.5
0.0
110
-2.5
105
-5.0
100
-7.5
-10.0
95
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
P Indicator
United States, Inflation n.i.e., ECRI Future inflation gauge, USD
P Indicator
GaveKal Research
Source: EcoWin
5
Conclusion: Q will Boom
•
For most of the past year, the predominant concern of financial markets has been whether economic activity would
pick-up following the end of the Iraq War. In July, policy makers, economic data, and the financial markets seem to have
put these fears to rest!
•
Our indicator of daily economic sensitive prices is now announcing a solid economic rebound; as is our monthly growth
(Q) indicator. And so is the data: last week, US GDP increased by a much higher than expected 2.4% in the second
quarter and jobless claims over the past two weeks have been coming in better than expected.
•
The recovery is there. And it will be strong.
Daily Indicator of Economic Sensitive Prices & OECD Ind. Prod.
GaveKal Quantity (Q) Indicator & OECD GDP
20
5.0
12.0
16
4.5
10.0
8.0
4.0
12
7.5
5.0
6.0
3.5
8
4.0
2.5
YoY % Change
3.0
0
-4
2.0
2.5
Index
Q Indicator
4
0.0
0.0
2.0
-2.0
1.5
-4.0
-2.5
-8
-12
1.0
-6.0
0.5
-8.0
-5.0
GaveKal Indicator leads by 100 days
R=0.8, lead time three months
-16
0.0
-20
92
93
94
95
96
Q Indicator
OECD Gross domestic product, Volume, sa RHS
Q Indicator
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
-0.5
04
-10.0
-12.0
-7.5
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
GaveKal Indicator of Daily Economic Senstive Prices
GaveKal Indicator of Daily Economic Senstive Prices
OECD IP total industry, Volume, sa
GaveKal Research
6
Back to the Deflationary Boom
Prices
Inflationary Boom
Buy: Gold, Cash
Sell: Financial Assets
Buy: Scarcity Assets & Cyclicals
Sell: Bonds,
Interest Sensitive Stocks
Buy: Government Bonds
Sell: Equity,
Negative Cash Flow Assets
Accelerating growth,
accelerating liquidity and
tame prices: we are back to
the glory days of the
deflationary boom.
•
A deflationary boom is a
very exciting, and
dangerous, investment
environment (see Theoretical
Framework for the Analysis of
A Deflationary Boom on our
website).
+
Inflationary Bust
Deflationary Bust
•
Deflationary Boom
Buy: Efficiency Shares
Sell: Price Inelastic
GaveKal Research
Economic
activity
•+ It is very propitious to overinvestments, overexcitements, and bubbles.
Where will the next bubble
be? Our guess is Asia…and
we want to participate in it!
•
In any event, the markets’
recent moves make sense in
light of economic
fundamentals.
7
Who will benefit structurally from the Boom
A Wicksellian Analysis of the World
Central Banks, Inflation, Deflation and
Financial Markets
GaveKal Research
Introduction.
•
Wicksell, the Swedish economist had a very powerful intuition. His view was that economic cycles
could be explained by the divergences between what he called the ‘’ natural’’ interest rates, and
what he called the ‘’market’’ rates. (More on those two later)
•
If the ‘’market rates’’ were too low i.e. if money was too cheap, it led to a boom centred on excess
capital spending, excess borrowing, excess consumption.
•
These ‘’boom conditions’’ led eventually to a rise in the market rates above the natural rate, and
this changes in the price of money eventually brought about a bust, which would lead in due time
to a fall of the market rates below the level of the natural rates.
•
And on and on…
•
With every country (at the time of his writing) operating under the Gold Exchange Standard, there
was little that could be done to stem these periodic booms and busts, more a function of gold
discoveries and international capital flows than the results of conscious decisions by the central
bankers.
•
This is not the case anymore: central bankers do control market rates at the short end.
GaveKal Research
9
Wicksell’s Children
Three economic schools can be traced to Wicksell.
1.
2.
3.
The Keynesians. Their view is very simple: since the rise of the market rate above the natural
rate creates the bust, the central bank should prevent the market rate from ever going above
the natural one. Their view was developed during a depression, and was dominant up to the
end of the seventies.
The Austrians. They believe that preventing the market rate from going up distorts the price
mechanism and that the central bank should leave the interest rate as close as possible from
the natural rate all the time. Their view, represented by the Bundesbank was developed
during an inflationary period and prevailed from the end of the seventies to the end of the
nineties.
The Fischerians, who after Irving Fischer considered that the role of the central bank was to
manage short rates contra-cyclically. Their views were developed into a historical period full of
potentially very dangerous financial accidents (Oil shocks, Banking collapses, countries going
bankrupt etc…) Their best representative is of course the Fed with Mr Greenspan
GaveKal Research
10
The Goal of this Presentation
Once in a while, we indulge in a little bit of theoretical work.
Not because we want to bore our readers to death, but simply to ‘’reposition’’ ourselves
intellectually.
We believe it leads afterwards to better understanding and thus better advice.
The work that we have done over the last few years (in fact since the re-emergence of our research
effort in 1998) has in fact convinced us that the Wicksellian analysis is the correct one.
Thus we will:
1.
Present our own definitions of what the ‘’natural’’ rate is
2.
Show that divergence between the natural and the market rate is indeed at the origin of the
economic cycle.
3.
Show that the ‘’core beliefs’’ under which a central bank is operating, leads almost naturally
to a series of economic and financial consequences over time, always the same for the same
set of core beliefs.
4.
Show that when a central bank changes it sets of core beliefs, (from Keynesian to Austrian
etc…), it has a huge influence on the underlying financial markets.
5.
Identify the sets of beliefs under which the main central banks are operating today, and draw
some investment conclusions.
GaveKal Research
11
Identifying the ‘’ Natural ’’ rate
USA IP Total Index & GDP : 10 Years Averages Annual Increases
12 Months Variations Ten Years Average
5.5
•
5.0
4.5
The US Natural Rate must be around 3%
4.0
Average Growth Rate of the GDP
3.5
3.0
2.5
•
2.0
Average Growth Rate of the US IP
1.5
1.0
0.5
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
USA IP total index, Volume, sa
USA Gross Domestic Product, Volume, AR, sa
GaveKal Research
00
01
02
03
•
Over the last
twenty five years,
the US GDP has
grown by 3% per
year on average,
and the Industrial
Production by
2.7%.
So the ‘’natural
rate for the US
economy must be
slightly below 3%
real
Why?
12
Reasoning ‘’ad absurdum’’
•
US GDP & Cash-Flows Base 100 in 1982
US GDP (Volume) & US Cash--Flows
340
290
•
240
190
140
90
40
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
USA Gross Domestic Product, Value, AR, sa
US Corporate cash-flows, Base 100 in 1982
Short Rates Capitalised (US T Bills)
GaveKal Research
00
01
02
03
04
•
Over the long
term, the growth
rate of the US
GDP=the growth
rate of the US
Corporate cashflows (profits).
If short term
rates capitalised
(the green line)
grew faster than
corporate profits
or the GDP,
overtime the
system would
implode.
Ergo, the upper
limit of the
natural rate must
be the growth
rate in volume of
the economy,
13
Defining ‘’Real’’ Rates
So, the upper limit of the ‘’Natural‘’ rate is 3 %.
Interest rates should not stay above 3 % for a sustained period of time real without creating
substantial damages to the economy. Big help indeed.
It leaves us with more questions than answers.
The question we have to address now are:
1.
Which market interest rates are we going to use as a proxy for our market interest rates?
2.
Which inflation rate are we going to deflate these interest rates with?
Fortunately, we have done over the last few years quite a lot of work on these topics, and have come
to the following conclusions.
When it comes to interest rates, we cannot introduce a ‘’risk’ ’element in the picture, so we will have to
use Government related tools.
We cannot use short rates only (too short a period), nor can we use long rates (volatility in inflation
expectations). So we will use the average of three months T Bills and 10 Years bonds.
As far as inflation is concerned, our readers know that we have always favoured the average inflation
of the last ten years, as the best proxy for the ‘’perceived’’ inflation rate.
Results
GaveKal Research
14
Our Measure of Real Rates
Market Rates in the US
•
8
7
•
6
Proxy for the Wicksellian Market Rates
Real Rates
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
•
Real Rates in the US
Favours the Entrepreneur
GaveKal Research
We are reasonably
happy with our
market rate proxy.
It moves between
0 and +3 %,
which is what we
were expecting,
and there is no
discernible trend,
a sign that we are
using the right
inflation rate to
deflate the
nominal interest
rates.
Next question of
course: does it
work ?
15
The Proof
•
US GDP Variations & Market Rates vs Natural Rates
9
8
7
5
Recessions
4
6
5
Market Rates Above Natural Rates
Y/o/Y % Changes
4
3
2
3
2
1
1
0
0
-1
-1
-2
-3
-4
Market Rates Below Natural Rates
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
•
-2
-3
Every Recession Took Place AFTER
Market Rates rose ABOVE Natural Rate
-4
-5
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
USA Gross Domestic Product, Volume, AR, sa
0
Market Rates Above or Below Natural Rate
•
GaveKal Research
Every recession
since 1968 in the
US took place
after a rise in real
rates above 3%
(Gray boxes above
zero).
When market rates
were below the
natural rate, the
US economy grew
‘’normally’’.
So it works…
16
The Keynesian Central Bank
•
USA T Bills Yields & US GDP Annual Growth Rate
17.5
15.0
Interest rates lower than GDP
Interest rates higher than GDP
12.5
Percent
10.0
7.5
?
5.0
•
2.5
0.0
Inflation
Desinflation/Deflation
-2.5
58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
Market Rates Nominal
GDP Growth Rate (Value)
USA CPI 12 Months Variations four Years Moving A verage
GaveKal Research
The characteristic
of a Keynesian
central bank is that
short rates will be
maintained all the
time below the
growth rate of the
economy.
This always leads to
everybody and his
brother borrowing,
money supply
exploding and
inflation going up
structurally…US
1958. 1979
17
Moving from Keynesian to Austrian
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A Keynesian monetary policy is aimed at what Keynes called the ‘’euthanasia of the Rentier’’.
It can work only if the financial markets are heavily regulated (regulation Q, credit controls, foreign
exchange controls etc...)
When the Futures markets in Chicago invented the contracts on the US interest rates, then this
policy was doomed.
The futures allowed the investors to hedge against the future inflation, thereby leading to a massive
rise in real rates immediately.
This rise in real rates brought those way above 3 % (the natural rate) for an extended period of
time and killed the incentive to borrow.
And the US moved from inflation to des-inflation-deflation.
This move has huge financial consequences, which we are going to study now using the Japanese
example.
GaveKal Research
18
The Japanese Drama in Three Acts
•
At the end of a Keynesian period, real rates are deeply negative, and nominal rates are high.
•
In the first phase (boom, bubble), we see a gradual fall in nominal rates and a gradual rise in real rates.,
at the same time. Since nominal rates are used to discount future cash-flows, we have an incredible
boom cum bubble.
•
Eventually (second act), real rates (market rates) rise above the long term growth rate of the
economy, even though nominal rates keep falling. This is when the bubble bursts. As long as real
rates (Market Rates) remain above the structural growth rate of the economy (which might be falling due to the
liquidation of the bad investments of the bubble period), the economy keeps stalling or falling.
•
The wave of bankruptcies destroy the banking system, Velocity collapses, and deflation kicks in
(third phase)
•
See next graph for the three phases…
GaveKal Research
19
A Graphic view of the Japanese Drama
Japan GDP & Real Interest Rates (Structural Inflation)
9
8
Market Rates < Natural Rates
Bubble
7
Banking Crisis
Market Rates > Natural Rates
Velocity Collapses
Bust
6
5
%
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
12 Months Variations GDP in Volume [ma 12]
Market Rates Real
Market Rates Nominal
GaveKal Research
20
Preliminary Conclusion
•
•
•
•
•
•
A French Politician once confronted with a very favourable development in France said ‘’ Let’s
feign to be the organisers of these phenomena that we do not understand’’. This is a luxury that a central
bank cannot afford.
The most dangerous phase when a central bank moves from Keynesian to Austrian is after a
few years of boom when real (market) rates start moving above the structural growth rate of
the economy (natural rate), when everybody has understood and borrows to buy financial
assets…
This usually coincides with the peak of the bubble (Japan 1989).
The central bank must then talk tough, but be willing to cut short rates aggressively and very
quickly to prevent a collapse of the house of cards, i.e. it must move from Austrian to Fischerian
in no time…
Maintaining real rates above the structural growth rate of the economy during more than five
years as the BOJ did was suicidal.
If such a mistake is made then the third phase unfolds, centred around a collapse of the
financials in general and the commercial banks in particular…and monetary policy becomes
ineffective.
GaveKal Research
21
What about a Central Bank being Austrian since its
Origin ?
The reader still with us may then ask: OK, then I should keep my money all the time in a country
ruled by a central bank which has operated for ever under the Austrian theory. If only life was that
simple…
• Because to operate efficiently, this central bank must have a pretty good idea of what the structural
growth rate of the economy is .
• If this structural growth rate of the economy moves down for one reason or another, and if the
central bank does not adjust downwards the short rates target, then the economy will move, over
time, into a deflation-depression…
• The same is true on the other side if the growth rate moves up…We could have an inflation boom
emerging
• Moreover the mandate of the central bank may change from one country to a group of countries,
and if the central bank follows a policy aimed at the average of all those countries, then all those with a
below average natural rate will go bust, eventually.
• This is what is happening in EuroLand.
GaveKal Research
22
Incompetence & Arrogance
•
France: Market Rates and Natural Rate
7
6
Market Rate below Natural Rate= Growth
•
5
4
Percent
3
•
2
1
0
-1
-2
Market Rate above Natural Rate = Bust
-3
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
•
France GDP total, Vol, sa [ma 3, c.o.p 12]
Market Rate in Real Terms
France GDP total, Vol, sa [ma 3, c.o.p 12]
GaveKal Research
Rates in France
are 200 bp too
high.
The French
Economy should
continue
collapsing.
Question: is it
going to be saved
by a positive
movement in
foreign trade
(boom in
exports)?
See next pages
23
The French Example
France Deflationary Pressure Index (DPI)
•
-5
-3
Market Rate Below Natural Rate
-1
1
Percent
3
Markets
rates have
been above
the natural
rate 95 %
of the time
since 1987.
5
7
Market Rate Above Natural Rate
9
11
13
15
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
Using IP*CPI
0
French DPI
GaveKal Research
24
Back to Purchasing Parity
Purchasing Parity: Adjusted for the differences in Productivity
10
8.0
9
7.5
8
US Dollar Over Valued
USD/FRF
7.0
7
6
6.5
5
6.0
4
3
5.5
2
5.0
1
US Dollar Undervalued
0
4.5
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
•
On a PP
adjusted for
the
differences in
productivity,
the Euro is
overvalued by
at least 15
%...and this is
not to
mention the
PP with
China, Korea
etc…
France Exchange rate USD/FRF
Purchasing Parity
One Standard Deviation UP
One Standard Deviation Down
GaveKal Research
25
France is not Price Competitive
Tendances
•
Productivity Differences & Euro vs Dollar
0.5
1.4
0.0
-0.5
1.3
-1.0
-1.5
Exchange Rate
Differences
1.2
-2.0
-2.5
-3.0
-3.5
1.1
The Euro should be at .84
-4.0
1.0
-4.5
0.9
-5.0
-5.5
-6.0
0.8
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Productivity Europe-Productivity US
Taux de Change
GaveKal Research
00
01
02
•
The
EuroLand
economy is
not benefiting
from the rise
in
productivity
which we are
seeing in the
US.
In fact
productivity
keeps
decelerating in
Europe (UK
included)
26
The Rise of the Euro Will Keep Hurting
Exchange Rate leads by 6 Months
20
15
15
10
10
12 Months Variations
12 Months Variations
Euro vs Dollar & French Exports
20
5
0
-5
•
The collapse of
French (read
EuroLand) exports
is just starting.
5
0
-5
-10
-10
-15
-15
-20
-20
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
EMU Exchange rate USD/EUR
France Exports of goods and services, Volume, sa, Right Scale
GaveKal Research
27
Who is going to Pay?
•
Purchasing Parity Yen Euro & Added Value in French Industry
12.5
-20
10.0
-15
7.5
-10
5.0
-5
EUR/JPY
Value Added
French Corporate Profits to Collapse
2.5
0
0.0
5
-2.5
10
-5.0
15
-7.5
20
Jul
95
Jul
96
Jul
97
Jul
98
Jul
99
Jul
00
Jul
01
Jul
02
Jul
03
Jul
•
04
•
Who else but
the French
companies?
After all, we
have a
Government
which has not
repealed one of
the stupid
Socialist laws
Like the UK
conservatives
before Mrs
Thatcher, they
are ‘’managing’’
the decline.
France Value added, by sector, industry, Value, sa
Deviation From Purchasing Parity with the Yen
GaveKal Research
28
The EuroLand Drama: End of Act 1, Moving Towards
Act 2
•
From 1970 to 1991, the German Industrial production grew on average by 2.5 % per year.
•
From 1992 to 2003, this growth rate has fallen to 1.2% per year. (Our objective here is NOT to
explain this decline, but simply to mention it).
•
In the 80’s real rates in Germany were most of the time above 3% when the growth rate was at
2.5%. Tight but not unbearable.
•
Those rates are still close to 3%, even though the growth rate has fallen to 1.25%. The difference
between the natural rate and the market rate has seldom been higher.
• An Austrian central Bank by gravely misreading the long term structural growth rate
of its economy can create a disaster about as bad as anything a Keynesian central
bank has achieved in the past.This state of affairs cannot not lead to the collapse of
the Euro. We are not sure that the Euro will survive in its present format.
GaveKal Research
29
The Economy is very Sensitive to the Variations in
Short Rates
Fed Funds vs. Industrial Production in the US
12.5
10.0
-75
•
Lead Time 12 Months
7.5
YoY % Change
5.0
2.5
0.0
-2.5
-5.0
Fed Funds Variations inverted
-50
War+Tax Increases
-7.5
-25
0
•
25
50
75
100
-10.0
-12.5
125
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
USA IP total index, Volume, sa [ma 3, c.o.p 12]
Changes in Fedeal Funds Rates RHS Inverted [ma 3, c.o.p 12, lag 12]
GaveKal Research
Twelve months
after a fall in US
rates, Economic
activity picks up,
the reverse being
also true.
As a result the
US central always
maintain the fed
funds rates
between the long
term growth rate
of the US
economy and 0
(in real terms)…
30
A Fischerian Central Bank
•
Real Rates & US GDP
5
Real Rates Remain Between -1 and +3...
Boom. the Fed Tightens
4
Real Rates
3
2
1
0
-1
Bust, the Fed Eases
-2
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
US GDP in Volume 12 Months Variations
Real Rates on T Bills Using 10 Y Inflation
2.3
0
GaveKal Research
01
02
03
04
There is no
alternative (TINA
as Mrs Thatcher
was fond of
saying) , but to be
a Fischerian central
bank,
manipulating
short rates,
putting them
above the growth
rate of the
economy when
the economy is
booming, and
putting them at
zero or below
when the
economy is
busting.
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Conclusion
•
Of all the countries which we follow, the biggest positive spread between the natural rate and
the market rate are to be found in Asia in general and China in particular. (see our Research on
Asia & China) A new boom there has started or is imminent. The way the local central banks
will manage the passage from Keynesian orthodoxy to Fischerian pragmatism will be the key
between a new boom and bust cycle or a sustained period of economic growth.
•
In the US the fundamentals have seldom been better for risks takers and corporate profits. The
US companies are back to positive cash flow. In the US, we should see a massive depreciation
of the US dollar vs. the Asian currencies, and an export surge, accompanied by a boom in
capital spending. The Fed will have to tighten pretty soon, or run the risk of inflation
accelerating markedly.
•
No hope for EuroLand, except if the Euro collapses and brings about a surge in nominal
activity through exports, allowing the market rates to move below the natural rate at least
temporarily. Unfortunately, we tend to believe that if the Euro were to fall the ECB might be
raising rates…
•
The procedures of the ECB are economically incoherent, and cannot work. We are not sure
that the Euro is going to survive in its present format. It could very well disappear. EuroLand is
entering into a massive political crisis.
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32
For more information, please contact Louis-Vincent Gave
at [email protected]
or call us on 852- 2869 8363, fax: 852- 2869 8131.
This presentation is available on our website:
www.gavekal.com
GaveKal Research
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