Transcript China, the US, and Currency Issues

China-US
Currency
Issues
Jeffrey Frankel
Harpel Professor
Revised from CLD Program, June 8, 2010;
CHINA FUTURE LEADERS,
10 a.m., Bell Hall, January 17, 2011
Topics to be covered
(I) Historical timeline of exchange rate diplomacy
(II) What is in China’s interest?
(III) What is in the interest of the US & Rest of World?
(IV) Shifting power relationships
–
Appendices:
•
•
•
•
U.S. Treasury biannual reports on currency manipulation
The current account imbalances
The internationalization of the RMB
Technical appendices
2
Historical
timeline
“I have listened to both sides of this
debate. Here is what I think. I think
those who call for a fixed exchange
rate are right in the short run. And
those who call for a floating exchange
rate are right in the long run.
How long is the short run, you ask?
You must understand. China is 8000
years old. So when I say, short run,
it could be 100 years.”
-- Li Ruogu, Deputy Governor,
People’s Bank of China, Dalian, May 2004
3
Historical timeline of currency diplomacy
• 1973: End of Bretton Woods era.
– Major currencies switch from fixed to floating. The rest keep their pegs.
• 1977:
IMF members agree that each shall “avoid manipulating
exchange rates … in order to prevent effective balance of payments
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.”
[Principle (A) of the “1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies,” and Sect.1, Clause 3, of Article IV amended in 1978.]
– In practice, the IMF almost never pressures countries to revalue their currencies upward;
• It just pressures deficit countries to devalue.
• 1983-84: ¥/$ Agreement. 1985: Plaza Accord.
– Japan, US & others cooperate to bring down overvalued $, esp. vs. ¥
• 1987-89:
– Louvre Agreement: $ depreciation halted.
– Big bubbles in Japan’s equity & real estate markets,
– followed by crash, & severe Japanese stagnation in 1990s.
4
Timeline, continued
• 1988: The Omnibus Trade
& Competitiveness Act
mandates the US Treasury report to
Congress biannually on whether trading
partners were manipulating currencies.
– Section 3004 requires the Treasury to “consider whether countries
manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the US $
for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments
or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.''
– The US must hold talks with governments deemed to be breaking rules.
– In the first Reports to Congress on International
Economics & Exchange Rate Policy, Korea &
Taiwan PoC were found to be guilty of manipulation,
• while Singapore & Hong Kong SAR “got off with a warning.”
• China was named in early 1990s.
5
Timeline, continued: Exchange rate
• Jan. 1994: China devalues its official rate,
– unifying its dual exchange rate system.
• 1997-98: East Asia crisis.
– China wins plaudits for keeping RMB (“yuan”’) fixed
• while all its neighbors are devaluing.
• 1995-2005: China continues to peg
– for 10 years
– at 8.28 RMB/$.
6
Timeline, continued: US pressure
• Oct. 2003: Treasury Secretary Snow begins
to “browbeat” China to allow appreciation.
– Treasury Report: RMB merits concern & talks
– Speculators in financial markets start to bet appreciation.
– as reflected in either capital flows (see Prasad & Wei)
– or non-deliverable forward price (see appendix graph).
• Feb. 2005: Senators Schumer & Graham propose
first of bills to impose (WTO-illegal) tariffs of 27.5 %
against all Chinese goods if China does not
substantially revalue its currency.
– Subsequent versions, by Baucus-Grassley and
others substitute the phrase “currency misalignment” in
place of “unfair manipulation” to ease standard of proof.7
Timeline, continued: China’s macroeconomy
• 2004-07:
• 2005-06:
Rapid growth puts China into Excess Demand.
Despite large balance of payments surpluses, PBoC
sterilization of reserve inflows prevents excessive money growth & inflation.
• 2007-08: Sterilization finally falters:
Money becomes excessive.
– Inflation becomes a serious concern.
– Shanghai stock market experiences a bubble.
• Mid-2008 – early 2009:
Worst of the global recession hits.
– China loses 26% of exports
– Growth slows; danger of overheating disappears.
• Mid-2009 – 2011:
China resumes very rapid growth
– in response to domestic demand stimulus + renewed exports
– China is now a major engine of growth in world economy.
– Danger of overheating returns: esp. real estate bubble.
8
Timeline,
continued:
Exchange rate
• July 2005: China announces a new policy,
– Immediate 2.1% revaluation,
– Followed by “managed float”: controlled appreciation,
supposedly against an unspecified basket of currencies.
– But, as often, de jure exchange rate regime ≠ de facto.
• Estimation of true regime reveals:
– $ link did not even begin to loosen until 2006.
– By 2007, implicit basket had shifted some weight
onto other currencies, especially the €.
– RMB appreciates against the $ from 2006 to 2008,
• because € does.
9
The magnitude of daily movements
vs. $ increased in the spring of 2006,
-.002
0
.002
.004
Changes in CNY per USD over Time: 07/22/05-1/8/2007
01 Jul 05
01 Jan 06
01 Jul 06
date
01 Jan 07
10
Timeline,
continued:
Exchange rate
• May 2008: Chinese leaders hear exporter
complaints of competitiveness difficulties.
• Mid-2008-April 2010:
yuan re-pegs ≈ $ 6.84 RMB/$
• ≈ 20% stronger, vs. $, than 2005.
11
04
04 Jan-M 05
04 ar-M 05
a
04 y-0
-Ju 5
04 l-0
5
04 Sep
-N -05
o
04 v-0
-Ja 5
04 n-M 06
04 ar-M 06
a
04 y-0
-Ju 6
04 l-0
-S 6
04 ep
-N -06
o
04 v-0
-Ja 6
04 n-M 07
04 ar-M 07
a
04 y-0
-Ju 7
04 l-0
-S 7
04 ep
-N -07
o
04 v-0
- 7
04 Jan-M 08
04 ar-M 08
a
04 y-0
-Ju 8
04 l-0
8
04 Sep
-N 08
o
04 v-0
-Ja 8
04 n-M 09
04 ar-M 09
a
04 y-0
-J 9
04 ul-0
-S 9
04 ep
-N -09
o
04 v-0
-Ja 9
04 n-M 10
ar
-1
0
/RMB
The RMB rose against the $ for 2 years,
but returned to peg in mid-2008
Exchange rates, Jan. 2005 - March 2010
0.18
2
0.16
$/RMB
0.1
0.08
0.06
$/RMB
($/2+euro/2)/RMB
euro/RMB
1.8
0.14
1.6
0.12
1.4
1.2
€/RMB
1
0.8
€/$
0.04
0.02
0
Euro/$ (RHS)
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Date
12
Timeline,
continued
• Oct. 2006 -- IMF Article IV consultation
finds RMB “undervalued.”
• 2007: US Treasury temporarily passes
hot potato of exchange rate complaints to IMF,
– which gets mandate for exchange rate “surveillance.”
• 2008: Though financial crisis originates in US,
“flight to quality” temporarily raises demand for $.
• 2009: Chinese leaders, for the first time,
express concerns that their vast holdings
of US treasury bills may not be well-invested.
– Pres. Obama & Secy. Geithner seek to reassure.
13
2009: Chinese warnings
– Premier Wen worries US T bills may lose value.
Urges the US to keep its deficit
at an “appropriate size” to ensure
the “basic stability” of the $
(again on 11/10/09).
– PBoC Gov. Zhou, proposes
replacing $ as international
currency, with the SDR
(March 09).
14
Timeline, continued
2010
• Winter 2010: Pressure mounts -– International pressure on Beijing to appreciate;
– Congressional pressure on US Treasury to find
China guilty of currency manipulation in its
biannual report due April 15.
– But Chinese say they will never bow to pressure.
15
• April 2010 -- Collision is averted:
– Treasury postpones manipulation report.
• June 19 – PBoC announces it will
“increase the renminbi’s exchange-rate flexibility,”
– though subsequent appreciation is small.
• So both sides save face
– for the moment.
16
• September 27 –
Brazil Finance Minister Mantega
warns of “Currency Wars”:
– Each country intervenes to push its currency down
– in effort to gain trade advantage,
• collectively futile.
• November 8, G20 Summit in Seoul -– China criticizes US
Fed’s monetary easing
(“QE2”) as an example
of currency wars.
17
• Jan. 2011:
Preparations for Obama-Hu summit
– Jan.14: Geithner notes that -- including higher China’s
inflation -- RMB is appreciating at 10% per year.
– That suggests US lower priority on the currency issue
• Vs. IPR, North Korea & other issues.
18
Appreciation + inflation
WSJ 1/22/11
19
5% nominal appreciation per annum
+ 5% inflation differential
≈ 10% real appreciation per annum
September-December 2010
Global Macro Monitor
Data sources: The Economist, BLS, CEIC, Thomson Reuters
(II) From China’s viewpoint,
• Countries should have the right to fix
their exchange rate if they want to.
• True, the IMF Articles of Agreement
and the US Omnibus Trade Act of 1988
call for action in the event that a country
is “unfairly manipulating its currency”.
• But
– Few countries have been forced to appreciate.
– Pressure on surplus countries to appreciate will inevitably
be less than pressure on deficit countries to depreciate.
– I support retiring the language of “manipulation.”
• Usually, it is hard to say when a currency is undervalued.
• Don’t cheapen the language that is appropriate to WTO rules.
• China should do what is in its own long-term interest.
21
What is in China’s interest?
• My view: mutually-beneficial bargain, between equals
– As part of G-20 process
– E.g., China agrees that:
• its exchange rate is part of the problem,
• it will cooperate to lower the RMB/$ rate in a gradual manner,
• and of course it won’t dump US treasury bills.
– In exchange, US agrees that:
• its low national saving rate is part of the problem,
• it will cooperate to reduce the budget deficit,
• and of course it won’t close off the US market to Chinese goods.
• But perhaps a bargain isn’t even necessary;
– It is in China’s own interest to begin appreciating the RMB.
22
Five reasons China should let RMB
appreciate, in its own interest
1. Overheating of economy
2. Reserves are excessive.
– It gets harder to sterilize the inflow over time.
3. Attaining internal and external balance.
– To attain both, need 2 policy instruments.
– In a large country like China,
expenditure-switching policy should be the exchange rate.
4. Avoiding future crashes.
5. RMB undervalued, judged by
Balassa-Samuelson relationship.
23
1. Overheating of economy:
• Bottlenecks.
Pace of economic growth is outrunning:
– raw material supplies, and
– labor supply in coastal provinces
– Also:
– physical infrastructure
– environmental capacity
– level of sophistication of financial system.
• Asset bubbles.
– Shanghai stock market bubble in 2007.
• Inflation 6-7% in 2007
=> price controls
 shortages & social unrest.
• All of the above was suspended in late 2008,
– due to global recession.
– But it is back again now; skyrocketing real estate prices.
24
Attempts at “sterilization,” to insulate
domestic economy from the inflows
• Sterilization is defined as offsetting
of international reserve inflows,
so as to prevent them from showing up
domestically as excessive money growth & inflation.
• For awhile PBoC successfully sterilized…
– until 2007-08.
– The usual limitations finally showed up:
•
•
•
•
Prolongation of capital inflows <= self-equilibrating mechanism shut off.
Quasi-fiscal deficit: gap between domestic interest rates & US T bill rate
Failure to sterilize: money supply rising faster than income
25
Rising inflation (admittedly due not only to rising money supply)
2. Foreign Exchange Reserves
•
Excessive:
– Though a useful shield against currency crises,
– China has enough reserves: $2 ½ trillion by April 2010;
– & US treasury securities do not pay high returns.
•
Harder to sterilize
the inflow over time.
26
Foreign exchange
reserves held by
the People’s Bank
of China are
approaching
$3 trillion in 2011.
27
New York Times Jan 12, 2011
The Chinese
money supply has
almost doubled in
the last 3 years,
contributing to a
rapid growth
aggregate demand
as reflected in
nominal GDP
28
New York Times Jan 12, 2011
The Balance of Payments
≡ rate of change of foreign exchange reserves (largely $),
rose rapidly in China over past decade,
due to all 3 components:
trade balance, Foreign Direct Investment, and portfolio inflows
Source: HKMA, Half-Yearly Monetary and Financial Stability Report, June 2008
29
Attempts
tosterilization
sterilize reserve
inflow:
Successful
in China:
2005-06
High reserve growth
=> steady money
offset by cuts in
domestic credit
While reserves (NFA) rose rapidly, the growth of the monetary base
was kept
to the
growth of the real
economy – even
in 2005-06.
were
remarkably
successful
inreduced
2005-06.
30
In 2007-08 China began to have more
trouble sterilizing the reserve inflow
• PBoC began to pay higher interest rate
domestically, & receive lower
interest rate on US T bills
=> quasi-fiscal deficit.
• Inflation became a serious problem.
– True, global increases in food & energy prices
were much of the explanation.
– But
• China’s overly rapid growth itself contributed.
• Appreciation is a good way to put immediate downward
pressure on local prices of farm & energy commodities.
• Price controls are inefficient and ultimately ineffective. 31
Sterilization faltered in 2007 & 2008
Monetary base
accelerated
Growth of China’s
monetary base,
& its components
32
Source: HKMA, Half-Yearly Monetary and Financial Stability Report, June 2008
China’s CPI accelerated in 2007-08
Inflation 2002 to 2008 Q1
Source: HKMA, Half-Yearly Monetary and Financial Stability Report, June 2008
33
Inflation is once again accelerating
34
3. Need a flexible exchange rate to
attain internal & external balance
• Internal balance ≡
demand neither too low (recession) nor too high (overheating).
• External balance ≡ appropriate balance of payments.
• General principle: to attain both policy targets,
a country needs to use 2 policy instruments.
• For a country as large as China, one of those policy
instruments should be the exchange rate.
• To reduce BoP surplus without causing higher unemployment,
China needs both
– currency appreciation, and
– expansion of domestic demand
• gradually replacing foreign demand,
• developing neglected sectors:
health, education, environment, housing, finance, & services.
35
4. Avoiding future crashes
Experience of other emerging markets
suggests it is better to exit from a peg in
good times, when the BoP is strong, than
to wait until the currency is under attack.
Introducing some flexibility
now, even though not ready
for free floating.
36
5. Longer-run perspective:
Balassa-Samuelson relationship
• Prices of goods & services in China are low
– compared at the nominal exchange rate.
– Of course they are a fraction of those in the U.S.: < ¼ .
– This is to be expected,
explained by the Balassa-Samuelson effect
• which says that low-income countries have lower price levels.
• As countries’ real income grows, their currencies experience real
appreciation: approx. .3% for every 1 % in income per capita.
– But China is one of those countries that is cheap or
undervalued even taking into account Balassa-Samuelson.
37
1
.5
-1
-.5
0
The Balassa-Samuelson Relationship
2005
-3
-2
-1
0
1
Log of Real Per capita GDP (PPP)
2
coef = .23367193, (robust) se = .01978263, t = 11.81
Source: Arvind Subramanian, April 2010,
“New PPP-Based Estimates of Renminbi Undervaluation
and Policy Implications,” PB10-08, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Undervaluation of RMB in the regression estimated above = 26%.
Estimated undervaluation averaging across four such estimates = 31%.
Compare to Frankel (2005) estimate for 2000 = 36%.
38
(III) What is in the global interest?
Solving the problem of current account imbalances,
• in particular, the US CA deficit & China’s surplus.
• Both have widened, on long-term trends.
39
39
The US trade & current account balances
have been on a downward path for 50 years.
They “improved” sharply in 2008-09, falling by half;
but this reversal was temporary, due to US recession,
Trade & current accounts, in $ billions per quarter
40
Dangers of the U.S. trade deficit
• Shorter-term dangers:
– Protectionist legislation
– A possible hard landing for the $.
• Long-term dangers:
– Dependence on foreign investors
– US net debt to RoW now ≈ $3 trillion,
• and rising.
• Will lower our children’s standard of living.
– When the US cuts its deficit,
that will mean the rest of
the world losing its surplus
• The longer adjustment is postponed, the harder it will be.
41
Policies to reduce the US CA deficit
• Reduce the US budget deficit over time,
– thus raising national saving.
– After all, this is where the deficits originated.
• Depreciate the $ more.
– Better to do it in a controlled way
• than in a sudden free-fall.
– The $ already depreciated a lot against the €
• & other currencies
• from 2002 to 2007.
– Who is left?
– The RMB is conspicuous as the one major currency
that is still undervalued against the dollar.
42
(IV) Changing power relationships
• It has never worked well for the US to make
a dozen different demands on China,
– IPR, human rights, help on N.Korea, Iran…
– when we only have one carrot /stick:
• keeping our markets open.
• As the world’s largest debtor, with China our primary
creditor, our ability to make demands is diminished.
• There is a particular tension between hoping China
will continue to buy our Treasury bills, while asking it
to stop buying our Treasury bills
– i.e., to stop buying $ / selling RMB,
• which is what keeps its currency from rising.
43
Be careful what you wish for. You might get it !
$2½
44
If China gave US politicians
what they say they want...
• we might regret it.
– if it included reserve shift out of T bills,
to match switch in basket weights from $.
– we could have a hard landing for the $.
• Skeptics argue China will not sell T bills
– because, as the largest holder,
it would be the biggest loser when the $ depreciated.
• Financial market fears that China might stop buying
US T bills could send the $ down in themselves.
• If the $ is falling, China will not want to be the only
45
one left “holding the bag.”
If China gave US politicians
what they say they want...
• For US output & employment to rise,
– we would first need other Asian
currencies to appreciate along with RMB.
• Otherwise, fall in US bilateral trade deficit
with China would be offset by rise in US bilateral deficit
with other cheap-labor countries.
– It also depends on excess capacity in US economy
• as 2008-2011…
• and no crowding out of domestic demand via higher interest rates.
46
Appendices
• Bi-Annual US Treasury reports
on currency manipulation
• Is the US Current account sustainable?
• The 2003 start of RMB speculation
• Internal & external balance
• The internationalization of the RMB
Technical appendices
47
Appendix 1: Analysis of the
Treasury Department’s biannual
Report to Congress on
International Economics and
Exchange Rate Policy
-- Frankel & Wei (2007)
48
Two hypotheses regarding determinants of
US Treasury decisions whether partners
are manipulating currencies:
• (1) Legitimate economic variables
– the partner’s overall current account/GDP,
– its reserve changes,
– the real overvaluation of its currency;
vs.
• (2) Variables suggestive of domestic
American political expediency
– the bilateral trade balance,
– US unemployment,
– an election year dummy .
49
Timeline, continued
–Those countries named as manipulators, or
given warnings, have always been Asian.
–What political economy determines
Treasury findings?
• Econometric analysis:
• Domestic political variables are as important as global
manipulation criteria.
50
Findings suggest the domestic US variables
affect the Treasury decision
as much as the legitimate global manipulation criteria:
•
•
•
•
weak role for partner reserve accumulation,
very high significance of bilateral balance,
significance of US unemployment, and
significant (borderline) extra effect of
unemployment in election years.
51
Implication
If the IMF were interpreting Article IV, rather
than the Treasury interpreting the 1988 US law,
– the criterion of consistent uni-directional forex
intervention would receive more emphasis,
– and US-specific variables such as the bilateral
trade balance would not appear at all.
52
Some sympathy for the Treasury
• It walks a fine line.
• An additional finding:
Treasury is eager not to single out one
country for unique opprobrium.
– No single country is left exposed on its own.
• the top-ranked country is less likely to be named than
if it had some other country to hide behind, while
• the 2nd- & 3rd-ranked countries are more likely to be
moved up, to give the leader company.
53
Has US pressure pushed the pace
of increased flexibility?
• We searched an electronic database of news
reports (FACTIVA/NewsPlus) , recording the number of
US news reports of US officials asking China to
speed up RMB flexibility/revaluation.
• Two separate time series on the cumulative
numbers of complaints
– from US Treasury and
– from officials of other government agencies (e.g. the
White House, Congress and Fed)
54
Complaints: Treasury & other US
0
5
10
15
20
Time plots of cumulative US Treasury and Non-Treasury Complaints
01 Jul 05
01 Jan 06
01 Jul 06
01 Jan 07
date
cumulative non-treasury report
cumulative treasury report
55
We added # complaints as a regressor
(Table 19)
• No evidence that U.S. official complaints
are associated with RMB appreciation
relative to the currency basket.
• There is evidence that cumulative
complaints are associated with a reduction
in the RMB’s weight on the US dollar.
56
Appendix 2:
CA Imbalances: Economists were split between
those who saw the US deficit as
unsustainable, requiring a $ fall,
and those who saw
no problem.
• Ben Bernanke
• Ken Rogoff *
• Ricardo Caballero *
• Maury Obstfeld
• Richard Cooper
• Larry Summers
• Michael Dooley
• Martin Feldstein
• Pierre-Olivier
• Nouriel Roubini
Gourinchas
• Menzie Chinn
• Alan Greenspan
• Me
• Ricardo Hausmann
• Lots more
• Lots more
57
* Some claim that the crisis of 2007-09 fits their theories.57
The events of 2007-09 struck major blows
against both interpretations of CA.
• Most of us in the unsustainability camp would have
predicted that something like the US sub-prime mortgage
crisis would cause a big fall in the $.
– Instead , the $ strengthened.
• Most of those in the sustainability camp had been
arguing that the US has uniquely superior assets (corporate
governance, securities markets, bank regulation…)
– Instead, the crisis showed the US system to suffer serious flaws
• of crony capitalism like other countries (Simon Johnson, Ragu Rajan)
• or – worse – excessive deregulation (Joe Stiglitz)
• The answer, for the moment: The $ and US Treasury bills
still play unique roles in the world monetary system. 58
Critics of the twin deficits view say that the
US current account deficit is sustainable.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Global savings glut (Bernanke)
It’s a big world (R. Cooper; Al Greenspan..)
Valuation effects will pay for it (Gourinchas)
US as the World’s Banker (Kindleberger…)
The US offers superior-quality assets
(Caballero, Forbes, Quadrini & Rios-Rull, Wei & Wu …)
6. “Dark Matter” (Hausmann & Sturzenegger)
7. Bretton Woods II
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau & Garber)
59
Exorbitant Privilege of $
• Among those who argue that the US
current account deficit is sustainable
are some who believe that the US will
continue to enjoy the unique privilege
of being able to borrow virtually unlimited
amounts in its own currency.
60
When does the “privilege” become “exorbitant?”
•
if it accrues solely because of size & history,
without the US having done anything to earn
the benefit by virtuous policies such as budget
discipline, price stability & a stable exchange rate.
•
Since 1973, the US has racked up $10 trillion
in debt and the $ has experienced a 30% loss
in value compared to other major currencies.
•
It seems unlikely that macroeconomic policy
discipline is what has earned the US its privilege !
61
The “Bretton Woods II”
hypothesis
• Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, & Garber (2003) :
– today’s system is a new Bretton Woods,
• with Asia playing the role that Europe played
in the 1960s—buying up $ to prevent
their own currencies from appreciating.
– More provocatively:
China is piling up dollars
not because of myopic mercantilism,
but as part of an export-led development strategy
that is rational given China’s need to import workable
systems of finance & corporate governance.
62
There is no reason to expect better today:
1) Capital mobility
is much higher now than in the 1960s.
2) The US can no longer necessarily rely
on support of foreign central banks:
• neither on economic grounds
(they are not now, as they were then,
organized into a cooperative framework where
each agrees explicitly to hold $ if the others do),
• nor on political grounds
(China & OPEC are not the staunch allies
the US had in the 1960s). .
63
My own view on “Bretton Woods II”:
•
•
The 1960s analogy is indeed apt,
but we are closer to 1971 than to 1944 or 1958.
•
Why did the BW system collapse in 1971?
•
The Triffin dilemma could have taken decades
to work itself out.
•
But the Johnson & Nixon
administrations accelerated
the process by fiscal & monetary expansion
(driven by the Vietnam War & Arthur Burns, respectively).
•
These policies produced: declining external balances,
$ devaluation, & the end of Bretton Woods.
64
Appendix 3:
Internal and external balance
• Between 2002 and 2007, China crossed from the deflationary
side of internal balance (ES: excess supply, recession,
unemployment), to the inflationary side (ED: excess demand
side, overheating). And again in 2009.
– =>Moved upward in the “Swan Diagram”
– => appreciation called for under current conditions.
– Together with expansion of domestic demand
• gradually replacing foreign demand,
• developing neglected sectors:
health, education, environment, housing, finance, services
• General principle: to attain 2 policy targets
(internal & external balance), a country
needs to use 2 policy instruments
(real exchange rate & spending).
65
China is now in the overheating +
surplus quadrant of the Swan Diagram
ED & TB>0
Excgange rate E
in RMB/$
BB:
External balance
CA=0
China
2011
ES & TB>0
ED & TD
China
2002
ES & TD
Spending A
YY:
Internal balance
Y = Potential
66
The US is not alone in its path of rising
debt. Other major industrialized
economies have the same problem.
A remarkable role-reversal:
• Debt/GDP of the top 20 rich countries
(≈ 80%) is already twice that of
the top 20 emerging markets;
• and rising rapidly.
• By 2014 (at ≈ 120%), it could be triple.
67
Appendix 4: The RMB
as an international currency
Based on presentation to Club de CEPII, Paris, 12 Jan., 2011
• What is an international currency?
• Empirical determinants of
international reserve currency status.
• The Renminbi
• Why should a country care if its currency
is used internationally?
68
What is an international currency?
• Definition:
An international currency is used by non-residents.
• The prospects for a country’s status as
an international currency is not the same
as its exchange rate prospects.
• Example: 1993-95
– The dollar depreciated strongly, reaching an all-time low against
the yen, among much hand-wringing.
– And yet its international currency use rose during that period.
69
Roles of International Currency
Table B
Adapted from tables of Kenen and Cohen
Function
of
money:
Store of
value
Medium
of
exchange
Unit of
account
Governments
Private actors
International reserve
holdings
Vehicle currency for
foreign exchange
intervention
Anchor for pegging
local currency
Currency substitution
(private dollarization)
Invoicing trade and
financial transactions
Denominating trade and
financial transactions
Central bank holdings of reserves is the most easily quantified,
and probably the most important, of the various measures. 70
Determination of international currency status
What suits a currency for international use?
• People use a given currency
– when everyone else is using it,
– not just because of its intrinsic characteristics.
• English became the international lingua franca
– not because of its beauty (French),
– nor its simplicity (Esperanto),
– nor even the number of native speakers (Chinese).
• => Network externalities
71
International reserve currency determinants
from the literature on reserve currencies
Determinant
Empirical proxy:
1. Size
GDP
2. Depth of financial
markets
FX turnover
3. Rate of return
inflation,
trend depreciation, or
exchange rate variance72
Determinants of reserve currency standing, continued
Network externalities
=> Tipping
captured by:
1) Inertia
lags
2) Nonlinearity
in determinants
logistic functional form
or
dummy for leader GDP
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
73
Historical illustration of the long lag:
£ ‘s loss of premier international currency
status in 20th century
•
By 1919, US had passed UK
in
1. output (1872)
2. trade (1914)
3. net international creditor position (1914-19)
•
$ passed £ as #1 reserve currency only with a lag
–
–
by 1940-45
though Eichengreen says 1924.
74
Figure 1: Currency share vs. GDP (market rates).
Is the relationship linear or “ogive”?
SHARE vs. RATIOY
.8
.7
Shares
of major .6
currencies
In central .5
bank
.4
reserve
.3
holdings
SHARE
}
Tipping
point
.2
.1
.0
(GDP using market rates)
-.1
.0
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Size of currency’s home economy75
RATIOY
Explaining currency shares, logit, pre-euro (1973-98)
GDP
Inflation
[2]
[4]
[7]
2.77
3.69
1.04
[0.64]
[0.92]
[0.29]
-2.64
-2.86
[1.16]
[1.16]
Depreciation
-1.10
Trend
Ex rate variance
FX turnover
[0.59]
-0.98
-1.40
-1.25
[0.57]
[0.64]
[0.34]
0.45
0.58
0.43
[0.29]
[0.30]
[0.15]
-0.22
GDP leader dummy
[0.16]
Lag logit:
log(share t-1 / 1 - share t-1)
0.85
0.85
0.96
[0.03]
[0.03]
[0.01]
76
Boldface = statistically signficant: size, retruns, turnover, and lag
How does China rank, by determinants of
international currency status?
1. Size
• Chinese economy famously passed Japan in 2010,
to attain 2nd ranking.
• Some projections claim it will pass the US soon.
• But
– What matters here is GDP (and trade) compared at
market exchange rates, not PPP-adjusted.
– Euroland’s GDP is still substantially bigger than China.
– Chinese growth will slow down,
• well before it reaches per capita equality with the West.
77
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
2. Depth of financial markets
One the one hand…
• China is starting to use RMB in international trade
• Foreign central banks can hold RMB since Aug. 2010
– Malaysia’s CB went first, buying RMB bonds for its FX reserves, in Sept.
• RMB market is now developing in Hong Kong
• Since 2007, RMB 62 b RMB bonds (27 batches) issued off-shore
» including by MacDonald’s.
» Bank of China HK launched an index Dec. 31, 2010.
• In November, RMB deposits reached RMB 280 b.
78
In Hong Kong
banks, yuandenominated
deposits have
quadrupled over
the last year – but
from a low base.
“RMB goes viral,” Financial Times, Jan. 4, 2011
79
Why should a country care?
Pros & cons of having one’s currency used internationally.
4 ADVANTAGES TO A COUNTRY OF HAVING
ITS CURRENCY USED INTERNATIONALLY.
• (1) Convenience for its residents.
• (2) Business for its banks & other financial institutions.
• (3) Seignorage
– narrowly defined as willingness to hold, e.g., the $ as
high-powered money (esp. fx reserves held by central banks) or
– more broadly as willingness of private investors to hold
$-denominated assets: America’s “exorbitant privilege.”
• (4) Political power and prestige.
80
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
On the other hand…
• RMB bonds and deposits in HK are small as a fraction.
– And of course HK$ is itself still firmly tied to US$.
• Development of China’s financial market has just begun.
• It ranks far behind other major currencies.’
• Still very highly regulated
– Domestic system still “financially repressed.”
– Cross-border capital flows still subject to heavy controls.
» Foreign companies still cannot borrow in China.
• Liquidity, breadth, openness… still have a long way to go.
81
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
3. Rate of return
• Inflation in China is again a danger currently.
• A financial crisis probably lurks
– somewhere down the road.
• Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the rate of return
to holding RMB over the next ten years will be high.
• Indeed that is the reason for
the strong portfolio capital inflows since 2004.
– Prasad & Wei.
82
China’s rank, by determinants of international currency status,
cont.
Inertia suggests that China’s ascent in
the currency rankings will be gradual.
• The rest of Asia will probably be no keener on a yuan bloc
than it was on a yen bloc in the 1980s.
• A guess: It will take the RMB a decade
to surpass the ₤ & CHF and rival the ¥.
• and much longer to rival the €, let alone the $.
• Nevertheless, that is the direction it is headed.
• And the $ is likely to continue losing share to all
the other international reserve assets in the future.
83
Central banks’ reserve holdings
The $ share has been on a downward trend since 1975
(with the exception of the 1990s).
80
USD share
75
USD + 0.6 Unalloc.
share (COFER)
70
65
60
55
50
Source: Chinn & Frankel (2007)
45
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
05
10
84
The $ share of
central bank
holdings
resumed its
decline in 2001.
Data: 1999-2009
from COFER, IMF.
85
Source: http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/2009/10/01/dollar-share-in-central-banks-fx-reserves-resumes-its-decline/
The global monetary system
may move from dollar-based
to multiple international reserve currencies
•
The € is still a rival for the $.
•
The SDR is again part of the system.
•
Gold in 2009 made a comeback
as an international reserve too.
•
The RMB will join the roster
with ¥ & ₤.
•
= a multiple international reserve asset system.
86
Technical appendices
87
Prices on Non-Deliverable Forwards
showing post-2003 speculation on RMB appreciation
7.6
7.8
8
8.2
8.4
Spot and Forward Rates of USD/RMB
04/07/03 10/15/03
12/31/04 07/22/05
01/08/07
date
spot
3-month
1-month
12-month
88
Explaining findings of Treasury Department biannual
Report to Congress on Int.Ec. & Exchange Rate Policy
All countries
Excluding oil exporters
US bilateral TB
-0.92***
0.0655
-0.99***
0.1548
Partner’s
0.014***
CA/GDP
0.002
Partner’s Real
-0.18***
Exchange Rate 0.0291
Change in
0.003
reserves/GDP
0.003
US unemployment
15 Asian economies
0.022**
0.010
0.028**
0.007
-0.23**
0.1115
-0.012
0.009
0.08**
0.037
89
*** statistically significant at 99% level
Estimating the weights in RMB basket
• A problem made-to-order for OLS regression.
• Regress % changes in value of RMB against
% changes in values of candidate currencies.
• Δ log RMBt =
c + α Δlog $t + β1Δlog € t
+ β2 Δlog ¥t + …
• The coefficients are the basket weights.
• Can impose α + Σ β j = 1.
F& Wei (2007), Frankel (2009)
90
Does the Balassa-Samuelson
relationship have predictive power?
 Typically across countries, gaps are corrected
halfway, on average, over subsequent decade.
 => 3-4 % real appreciation on average per year,
including effect of further growth differential
.
 Correction could take the form of either inflation or
nominal appreciation, but appreciation is preferable.
91
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/index.htm
92