Transcript EC120 week 1 - University of Essex

EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
Topics Week 23: The Elusive Search for Global Monetary Stability after
Bretton Woods
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1. The disruptive, generally inflationary, oil price shocks after 1972.
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2. Widespread policy moves to control inflation in the late 1970s.
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3. Policy constraints (especially in Europe) and the International Trilemma.
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4. Only limited global co-ordination to manage exchange rates after 1973;
does it matter?
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5. Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area? Why the answer matters.
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6. The European experience with exchange rate co-ordination after 1987:
German reunification, the crisis in the European Monetary System,
1992-93, and its aftermath.
• 7. The (flawed?) creation of the euro.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 0
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
1. The Disruptive Oil-Price Shocks after 1972.
• Note that the oil shocks occurred after inflation had begun to accelerate
in the 1960s.
• Given the pervasive use of oil throughout advanced economies for both
transportation and electrical power generation, it is clear that a sharp
increase in oil prices, ceteris paribus, will lower aggregate output.
• The inflationary impact is much harder to determine a priori, for it depends
heavily upon the policy response to the decline in output and rise in
unemployment (see Diagram 1).
It took time to adjust the capital
stock to the new reality
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 1
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
1a. The Disruptive Oil-Price Shocks of the 1970s [con’t.]
• As Diagram 1 indicates, it is not hard to imagine a situation where
an adverse oil price shock reduces the level of both output and
prices for an oil-importing country.
• However, the actual experience of the oil shocks of the 1970s on
the economy-wide price levels of OECD countries was
unambiguously highly inflationary. This suggests that both the
economic environment in which the oil shocks occurred and the
subsequent policy responses deserve closer attention.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 2
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
2. Widespread policy moves to control inflation starting in the late 1970s
• The long struggle to suppress inflation – an overview:
̶ In Europe, steps towards closer economic integration and monetary
union were only possible with converging (or at least stable) rates of
inflation, a task not easily accomplished (for an indication of the
consequences of differential inflation in foreign exchange markets, see
Baldwin & Wyplosz (2004), Fig. 10-4).
̶ In the U.S., the “Volcker squeeze”, starting in late 1979 and following
an abrupt change in policy, brought inflation (CPI) down to 3.2% by
1983, from an average of 7.1% over the preceding eight years,
albeit at the cost of two sharp but brief recessions (see again Barsky &
Kilian (2001), Table 1).
̶ Eventually interest rates, both real and nominal, also eventually came
down (see Blanchard (2003), Figs. 1 & 2).
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 3
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
3. Policy Constraints (especially in Europe) and the International
Monetary Trilemma
• The particular problems of differential inflation rates for European
economic integration in the context of generalized floating:
– either the country with a higher rate of inflation accepts the loss of
export market share that pegged exchange rates imply and the loss of
reserves that follow (not a sustainable policy, but then what?);
– or it devalues (or markets force it to devalue) and thereby perhaps
gains a temporary cost advantage in export markets (i.e. a competitive
devaluation, the scourge of the 1930s);
– or it imposes exchange and/or trade controls;
– in any case, unequal rates of inflation tend to disrupt trade.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 4
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
4. Only Limited International Co-ordination to Manage Exchange Rates
• The broader international environment of floating rates: “benign neglect”
by the US (dictated by the primacy of domestic objectives and the
international trilemma) broken only occasionally by limited concerted
intervention: the Plaza (September, 1985) and Louvre (February, 1987)
“accords”.
• International monetary co-operation has been an intensely political
process – only when all the main actors can agree on a particular
course of action is effective co-ordinated policy likely to occur.
• Inflation targeting by central banks may be a means by which effective
co-ordination can occur without requiring comprehensive, detailed
agreement, much as the classical Gold Standard operated with only
occasional central bank co-operation.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 5
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
5. A Note on Optimal Currency Areas (OCA).
• The concept of an OCA was devised as a means of assessing whether a
particular group of regions or countries would be better off sharing a
single currency or having separate currencies with floating exchange
rates.
• The characteristics of OCAs:
− Economic considerations.
− Political considerations.
• Europe does not currently meet the normal criteria of an Optimal
Currency Area. The political question is whether it can either become
one or contain adequately the costs of sub-optimality.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 6
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
6. The European Experience with Exchange Rate Co-ordination after
the Launch of the Single Market Programme in 1986.
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After four years of stability, the shock of German reunification led to
atypical German inflation, to which the Bundesbank responded by raising
interest rates, creating serious problems for countries facing weaker
domestic demand, flagging exports, and higher unemployment.
The Berlin Wall, c.10 November 1989
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 7
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
6a. Europe’s Experience with Exchange Rate Co-ordination: Crisis in
the EMS, 1992-93
• Britain and Italy were forced out of the ERM in September 1992,
unable to hold the peg to the DM without unacceptable costs.
Pressure continued, and in August 1993, the normal ERM bands
were widened from 2.25% to 15%, greater than they had ever
been during Bretton Woods, the ‘Snake’, or the EMS previously.
• The policy choices after 1992: monetary union vs. wide-band
floating.
Norman Lamont, British Chancellor of the Exchequer
and aide, September 1992
EC120 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 8
George Soros, c. 1992
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
6b. Europe’s Experience with Exchange Rate Co-ordination: After the
Crisis
• After a turbulent period in 1992-93, stability returned to the EMS
and plans were made for the ultimate in exchange rate coordination – the move by some countries to a single currency, the
euro.
• Criteria for euro eligibility:
− low inflation (reinforced by the market test of low long-term
interest rates);
− government budget deficits capped at 3% of GDP;
− the total nominal amount of government debt capped at 60% of
GDP.
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 9
EC120: The World Economy in Historical Perspective
7.
The (flawed?) creation of the euro.
• Britain’s exit from the ERM removed from the ranks of euro candidates a
large economy arguably unusually prone to asymmetric shocks.
• A favourable growth environment made euro-entry criteria easier to meet.
• Euro-fudge: countries with high (over 100%) levels of government debt
(Belgium, Italy, Greece) were allowed to enter the euro on grounds of
(slow) movement towards the 60% cap, with budget deficits (allegedly)
well under 3%.
• Emerging problems
− The difficulty of fitting a single interest rate to the entire euro-zone.
− Trade imbalances.
• Can the euro-zone cope?
EC120 Spring 2015: Week 23, Topic 18, Slide 10