Transcript The Role of Russia in the Post

Russia and the Post-2012
Climate Regime:
Foreign rather than Environmental Policy
Dr Anna Korppoo
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
24 November 2008
Contents
1) Background
2) Russian submission for Poznan
3) Economic argument against post-2012
commitments
4) Political arguments
5) Conclusion
1) Background
Russia and the Kyoto Deal
• Collapse of GHG emissions due to the economic
recession in the early-1990s
• Kyoto base year 1990 – target to limit emissions to 1990
level
 Surplus allowances i.e. ’hot air’
• Kyoto seemed like a good deal for Russia BUT
dissappointment when the US withdrew
• Kyoto mechanisms seem bureaucratic
• Since Kyoto economic situation changed a lot as large
revenues from fossil fuel exports – Kyoto money seems
insignificant
• Russian climate politics so far driven rather by economic
gains than environmental concerns
Impacts of climate change: not just
doom and gloom?
• Belief that not only negative – also IPCC predicts some
positive impacts in the Russian territory: decreased
heating, improving agricultural potential, opening sea
routes, new oil and gas reserves uncovering
• Also negative impacts already at sight: forest fires,
spreading diseases, floods, trouble for forestry industries
• Changes in the North may be less relevant as less
population
• Official line to support the findings of the IPCC
• No public pressure and ’climate hype’ – low awareness
and the lack of democracy and a civil society
• Sceptical views and engineering solutions by Russian
scientists
2) Russian submission for
Poznan
Position for Poznan: Russia is reluctant to
commit to binding targets
• G8 -50% by 2050 – ’aspirational’, NOT basis for
distribution of emitting rights
• Collective reduction target of 25-40% from 1990 level by
2020 ’unreasonable’
• Effectiveness and fairness
– national conditions and real capabilities of countries
• ’Legally binding’ commitments acceptable if:
– NOT enforceable and sanctioned
– Possible to adjust on the course of implementation
– Effective incentives to fulfill
• Market approach: may lead to speculation
• Grouping of countries need updating
– economic and social indicators to guide
3) Economic argument against
post-2012 commitments
Russian
economy and
GHG
emissions
are growing –
in tandem?
Russian GHG emissions
Mt
3200
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06
1600
• Emissions 27% below 1990 in 2006
• Emissions grown by some 15% by 2006 since the lowest
point in 1998
• GHG growth 2.6% in 2006 – GDP growth 6.7%
Economic growth and emissions
• Why emissions are growing?
–
–
–
–
Standard of living improving – power consumption up
Reintroduction of inefficient old capacity
Switch from gas to coal which price is seen as more stabile
Efficiency of economy improved due to modernisation less than
expected
• Putin’s goal doubling GDP 2000-2010 – cutting
emissions could hinder achieving
• Illarionov’s original argument during ratification which
was disagreed by many, but now more support as
emissions are growing
• 45% of public do not think that public money should be
spent on emission reductions
• Stage of development of economies -thinking
Criticism of the economic growth
argument
• Recent GDP growth fuelled by the high oil price – not
directly leading to higher emissions
• Potential to improve energy efficiency – positive impact
on the economy in general
• Development towards post-industrialised economy
• Recent global economic trends slowing down Russian
economic growth?
 Russian position could be challenged: not so difficult or
costly to reduce emissions – even beneficial for the
economy?
 Already existing policies which can cut emissions
BUT Western scientific views unlikely to be taken seriously
in the Russian debate
4) Political arguments
Participation of other countries
• The Kyoto Protocol is not regarded as effective in Russia
due to its small impact on global emissions
• Large emitters wanted to join, also developing countries
• The role of the US is important, seen as an equal partner
for Russia
• G8 key actor to encourage Russia to join post-2012 pact
- Russia could support views opposing binding targets
inside G8 but difficult to break concensus
• G8 goal to cut 50% of emissions by 2050 labelled as
’aspirational’
• Envy of the CDM early start compared to JI: Russia been
unfairly treated
Russia as a Global Player
• Prestige of Russia – leadership seeking to regain status
as a world power like the Soviet Union – showing muscle
and independent decisions for instance with Georgia
• Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was a good example –
Russia wanted attention and got it
• Important that Russian decisions well backed by analysis
as bad experiences in the early 1990s when the Soviet
structures could not respond international requirements
very competent way
• Russia’s aim to gain a role as a world power could be a
way to encourage Russia to join post-2012 regime
5) Conclusion
Conclusion
• Post-2012 regime very different for Russia than Kyoto:
unlikely to be allocated benefits only
• No incentive to join: Reluctant negotiation partner as no
public pressure or environmental concern
• Likely to expect space to grow emissions, limiting
economic growth politically unacceptable
• BUT - the Russian economic growth argumentation
could be challenged – for instance BAU policies can cut
emissions significantly
• Unlikely to disagree with the G8 but likely to team up
with the other reluctant members of the group - external
political pressure important
• Focus on Russian role as a world power and
modernisation of economy rather than the environment
Thank you!
Contact: [email protected]