Transcript U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS Sudan

Gauhara Karimova

For over a decade, the U.S. Dept. of the
Treasury has administered economic
sanctions against the Government of Sudan
(GOS) for its support for international
terrorism, efforts to destabilize neighboring
governments, and the prevalence of human
rights violations, under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).


On November 3, 1997, President Clinton
issued EO 13067 which imposed a
comprehensive trade embargo against the
entire territory of Sudan and total asset freeze
against the GOS.
On March 29, 2005 and April 25, 2006, the
U.N. Security Council issued resolutions 1591
and 1672, respectively, condemning the
continued violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in Sudan’s
Darfur region.


On April 27, 2006, President Bush issued EO
13400, which expanded the first EO to target
the people involved in the Darfur conflict.
Six months later, President Bush issued EO
13412, excluding the regional Govt. of Southern
Sudan from the definition of GOS, so the
former could partake in most economic
transactions. However, it did not exclude the
region’s petroleum or petrochemical industries.



The ultimate objective of sanctions is
behavioral change, however, it is hard to
quantify and measure the impact that they
have and the role they play in bringing
changes.
Sudan’s economy has had overall growth and
stability, with a GDP growth rate in both 2006
& 2007 exceeding 10 percent.
GOS has endeavored to navigate around U.S.
sanctions.



The U.S. has the broadest Sudan sanctions
regime in the world.
Current UN Security Council and EU sanctions
against Sudan include only a limited arms
embargo and a travel ban and asset freeze on
four individuals.
GOS has large Chinese and regional
investments in its petroleum and petrochemical
sectors.



Sanctions are most effective when imposed
multilaterally, because they are more effective in
bringing about change in regime behavior.
Therefore, the U.S. should seek multilateral
cooperation with its allies to augment the pressure
being already exerted against the GOS.
Once Sudan undertakes significant improvement
in its regime behavior and changes its policies, the
U.S. should be prompt in implementing gradual
removal of sanctions in light of possible economic
gains.


http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/sudan.pdf
The Department of Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets Control) description of the Sudan Sanctions
Program.



http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/sudan_report_030509.pdf
The Department of Treasury (OFAC) report to Congress on the effectiveness of U.S. Economic
Sanctions with respect to Sudan (2009).



http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/sudan.pdf
An overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations – Title 31 Part 538 of the U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations and Executive Order – Blocking Property of Persons in Connection with the Conflict in
Sudan’s Darfur Region



http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/going-alone-economic-sanctions-hurts-us-morefoes
CATO Institute article describing how trade sanctions hurt the U.S. economy more so than they bring
forth any benefits.



http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-23/why-economic-sanctions-rarely-work
Bloomberg article on why economic sanctions rarely work.



http://www.cfr.org/sudan/crisis-guide-darfur/p13129
Short 5 minute video on the crisis in Darfur.