Transcript Document

Lesson 17-2
Keynesian Economics in the 1960s and 1970s
Expansionary Policy in the 1960s
Correcting a Recessionary Gap
Kennedy proposed expansionary fiscal policy for the first time in
U.S. history in 1961 and the Fed followed with expansionary
monetary policy.
By 1963, the U.S. economy was back at its potential output.
Kennedy pressed for a tax cut in 1963 that was passed after his
assassination,
although the recessionary gap had already closed.
Spending for the expanded Vietnam War added to the expansionary
fiscal policy.
The economy remained in an inflationary gap for the last 6 years of
the 1960s.
The 1970s: Troubles from the Supply Side
Macroeconomic Policy: Coping with the Supply Side
The inflationary gap of the 1960s was closed by shutting off the
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that had sustained it.
The economy went into recession with rising prices in 1970, so
expansionary fiscal policy began creating an inflationary gap by
1974.
The price of oil tripled, shifting the short-run aggregate supply
curve to the left and resulting in a recessionary gap with rising
prices.
Two lessons had to be learned from the 1970s—the importance
of monetary policy and the importance of aggregate supply.
The Monetarist Challenge
The monetarist school holds that changes in the
money supply are the primary cause of changes in
nominal GDP.
The leader of the monetarist school, even during the
consensus over Keynesian economics, was Milton
Friedman of the University of Chicago.
Monetarists generally argue that the impact lags of
monetary policy are so long and variable that trying to
stabilize the economy using monetary policy can be
destabilizing.
Monetarists are critical of fiscal policy because of
crowding out effects.
Monetarists generally support a rule for the
expansion of the money supply at a fixed annual rate.
Friedman’s natural unemployment rate explained
much of what was inexplicable by Keynesian theory.
Events of the 1970s supported the significance of
money supply growth to the economic course of the
economy.
New Classical Economics: A Focus on Aggregate
Supply
New Classical economists focused on individual
choices.
They rejected the entire framework of macroeconomic
analysis.
They stressed the economy’s ability to achieve its
natural level of output
They used complex mathematical models to generalize
from individual behavior to aggregate results.
Changes in macroeconomic variables must come
from changes in aggregate supply.
This approach to macroeconomic analysis built from
an analysis of individual maximizing choices is called
new classical economics.
The problems in the 1970s were said to be caused by
stabilization policies that shifted aggregate demand to
solve what were the results of rapid accomodation of
shifts in long-run aggregate demand.
Rational Expectations
A key theory of the new classical position is the rational
expectations hypothesis which assumes that
individuals form expectations about the future based on
the information available to them, and that they act on
those expectations.
The founder of the rational expectations hypothesis is
Robert E. Lucas of Carnegie-Mellon University.
An implication of rational expectations is that monetary
policy may not have any effect on real GDP unless it
takes people by surprise.
Fiscal policy doesn’t shift the aggregate demand curve
at all but only changes the deficit or surplus.
Lessons from the 1970s
The short-run aggregate supply curve cannot be viewed as something
that provides a passive path over which aggregate demand can roam.
The short-run aggregate supply curve can shift in ways that clearly
affect real GDP, unemployment, and the price level.
Money matters more than Keynesians had previously suspected. The
work of monetarists showing a close correspondence between
changes in M2 and subsequent changes in nominal GDP convinced
many Keynesian economists that money is more important than they
had thought.
Stabilization is a more difficult task than many economists had
anticipated. Shifts in aggregate supply can frustrate the efforts of
policymakers to achieve certain macroeconomic goals.