Lecture 19 - The University of Texas at Dallas
Download
Report
Transcript Lecture 19 - The University of Texas at Dallas
Introduction to Biometrics
Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham
The University of Texas at Dallas
Lecture #19
Biometrics and Privacy - I
October 31, 2005
Outline
Overview of Privacy
Biometrics and Privacy
Some Privacy concerns
Medical and Healthcare
- Employers, marketers, or others knowing of private
medical concerns
Security
- Allowing access to individual’s travel and spending data
- Allowing access to web surfing behavior
Marketing, Sales, and Finance
Allowing access to individual’s purchases
Biometrics
- Biometric technologies used to violate privacy
-
Data Mining as a Threat to Privacy
Data mining gives us “facts” that are not obvious to human analysts
of the data
Can general trends across individuals be determined without
revealing information about individuals?
Possible threats:
Combine collections of data and infer information that is private
Disease information from prescription data
Military Action from Pizza delivery to pentagon
Need to protect the associations and correlations between the data
that are sensitive or private
-
Some Privacy Problems and Potential Solutions
Problem: Privacy violations that result due to data mining
- Potential solution: Privacy-preserving data mining
Problem: Privacy violations that result due to the Inference
- Inference is the process of deducing sensitive information from
the legitimate responses received to user queries
- Potential solution: Privacy Constraint Processing
Problem: Privacy violations due to un-encrypted data
- Potential solution: Encryption at different levels
Problem: Privacy violation due to poor system design
- Potential solution: Develop methodology for designing privacyenhanced systems
Problem: Privacy violation due to Biometrics systems
- Privacy sympathetic Biometrics
Privacy Preserving Data Mining
Prevent useful results from mining
- Introduce “cover stories” to give “false” results
- Only make a sample of data available so that an adversary is
unable to come up with useful rules and predictive functions
Randomization
- Introduce random values into the data and/or results
- Challenge is to introduce random values without significantly
affecting the data mining results
- Give range of values for results instead of exact values
Secure Multi-party Computation
- Each party knows its own inputs; encryption techniques used to
compute final results
Privacy Controller
User Interface Manager
Privacy
Constraints
Constraint
Manager
Query Processor:
Constraints during
query and release
operations
DBMS
Database Design
Tool
Update
Processor:
Constraints during
database design
operation
Constraints
during update
operation
Database
Semantic Model for Privacy Control
Dark lines/boxes contain
private information
Cancer
Influenza
Has disease
John’s
address
Patient John
address
England
Travels frequently
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P):
What is it?
P3P is an emerging industry standard that enables
web sites to express their privacy practices in a
standard format
The format of the policies can be automatically
retrieved and understood by user agents
It is a product of W3C; World wide web consortium
www.w3c.org
Main difference between privacy and security
User is informed of the privacy policies
User is not informed of the security policies
-
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P):
Key Points
When a user enters a web site, the privacy policies
of the web site is conveyed to the user
If the privacy policies are different from user
preferences, the user is notified
User can then decide how to proceed
User/Client maintains the privacy controller
- That is, Privacy controller determines whether
an untrusted web site can give out public
information to a third party so that the third
party infers private information
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P):
Organizations
Several major corporations are working on P3P
standards including:
Microsoft
IBM
HP
NEC
Nokia
NCR
Web sites have also implemented P3P
Semantic web group has adopted P3P
-
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P):
Specifications
Initial version of P3P used RDF to specify policies
Recent version has migrated to XML
P3P Policies use XML with namespaces for
encoding policies
Example: Catalog shopping
Your name will not be given to a third party but
your purchases will be given to a third party
<POLICIES xmlns =
http://www.w3.org/2002/01/P3Pv1>
<POLICY name = - - - </POLICY>
</POLICIES>
-
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P):
Specifications (Concluded)
P3P has its own statements a d data types
expressed in XML
P3P schemas utilize XML schemas
XML is a prerequisite to understanding P3P
P3P specification released in January 2005 uses
catalog shopping example to explain concepts
P3P is an International standard and is an ongoing
project
P3P and Legal Issues
P3P does not replace laws
P3P work together with the law
What happens if the web sites do no honor their
P3P policies
Then appropriate legal actions will have to be
taken
XML is the technology to specify P3P policies
Policy experts will have to specify the policies
Technologies will have to develop the
specifications
Legal experts will have to take actions if the
policies are violated
-
Challenges and Discussion
Technology alone is not sufficient for privacy
We need technologists, Policy expert, Legal experts
and Social scientists to work on Privacy
Some well known people have said ‘Forget about
privacy”
Should we pursue working on Privacy?
- Interesting research problems
- Interdisciplinary research
- Something is better than nothing
- Try to prevent privacy violations
- If violations occur then prosecute
Privacy is a major concern for Biometrics
Biometrics and Privacy
How are Biometrics and Privacy Related?
What are the major privacy concerns associated with Biometrics
Usage?
What types of Biometric deployments require stronger protections
against privacy invasiveness
What biometrics technologies are more susceptible to privacy-
invasive usage
What types of protections are necessary to ensure that biometrics
are not use in a privacy invasive fashion
Relationship: Biometrics and Privacy
Biometrics technology can be used without individual knowledge or
consent to link personal information from various sources, creating
individual profiles
These profiles may be used for privacy invasive purposes such as
tracking movement
Biometrics systems capable of being used in a privacy
compromising way are called privacy invasive systems
Privacy neutral means that the technology cannot be used to protect
information nor undermine privacy
Privacy sympathetic deployments include special designs to ensure
that biometrics data cannot be used in a privacy invasive fashion
Privacy protection is about using biometric authentication to protect
other personal information (e.g., bank accounts)
HIPPA and Biometrics
HIPPA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) refers to
biometrics
Biometrics could be a potential identifier and as a result cause
privacy concerns and must be disassociated from medical
information
Biometrics can be used for authentication and ensuring security
HIPPA and P3P relationships
- Implementing HIPPA rules in P3P
Privacy Concerns Associated with Biometric
Deployments
Informational privacy
- Unauthorized
collection, storage and usage of biometrics
information
Personal Privacy
- Discomfort of people when encountering biometrics technology
Privacy sympathetic qualities of biometrics technology
- E.g., not storing raw data
Informational Privacy
Usage of biometric data is not usually the problem, potential
linkage, aggregation and misuse of personal information
associated with biometric data is the problem
Unauthorized use of biometric technology
Conducting criminal forensic searches on drivers license
databases
- Using biometric data as a unique identifier
- Is biometric data personal information – debate in the
industry
Unauthorized collection of biometric data
- E.g., Surveillance
Unnecessary collection of biometric data
Unauthorized disclosure
Sharing biometric data
-
-
Personal Privacy
Many biometric technologies are offensive to certain individuals
especially when they are introduced
- Smartcards, Surveillance
Unlike informational privacy, technology in general cannot help with
personal privacy
Need psychologists and social scientists to work with individuals to
ensure comfort
Legal procedures also should be in place in case privacy is violated
so that individuals are comfortable with the technology
“Please excuse for intruding on your privacy”
Privacy Sympathetic Qualities of Biometric
Systems
Most biometric systems (except forensic systems) do not store raw
data such as fingerprints or images
Biometric data is stored in templates; templates consist of numbers;
cannot reconstruct biometric data from templates
The idea of universal biometric identifier does not work as different
applications require different biometric technologies
Different enrollments such as different samples also enhance
privacy
Non interoperable biometrics technologies also help with privacy,
however difficult for different systems to interact without standards
Application Specific Privacy Risks
Each deployment should address privacy concerns; also depends
on the technology used and how it is used; what are the steps taken,
what are the consequences of privacy violations
BioPrivacy framework was developed in 2001 to help deployers
come up with risk ratings for their deployments
Risk ratings depend on several factors such as verification vs.
identification
BioPrivacy Framework
Overt vs. Covert
- Users being aware that biometric data is being collected has
less risk
Opt-in vs. Mandatory
- Mandatory enrollment such as a public sector program has
higher risk
Verification vs. Identification
- Searching a database to match a biometric (e.g., Identification)
has higher risk as individual’s biometric data may be collected
Fixed duration vs. Indefinite duration
- Fixed duration has a negative impact
Public sector vs. Private Sector
- Public sector deployments are more risky
BioPrivacy Framework (Concluded)
User Role
- Citizen, Employee Traveler, Student, Customers, Individual
- E.g., Citizen may face more penalties for noncompliance
User ownership vs. Institutional ownership
- User maintaining ownership of his/her biometric data is less
risky
Personal storage vs. Storage in template database Is the data stored
in central database or in a user’s PC
- Central database is more risky
Behavioral vs. Physiological Storage
- Physiological biometrics may be compromised more
Template storage vs. Identifiable Storage
- Template storage is less risky
Risk Ratings
For each biometric technology, rate risk with respect to the
BioPrivacy framework
Example: Over/Covert risk is
- Moderate for Finger Scan
- High for face scan
- Low for Iris Scan
- Low for Retina Scan
- High for Voice scan
- Low for signature scan
- Moderate for Keystroke scan
- Low for hand scan
Based on individual risk ratings compute an overall risk rating:
example, High for facial scan, Moderate for Iris scan and Low for
hand scan
Biometrics for Private Data Sharing?
Data/Policy for Federation
Export
Data/Policy
Export
Data/Policy
Export
Data/Policy
Component
Data/Policy for
Agency A
Component
Data/Policy for
Agency C
Component
Data/Policy for
Agency B