Transcript EMU - eu-newgov.org

THE LISBON STRATEGY AS
POLICY CO-ORDINATION
Does it promote policy learning?
Iain Begg
European Institute
London School of Economics & Political Science
LISBON FAULT-LINES
Strategic aims not really contested
– But shifting priorities undermine consistency
– Few demonstrate case for Community level
Policy instruments have been inadequate
– Problems with incentives & means
– Action plan fatigue? Target proliferation?
Delivery failings
– Large disparities among the Member States
THE RECORD SO FAR
The growth shortfall: undermines progress
Confusion in:
– Objectives (too many)
– Responsibilities (everyone = no-one)
Targets proving to be elusive
Policy learning mechanisms: limited impact
– Peer review (naming & shaming) but…
– Bench-marking: not very visible
RATIONALE FOR CO-ORDINATION
Spillover effects across economies
– Mutually reinforcing policies: common interest
– The example of fiscal policy
Avoiding undue pressure on monetary policy etc.
– Does it apply to Lisbon strategy? How?
The vincolo esterno argument
– Valuable where vested interests are strong
Policy learning and improvement
CO-ORDINATION & LEARNING
Common policy agenda  shared solutions
Framework for policy-making
Better policy integration
Procedures & monitoring
– Exchange of experience & good/best practice
– Use of targets and benchmarks
– Peer review and other forms of scrutiny
Transfer/adaptation of successful models
TRAJECTORY OF ECONOMY
The reform ‘j’-curve
Performance
With extensive
reforms
Without major
reforms
A
B
Time
THE KOK PROPOSALS
Above all about governance
– Derived from perception of delivery failures
Increase ownership and focus
– Above all by NRPs
Expand support from Community budget
– Not much progress – December 2005 outcome
Greater weight to naming and shaming
– Opposed by Commission
THE RELAUNCH
Growth and employment as headline goals
– Playing-down of social and environmental
A new partnership approach
– NRPs based on 24 integrated guidelines
Same for all Member States
Yet big differences in practice
– Community problem
But what is new in it?
No national recommendations…yet
RETHINKING GOVERNANCE
Methods of economic policy governance
– Balance between hard law and open method
needs to be reviewed
– Finding effective incentives …and sanctions
Role(s) of the EU level
– Arbitrator, disciplinarian, or just advisor?
– Is real budgetary capability needed?
Soft rules and weak institutions worst of all
ENHANCING LEARNING
Ownership should be vital
– But limited embedding in national discourse
– Communication & advocacy therefore vital
Continuing absence of hard incentives
– Few sanctions … or rewards
– Should be factored into 2008/9 FP review
Stability needed in policy framework
– Structural reforms never a quick fix (j-curve)
– …or easy to sell
STRUCTURAL REFORMS
The latest in U-shaped curves?
 Sense of crisis in economy
ESTONIA
1992-94
SPAIN
Intensity
of
reforms
Political
support
for reforms
ITALY
Performance of economy 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Member States broadly know what’s needed
– But have to overcome inertia & resistance
– Key challenge will be implementation
Far from clear how co-ordination adds value
– Still searching for a rationale on supply-side
– The danger of Lisbon becoming too pervasive
– Tension between national plans & common IGs
Scope for learning not proven
HOW TO ACHIEVE REFORM
‘No EU member is going to accept the pain
of reform just because Mr Blair makes a
good speech in the European Parliament,
or because an EU summit passes a stirring
resolution. Economic reforms in France or
Germany will be carried through by French
of German politicians or not at all’
Charlemagne column, The Economist, 9th July
2005