Transcript Kant on Human Nature and Morality

Philosophy 224
Kant and Humans and Morality
Immanuel Kant
Immanuel Kant (17241804) was one of the most
important philosophers of
the modern era.
• His critical project
revolutionized philosophy,
and has remained a
touchstone (positive and
negative) for philosophers
up to the present.
• It’s not widely recognized,
but Kant was the first
person to use the term
‘race’ in the way which we
use it today.
•
The Critical Project

The term that Kant uses to describe his fundamental philosophical
position is "critical transcendental philosophy.”
◦ The central task of such a philosophy is to delimit the activities of
reason.

As Kant understands it, reason has two primary activities: cognizing
and willing.
◦ To the first corresponds theoretical philosophy, which investigates the
laws given by the concepts of the pure understanding (Critique of Pure
Reason).
◦ To the second corresponds practical philosophy, which is concerned
with the law's given by pure reason's concept of freedom (Critique of
Practical Reason).

Roughly, there is a philosophy of the sensible (phenomenal) world,
and a philosophy of the intelligible world. However, in experience,
the two worlds are one.
◦ The task of the third critique (Critique of Judgment) is to articulate the a
priori conditions of this unity, the locus of which is in yet another
faculty of reason: judgment.
The Anthropology
Before we turn to the text for today, which belongs to the
project of the second Critique, let’s consider the account of
the human that is more in line with the results of the first.
 For this, we need to consider the lectures that Kant gave on
what was then the newly emerging field of anthropology.

◦ Kant gave these lectures annually, from 1772 until he retired in
1796.
The lectures (and the resulting book) were intended for a
general (not specialized) audience and in them Kant not only
discusses the information recently pouring into Europe about
the diversity of human cultures, but his views of the world
and humanity’s place in it.
 The key to the work is his reflection on what humans, 'as a
free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of
himself.’

A Difficulty
Kant begins the selection we read for today by
noting a difficulty of adequately specifying human
nature.
 We have no standard of comparison by which to
judge the nature of human rationality.

◦ We have no example of non-terrestrial rational beings
which could serve as the point of comparison to
isolate the specific character of our rationality.

All we can do, then, is to specify the character of
our animal nature: humans are self-creating
animals, perfecting themselves in relation to selfdetermined ends.
Three Aspects of Self Creation

This account of the specificity of the human animal, highlights
the centrality of the capacity of reason to our animal being.
◦ This capacity is expressed by the definition of a human being as a
‘rational animal.’

In this capacity, Kant finds three more specific aspects that
characterize human activity (and also can be used to account
for and characterize cultural development).
◦
◦
◦
Preservation: refers to the capacity to address the problems
and threats posed to us by the world.
Education: refers to our capacity to preserve and pass on our
accomplishments in preserving our selves and serves as the
basis of society.
Governance: refers to our capacity to organize our social
existence according to the “principles of reason.”
Three Predispositions
•
Coordinate to the three aspects of humans
as rational animals are three dispositions
typically revealed in human action.
1.
2.
3.
Technical: we are natural problem solvers.
Indicated by our hand. (cf. also, the reference to
Adam and Eve).
Pragmatic: we are naturally inclined towards
civilization. Indicated by the fact that we progress
as a species and not as individuals.
Moral: as rational, we are naturally inclined to
the good, as sensible, we are naturally inclined to
evil.
Three Questions, and an Answer

As Kant makes clear, the identification of
these three dispositions serves as the basis
for answers to three pressing questions:
◦ Are humans by nature social?
◦ Is that social existence naturally civilized or are
we instead naturally savage?
◦ Is man good by nature, evil, or both?

There’s a clear progression to these
questions, and Kant thinks that in the
progression we find the key to the answer.
◦ The key: education in the good.
The Grundlegung



Our text for today was written by Kant as a
popular introduction to the results of the
Critique of Practical Reason.
In the Critique and in the Grounding, the
thrust of his critical transcendental
examination of practical reason is to locate a
foundation for freedom.
This foundation requires the capacity to
choose one’s actions independent of sensible
determinations such as instincts, desires,
passions, and sensations of pleasure and pain.
Where to Start?
The starting point of this examination is the
capacity of conceive laws and to act according to
them.
 In the practical sphere, as in the theoretical, Kant
makes a clear methodological distinction between
dependence upon sensory causes and
independence from them.

◦ Pure practical reason is independent of all empirical
conditions and completely self-sufficient.

Kant claims that “all moral concepts have their
seat and origin in reason completely a priori.”
A Good Will

Our selection begins with a claim that Kant believes will be commonly
accepted: nothing is good without qualification except a good will (153-4).
◦ A good will is intrinsically good; it is not dependent on external circumstances or
consequences.

Why might we think that there was such a will?
◦ Kant assumes that nature exhibits purposiveness, and that the different natural human
capacities are fit for the ends to which they are aimed (155).
◦ A brief consideration of the role of reason in our lives reveals that, if happiness was
the end appropriate to reason, nature has done a poor job of fitting the means to the
end.
◦ Rather than produce happiness, reason often produces the latter.

The situation is the same when we consider the role of reason in morality
(156).
◦ Reason is an imperfect guide to the will, insofar as it concerns objects.
◦ After all, we've all been confused about how to go about getting something.
◦ If right action is our goal, we would have been much better served with a "moral
instinct."
◦ So, if reason has a purpose (which it must, since we have it), it has to lie in the
production of a will that is not instrumentally good, but good in itself.
Duty
Now that we've established the possibility of
something like a good will, we have to further
specify the concept.
 Kant proposes to develop the notion of the good
will through the related notion of duty. He
proceeds to specify 4 different ways in which the
concept of duty can serve as a motive (157).

1. Action is contrary to duty
2. Action is in accord with duty, but natural inclination
is lacking (selfish inclinations can be operative).
3. Action is in accord with duty and there is a natural
inclination to do it.
4. Action is in accord with duty and there is a
contrary inclination in force.
From Duty to Morality
Clearly in case 1. there is no motive offered by
duty. Case 2. is developed by Kant in the example
of the shopkeeper. Case 3. is explained with the
help of the example of the naturally sympathetic
person and Case 4. with the help of the example
of the person whose natural sympathy has been
submerged by other concerns.
 The implied point of these examples could be
called the “first proposition of morality:” the
moral worth of an action is solely dependent
upon its being motivated by duty 158.

Second and Third Propositions
The “second proposition of morality” is found on
(159). It proposes that what makes an action
motivated by duty morally worthy is not the
consequences of the action, but the status of the
maxim from which it is done.
 So what makes one maxim better than another?

◦ The motivational structure revealed in the reasoning.

This leads Kant to the “third proposition of
morality” the necessity implied by moral duty is a
feature of the “lawfulness” of the maxim (the
extent to which it is universalizable).
The Categorical Imperative

On the basis of these propositions, we get
a first provisional statement of the
“principle” of morality, the Categorical
Imperative: “I should never act except in
such a way that I can also will my maxim
should become a universal law” (161).