Transcript duty - Acsu Buffalo

3: Animality, Rationality, and the
Constitution of the Self
1
Testing moral theories
• 1) phenomenology of morality
– Duty versus desire
• 2) theories about morality
– How do they hold up against this phenomenology
of duty versus desire?
2
The moral experience: an alien will
• When we relate external things to our need,
we cannot do so without at the same time
feeling ourselves bound and limited by a
certain sensation; this sensation draws our
attention to the fact that an alien will [ein
fremder Wille] so to speak, is operative within
ourselves, and that our own inclination needs
external assent as its condition.
3
• A secret power forces us to direct our will towards
the well-being of others or regulate it in accordance
with the will of another [nach fremder Willkűr],
although this often happens contrary to our will
[ungern] and in strong opposition to our selfish
inclination. The focal point at which the lines which
indicate the direction of our drives converge, is
therefore not merely to be found within us; there
are, in addition, other forces which move us and
which are to be found in the will of others [in dem
Wollen anderer] outside ourselves.
4
• This is the source from which the moral
impulses take their rise. These impulses often
incline us to act against the dictates of selfinterest. I refer to the strong law of obligation
and the weaker law of benevolence. Each of
these laws extort from us many a sacrifice,
and although self-interested inclinations from
time to time overrule them both, these two
laws, nonetheless, never fail to assert their
reality in human nature.
5
• As a result, we recognise that, in our most
secret motives, we are dependent upon the
rule of the general will. It is this rule which
confers upon the world of all thinking beings
its moral unity and invests it with a systematic
constitution, drawn up in accordance with
purely spiritual laws.
6
Phenomenon and Noumenon
• How explain this experience?
– 1) our own will as sensuous individuals seeking to
realize our own inclinations, desires, and interests
• Here we see ourselves as separate individuals
– 2) another will within us, connecting us to others
• Here we see ourselves as connected to others
• The first will:
– phenomenal appearance, how things seem
• He second will:
– noumenal, how things really are
7
Knowing and believing
• Recall Kant’s theory of knowledge
– In science, we impose subjective categories on
reality
– And so we cannot know reality
– But we can entertain beliefs that do not contradict
science
• Two beliefs of practical/moral life
– We are free, not determined
– We are connected to one another, despite our
apparent separateness as individuals
8
Outline
• 1 Other ethical theories: 3-24
• 2 Animality and rationality: 25-40
• 3 Maxims of action and moral law: 41-79
9
1 Other Ethical Theories
Aristotelian Natural Law Theory
Social Contract Theory
Utilitarian Theory
10
Feeling or Reason?
• Hume’s argument that morality is a certain
kind of disinterested feeling
– Because cold (theoretical) reason does not move
us
– But morality does move us
– Therefore morality must not be a matter of
reasoning (as Hobbes argues), but of feeling
11
Kant’s response to Hume
• But feelings (e.g., benevolence) are
– 1) unreliable:
• consider example of the benevolent person who helps
others because of feelings
• She then becomes preoccupied by her own problems
– 2) produced by external causes outside our
control.
• It’s her nature that is causing the action.
• If not feeling, then reason …
12
Reason-based ethical theories
• 1) reason in pursuit of happiness
– 1) Aristotle: natural law theory
– 2) Hobbes/Rawls: social contract theory
– 3) Bentham/Mill: utilitarian theory
• 2) reason as pure reflection on the individual’s
own will: Kant
13
Aristotle’s communitarian natural
law theory
• Morality is based on natural drives and
inclinations of human beings for happiness
• People are naturally social/political
individuals, naturally cooperative
• Individuals find their happiness in cooperative
social-political activity
– Including slaves and women whose natures
require subordinate positions in society
14
Simulacrum of duty
• Goal: (true) happiness
• Short-term egotistical activity is counter to
one’s inherent social nature: false happiness
• Hence: One ought to subordinate illusory
short-term desires to true long-term desires of
one’s essential nature
• This is not duty but a theory of rational selfinterest (of a socially inclined self)
15
Two teleologies of nature
• Aristotle: morality is based on natural
teleology
– Hence: “contraception is immoral”
• Kant: teleology of nature presupposes morality
– Nature aims to produce a being who is not
dependent on nature
– Morality first, and then nature:
• what must nature be like to support morality?
• Not: what must morality be given nature’s laws
16
Nature wants us to have the credit
• “…just as if she [Nature] had willed that, if
man ever did advance from the lowest
barbarity to the highest skill and mental
perfection and thereby worked himself up to
happiness (so far as it is possible on earth), he
alone should have the credit and should have
only himself to thank—exactly as if she aimed
more at his rational self-esteem than at his
well-being.”
17
Kant cannot follow
ancient/medieval theory
• 0) Ancient teleological science of Aristotle
– 1) Sun goes around the earth
– 2) Slaves naturally serve masters
• 1) Sciences of nature are now thoroughly
mechanistic—not teleological
• 2) Hence, morality must found any teleology of
nature—as a supplement to mechanism of science
– Two subjective ways of organizing data of experience
• 3) Ideas of happiness are ultimately personal (modern
individualism)
– Not the expression of species drives
18
Social Contract theory of Hobbes
• Humans are naturally egotistical, self-seeking
individuals pursuing happiness each in his own way
(= modern individualism)
• > War of all against all, and life in the state of nature
is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
• Morality is the science of fulfillment of the
individual’s basic interests
– =“sacred duty” … to myself!
• > The equal freedom of each person before the law
(enforced by the State) is in the self-interest of each
• =Not duty but individual self-interest is basis of
morality
19
Duty to kill preemptively
• 1) Main “duty” of individual: my own survival and
flourishing
• 2) best way to survive and flourish: Golden Rule
(when universally applied)
– Golden Rule of egoism: I won’t kill you (rob you, lie to
you, etc.) if you don’t kill me
• 3) But if by following this Rule when others do
not, I jeopardize my survival, then I violate my
sacred duty to myself
• 4) Hence, in such a circumstance, it is my “sacred
duty” to myself to violate the Golden Rule
20
Role of the State
• Morality (Golden Rule) is impotent without
the State to enforce it
• =>“Duty” to accept the laws of the State as
framework for free egos seeking happiness
each in his/her own individual ways
– Laws apply equally, allow maximum liberty for
each compatible with freedom for all
– Contradicts “natural liberty”
• Hence: State is not the fulfillment of human
nature but an anti-natural force (v. Aristotle)
21
Ring of Gyges
• Glaucon in Republic: Basis of “duty”: one’s own
interests, happiness
– When short-term interests require breaking the law, and
he would not get caught, why should a natural egotist
follow the law?
• Hobbes’ reply: this is less of a problem with the
existence of the State than without it.
• Recall “Ring of Power” in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings
– Plato and Kant side with Frodo
– They reject the ring of power because it darkens
and disfigures the soul of the person
– Smeagol
22
Rawls’ contemporary version
• 1) Veil of ignorance instead of state of nature
– =a kind of Ring of Forgetfulness and Disempowerment
• 2) Libertarian and egalitarian moral principles
follow
– Rawls recognizes that libertarian equality (of Hobbes)
is formalistic, allows for great material inequality
– Hence, an equality principle as well as a liberty
principle: only so much inequality as serves the wellbeing of the poorest people
23
Rationality of the Action
• We respect the liberty and promote the equality of
others because this is our duty, not because of
desires
• Importance of: What is the source of duty?
– Rationality of the action? Doesn’t this support Glaucon?
– Kant’s noumenal source of duty v. phenomenal desires: An
“alien will” that replaces our ordinary egotistical will
• Rawls wants to “naturalize” Kant (eliminate
phenomenon/noumenon metaphysics)
– Hence: rationality of action for individuals in general, not
for me in particular. How establish this?
– Imagine that you don’t know your advantages or
disadvantages: what would be rational to will as a
universal law?
24
Circularity?
• But why should one act on the basis of the veil of
ignorance?
– Why the duty to submit oneself to this imaginary
condition?
• Circularity of argument
– Rawls’ original position is supposed to found a system of
duties
– But it presupposes a duty to put ourselves in this state in
the first place. How found that?
– Also these duties are really grounded in self-interest (that
of a person behind the veil of ignorance)
25
Utilitiarianism
• Empiricist utilitiarianism (Bentham, Mill) v.
rationalist/deductivist social contract theory
– Rationally calculate the total amount of pleasure
• I ought to promote the greatest happiness of
the greatest number of people
• as determined by (instrumentalist) reason
– calculation of pleasures
26
Duty in utilitarianism
• Utilitarian theory: duty to promote the most
satisfaction of desire
– Re this act (act utilitarianism)
– Re rule implicit in this act (rule utilitarianism:
utilitarianism with a Kantian slant)
• There a true duty for the individual to
subordinate his own desires to satisfying the
desires of others
• But if duty, not desire, is primary, can the content
of the duty be determined by the maximization of
desire-satisfaction for the majority?
27
Utilitarian altruism
• Paradox of utilitarianism:
– I must do my duty, not follow my desire;
– but what determines what is my duty specifically (content
of duty) are the desires of others
• My one vote versus 7 Billion others
– = Morality is a hungry monster
– = rampant altruism
• We need a Bill of Rights to protect us from the
possible tyranny of utilitarian democracy
– These moral rights cannot be based on utilitarianism
28
Utilitarian egotism
• 1) One should be willing to submit one’s desires
and interests to what is right (=duty)
• 2) But: What is right = action that produces the
most pleasure or satisfaction for people
• 3) Hence providing the maximum amount of
pleasure for all individuals is basis of the “duty”
of each individual
• 4) Morality, what is right, approximates the
statistical average of people’s desires/interests
• 5) Hence, the duty for most people, most of the
time, is the satisfaction of their own desires
• = rampant egotism
29
Paradox of eudaimonist duty
• “Duty” involves conflict between what is right
and what is desired
• But ultimately what is right is what is desired
– 1) long term desire of social individual (Aristotle)
– 2) self-interest of ego in competitive social world
(Hobbes, Rawls)
– 3) desires of the majority (Bentham, Mill)
• Hence duty ultimately collapses into desire
– Contrary to phenomenology of moral experience
30
2 Animality and Rationality
31
Animal consciousness
• Implicitly, animals act instinctively
• species-specific determinations—inbuilt universals
• But explicitly, “for” the animal, the motives
are related to individual circumstances and
desires – eat this food, chase this squirrel.
– =perceptual consciousness, sensibility dominates
• The world for the animal is unconsciously
mediated by its species-specific structure
32
Human consciousness
• “Reason” largely replaces instinctive species-specific
frameworks of action with thought, ideas
– =The individual consciously represents the species
through universal ideas (replacing species instinct)
– Rational human consciousness is explicit species
consciousness for the individual
• (Animal) perceptual consciousness, desire, is
mediated by this rational conscious framework.
• Hence “for” human consciousness there are two
levels: individual-perceptual and universal-rational
33
Two levels of consciousness
• 1) awareness of things as mediated by specific
animal needs, desires (sensibility or perceptual
consciousness)
• 2) Awareness of this awareness via creation of ideal
models of reality (rational consciousness)
– Action on the basis of an ideal representation of the action
• Practical reason represents first level desires through
second level ideal (general or universal) models
• The level 1 power of immediate desires is
checked/overlaid by the power of level 2 rational
consciousness
34
Power of reason: affirmed
• All eudaimonistic theories assert that rational
considerations (level 2) have practical effect in
checking immediate desires (level 1)
• Hence the “form” of rationality is a power
over the supposed causal forces governing
action
– Violating determinism and phenomenal laws of
the sciences
– Implicit admission of noumenal status of the
rational person
35
The power of reason: denied
• But the “content” of reason is then said to be
determined by desires, which then ultimately
motivate the action
• Reason is thereby reabsorbed by phenomenal
forces and mechanism
• Hume: reason as slave of the passions
36
Kant’s reply
• Kant calls such reason impure practical reason,
connected to the impure will governed
ultimately by desires
• But this is a pseudo-mechanism, since one
must inevitably will such submission to
heteronomous desires
37
Animals Live in the Now
• For the individual animal, the concrete
individual situation is primary (animals live “in
the now”)
• Animals act in the immediate situation based
on specific instincts of their species
• The cow looks avidly at the grass, not at the meat
• The dog sniffs about for meat, not grass
38
The animals in their lair
• Sleeping on full or empty stomachs
• The past is essentially gone for them
• It is replaced by “contingencies of reinforcement”
(Skinner): a posteriori effects from the past
determine present behavior
• The animal acts on the basis of direct perceptions
informed by
– A priori species-based instincts
– Contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner), “first-signal
systems” (Pavlov)
39
Pavlov’s levels
• 1) instinct arising out of natural selection
• 2) first signal system: (Humean) associations with
the above
– Bell associated with food
– A water hole associated with prey
• 3) Human language: a “second signal system”
– Mediates perception as a distinct object for
consciousness, guiding action
– Can be operated on consciously as an object with its
own relative autonomy
– e.g., substituting pizza for cream puffs
40
Hunters around the campfire
• Talking about the day’s hunt
• = representing past events now, in the present
– Strangeness of this: what is now past is still present, what is not
here, somehow nevertheless, is here
• Recognizing patterns of behavior, accumulating
experiences, comparing and contrasting them
• Results in new patterns or models of action for the future,
created by humans, operating a priori in the next hunt
• Practical adjustments to experience within the dominant
framework of the larger symbolic order
• = human temporality (internally generated time structure
of human thought and action)
41
Three ways of examining
representations
• 1) in terms of the feelings evoked
– “amoralist” perspective of immediate (present
tense) desires when this is absolutized
• 2) in terms of maximizing future satisfactions
based on past experience
– “immoralist” perspective of rational interests,
when absolutized
• 3) in terms of internal structure of the
representation itself (moral dimension)
42
Temporality of moral
consciousness
• Human action is mediated by conscious intention,
representations, ideas to be realized in the future
based on experiences from the past (practical
rationality)
• But even now, the ideas I intend to realize in the
future have a general or universal nature
– The concept of the action itself, expressed in language
• Morality: reflect on implications of this second
level, which constitutes our distinctive humanity
43
Social implications of lying
• Lying requires that the individual
– separate himself from the collectivity
– and regard language as a personal instrument
• Perhaps this is an impossible situation for
individuals in intact primitive societies
– But it is the common situation for modernity
– Aristotle’s Greek society: in transition?
• Lying is common, but “unnatural”
• Hence the moral superiority of “savages”
– Not because their desires are simple (Rousseau)
– But because their social relations are “transparent”
44
3 Maxims of action and morality
45
What is the intention?
• 1) Desires, feelings + instrumental reasoning
re means and consequences
• 2) =>an intention
• The intention is a consciously formulated goal
with inherent universality
• Between 1 and 2: a transformation from
physical concreteness to abstract idea
• thanks to practical human rationality
46
The deep structure of the will
• 1) technical actions for the sake of realizing an end
(technical-hypothetical imperatives)
• 2) the end that is proposed by desire (pragmatichypothetical imperative)—ultimately, happiness
• 3) implications of
– a) the end that I will (concept of the action) and
– b) the willing of that end (unity of my projects)
• 4) higher level intentions from reflecting on 3):
categorical imperatives
47
Pure practical reason?
• 1) I want tea at 4 p.m.
– why? It makes me happy. = Pragmatic Imperative
• 2) I must boil water = Technical Imperative
• 3) but boiling water is boring
• 4) Allen Wood’s argument: So I must constrain my
desire to do something else and act on the basis
of pure practical reason, following the rational
principle: he who wills the end, must also will the
means
– Like Rawls, Wood wants to naturalize Kant
– And so avoid any “noumenal” dimension
48
Conflicting desires
• It’s 4 p.m. so time for tea
• I should boil water
• But I remember: Oprah is having Sarah Palin, and
if I boil water now, and forget it, I may burn my
house down
• 1) Wood’s position: I should constrain my desire
to watch Oprah/Sarah because of a purely
rational motive: he who wills the end, must, on
pain of violating a law of reason, will the means
• 2) I should watch Oprah because it’s more
interesting than having tea.
49
Passion, not reason, motivates me
• If I desire the end, that desire is what
motivates me in boiling the water, not the
rational principle that ends require means
• Theoretical reason determines the means:
having tea requires hot water
• But this reason does not motivate me in
boiling the water: my desire for tea is my
motivation (not a principle of rationality)
– Recall Hume: reason is cold
50
New level of motivation
• And if I would rather watch Oprah, the greater
desire rules (Pragmatic Imperative)
• Unless there is another reason:
• I invited John for tea at 4 and he hates both Oprah
and Sarah,
• and I should keep my promise: moral reason related
to experience of duty, not adherence to a principle of
theoretical reason (ends require means)
• And so the noumenal question arises:
• the source of the sense of duty arises,
• which is not a matter of abstract rational consistency as
Wood emphasizes
51
Nesting structure of the will
• 1a) I am driving my car
– I must push on the gas pedal, steer, watch the
road … (Tech Imperatives or TI)
• 1b) I am driving my car to get to work (TI)
• 1c) I am going to work to make money (TI)
• 2) I want to make money to live, to satisfy my
desires, to be happy
– Pragmatic Imperative (PI)
52
What is the real intention?
• 1) I intend to drive my car
• 1a) I intend to drive-my-car-to-get-to-work
(means-end relation)
• 2) I intend to drive-my-car-to-get-to-work-inorder-to-be-happy … (higher order intention)
• 1) is a relatively distinct moment of the more
complex intention/action
53
Ethics of driving a car
• 1) I must watch the road (TI)
• 2) Because I don’t want to die (PI)
• 3) Implicit universality: I am a person like others
driving their cars.
• 4) Maxims of action
– 4a) People should drive carefully to keep from
getting killed (prudence)
– 4b) People should drive carefully to keep from
killing (morality)
54
Two higher level possibilities
• 4a) My individual existence is primary
– Concern for consequences (I could be killed) are
prudentially based (PI)
– Phenomenal orientation of desire/interest re myself
• 4b) I represent persons in general, and my
intention legislates respect for persons--and this
is primary (CI)
– Concern for consequences (I could kill someone) are
morally based
– Noumenal orientation of duty to humanity
• Between higher level goals a) and b): free choice
55
Means and Ends
• The end I pursue (getting from A to B by means of
C)
– A desire originally motivates the action of taking the
means
• The means: driving my car:
– contains its own requirements independently of the
end I am pursuing
• So the end does not justify the means
– There arises a new motive inherent in the action of
the means: moral motivation to drive carefully for the
sake of humanity
56
Universality of all intentions
• Language involves universality
• “I” is a general term used by other persons
who refer to themselves.
• Driving a car is a general kind of activity
• Hence, the singular event is an instance of a
type of activity for a type of being.
• My intention is never wholly singular, always
involves an implicit universality
– From phenomenal singularity to noumenal
universality
57
The Principle of Morality (CI)
• “I ought never to act except in such a way that I
can also will that my maxim should become a
universal law.” 4: 402, 15; see 4: 421, 31
• Maxim 1): I should be careful driving so as not to
kill myself.
– not a universal law: I aim at preserving my singular
existence
– But “I” am a person, a human being
• Maxim 2) People should be careful when driving
out of respect for human life in general.
58
Reversal of source of intention
• Pure reflection on the nature of the act (of
driving my car)
• leads to a reversal of the source of the
intention:
– from intentions arising passively out of desires
(impure will—I want to live, to be happy, and so I
drive my car to work)
– to intentions arising out of the pure will itself
• > 1) In driving my car, I ought always to act as
a law-making representative of humanity
59
“It’s wrong to drive a car”
• > 2) It’s wrong to drive cars when you don’t
absolutely have to; ride a bike instead, to save
the planet!
• Various considerations of harm to
environment, problems of oil dependency, etc.
– Being a careful driver is also about bad
consequences of careless, unnecessary driving.
• Utilitarian ethics?
60
Utilitarian perspective
• Concern for consequences for people in general is
motivated by
– 1) duty to maximize utility/pleasure for others? But
why be concerned about the pleasures of others?
– 2) principle of respect for humanity, and recognition
that I am a legislator for humanity
• Utilitarianism presupposes this a priori moral
motive, but attempts to ground it in satisfactions
for the majority
– Why respect people’s desires for happiness?
– Because people deserve respect (period)
61
In each act we realize a law
• I will not only this individual act
• I will this kind of act—a rule or law is
embodied in my action
– I drive on the right side of the road in the USA
– And on the left side in Great Britain
• I am not only “following the law,” I am
consciously, actively, reproducing it, or making
it real.
62
Making the intention explicit
• The intention is there whether or not you are
fully aware of it. (Become aware!!!)
• Hence Kant’s ethics is first of all descriptive,
not prescriptive: what is my basic intention?
• The basic prescription is: try consciously to will
what you are already implicitly, pre/semiconsciously willing.
– I.e., be one with your own will.
– Don’t divide against yourself.
63
Egotism
• My chosen maxim is: drive carefully so that
the life that you save is your own
• I put my own individual existence first.
• But this contradicts the universality implicit in
my intention—I is a universal (too)
64
What is the real maxim of the
action?
• Maxims cannot be too detailed
– What is the real maxim or general rule you are
acting on?
• Maxims cannot be too general
– Must intend the action in its basic features
– What is the nature of the action itself? What are
you really doing?
65
Pitching level of generality
• What is the level of generality of the
intention/maxim?
• 1) drive on the right side of the road.
– Too specific
– Technical imperative
• 2) stay awake (too general) TI
• 3) drive carefully
– To keep from getting killed (me) PI
– Out of respect for human life (humanity) CI
66
The maxim of the thief
• I want to take her money so I can have it myself
• Maxim 1: I (J Lawler) should take other people’s
property when I can get away with it without
harming myself
– not general enough
– Maxim 2: People should follow their desires
– too general
• Maxim 3: People should take other people’s
property when they can do so without harm to
themselves.
67
Contradiction in willing the maxim
• But the thief does not will the maxim in its
universality: He does not want others to steal
from him!
• Hence, contradiction in the will:
– I will the maxim when it is in my favor,
– but I do not will it when it goes against me
• The thief contradicts himself (as a rational
being)
– Contradiction between the different projects of
the individual
68
Consistent thief?
• “If someone can steal from me, I will accept,
even admire that”
• = universalizes the maxim of the action
• It seems possible in the abstract, but is it so in
practice, really?
• If he truly wants his property, can he
simultaneously will that it be taken away?
69
Contradiction in the concept of the
action of theft
• 1) presupposes the existence of property
• 2) aims at preserving property (for himself)
• 3) yet destroys the existence of property (for
other person)
70
Is this a contradiction?
• I affirm property for me
• And deny it for others
• How is this a contradiction?
71
Who am I?
• 1) “I” as this sensible individual
– Attempt to return to animal consciousness
• 2) “I” as this particular person of a definite kind
– Sensible existence, object of empirical study—a
certain kind of being: James son of John, university
professor, etc.
• 3) “I” as a universal: “transcendental unity of
apperception” (Descartes’ Cogito: I am)
– Each conscious human being is an “I” (person)
– more specific/individual dimensions or aspects of
the personality that concretize this universality of
consciousness
72
A reason for distinguishing
me and you
• My child is starving, and I need money to save her life.
• Maxims:
• I should steal to save my child (and so I take the bread from
another starving child)
• People have a right to take property from others in order to
avoid starvation
– as long as they do not cause others to starve in the process
• Hence, I take property of another because I am a starving
person, the father of a starving child
– i.e., a general kind of being
– Not just “me” as this individual being
73
Universalizable exceptions
• E.g., water boils at 100 degrees C, except above
and below sea level
• People should respect property, except when
someone’s life is at stake
– Does this maxim as a universal law destroy the
concept/institution of property?
– Is it self-contradictory?
• Thou shalt not kill (innocent people)
– i.e., it is wrong to kill, except in self-defense
– It is wrong to kill, except for capital offenses
74
Non-universalizable exception
• People should respect property, except for me.
– This is the exception that morality condemns
– The immoral person (Kant’s immoralist) wants to
return to animal individuality
75
The thief means “me”
• What he means is himself as a pure individual
• But then there is no reason for distinguishing
himself from anyone else
• He means himself as this sensible individual
• But he cannot say this, or think this, without
making this into a generality: I am a person
like others
• So his maxim of the theft: I affirm property for
a person and I deny property for a person
76
A contradictory will
• The law I am realizing: deny property to affirm
property
• A contradiction?
– No: Deny property to her, to affirm it for myself.
• But she and I are persons.
– Hence: deny property (to persons) to affirm
property (to persons).
77
Semi-unconscious (impure) willing
• >The law I am implicitly realizing = the
destruction of property
• But I want there to be property (so I can have
objects in my possession)
• Hence I cannot in full consciousness will this
maxim as a universal law
• I do so in semi-unconsciousness
– Sartre: in bad faith (impure reflection)
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Self-destruction too
• As a rational person, I legislate for humanity,
all persons:
– Property should be respected …
• As a sensuous individual I want that thing for
myself
– … except by me
• = I affirm my sensuous individuality against
my humanity
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Socrates on upholding the Laws of one’s actions
• "Tell us, Socrates," they [the Laws] say; "what
are you about? are you going by an act of
yours to overturn us- the laws and the whole
State, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine
that a State can subsist and not be
overthrown, in which the decisions of law
have no power, but are set aside and
overthrown by individuals?" (Crito)
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Thief makes himself a parasite
• I want there to be property in general, so that I may
take advantage of this law for myself
• But I am unwilling to participate in or take
responsibility for the realization of this law whose
advantages I recognize
• I want others to maintain the law, while I break it.
• I make an exception for myself from the laws
obligating humanity
• (In game theory this is called the free rider problem.)
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Heteronomy and autonomy
• 1) The thief is a parasite: let others uphold the law; I
will destroy it for my benefit
– = “Heteronomy”
• 2) Mixed case: I will uphold (follow) the law, because
otherwise I might get in trouble.
– - Heteronomy (Hobbesian State enforces the law
governing individuals pursuing desires/interests)
• 3) Morality: I will uphold the law, because it is the
law of my own conscious (rational) will
– Autonomy
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Arendt on the “two-in-one”
• Hannah Arendt writes of moral thinking as “the
two-in-one of the soundless dialogue.” Such
thinking “actualizes the difference within our
identity as given in consciousness and thereby
results in conscience as its by-product.”
• As in Rousseau—withdrawal from distorting
influence of others to be at one with oneself.
– But this self is a universal, not a singular being: the
“soul,” not body
– Early Kant’s spirit world of the “alien will”
– Noumenal dimension of reality
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Formal logic?
• Isn’t this still a matter of formal logical
contradiction?
– I don’t steal because I would be engaged in a logical
contradiction
• Why should a thief worry about logic?
– Hume’s argument that reason does not motivate
• Kant: The “I” that I respect in myself and in others
is an ideal, a noumenal reality, not a sensible,
phenomenal individuality
– The logical contradiction is an expression of this
noumenal reality that I sense in the experience of duty
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The idea and the ideal,
the archetype
• “As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such
a case serves as the archetype for the
complete determination of the copy; and we
have no other standard for our actions than
the conduct of this divine man within us, with
which we compare and judge ourselves, and
so reform ourselves, although we can never
attain to the perfection thereby prescribed.”
(3-76)
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Morality: the ideal person within
us
• “There is no one, not even the most hardened
scoundrel—provided only he is accustomed to
use reason in other ways—who, when
presented with examples of honesty in
purpose, of faithfulness to good maxims, of
sympathy, and of kindness towards all (even
when these are bound up with great sacrifices
of advantage and comfort), does not wish that
he too might be a man of like spirit.” (Kant)
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