Transcript Chapter 9: Abortion

Chapter 9: Abortion

Pope John Paul II, “The Unspeakable Crime of
Abortion”
–
Main argument:
1. The human fetus from conception is “an
innocent human being.”
• 2. Therefore, it “is to be respected as a person.”
• 3. Therefore, it has the same right to life (and in
the same degree) as any other person.
------------------------------------• 4. Therefore, all abortions that kill the fetus are
instances of murder.
•
Chapter 9: Abortion
•
Pope John Paul II, “The Unspeakable Crime
of Abortion”
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Objection: We don't know for sure that the fetus
from conception is a person
•
•
Response 1: Yes, we do know for sure. Given
what modern genetic science has shown, “How
could a human individual not be a human
person?”
Response 2: And even if we don't know for sure,
“the mere probability that a human person is
involved would suffice to justify an absolutely
clear prohibition” of abortion.
Chapter 9: Abortion
•
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of
Abortion”
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Conclusion: Even if a fetus is a person from
conception (and hence has a full right to life), a
pregnant women still has a right to have an
abortion.
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How does this conclusion interact with the
Pope's argument?
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Note: Thomson is not saying it is always morally
permissible to have an abortion.
Chapter 9: Abortion
•
Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of
Abortion”
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The “unconscious violinist” case
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Thomson distinguishes “having a right to life”
and “having a right to be given at least the bare
minimum one needs for continued life.”
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The point of this distinction: (A) “a fetus has a
right to life” does not entail (B) “a fetus has a
right to use its mother's body for survival”
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So one cannot argue directly from (A) to (B)
Chapter 9: Abortion
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Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion”
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The genetic-code argument (roughly): Abortion
is wrong because the fetus is, biologically
speaking, a human being.
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Warren's response to the genetic-code
argument: What matters is whether the fetus is
a person, not whether it is biologically a human
being.
Chapter 9: Abortion
•
Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status
of Abortion”
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So what makes something a person?
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Warren's five “basic criteria” for personhood:
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• 1. Consciousness
• 2. Reasoning
• 3. Self-motivated activity
• 4. The capacity to communicate
• 5. The presence of self-concepts
Warren's main premise: The fetus lacks all five,
so it is definitely not a person.
Chapter 9: Abortion
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Dan Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral”
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To determine whether abortion is wrong,
Marquis claims we must first determine what
makes killing generally wrong.
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His answer: When someone is wrongly killed,
he or she is deprived of a valuable future.
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“When I am killed, I am deprived...of what I now
value [and] also what I would come to
value...Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of
all of the value of my future.”
Chapter 9: Abortion
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Dan Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral”
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Conclusion: “Since the loss of the future to
standard fetus...at least as great a loss as the
loss of the future to a standard human being
who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could
be justified only by the most compelling
reasons.”
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In other words, he concludes that abortion is
“seriously presumptively wrong.”
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Note: Marquis intentionally avoids the question
of whether the fetus is a person.
Chapter 9: Abortion
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W. L. Sumner, “A Moderate View”
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A problem with liberal and conservative views:
“despite their differences, [they both] agree on
two very important matters: the moral
irrelevance of when and why an abortion is
performed.”
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Irrelevance of when: “Neither view is able to
support the common conviction that late
abortions are more serious than early ones.”
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Irrelevance of why: “Neither view is able to
support the common conviction that some
grounds justify abortion more readily than
others.”
Chapter 9: Abortion
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W. L. Sumner, “A Moderate View”
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Sentience: the capacity to experience pleasure
and pain
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Sentience criterion: a being has moral standing
only if it is sentient
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Application: “The threshold of moral standing is
the stage during which the capacity to
experience pleasure and pain is first [acquired]”
(some point during the second trimester)
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So: first-trimester abortions = generally
permissible, third-trimester abortions =
generally wrong, second trimester = ?
Chapter 9: Abortion
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Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”
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The skeleton of a virtue ethical theory
• “An action is right if it is what a virtuous
agent would do in the circumstances.”
• “A virtuous agent is one who...has and
exercises the virtues.”
• “A virtue is a character trait a human
being needs to flourish or live well.”
• So right action is defined in terms of
virtuous agents, who are defined in terms
of virtue, that is defined in terms of
flourishing.
Chapter 9: Abortion
•
Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”
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Note how this avoids any trivial circularity (e.g.,
defining right action in terms of virtue and virtue
in terms of right action).
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When applied to abortion, rights become
irrelevant, because one can exercise one's
rights virtuously or viciously.
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A virtuous person will appreciate the value of
love, motherhood, family life, etc.
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Abortion will be permissible when it expresses
virtues like modesty and impermissible when it
expresses vices like selfishness.