Transcript Three challenges to conventional morality

THREE CHALLENGES TO
CONVENTIONAL
MORALITY
Thrasymachus
Glaucon &
Callicles
PLATO’S REPUBLIC: SOME HIGHLIGHTS
 Plato begins by articulating a powerful attack on conventional
morality.
 He responds to the challenge by developing a novel approach
to morality.
 The new approach depends on a theory of human psychology
which departs from Socrates’ preferred view.
 The new approach also depends on striking metaphysical &
epistemological claims.
 In an attempt to clarify and defend his moral psychology,
Plato develops analogies between the individual and the
state. In the process Plato presents his vision of how an ideal
state would be organized.
PRELIMINARIES
To appreciate what Plato’s Republic accomplishes, we need
some background on
 the kinds of moral skepticism Plato is responding to, and
 Socrates’ moral psychology.
PLATO’S SKEPTICAL OPPONENTS
In Plato’s dialogues some actual historical figures are depicted
as presenting skeptical positions. It is unclear whether these
positions were held by actual historical figures.
The most famous statements of moral skepticism in Greek
philosophy are attributed to the following characters:
 Thrasymachus (Republic I)
 Glaucon & Adeimantus (Republic II)
 Callicles (Gorgias)
We will discuss each of these in turn.
STAGE SETTING
The initial question of the Republic: What is justice?
Socrates thinks that this question is critical. Unless we know
what justice is, we cannot decide whether we have reason to be
just.
Some theories of justice, like that of Thrasymachus, have the
consequence that we have reason to avoid being just .
The deeper issue for Plato is whether we have reason to be just.
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form?
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form?
 Justice is the advantage of the stronger. (338c)
Who are the stronger?
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form?
 Justice is the advantage of the stronger. (338c)
Who are the stronger?
 The rulers, i.e. those who set up the rules/laws that govern
behavior (338d)
What are the stronger doing in coming up with rules/laws?
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form?
 Justice is the advantage of the stronger. (338c)
Who are the stronger?
 The rulers, i.e. those who set up the rules/laws that govern
behavior (338d)
What are the stronger doing in coming up with rules/laws?
 An empirical thesis about rulers: “Each makes laws to its own
advantage.” (338de)
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
REFORMULATED
Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis about rulers leads to a
reformulation of his account:
 Justice is a system of rules governing behavior devised by
rulers who have their own advantage in mind. (339c)
What is it for a citizen to be just?
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
REFORMULATED
Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis about rulers leads to a
reformulation of his account:
 Justice is a system of rules governing behavior devised by
rulers who have their own advantage in mind. (339c)
What is it for a citizen to be just?
 Being just is a matter of conforming to the system of rules
devised to promote the interests of the rulers. (339bc)
So do we have reason to be just?
THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT
REFORMULATED
Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis about rulers leads to a
reformulation of his account:
 Justice is a system of rules governing behavior devised by
rulers who have their own advantage in mind. (339c)
What is it for a citizen to be just?
 Being just is a matter of conforming to the system of rules
devised to promote the interests of the rulers. (339bc)
So do we have reason to be just?
 No, justice is another’s good. Being just amounts to promoting
someone else’s interests. (next slide)
JUSTICE AS ANOTHER’S GOOD
“You are so far from understanding about justice and what’s
just, about injustice and what’s unjust, that you don’t realize
that justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the
stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and
serves.” (343c)
 Do you agree that justice is solely another’s good and always
amounts to a loss/harm/sacrifice for the one who is just?
 Is Thrasymachus overlooking positive benefits of justice?
 Suppose Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis is correct. Does it
really follow that being just amounts to a loss?
SUMMING UP
Thrasymachus’ challenge to commonsense morality. Justice is
nothing but a system of rules governing behavior devised by
rulers who have their own advantage in mind. Being just, i.e.
conforming to such rules, is really just a matter of promoting
someone else's interests and always amounts to a
loss/harm/sacrifice for the one who is just.
THE LARGER CONTEXT
 One of the central aims of the Republic is to combat moral
skepticism. But the target is not so much Thrasymachus’
formulation of skepticism as Glaucon and Adeimantus’
formulation.
 Plato seems to think that Thrasymachus’ position can be
dismissed in a few pages. The objections raised by Socrates
are presented as decisive.
 We’ll look at the back -and-forth between Socrates and
Thrasymachus because it provides a nice illustration of
Socrates’ methods.
SOCRATES CONTRA THRASYMACHUS
Socrates’ initial observation: Rulers can fail to legislate to their
own advantage. They can make mistakes.
 How does this observation raise a problem for Thrasymachus’
overall theory?
SOCRATES CONTRA THRASYMACHUS
Socrates’ initial observation: Rulers can fail to legislate to their
own advantage. They can make mistakes.
 How does this observation raise a problem for Thrasymachus’
overall theory?
On the assumption that being just consists in conforming to the
laws, whether or not those laws in fact promote the interests of
the rulers, being just is not always a matter of promoting
someone else’s interests. (339de)
 How does Thrasymachus reply to this worry?
THRASYMACHUS’ RESPONSE
A ruler is like a craftsperson. The ruler qua ruler does not make
mistakes. (340d)
Take a lens grinder. A lens grinder is one who practices the art
of lens grinding. When a so -called “lens grinder” makes a
product that fails to focus light in the desired manner, she is
not exercising the art of lens grinding. Strictly speaking, she is
not being a lens grinder.
Likewise, a so-called “ruler” who makes bad laws isn’t
exercising the art of ruling.
Accordingly, we do not have an exception to the claim that
justice is the advantage of the stronger. Strictly speaking, it is.
SOCRATES’ RESPONSE
If the ruler is like a craftsperson, then the ruler does not aim at
her own good. (342bc)
 What is Socrates’ point here?
SOCRATES’ RESPONSE
If the ruler is like a craftsperson, then the ruler does not aim at
her own good. (342bc)
 What is Socrates’ point here?
A lens maker qua lens maker aims to make a properly
functioning lens. She does not aim at her own good.
THRASYMACHUS’ RESPONSE
Thrasymachus appeals to the case of the shepherd. (343b)
 What is the relevance of shepherds in this context?
SOCRATES’ FINAL BLOW
Thrasymachus wants to speak in a strict manner: strictly
speaking, the ruler doesn’t make mistakes.
Well, strictly speaking the art of lens grinding is directed toward
making properly functioning lenses, not the advantage of the
lens grinder. The art of making money from lens grinding is,
strictly speaking, something else.
Strictly speaking, the art of ruling is not directed toward the
ruler’s advantage; it is directed toward the advantage of the
ruled.
*Does this seem like a satisfying response?
THE DEEPER ISSUE
It might appear that Socrates and Thrasymachus are engaged in
a verbal dispute about the term “ruler.” More charitably, they
are in genuine disagreement about the relation of ruling.
Thrasymachus: ruling amounts subordinating, enslaving,
dominating, oppressing, exploiting… If he of fers an argument at
all, it is very quick: “each makes laws to its own advantage.
Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical
laws…” (338de)
Socrates: rulers are in fact the ones having to service the ruled.
He of fers the following supporting evidence: “no one willingly
chooses to rule and to take other people’s troubles in hand and
straighten them out, but each asks for wages” (346e f f.)
TRANSITION TO GLAUCON
A problem with Thrasymachus’ challenge. His account of justice
fails to acknowledge ways that living in a just society seems
genuinely beneficial. Consider two possibilities:
1 . Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare
of others.
2. Everyone acts morally.
*Why would we prefer to live in world 2 over world 1?
As we will see, Glaucon's theory has the advantage that it
explains why we prefer world 2 .
GLAUCON ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE
OF JUSTICE
People “decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement
with each other neither to do injustice nor to suf fer it. As a
result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the
law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the
origin and essence of justice. It is intermediate between the
best and worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the
penalty; the worst is to suf fer it without being able to take
revenge. Justice is a mean between these two extremes.”
(358e f f.)
Rules of justice/morality are profitable agreements involving
compromise. Roughly: we agree to set aside pursuit of self interest in the name of self -interest.
A PUZZLE
How can it be true that we promote self -interest by setting
aside self-interest?
PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY
A helpful way to think about Glaucon’s proposal: rules of justice
are solutions to problems of collective agency.
We have a problem of collective agency when rational pursuit of
self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all .
Two illustrations:
1. Paying taxes (in a just society)
2. Conserving water (in a severe shortage)
RANKING YOUR PREFERENCES
Ranking options in the matrix: 4=best, 1=worst. Player B = you.
Player A = an arbitrary player.
PLAYER A’S PREFERENCES
Ranking options in the matrix: 4=best, 1=worst. Player B = you.
Player A = an arbitrary player.
THE COMPLETE MATRIX
Ranking options in the matrix: 4=best, 1=worst. Player B = you.
Player A = an arbitrary player.
A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR RANKINGS
Whatever Player A does (cooperate or defect), Player B
rationally prefers to defect.
A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR RANKINGS
The same goes for Player A: whatever Player B does, A prefers to
defect.
PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY
So rationally pursuing self -interest, we end up defecting even
though we would be better of f cooperating.
GLAUCON ON THE ORIGINS AND NATURE
OF JUSTICE
Glaucon develops a contractarian theory of the nature of
justice/other-regarding morality. The rules of morality come
about through (hypothetical) negotiations.
Origins. Laws of morality arise in the face of problems of
collective agency. Rational agents recognize that unchecked
pursuit of self-interest leads to a worse result for all . They make
agreements to set aside pursuit of self -interest.
Nature. Laws of morality are nothing more than agreements
rational agents make (or would make) that prohibit pursuit of
self-interest in those cases where unstifled pursuit of selfinterest leads to a worse result for all .
DO WE HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?
If the laws of morality arise through rational reflection on selfinterest, it might seem that we have prudential reasons to be
moral, i.e. reasons of self -interest.
After all, we have prudential grounds for preferring world 2 over
world 1:
1 . Everyone pursues self -interest without regard to the welfare
of others.
2. Everyone acts morally.
 Is there perhaps a world even better than world 2, as far as
self-interest is concerned?
DO I HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?
1.
of
2.
3.
Everyone pursues self -interest without regard to the welfare
others.
Everyone acts morally.
Everyone acts morally except me.
Yes, we as a group have reason to prefer world 2 over world 1 .
But the question of the Republic is whether I have reason to be
moral.
 Why do I have reason to prefer world 3, given Glaucon’s view
of morality?
DO I HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?
1.
of
2.
3.
Everyone pursues self -interest without regard to the welfare
others.
Everyone acts morally.
Everyone acts morally except me.
Yes, we as a group have reason to prefer world 2 over world 1 .
But the question of the Republic is whether I have reason to be
moral.
 Why do I have reason to prefer world 3, given Glaucon’s view
of morality?
Because morality is a compromise that involves genuine
sacrifice of self-interest. (go back to the matrices)
AN OBVIOUS QUESTION
But what about the obvious advantages which come with being
just? Things like
—the benefits that go along with a good reputation
—avoiding punishments
 Don’t these obvious considerations show that I have
prudential reasons to be just? (How does Glaucon respond to
this question?)
AN OBVIOUS QUESTION
But what about the obvious advantages which come with being
just? Things like
—the benefits that go along with a good reputation
—avoiding punishments
 Don't these obvious considerations show that I have
prudential reasons to be just? (How does Glaucon respond to
this question?)
No, all that these considerations establish is that I have reason
to seem just, not reason to be just. (next slide)
ACKNOWLEDGING THE BENEFITS OF
SEEMING JUST
What these reflections reveal is that I have reason to prefer
option 4 over the rest:
1 . Everyone
of others.
2. Everyone
3. Everyone
4. Everyone
unnoticed.
pursues self -interest without regard to the welfare
acts morally.
acts morally except me .
acts morally except me and my transgressions go
BUT WHAT ABOUT DIVINE RETRIBUTION?
We need not worry about punishment by fellow citizens as long
as we seem just. But the gods know better. Doesn’t divine
retribution provide a prudential reason to be moral?
 How does Adeimantus respond?
BUT WHAT ABOUT DIVINE RETRIBUTION?
We need not worry about punishment by fellow citizens as long
as we seem just. But the gods know better. Doesn’t divine
retribution provide a prudential reason to be moral?
 How does Adeimantus respond?
Adeimantus: Perhaps the gods don’t exist. But if they do, all we
know about them is from the stories told. And these stories tell
us that they can be appeased through gifts.
Another point: on Glaucon’s view, the rules of morality are not
divinely sanctioned. It is unclear why the gods would care about
them.
THE RING OF GYGES
This case helps to illustrate the point that each of us most
prefers the following world:
4. Everyone acts morally except me and my transgressions go
undetected.
Glaucon suggests that anyone in possession of the Ring would
be unable to resist the temptation to violate the rules of
morality. Each of is just only involuntarily—if we could get away
with injustice, we would in fact be unjust .
 Do you agree with Glaucon or is he being overly cynical?
THE COMPARISON OF LIVES
The task of the Republic is to show that one has reason to be
just and not merely to seem just. Glaucon illustrates the
challenge vividly with his comparison of lives.
Show me that the just person is happier than the unjust person
even though the latter enjoys all the advantages of seeming just
and the former suf fers all the ills of seeming unjust.
In other words, show me that justice is good in itself, deprived
of all of its good consequences . In that case I will have reason
to prefer the just life .
 Is this a hopeless task?
FOR DISCUSSION
1. Set aside all the advantages that come with being moral,
advantages that can be had just by seeming to be moral.
2. Set aside worries about divine retribution.
3. Suppose most others will be moral whether or not you break
the rules.
4. Let’s grant that being moral involves genuine sacrifice.
 Might you still have reason to be moral? Don’t you want to be
moral, knowing full well that there are costs involved? So
what reasons do you have?
REASONS TO BE MORAL
We are looking for reasons independent of self -interest. A
couple possibilities to consider:
1. Respect for the moral law.
2. Concern for the welfare of others.
 Does Glaucon’s view of morality as a product of self interested negotiations have the ef fect of deflating whatever
lofty status morality seemed to possess?
 Do you worry, with Glaucon, that people are by nature selfish?
(The Ring of Gyges example is supposed to provide some
insight into human nature.)
THUCYDIDES ON THE ATHENIANS VS.
MELIANS
This remarkable passage from Thucydides of fers a
reconstruction of negotiations between the Athenians and
representatives of the island of Melos during the Peloponnesian
War (431-404), a war in which Sparta defeated Athens.
Inhabitants of Melos hoped to remain neutral in the war, but the
Athenians had dif ferent ideas . “Be our allies or perish” was the
ultimatum set before the Melians.
GLAUCON, THE ATHENIAN
The Athenians assume that justice is in play only when we are
dealing with parties of approximately equal power: “since you
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in
question between equals in power, while the strong do what
they can and the weak suf fer what they must .”
 How do Glaucon’s views on justice help us to make sense of
this dark claim?
NIETZSCHE ON JUSTICE
“Justice (fairness) originates between parties of approximately
equal power, as Thucydides correctly grasped (in the terrible
colloquy between the Athenian and Melian ambassadors): where
there is no clearly recognizable superiority of force and a
contest would result in mutual injury producing no decisive
outcome the idea arises of coming to an understanding and
negotiating over one another's demands: the characteristic of
exchange is the original characteristic of justice. Each satisfies
the other.” (Human, All Too Human 92)
NIETZSCHE ON JUSTICE (CONT.)
“Justice is thus requital and exchange under the presupposition
of approximately equal power position: revenge therefore
belongs originally within the domain of justice, it is an
exchange. Gratitude likewise. Justice goes back naturally to
the viewpoint of an enlightened self -preservation, thus to the
egoism of the reflection: ‘to what end should I injure myself
uselessly and perhaps even then not achieve my goal ?’ So
much for the origin of justice .” (Human, All Too Human 92)
JUSTICE WITHOUT EQUALIT Y?
So Glaucon’s theory of morality has the consequence that there
is nothing morally problematic about the strong using the weak
against their will.
Some questions to consider:
 Does Glaucon’s theory have the consequence that ‘anything
goes’ in our relations to other animals?
 Do you think it is a problem with Glaucon’s theory that it fails
to acknowledge a greater role for equality?
 Does anyone know how modern contractualist theories of
morality avoid the problem?
JUSTICE WITHOUT EQUALIT Y?
 Do you think it is a problem with Glaucon’s theory that it fails
to acknowledge a greater role for equality?
Suppose you think the strong ought to confer equal status to
the weak. But ought implies can. And perhaps it is part of
human nature that the strong impose their will. (see next slide)
AN APPEAL TO HUMAN NATURE
According to Thucydides, the Athenians forego justification in
favor of explanation:
“Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a
necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And
it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon
it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it
to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing
that you and everybody else, having the same power as we
have, would do the same as we do ?”
Cf. Glaucon’s Ring of Gyges. Or consider the ways we use non human animals.
CALLICLES
On Callicles’ understanding of our everyday morality, we think
all people ought to enjoy equal shares of power and other
goods. Callicles insists that conventional morality is a
complete sham: it is a mere convention that is contrary to the
laws of nature.
 What, on Callicles’ view, gives rise to this idea that all should
get equal shares?
CALLICLES
On Callicles’ understanding of our everyday morality, we think
all people ought to enjoy equal shares of power and other
goods. Callicles insists that conventional morality is a
complete sham: it is a mere convention that is contrary to the
laws of nature.
 What, on Callicles’ view, gives rise to this idea that all should
get equal shares?
A desire on the part of the weaker to get more than their
natural allotment.
 What do you think is meant here by ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’?
CALLICLES
 What do you think is meant here by ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’?
Very likely he has in mind the sorts of gifts of fortune which
make people better able to attain power and other goods:
creativity
intelligence
beauty
diligence/drive
athleticism/physical strength
People with such attributes are naturally superior: by nature
they will typically get more .
CALLICLES
Conventional morality is a contrivance of the naturally weak
that keeps the more powerful in check to create a balance of
power.
 Suppose this view of morality is correct. In that case do we
have reason to be moral ?
CALLICLES’ ALTERNATIVE TO
CONVENTIONAL MORALIT Y
Natural justice: “nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for
the better man and the more capable man to have a greater
share than the worse man and the less capable man.” (483d )
Evidence: “Nature shows that this is so in many places; both
among the other animals and in whole cities and races of men,
it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: that
the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than
they.” (483d)
 What sort of evidence do you think he has in mind?
CALLICLES’ BOLD PREDICTION
“We mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking
them while they’re still young, like lion cubs, and with charms
and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that
one is supposed to get no more than his fair share, and that’s
what’s admirable and just. But I believe that if a man whose
nature is equal to it were to arise, one who had trampled
underfoot our documents, our tricks and charms, and all our
laws that violate nature, he, the slave, would rise up and be
revealed as our master, and here the justice of nature would
shine forth.” (484a)
 Why do you think Callicles describes this individual first as
slave and then as master?
MORALIT Y AS CONTRIVANCE
CREATED
DISCOVERED
CALLICLES
Conventional morality is just a
contrivance of the weak (inferior) in a
power struggle.
True morality: it’s a law of nature that
the strong (superior) have more power
and other goods.
GLAUCON/THUCYDIDES
Among parties of approximately equal
power, agents pursuing self-interest
arrive at agreements to set aside pursuit
of self-interest.
THRASYMACHUS
Rules of morality are devised with the
aim of satisfying the interests of the
ruling class.
Among parties of unequal power, the
strong do what they can while the weak
suffer what they must. It’s a necessary
law of human & divine nature: we rule
wherever we can.
MORALIT Y AS CONTRIVANCE
 Do you find the view of morality as a human creation a
worrisome one? (Plato will ultimately reject this view.)
WHY THESE VIEWS SOUND SO MODERN
The idea that morality is a contrivance issuing from a power
struggle gets its most influential formulation in the work of
Nietzsche, the great classicist and philosopher of the 19 th
century.
Nietzsche’s views are especially reminiscent of the views
expressed by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias.
CALLICLES & NIETZSCHE
“Society is in origin an organization of the weak to create a
balance of power with the forces that threaten them, internal as
well as external .” (The Wanderer and his Shadow 22)
“You preachers of equality…: your most secret ambitions to be
tyrants thus shroud themselves in words of virtue .” (Zarathustra
II.7)
“Struggling ‘civilization’ (taming) needs every kind of irons and
torture to maintain itself against terribleness and beast -of-prey
natures.” (The Will to Power 871)
“…the meaning of all culture is the reduction of the beast of prey
‘man’ [the splendid blond beast] to a tame and civilized animal, a
domestic animal…” (Genealogy of Morals I.11)
MASTER MORALIT Y
Nietzsche sees conventional morality as a historical response to
the evaluative attitudes of aristocrats and nobles. He seems to
be thinking principally, but by no means exclusively, of values
prevalent among the Ancient Greeks.
When the nobles think of good and not -good (bad), their point
of reference is self and not -self. Evaluation is principally about
ranking.
good (noble)
not-good (ignoble)
strong
weak
powerful
powerless
self-governed
subordinate
proud
humble
…
…
THE ORIGINS OF “SLAVE MORALIT Y”
The disadvantaged are angry about their plight, but they are
unable to react openly. They suppress their anger and it
becomes unconscious. This resentment gives rise to a set of
evaluative attitudes that invert the evaluations of the nobles.
Whence conventional morality.
good of the nobles evil
not-evil (good)
strong
strong
meek
powerful
powerful
obedient
proud
proud
humble
…
…
…
PARABLE OF THE LAMBS &
BIRDS OF PREY
“That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem
strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds of
prey for bearing of f little lambs. And if the lambs say among
themselves: “these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least
like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not
be good?” there is no reason to find fault with this institution of
an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a
little ironically and say: “we don't dislike them at all, these
good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than
a tender lamb.”” (Genealogy, I.13)
 Here Nietzsche says “there is no reason to find fault with this
institution of an ideal,” but Nietzsche is in fact highly critical
of conventional morality. Any idea what his complaints are?
THE CRITIQUE OF SLAVE MORALIT Y
Calliclean point: Conventional morality is unnatural or even
against nature (preachers as “haters of the earth”) & harmful
for the best.
Platonic point: Equality stifles excellence.
In part Nietzsche thinks that morality has bad ef fects because
of its emphasis on happiness as good, suf fering as bad. A
negative consequence of this way of thinking is that people
seek contentment rather than arduously striving to be creative.
 Plato’s moral theory emphasizes happiness as a goal, but the
happiness sought is not absence of suf fering. Why do I say
this? (think of the comparison of lives)
SUPERMAN
In line with Callicles, Nietzsche envisions a day when higher
individuals are unshackled by the values of the weak. But the
suggestion is not a return to preexisting laws (of nature).
“[T]he passion that attacks those who are noble is peculiar….It
involves the use of a rare and singular standard cold to
everybody else; the discovery of values for which no scales have
been invented yet; of fering sacrifices on altars that are
dedicated to an unknown god; a courage without any desire for
honors; self-sufficiency that overflows and gives to men and
things.” (The Gay Science 55)
A PUZZLE & PROPOSED SOLUTION
How can Nietzsche agree both with Glaucon and Callicles?
Aren’t they of fering competing accounts of morality?
A suggestion: Nietzsche agrees with Glaucon that justice has its
origins in rational reflection on self -interest. He also recognizes
that Glaucon’s contractarian view of morality leaves out an
important dimension of commonsense morality: it fails to
respect our concern for equality. Commonsense demands that
we treat each person equally —even the weak. This concern for
equality—the idea that everyone has an equal standing at the
bargaining table—is something additional to the contractarian
view, and Callicles is right that it is a mere contrivance on the
part of the weak .
DISCUSSION
 Any worries about the Calliclean-Nietzschean critique of
conventional morality?