Transcript Why Be Moral?

Why Be Moral?
Themes in Ethics and Epistemology
Shane Ryan
[email protected]
16/10/13
Issue
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Why be moral?
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Part I: Why should we be moral?
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Part II: Should we be as moral as possible?
Structure
Part I
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
2. Possible Objections and Responses
Part II
3. Wolf's Challenge
4. Conclusion
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
Glaucon distinguishes between three types of goods
and ask which kind of good justice (or morality) is.
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–A good
that we value for its own sake; e.g. pleasure
–A good
that we value for its own sake and for what comes from
it; e.g. being healthy
–A good
that we value not for its own sake but because of what
comes from it; e.g. making money
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
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Justice as being like money, we don't value it
for it's own sake but for what it can get us.
“We can see most clearly that those who
practice justice do it unwillingly and because
they lack the power to do injustice, if in our
thoughts we grant to a just and an unjust
person the freedom to do whatever they like.”
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
The Ring of Gyges
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Glaucon: Which kind of good is justice?
Glaucon tells the tale of a shepherd who finds
a ring that allows it's wearer to become
invisible. The shepherd realising its power
arranges to become a messenger that reports
to the king. He seduces the king's wife and
kills the king with her help, taking over the
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
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Glaucon claims that anyone who had such
power as the shepherd had, the power to get
away with any injustice, would steal, have sex
with whoever they liked, kill whoever he
wished to kill.
People only act justly because they're
compelled to do so.
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
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“Someone who didn't want to do injustice,
given this sort of opportunity, and who didn't
touch other people's property would be
thought wretched and stupid by everyone
aware of the situation, though, of course,
they'd praise him in public...”
1. The Immoralist's Challenge
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We are presented with a challenge. Glaucon
has suggested that the shepherd would be
thought of as foolish if he acted justly
What reason can we give for saying that the
shepherd should behave justly and not kill the
king?
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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The example is described such that the
shepherd will not face external sanction
–
He'll become king, so others won't be able to
punish him for killing the previous king.
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(It's also claimed that he won't face punishment
from the gods.)
He'll gain the benefits of being king and
without apparently suffering any bad
consequences. Why shouldn't he act
immorally?
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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But will he not face any negative
consequences?
Internal sanctions. He might feel guilty for
murdering another person.
But it's plausible that even if an agent does
feel some guilt from an immoral action, that
guilt may not be commensurate with the
benefits gained from that action, in which case
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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If he kills the king, then the shepherd may feel
guilty. But he'll live in a palace, have the power
to live as he pleases, any children he has will
likely enjoy comfortable lives.
Won't the benefits of the action outweigh the
costs?
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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In order to say that one should be moral, does
one need to appeal to the existence (or merely
possible existence?) of a righteous, all
knowing, all powerful God?
If there is such a God, then it makes sense for
the shepherd not to kill the king. If he were to
do so, he would risk eternal damnation.
Making such an argument looks dialectically
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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This answer by itself, though a theologian may
be able to add more, still gives us the result
that morality is the third kind of good –
something that we do not for its own sake, but
for what it brings us.
Might there not be another basis to argue that
the shepherd should not kill the king?
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
A virtue response
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So far we have focused on what the shepherd
should choose.
The virtue ethicist can argue that such a
choice won’t present itself in the way we have
been describing to the virtuous agent.
–
Part of being virtuous is acting in virtuous ways
and also having the appropriate reactive attitudes
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
A virtue response
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Does this mean that an agent would be better off not
being virtuous, given that it results in them missing
out in particular instances on promoting their
interests?
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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This needn’t be the case. The virtuous person, by
being virtuous, is locked into certain ways of
behaving, reacting to and seeing the world.
If we grant that being virtuous is a necessary
condition for enjoying the good life, then we can say
that while being locked into these ways of behaving
and seeing the world might mean missing out on
one-off opportunities to promote one’s self-interest,
being virtuous still comes out as being best for a
person overall.
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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An odd result? We should be moral, because it’s in
our self-interest?
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“Self-interest” may be misleading. We have reason to
be virtuous as it puts us in a position to live well, but
becoming virtuous is transformative – it changes an
agent’s character.
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The virtuous person doesn’t act morally out of a
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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Being just isn't something we only value for
what it can get us, if we're virtuous. If we're
virtuous then we love the good and if we love
the good then we value justice for its own sake
as well as for the benefits it can bring us.
2. Possible Objections and
Responses
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But isn't this dialectically burdensome in just the
same way as appealing to the existence of a certain
kind of God is?
–
One has to argue that being virtuous is a
necessary condition for the good life.
–
This may be easier or harder than making the God
argument.
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What about the vicious person?
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How might Glaucon respond?
3. Wolf's Challenge
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Susan Wolf (1982):
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“I don't know whether there are any moral saints.
But if there are I'm glad that neither I nor those
about whom I care most are among them.”
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Claim: Being morally perfect, i.e. being a moral
saint, is not a model of being towards which it is
rational or desirable to strive.
3. Wolf's Challenge
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What exactly is a moral saint?
Someone whose every action is as morally
good as possible.
Different possible moral saints
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Loving Saint
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Rational Saint
3. Wolf's Challenge
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The worry: the moral virtues “are apt to crowd
out all the nonmoral virtues”.
If the moral saint is devoting all her time to
raising money for charity or feeding the
hungry, then she's not reading novels or
playing games, pursuing romance, enjoying
gourmet cooking, etc..
3. Wolf's Challenge
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The models of moral saints are unattractive,
but are they not unsuitable?
Wolf: Maybe us finding them unattractive
indicates our own weaknesses, vices and
flaws.
But there are non-moral qualities, which the
moral saint will lack, that we ought to like.
3. Wolf's Challenge
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There are non-moral accomplishments that it
is appropriate to recognise.
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For example, in the fields of exploration, the arts,
and the sciences.
In advocating the development of non-moral
excellences, we advocate non-moral reasons
for acting and “implicitly acknowledge the
goodness of ideals incompatible with that of
the moral saint.
3. Wolf's Challenge
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Wolf's deeper point: Morality is important but it
shouldn't override all other considerations
about how we should act and be.
Response: Wolf's objector might maintain that
moral value is the highest value and that it
should override.
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She may maintain our not valuing the life of the
moral saint is an indication of our own moral failing
rather than the worth of the life of the moral saint.
4. Conclusion
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The seminar addressed the following
questions:
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Part I: Why should we be moral?
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Part II: Should we be as moral as possible?
We examined the story of Ring of Gyges and
it's implications for morality.
We considered a virtue ethical response.
4. Conclusion
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We examined Wolf's argument that being
morally perfect, i.e. being a moral saint, is not
a model of being towards which it is rational or
desirable to strive.
And her deeper point that morality is important
but it shouldn't override all other
considerations about how we should act and
be.