Transcript David Hume: A matter of "taste"

Hume on Taste

Hume's account of judgments of taste
parallels his discussion of judgments or
moral right and wrong.




Both accounts use the internal/external
distinction: external facts -- internal
"sentiment" [behavior/feeling]
In both cases the "error" in judgment will be
in the analysis of the external facts.
Judgments of taste will be objective in part
because the judgments of "objects of taste" are
"question of fact, not sentiment."
Therefore it's of some use to look at Hume's
views of causation and morality.
on to morality!
David Hume
Morality and "Sentiment"


HUME begins with "natural philosophy"
[which is an empirical, experimental method
of inquiry]
He holds that nothing is present to the mind
except its PERCEPTIONS.
 PERCEPTIONS are either sense
impressions, or ideas based on sense
impressions.
 "knowledge" consists in judgments about
either "matters of fact" or "relations
between ideas"
Traditional View of Causation
[NOT Hume’s]

We extend the usefulness of the factual
information that comes from the senses by
making inferences based on a belief in
"cause and effect“

The traditional view of causation has three
elements.
 In addition to the cause and its effect there
is a third element: a necessary, real
relation between the cause and the effect
that is contributed by reason
Hume on "Causation"

Hume believes the traditional view confuses a
mental habit with an "alleged real relation“

For Hume causation is rooted in belief.
 A "belief" is a lively idea associated with a
present impression.
 We see cause A and effect B in "constant
conjunction", so we believe that B always
follows A.
 There is no additional "necessary relation"
independent of our senses and our ideas.
"Causation" and Morality I


How are causal explanations of moral
issues and matters of fact related?
First: They are similar
 "Helping the injured is good" and "Acid
causes litmus paper to turn red" are
contingent, not necessary truths
 All matters of fact are contingently true.
 This means they could be otherwise.
 Note: "necessary truths" are those that
are true independent of experience. [e.g..
Plato's forms]
"Causation" and Morality II

Second: They are different
 The "causal connection" is based on the
conjunction of two external events.
 A moral assertion is based on an external
behavioral event and an internal mental
event.

That is - voluntary actions and
 feelings of approval/disapproval
"Causation" and Morality III

Third: They are comparable.
 We are psychologically "tuned" to attribute
a moral quality to an action that is
experienced in "constant conjunction" with
a feeling of approval or disapproval.

If we are presented with the same data
we will tend to respond in a similar
manner.
Source of Morality


Does morality "reside" with our ability to
reason. Or our ability to feel?
 Some argue that moral distinctions are
found through the use of reason alone.
 Others argue that reason cannot draw
moral conclusions; that virtue and vice are
a matter of "sentiment."
Hume believes that making moral
judgments involves both.
Yet Sentiment Is the Ultimate
Source of Morality



According to Hume the function of morality is
to teach us our duty. [that is what we should
DO.]
Hume argues that reason can have no effect
on our behavior.
 He says that reason has no power over our
feelings.
 And, thus, no influence over our behavior.
Without "sentiment" morality is not a
"practical study."
What constitutes the
WRONGNESS of an Act?



Hume parallels his critique of the traditional view
of causation.
He argues that the "wrong-ness" of an action is
neither
 a matter of fact : "where is the matter of fact
we call a crime?"
 nor a moral relation discovered by reason:
morality doesn't consist in the relation of its
parts.
The “wrong-ness” comes from the feeling of
approval or disapproval towards an action.
Sentiment is the Source of
Morality
Hume states that VIRTUE is those mental
actions that give the viewer the "pleasing
sentiment of approbation.“
The role for reason in morality is to ascertain the
facts and relations of the situation.
 How does this differ from the use of reason in
non-moral matters?
 In moral reasoning we must know all the
objects and relations before we make our
moral judgment.
 The difference between a mistake of fact
and a mistake of right: Oedipus vs. Nero.
Source of our "passions"?


Hume's MORAL THEORY rests on some of
our "sentiments" originating outside our
personal concerns. [This is necessary for him
to avoid relativism]
He argues that "the notion of morals implies
some sentiment common to all mankind."
 a universal sentiment that is different than
desire/aversion, affection/hatred etc…
 And that as long as humans have the same
elements as now, we will never be
indifferent to the public good.
back to TASTE!
Hume’s Discussion of “Taste”



A “standard of taste” will be “a rule by which the
various sentiments of men may be reconciled” #6
[See #3 for discussion of reason & language]
This standard is not a priori. #9
[a priori = prior to or apart from experience]

Not an unchanging abstraction based in reason.

Based on experience and the observation of
the common sentiments of human nature.

From these observations and experiences we
discover some general principles of praise and
blame. #11- 12
Since the sentiment is certain, the error will be
with perception: “defects” in the internal organs.
Hume's 5 reasons judgments of
taste may go wrong
1. We may lack delicacy of imagination. #14
2. We may lack practice in [experience of] a particular
art. #18
3. We may lack experience in making comparisons
"between the several species and degrees of
excellence and estimating their proportion to
each other.“ #20
4. We must reserve our mind free from all prejudice -considering only the object #21
5. We may lack good sense. #22
Role of sense organs in
judgments of taste
What about the relationship Hume states as
existing between defects in the sense
organs and defects in aesthetic judgment?
#12-13


What problems do these defects create
for a judgment of value in art?
Does this make sense to you?
Two questions for you!
1. Hume believes that all general rules of art are
based on experience, not on a priori
reasoning. #9
-- is this consistent with your experience of
art?
2. Hume believes that the greatest works of art
are “universal” -- i. e. appreciated in all
times and places. #23
-- is this consistent with your own
experiences of art?
-- can you think of examples that support
Hume’s view? That don’t support his
view?
Preview Comparison:
Kant/Hume on “taste”

Hume: taste is a matter of perception
 relation between perception and judging
 the general rules of art are founded on
experience

Kant:- argues that taste is indifferent to what is
pleasure
 As you read Kant ask yourselves why?
 Hints: Relationship to the “agreeable”-“finality of form” -- based on pure ideas
Question to consider: What is the relationship
between perception & pleasure?
Kant/Hume
Can we reduce aesthetics to a singularly
intellectual analysis?
.
"A pure judgment of taste has, then, for its
determining ground neither charm nor
emotion, in a word, no sensation as a matter
of the aesthetics judgment."
Kant SS 16
.


How might Hume respond?
Why isn’t taste [and thus aesthetics ] a
matter for our cognitive capacity
according to Hume?