Transcript The Intercultural Ethics Agenda from an Objectivist Point of View

The Intercultural Ethics
Agenda from an
Objectivist Point of View
Kenneth Einar Himma
Seattle Pacific University
[email protected]
A Variety of Different
Intercultural Ethics Projects
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Ess and Buchanan: Get cultures to agree on
intercultural ethics to facilitate coordinated
activity in a global economy
Hongladarom: Reconcile ordinary doctrines
of privacy with Buddhist denial of self
Capurro and Britz: Organized series of
conferences, most recently in South Africa,
to facilitate dialogue between IE in different
parts of the world.
Three Views of Truth
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Subjective truth: a proposition or norm P is
subjectively true if and only if its truth-value
depends on what some relevant individual thinks
and that individual thinks P is true.
Intersubjective truth: a proposition or norm P is
intersubjectively (or conventionally) true if and only
if its truth-value depends on what some group of
individuals thinks and members of the group
converge in thinking P is true.
Objective truth: a proposition or norm P is
objectively true if and only if its truth-value is
independent of what any person or group of
persons think about the truth-value of P.
Two Classes of Intercultural
Ethical Tasks
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Descriptive ICE: Identify ethical principles
that different cultures have in common and
those on which they disagree.
– Empirical in character
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Normative ICE: Identify ethical principles
that different cultures should agree on in
governing global information and economic
activity.
– Moral, prudential, or aesthetic in character
Skepticism about
Objective Truth
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Skepticism about objectivity is not
limited to skepticism about objectivity
of moral principles.
– The earth is roughly spherical
Skepticism about
Objective Truth
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Skepticism about objectivity is not limited to
skepticism about objectivity of moral
principles.
– The earth is roughly spherical
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Grounded in Kantian claim that we do not
have unmediated access to reality an sich.
Can’t think or talk about the world without
concepts and language that are social
inventions.
Problems with Skepticism
about Objective Truth
1.
Kantian claim, however, is an epistemological
claim that cannot support the ontological claim that there
are no objective truths about the world – or no way that
the world is independently of our concepts.
2.
Indeed, given our concepts, everyone could be
mistaken about the shape of the world, which is the
hallmark of objectivity.
3.
The claim that there are objective truths
purports to be an objective truth, so the denial of this
claim, if it is to engage the position, must also purport to
be objective, which is self-contradictory.
Skepticism about Moral
Objectivity
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Moral principles are neither objectively
true nor objectively false; if they have
truth-value, they are determined by
cultural practices.
Arguments for Skepticism
about Moral Objectivity
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The Disagreement Argument: Cultures
disagree on moral principles; so, moral
principles not objective.
The Epistemological Argument: We have no
epistemically reliable way to resolve moral
disagreements between cultures.
The Tolerance Argument: Intersubjectivism
more likely to encourage tolerance of
cultural differences than objectivism.
Normative ICE and
Skepticism about Objective
Truth
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Intersubjectivism and subjectivism cannot provide
coherent motivation for normative project of
pursuing agreement on moral principles. Can’t
argue for agreement on moral grounds because
there is no universal principle that agreement is
morally good. Can’t argue for agreement on
prudential grounds because prudential grounds are
irrelevant with respect to choosing or adopting
moral principles. Only moral grounds can justify
adoption or choice of moral principles. (see William
Frankena, “The Concept of Morality”).
Normative ICE and Moral
Objectivism
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Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult
issues.
– E.g., what is ground for believing moral
objectivism is true?
Normative ICE and Moral
Objectivism

Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult
issues.
– E.g., what is ground for believing moral
objectivism is true?
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But moral objectivism can coherently
pursue the normative goal by giving
moral reasons for the goodness of
agreement.
Normative ICE and Moral
Objectivism
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Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult
issues.
– E.g., what is ground for believing moral
objectivism is true?
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But moral objectivism can coherently pursue
the normative goal by giving moral reasons
for the goodness of agreement.
Moral objectivism also has a viable
methodology for producing agreement:
Gert’s “common morality” + Rawls
“reflective equilibrium”
Normative ICE and Moral
Objectivism
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Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues.
– E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is
true?
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But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the
normative goal by giving moral reasons for the
goodness of agreement.
Moral objectivism also has a viable methodology for
producing agreement: Gert’s “common morality” +
Rawls “reflective equilibrium”
– Much disagreement that appears moral is not about
fundamental moral principles at all: much disagreement
involves disagreement about how to apply shared
principles or disagreement about factual matters that
condition applicability of shared moral principles.
Normative ICE and Moral
Objectivism

Moral objectivism faces a lot of difficult issues.
– E.g., what is ground for believing moral objectivism is true?
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But moral objectivism can coherently pursue the normative
goal by giving moral reasons for the goodness of agreement.
Moral objectivism also has a viable methodology for producing
agreement: Gert’s “common morality” + Rawls “reflective
equilibrium”
– Much disagreement that appears moral is not about fundamental
moral principles at all: much disagreement involves disagreement
about how to apply shared principles or disagreement about
factual matters that condition applicability of shared moral
principles.
– Indeed, one reason that diversity of moral views has been
reduced during Information Age is precisely that new information
technologies have made possible dialogues seeking reflective
equilibrium.
Conclusion
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The most promising foundation for the
normative ICE project is moral
objectivism. If intersubjectivists
succeed in producing agreement, it
will be, in part, because they have
ignored their own skepticism about
objectivity to adopt methodologies
available only to moral objectivists.
The End
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Thank you.