Transcript The Ideal Spectator

Ideal spectator approach
Lecture 2
“The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains
that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines
virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a
spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and
vice the contrary.” --Hume, Appendix I
Topics today:
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Hume’s view of moral judgment
His critique of the rationalist
position
Sec. 5: Why utility
pleases
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Why do we morally admire those
qualities that are socially useful?
Can’t just be a result of education.
There must be a basis in human
nature.
2 possibilities: self-regard or
humanitarian concern
Self-regard or concern for others?
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Moral sentiment can oppose our self-interest
Can concern matters that don’t affect our selfinterest
 far
away in space or time
 fictional
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Concern for self and moral concern feel
different
Moral sentiment cannot be a form of selfregard
Must be a concern for others
Universal benevolence
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Rooted in an innate human
capacity for sympathy
Sympathy can take the form of a
sentiment of benevolence toward
all, a humanitarian concern.
This concern is what drives our
moral judgments
Objection
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Sympathy leads to more concern
for those close to us
Our moral judgments do not vary in
this way
Reply
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Unequal concern arises from a
biased point of view
An impartial consideration of the
situation channels benevolence
equally toward all
Correct moral judgments express
the attitudes of an impartial,
sympathetic observer
Role of reason in morality
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Reason ascertains facts about
what promotes or diminishes
pleasure and happiness
So reason plays a role
But reason does not make the
moral judgment
Moral judgment expresses a
sentiment evoked by consideration
of the facts revealed by reason.
1st argument against rationalism
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Reason: inductive or demonstrative
Inductive: infers facts from observation
Demonstrative: works with abstract
mathematical and logical relations.
Moral judgments don’t pick out such
facts or relations
Hence they are not made by reason
Example: the “crime” of ingratitude
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Observable fact: ill will or
indifference in the mind of the
ungrateful person
This is not a moral fact because it
is not always wrong
Abstract relation: contrariety of
attitude
Again, this is not always wrong
2nd argument
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Reason operates to infer NEW
facts and relations
A moral judgment must be based
on all the facts of a situation
Hence moral judgments are not
made by reason
3rd argument
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Moral judgments are like
judgments of beauty
Beauty is not a quality or feature
we discover in the object
Rather, a judgment of beauty is an
expression of a favorable
sentiment toward the object
Moral judgments express a similar
kind of sentiment
4th argument
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Non-human objects can manifest
all the relations that obtain in a
moral situation.
But we don’t apply morality to the
non-human world
Hence morality is not a matter of
relations.
5th argument
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Reason alone is never a motive to
action
Moral judgments can move us to
action
Hence reason by itself cannot give
us morality