Transcript Is morality objective? The state of the debate

Is morality objective?
The state of the debate
Michael Lacewing
[email protected]
© Michael Lacewing
Cognitivism
• There is moral knowledge. In some sense,
moral judgments can ‘fit the facts’.
– Standard: moral knowledge is ‘universal’.
– Bernard Williams: moral knowledge is relative to
society.
• G E Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’: moral
values cannot be deduced from natural facts.
– But there are still non-natural facts about moral
values.
– What kinds of ‘facts’ can these be? Aren’t values
dependent on valuing?
Emotivism
• A J Ayer: when two people disagree over a
fact, the matter can be resolved (or at least,
we know what would resolve it); when two
people disagree over a value judgment,
either they disagree over a (natural) fact, or
there is no further way to resolve the
disagreement.
• Moral judgments express feelings of
approval/disapproval.
Emotivism developed
• Obj: this means there is no such thing as moral
reasoning (only factual).
• Charles Stevenson and Simon Blackburn: there is a
disagreement in attitude, and attitudes are not
held one-by-one.
– My attitude of disapproval relates to beliefs about the
action (my reasons for disapproving), desires towards it,
and to other attitudes of approval and disapproval
(similar feelings about similar actions).
– Many attitudes can be involved in a single practical
ethical issue, e.g. abortion.
• Blackburn: very few systems of moral attitudes are
internally coherent and psychologically possible.
Cognitivism developed
• There are truths about moral reasons.
– Moral judgments can’t be deduced from natural
facts, but they can be rationally supported by
them.
– Whether some consideration is a moral reason is
a fact, a fact about reasons.
• Reasons are readily understandable, e.g.
reasons for holding scientific beliefs.
– Facts about reasons are normative facts.
Cognitivism developed
• When two people disagree morally,
they either disagree about natural
facts or about normative facts.
– At least one is making a mistake.
• Moral reasoning is a matter of weighing
up what reasons we have to act in
particular ways.
Are moral reasons objective?
• Blackburn: our judgments about what
reasons we have are a reflection of our
attitudes, not a description of independent
normative facts.
• Thomas Scanlon: our attitudes are
reflections of our judgments about reasons,
they are ‘judgment-sensitive’.
– E.g. a desire reflects a judgment that the object
of desire is good in some way.
– Without this evaluative element, the ‘desire’ is
not recognisably human (rational), but a mere
‘urge’.
‘Correct’ judgments?
• Blackburn and Williams: what is it to judge moral
reasons ‘correctly’?
– Has someone who judges they have no reason to be
moral made a mistake?
• Modern intuitionism: Rawls’ ‘reflective
equilibrium’ - what reasons we have is discovered
by testing theory and intuitions against each other.
– Cp. Scientific judgments re. ‘best explanation’
• Blackburn: this form of reasoning is equally
available to non-cognitivism.
• Williams: cognitivism retains additional idea of
insight into normative reality.