Transcript 160: Ethics

160: Ethics
“The Trolley Problem”
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Ethics as a theory:
• In the natural sciences, the goal is to stipulate principles
that are at work (e.g. gravitation, entropy, the
electromagnetic force) to explain the facts, that is, our
observations. These principles are the large scale
components of theories of nature.
• Ethics is no different. The goal is to identify principles
(the large scale pieces of ethical theories) that explain
our considered moral judgments (the evidence). Any of
these basic ethical principles, like any principle of any
theory, must be consistent with itself and consistent with
the evidence.
Ethical Principles:
• This course will be concerned with
identifying, discussing, and testing a
variety of ethical principles.
• Some examples include the principle of
utility, the categorical imperative, moral
virtues, the principle of benevolence.
• Thomson’s article is concerned with
finding a moral principle that explains a
pair of our considered moral judgments
Considered moral judgments
• There is a difference between a
considered moral judgment and a mere
moral sentiment. The considered
judgments admits of at least some
justification besides how people feel about
it.
• The considered moral judgment is the
primary evidence in the evaluation of
ethical theories and principles.
Foot’s dilemma (1):
• Our considered moral judgment in the
case in which a runaway trolley may be
turned to result in one death to avoid the
death of five
• A plausible moral principle that explains
this is a principle of numbers. A greater
number of people dead is a greater moral
wrong.
Foot’s dilemma (2)
• Our considered moral judgment in the
case of a surgeon who proposes to cut up
a healthy man just in for a routine checkup
to save five who need organs flies in the
face of the previously stated moral
principle of numbers.
• What moral principle explains our
considered moral judgments in these
cases?
Foot’s proposal and Thomson’s reply:
• Foot: the morally relevant difference
between the two cases is explained by the
following two principles:
– (I) Killing one is worse than letting five die
– (II) Killing five is worse than killing one
• Thomson: Introduces Bystander at the
Switch to replace Trolley Driver which
seems to indicate that (I) is incompatible
with our considered moral judgment.
Consequences:
• If (I) is false, then there is no reason why the
surgeon cannot then operate on the one to save
the five.
• Further, consider Transplant with an evil doctor
who intentionally caused the circumstances that
lead the five to require organs. If he does not
give them organs, he kills them, not just lets
them die. If he stil may not morally operate, then
it appears that (II) is false as well as (I).
Ways out of this difficulty:
• Either (II) is true and the surgeon may
operate
• Or (II) is false and the surgeon may not
operate
– The above claim may require the following:
just because one thing is worse than another
doesn’t mean it’s always allowable to do the
other.
– Or, (II) is false and some other principle, much
like (II) is true.
Another Principle:
• (II') If a person is faced with a choice between
doing something here and now to five, by the
doing of which he will kill them, and doing
something else here and now to one, by the
doing of which he will kill only the one, then
(other things being equal) he ought to choose
the second alternative rather than the first.
• This explains why the bystander may turn the
trolley, but simply leaves out why the surgeon
may or may not operate. Also, should the
present tense really matter so much?
A Kantian principle:
• Perhaps (III) Never use a person as a
means only (a Kantian idea that we will get
to later) works?
• No, (III) explains why the surgeon cannot
operate, but does not explain why the
bystander may turn the trolley (especially
in the loop case)
A rights-based approach
• (i) “The reason why the surgeon may not proceed in
Transplant is that if he proceeds, he maxi-mizes utility,
for he brings about a net saving of four lives, but in so
doing he would infringe a right of the young man's.”
• (ii) “The reason why the bystander may proceed is that if
he proceeds, he maximizes utility, for he brings about a
net saving of four lives, and in so doing he does not
infringe any right of the one track workman's”
• However, it appears difficult to say that the bystander
does not infringe the rights of the one he kills, so (ii) is on
doubtful ground, and if (ii) is false, it implies that (i) is
false as well.
Thomson’s proposal:
“The bystander who proceeds does not make
something be a threat to people which would
otherwise not be a threat to anyone; he makes be a
threat to fewer what is already a threat to more. We
might speak here of a "distributive exemption,"
which permits arranging that something that will do
harm anyway shall be better distributed than it
otherwise would be-shall (in Bystander at the
Switch) do harm to fewer rather than more. Not just
any distributive intervention is permissible: It is not
in general morally open to us to make one die to
save five. But other things being equal, it is not
morally required of us that we let a burden descend
out of the blue onto five when we can make it instead
descend onto one.”
Fat Man
• Hospital cases seem to bear this out, but
there are difficulties.
• If Thomson’s distributive exemption
proposal were true, then it would be
morally permissible to push a fat man over
the railing of a footbridge to stop the trolley
from hitting the five.
• This troubles most people.
Villain cases:
• Thomson believes that her distributive
exemption principle, combined with the
truth of (II), and the principle that an
action’s being worse than some alternative
does not preclude one from taking that
alternative.
Summary and Analysis:
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Are there other solutions to this dilemma that
Thomson does not discuss?
Are your reactions to any of the cases
Thomson presents different than hers?
Consider taking a rights-based approach so
strictly that the Bystander may not stop the
trolley at the expense of infringing any right.
What does Thomson say of this?
Consider taking the numbers approach so
seriously that the surgeon is allowed to
operate. What does Thomson say of this?