Transcript The Ethics of War

”The Ethics of War
3.forelesning
Vènuste’s dilemma
Vènuste: ”For four days I struggled with the
terrible thought of how the family could
cope with responsbility for the death of
Thèoneste”
• Is Vènuste reponsible for his brother’s
death?
• Did he do the right thing?
Utilitarianism and the rules of war
• What, from a moral point of view, ought to
be the rules of war?
• Is it ever morally right for a person to
infringe ”ideal” rules of war?
• The rule-utilitarian may take a two-level
view:
• - in justifying the rules, nothing but
utilitarian considerations are in order
• - in decision-making, the rules are
absolutely binding
Brandt: contractual utilitarianism
• The utilitarian rules of war are the rules
rational, impartial persons would choose
as authoritative, given that they expected
that their country at some time would be at
war.
• - impartial (here) = chosen behind a veil of
ignorance
• - autoritative = absolutely binding
Brandt’s premises
(1) Rational, impartial persons would choose
certain rules of war
(2) A rule of war is justified if and only if it
would be chosen by rational impartial
persons
(3) The rules rational impartial persons
would choose are ones which will
maximise expectable long-range utility
for nations at war
Why prefer utilitarian rules?
• If people are self-interested, they will
choose rules that maximise expectable
utility generally, since that will increase
their chance of coming out best
• If people are altruistic, they will choose the
rules that maximise expectable utility
generally (for that reason)
Three types of rules
• Humanitarian restrictions of no cost to
military operation
• Humanitarian restrictions possibly costly to
military victory
• Acceptance of military loss for
humanitarian reasons
Humanitarian restrictions of no cost
to military operation
• Unnecessary harm to civilian population
• (unnecessary = does not decrease enemy
military capacity and therefore does not
increase probability of victory)
• Murder and ill-treatment of POWs
• Pillaging
Humanitarian restrictions possibly
costly to military victory
Proper rule: substantial destruction of the
lives and property of enemy civilians is
permissible only when there is good
evidence that it will significantly enhance
the prospect of victory
Acceptance of military losses for
humanitarian reasons
(1) When may one inflict large losses on the
enemy to avoid smaller losses to oneself?
(when the issue of war is settled)
1 a) Harm to enemy civilians balanced against own military losses
1 b) Harm to enemy civilians balanced against bringing war to end
(2) Restrictions on the treatment of an enemy in
cases where these do not affect outcome of
the war?
Morally permissible acts vs acts
permitted by the rules of war
• Morally permissible act (according to rule
utilitarian theory of moral principles) = act which
would not be forbidden by the kind of
conscience which would maximise long-range
expectable utility were it built into people as an
internal regulator of their relations with other
sentient beings, as contrasted with other kinds of
conscience or or not having a conscience at all.
How absolute are Brandts rules?
•
Acts in war are permitted of prohibited
according to
(1) Ideal rules
(2) Actual rules
(3) Morality
Nagel: moral basis for the rules of
war
• Like Walzer: assumes that (some of) the
(actual) rules of war express/embody
”deep morality”
• => (some) rules of war are absolute
• Difference between Brandt/Nagel on
absoluteness of rules?
Mavrodes: Convention-dependent
obligations
• War convention does not express morally
relevant distinctions
• Should be regarded as convention-dependent
• Obligations are convention-dependent if
(1) their moral force depends on
enforcement of convention
(2) there could have been a different
convention, in which case we would not have
the former obligations
Absolute norms
•
•
•
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•
What is an absolute norm?
=> must be fulfilled without any exeptions
Ex: prohibition against murder
”Do not (intentionally) kill (the innocent)”
Can be specified, that is, exceptions can
be included in norm
Absolute rights
• Prohibition against murder expressed in
language of rights (rights-norms)
• There is an absolute right not to be
(intentionally) killed (unless…)
• Right-duty correlation (Hohfeldian relation)
• An absolute right can never be justifiably
infringed/overridden.
• Infringement = violation.
Analysing Nagel’s absolutism
• Distinction between doing/allowing (i.e.,
between killing and letting die)
• Avoid murder, not prevent murder, at all
costs.
• Hostile relations are (inter-)personal
• Never treat people as mere means
• Treatment must be appropriately suited to
its target in order to be justified
Justification of hostile act
• Brandt: To (ideal) rational, impartial
persons
• Nagel: To (real) victims of the act
• Nagel against Brandt: utilitarian
justification to the world at large ignores
the special relation to the victim
• Brandt against Nagel: cannot require
consent in individual cases
The moral purity objection
• Absolutism as moral self-interest, aimed at
preserving one’s moral purity. BUT
• The need to preserve one’s moral purity cannot
be the source of an obligation. Can only sacrifice
moral integrity if there is alredy something wrong
with the act (i.e.,murder)
• The idea that one can justifiably sacrifice one’s
moral integrity is incoherent. If one is justified in
sacrificing moral integrity, there is no sacrifice of
moral integrity.
Venustè, again
• Did Vénuste do the right thing by killing his
brother?
Thresholds and tragedies
• Nagel’s qualified absolutism:
• There are (threshold) situations that
render an absolutist position untenable
• Cannot claim justification for the violation
• Moral blind alley
• Incoherence of moral thought
• Ought does not imply can in dilemmas
Conflicts of value
• Pluralism of value
• Values are incommensurable
• No universal currency (lexical ordering or
higher value (independent or not)) to
appeal to in order to settle conflicts
• Relative importance of values
• Tragic cases: no overriding value