Countermeasures to Denial-of

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Transcript Countermeasures to Denial-of

By Steve Shenfield
COSC 480

Definition
 Incidents
 Damages
 Defense Mechanisms
• Firewalls/Switches/Routers
• Routing Techniques (Blackholing/Sinkholing)
• Clean Pipes
• Intrusion Prevention Systems(IPS)
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Conclusion
Denial-of-Service
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A malicious attempt by a single person
or a group of people to cause the victim,
site, or node to deny service to its
customers.
• ex) inability to login to an account
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or access a website
Targeted resources: bandwidth, CPU, memory,
disk capacity, or any combination
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September 1996 - the very first DoS attack
occurred against Panix(New York ISP) using SYN
flood
January 2001 - first major attack involving DNS
servers against Register.com
February 2007 - over 10,000 online game servers
attacked by group RUS
December 2010 - a group called “Anonymous”
successfully attacked Mastercard.com, PayPal,
and Visa.com but failed against Amazon.com
70
60
50
40
2007
2008
2009
30
20
10
0
10 9 17
12 12 20
21 20 23
25 21 29
52 50 64
Password
Sniffing
Financial
Fraud
Zombies
Denial of
Service
Virus
2009 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey
185 Respondents

How much does a successful DoS
attack cost?
• Estimated at $122,000 per attack in 2004
• Up to 32 hours for security personal to
counteract damages done

Interruption to services may negatively
impact customer satisfaction and trust
Financial Fraud
$21,124,750
Virus (Worms/Spyware)
$8,391,800
System Penetration by Outsider
$6,875,000
Denial of Service
$2,888,600
Zombies within Organization
$2,869,600
Sabotage of Data or Networks
$1,056,000
Telecom Fraud
$600,000
Password Sniffing
$168,100
Blackmail
$160,000
0
CSI 2007 Computer Crime and
Security Survey
10
Millions
Year = 2007
Total Losses ≈45.6 million
20
194 Respondents

For Users
• Install system security mechanisms
• Protect yourself from being a zombie

For Businesses
• Security companies can guard a client’s
network
 ex) Prolexis Technologies
Firewalls
Pros
 Will prevent simple flood attacks
• ex) SYN flood

Able to allow or deny protocols, ports, or
IP addresses
Cons
 Unable to prevent more complex
attacks
Switches & Routers
Pros
 Both have the ability to limit data rate
 Both have network Access Control Lists
• ACLs are custom router filters
• Able to filter both inbound and outbound
traffic
Cons
 Most can be easily overwhelmed
Blackholing
 Attempts to mitigate the impact of an
attack
 Redirects traffic from attacked DNS or
IP address to a “black hole”
• Then all traffic will be dropped

Must know IP address of attacker or
else legitimate traffic will be dropped as
well
Sinkholing
 Routes suspicious traffic to a valid IP
address where it can be analyzed
 Capturing traffic and analyzing it can be
done with a sniffer
• Traffic found to be malicious is rejected
Cons
 Unable to react to severe attacks as
effectively as blackholing
Clean Pipes
 Best used when deployed inside ISP
 When an attack occurs, traffic is diverted
to a cleaning center in the ISP
• Here the traffic is “cleaned” by specialized
filtering devices and malicious activity is
removed
• Only legitimate traffic is passed to the
destination
Intrusion Prevention System(IPS)
 Monitors network traffic for malicious
activity
• Scans both inbound and outbound
• Searches for suspicious patterns known as
signatures or rules

System logs malicious activity and will
attempt to stop it
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What have we learned?
• DoS Definition
• Brief History of Notable Attacks
• Damages/Losses for a Business
• Protect yourself from becoming a Zombie
• Defense Mechanisms
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http://cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issued/ipj_74/dos_attacks.html
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Gs5vmKHFfpUJ:p
athmaker.biz/whitepapers/CSISurvey2009.pdf
http://i.cmpnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSISurvey2007.pdf
www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~ddosvax/talks/ddos_td.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack
http://www.csoroundtable.org/knowledge/there-business-caseit-security
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_prevention_system
http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/mags/ic/2009/06/mic200906001
0.pdf