Transcript Slide 1

Combating Terrorism Networks:
Agency Theory and Adolescent Exploits
Joint Special Operations University
Symposium 2006: Countering Global Insurgency
May 4, 2006
James J.F. Forest, Ph.D.
U.S. Military Academy
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Please Note:
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport
to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the
Department of the Army, or the U.S. Department of Defense.
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Agenda
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Networks
Network Vulnerabilities
Functional Agency Viruses
Implications for Information Operations
Conclusion
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Networks: Computer & Human
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Nodes
Links
Functions
Access
Maintenance
Security
Control
Key Computer Network Features
• Nodes and connections (computers, servers, routers,
hubs, etc. and wires/wireless links)
• Critical nodes – high in importance – low in redundancy
(no substitutes)
– DNS (Domain Name Servers: www.books.com = 123.45.6.789)
• Internet (global network) functions effectively because:
– Trust in the identity of whom you’re communicating with
– Trust that financial transactions are secure
– Privacy; trust that “nobody is listening, watching” while you
conduct your business
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Key Computer Network Features
• Communication protocols bind the network
nodes together on the Internet
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TCP/IP
DNS Servers
IMAP/POP (e-mail)
Etc.
• Critical transactions (info, money) require
additional layer of these “trusted handshakes”
(e.g., encryption) to ensure network security
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Key Computer Network Features
• Size matters – the number of nodes and connections
helps determine resiliency
• Coupling – degree of interaction (dependence) between
two nodes impacts network security/vulnerability
• Strength of a network is based on the level of its integrity
for conducting transactions (communication, financial,
etc.); reliability and trust of a network are critical
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Key Human Network Features
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Key Human Network Features
• Cliques, cells, bridges – all components of networks in which
contingent relationship, based on trust, are formed
• Sophisticated organizational forms; “Living, breathing
organisms” with no state/geographical boundaries
• Can include hierarchical organizations within the overall
network
• Becoming preferred method of communication, coordination,
cooperation & collaboration
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Political Activists
Organized Crime
Terrorists
Academic Researchers
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Key Human Network Features
• Size matters – the number of nodes and connections helps
determine resiliency
• Coupling – degree of interaction (dependence) between two
nodes impacts network security/vulnerability
• Strength of a network is based on the level of its integrity for
conducting transactions (communication, financial, etc.);
reliability and trust of a network are critical
• Distributed networks actually require a higher level of trust
than hierarchical organizations in order to maintain
operational security
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Key Human Network Features
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Anyone can plug into the network if they use the proper
protocols and can establish the necessary trusted
relationships
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Networked orgs provide multiple pathways for knowledge
transfer; enabling org learning; more individual nodes can
contribute to the collective knowledge base, like a Wikipedia
or CompanyCommand.com sort of approach
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Force multiplier: Can concentrate resources when
necessary (‘swarming’)
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Global Salafist Insurgency
• A networked organization that is committed to using
terrorism to achieve its objectives
• Kilcullen – networked nature of insurgency; loose
confederation of local movements, connected by global info
technology, shared beliefs, some common ideological,
political or economic goals
• Ishimoto – networked structure; “interlocking directorships”
• Network linkages provide conduits through which members
can publicize, mobilize, radicalize, coordinate, finance, collect
and share info, etc.
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Protocols in the Salafist Network
• Both computer and human networks connections rely on
common languages (protocols) to establish levels of trust in
the integrity of financial and information transactions.
• “To work well, networks require strong shared beliefs, a collective
vision, some original basis for trust, and excellent
communications” - Brian Jenkins, 2006
• In human networks, trust is established by various social
mechanisms (family, tribe, clan, etc.) and shared beliefs
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Protocols in the Salafist Network
Shared Beliefs
Core tenets of the Sunni insurgents’ ideology and key ideologues:
• Taymiya, Wahhab: inspired Salafist (“pure” Islam) movements among
Sunnis
• Banna: Every aspect of Western thought is a threat to Islam
• Mawdudi: God’s sovereignty is absolute; thus, no laws created by man
are valid
• Qutb: Muslims who do not conform to jihadi interpretations are infidels
(ok to kill); separation of church and state is anathema to true Islam
• Azzam: Jihad is a necessity wherever Muslim lands are invaded or
occupied, including Afghanistan
• Azzam and Zawahiri: manhaj (blur the paradigm of defensive jihad with
the idea of jihad against the West)
• Zawihiri: In order to bring down the apostate regimes in the Middle East
(the near enemy), we must focus on the superpower patrons – the U.S.
and the West (the far enemy).
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Protocols in the Salafist Network
Shared Beliefs
Resonance of the Al Qaeda message (principle of jihad) is one form of
network protocol, like a secret handshake which confirms a lot of
tacit knowledge between two people
Religious dimension: Sunni insurgents’ ideology exploits certain Islamic
teachings in order to push the global umma into bringing down the
world order of responsibly governed states
Political dimension: As a whole, the Muslim world has many developmental
challenges due to political corrupion; these can only be overcome by
bringing down the world order of responsibly governed states and
replacing it with Islamic rule in the form of a caliphate
Social dimension: Social reinforcement of the core tenets of the ideology
eventually raises it to a level of sacred obligation
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Attacking Networks: Lessons from Hackers
• Attack the network nodes, get 1 kind of result
– For example: Amazon.com, Barnes & Noble.com
• Destroy one node, another can take its place
• However, attack the protocols, impact the entire network
– This is why MS Internet Explorer vulnerabilities (and those in other
browsers) are so critical, and why you have to constantly update
your software – and why you should be kind to your network
administrator
• If the public lost confidence in the Internet’s ability to provide for
secure information and financial transactions, we would see a
reduction in Internet traffic; in essence, would be less valuable to
people
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Human Network Vulnerabilities
• National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
– Goal #1: “Identify, locate and destroy terrorists” (nodes)
• Intelligence analysts map a network by looking for
nodes (individual leaders, operators, financiers, etc.)
and for personal connections, social relationships,
etc. between nodes
• However, network nodes can be replaced
• Let’s focus on what links them together: the trusted
relationships, the shared beliefs (protocols . . .)
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Network Vulnerabilities
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Network Vulnerabilities
• Harmony/Disharmony report
– Analysis of captured AQ documents in OEF and OIF
– Reveals concern over disagreements within
movement
– Suggests ways to interdict/degrade lines of
communications between network nodes
– Offers insights into ways some members of the
movement have subverted the authority of senior
commanders (preference divergence)
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Agency Theory
• Three main areas of preference divergence within the
organization/movement:
– Tactical control
– Transaction integrity
– Ideological authority
• Protocols: Humans need trust in order to work together
toward any goal
• Preference divergence impacts the level of
trust/expectations of shared effort toward common goal
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Network Viruses
• Viruses = malicious code that infects computers,
network routers, etc. and propagates, spreads itself to
others on the network, often by corrupting the normal
protocols used for information and financial transactions
• Are there viruses we can use to negatively impact the
network integrity of the global salafist insurgency?
– Independence Day – “plant a virus into the mother ship . . .”
• Functional Agency (FA) Viruses to exacerbate
preference divergence within an organization
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• Political and ideological leaders—the principals—must
delegate certain duties to middlemen or low-level
operatives, their agents.
• But because of the need to maintain operational secrecy,
terrorist group leaders cannot perfectly monitor what
their agents are doing.
• Thus, preference divergence creates operational
challenges which can be exploited to degrade a terrorist
group’s capabilities.
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• Preference divergence over controlled use of violence;
terrorists cannot afford too alienate the center of gravity, or
risk losing all support
• Preference divergence over “who’s in charge”
• Preference divergence over who needs what kinds of
situational awareness
• Preference divergence over what should be done to maintain
security
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• Abu Bakr Naji
– one of AQ’s leading strategists
– published a number of texts discussing problems that confront
the global network
– e.g., organizational difficulties in resolving chains of
command, ferreting out spies within the organization, and
reigning in overzealous recruits.
– also worries about low-ranking members of the movement will
initiate their own large-scale attacks against high-value targets.
– for more, see Stealing al Qaeda’s Playbook
• What does newly established Shura Council in Iraq
signify re: desire among some leaders for greater
tactical control over activities?
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• What could UBL do to destroy his own credibility, popular
ratings? If you were UBL, what would you fear or worry about
most?
• Perception of strategic drift
• Highlight disconnect between rhetoric and actions
• Publicize CT successes and tactical failures; discredit
perception of competence
• Publicize the differences between AQ leaders and affiliate
groups and the internal dissension within the AQ leadership
• Make information management more difficult; degrade the C2
network channels with noise, static
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• Create uncertainty over which affiliate group is responsible
for particularly brutal attacks against innocent Muslim;
– provide “claims” of responsibility on behalf of dozens of groups each
time
– try to force real culprits to “prove” their ownership of an attack
– in doing so, they may reveal more than they want to (OpSec
challenge), and may also alienate the local population/support base
by demanding recognition for murdering Muslims
• Force leaders to consider punitive actions against
agents/operatives
• Flood the network nodes with requests for info/requests for
clarification of intent, strategy, etc. Goal: overwhelm the
decision-makers from within
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FA Virus #1: Tactical Control
• Cellular structures complicate C2
• Secure long-distance communication is time consuming and
expensive
• How can we increase their concern about network infiltration,
forcing them to spend more time on screening new members,
allowing less time for planning/conducting attacks?
• Overall focus: degrade level of trust regarding leadership,
leaders’ competence, personal agendas, etc. as well as
forcing them to focus more on operational security and
tactical control
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FA Virus #2: Transaction Integrity
• Expectations of money to support operations will be
made available in a timely fashion
• Expectations that individual recipients will do the correct
things with those funds
• Problem: Limited or no accountability
– Because of operational security needs, a clandestine
organization cannot offer much transparency regarding its
finances
– This allows considerable latitude for abuse, corruption
– Use their need for secrecy against them
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FA Virus #2: Transaction Integrity
• Networked organizations need to support financial
transactions, movement of assets, weapons, people
• Key element in financial networks is trust
• Promote suspicion, rumors, mistrust in financial networks
• Encourage internal looting (or perception of looting)
• Overall goal: degrade the integrity within financial
networks; make asset management more difficult
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FA Virus #2: Transaction Integrity
• Get money to disappear with no reason
• Have conspicuous consumption items (big screen TV)
appear in place of the missing money
• Raise suspicion of misappropriation, fund diversion;
should be particularly effective in certain cultures where
conspiracy theories are already popular
• Some members of the movement (especially Pakistanis) have
complained on web forums that Egyptians and Saudis are
given preferential treatment in the network; opportunities for
exploiting fissures by publicizing supposed benefits given to
them
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FA Virus #2: Transaction Integrity
• How else to enhance suspicion of financial mismanagement,
corruption in network?
• Slow the transfer of funds, assets from one node to another; cause
unexplained transaction delays
• If Internet is a primary means for getting funds into the network, need
to publicize financial agency problems, encourage suspicion that
money donated will not necessarily be used as intended (e.g., to pay
drug couriers, murderers of schoolchildren, etc.)
• Publish articles on “lavish lifestyles of AQ leaders” focusing on KSM
and his playboy antics; al Fadl stealing money in Kenya; the Montreal
cell and its money mismanagement, etc. Paint a portrait of these guys
as anything but humble, pious, devout Muslims or competent financial
decision makers.
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Other Functional Agency Virus Ideas
Technological
Capacity
Organizational Tightness
Tactical
Control
Financial
Efficiency
Operational Security
Operational Security
Constrain the network’s security environment
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FA Virus #3: Ideological Authority
• Preference divergence over who has greater
ideological authority
• Zawahiri illustrates challenges of networked organization
– Trying to retain his ideological grip on the movement; struggle
with Zarqawi over tactics, influence
– Public arguments with others over strategy, control, authority
(e.g., Zawahiri’s criticism of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas)
– Is democratic process de-legitimizing existing orgs (in the eyes
of radicals)?
• Hamas and Sudan responded to recent UBL tape with
“thank but no thanks;” Hamas also criticized recent
attacks in Egypt
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FA Virus #3: Ideological Authority
• Identify and exploit rivalries within the network
– Disagreements already exist in the network
– How to exacerbate them, make them more acrimonious?
– Open marketplace to encourage competition; force them to
defend their ideas
• What are the ideological disagreements in the global
jihadist movement?
– Is Muslim Brotherhood competing against AQ for the support of
the center of gravity (bulk of Muslim world)?
– Encourage network competition/competing network formation
– Get ‘competitive fatwas’ out there
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FA Virus #3: Ideological Authority
• Exploit disconnects between nationalist loyalties and
calls for a non-state global caliphate
– Who would be on the soccer team for the World Cup finals?
• Sacred values are important; focus on attacks, other
activities that occur without any religious justification
• In the history of insurgencies, once a group has had the
power to do so, it destroys/terrorizes any political
opposition; rarely provides the just society it promised
• Insurgent groups will not/cannot be just rulers because
they have only known success through unjust, violent
means
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FA Virus #3: Ideological Authority
• Raise questions strategic coherency
• Puncture the myths
• Highlight the hypocrisies
• Highlight personal agendas; expose jihadists as seeking
a power grab, but pursuing a religious goal
• Emphasize internal criticisms of “armchair” jihadists with
no operational experience (e.g., Maqdisi)
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Implications for Information Operations
• Boykin: “Info Ops are critical, we must do better”
• Ishimoto: “Info Ops are critical, we must do better”
–
IT460: Politics and Strategies of Information Warfare
• What to do when combating an idea-based global
network?
– Map the influences within the network; Identify their most
influential members; who is trusted most? Whose ideas
carry the most weight?
– Avoid strategic miscommunications that reinforce their
beliefs
– Deprive them of the ability to discredit the U.S. and the
West
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Implications for Information Operations
• Foster/strengthen a universal belief that the globalized
community of responsibly governed states offers a
more viable future of dignity, respect, security, prosperity
for everyone
– Note: this does not say “promote democracy”
• Organize and properly resource a multilateral,
multidimensional Information Operations capacity
– Networked hackers are far more dangerous than a single one
• Use IO tools to combat the enemy in the strategic
battlespace of ideas and perceptions
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Other Items on the “To Do” list
• Diminish likelihood of state sponsorship/facilitation
• Diminish likelihood of new group affiliation, allegiance to
AQ/OBL/global Islamic insurgency/movement
• Explore possible opportunities to address generational
preference divergence
• Find other ways to create suspicion in the network –
discredit conduits and centers of learning
– “don’t download the training manuals; they have been tampered
with, and could get you killed!”
– The “training” provided by so-and-so is inaccurate, ineffective; they
are incompetent”
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Other Items on the “To Do” list
• Build new networks, based on alternative protocols of
trusted relations (e.g., civic groups, sports clubs, etc.),
particularly for dissatisfied youth
• Develop MOE for assessing gradual network deterioration
(e.g., frustration of members over C2, financial agency
disruptions)
• Don’t do anything that could strengthen the protocols of
trust with the enemy’s networks
– For example, if we don’t deliver on our post-conflict
reconstruction promises, we lose our honor, respect, social
credibility among critical target populations
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Conclusion
• Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal challenges and
vulnerabilities is key to developing effective strategies to combat
the threats they pose and degrade these groups’ ability to kill
• Networked organizations require trusted relationships in order to
support information and financial transactions
• Degrading the network protocols of trust may be more important
than other missions
• Refrain from actions that encourage preference alignment among
disparate groups within the global network
• Spread agency theory-based viruses that exploit network
vulnerabilities and produce a constant state of disruption and
uncertainty – degrade its ability to function effectively
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Winning Long Wars
We face a hostile ideology-global in scope, atheistic in
character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method.
Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite
duration.
Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People
by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961.
“In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning
the war on ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the
disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims.”
National Security Strategy (March 2006), p. 9
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