Introduction to Strategy and Conflict Phase

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Transcript Introduction to Strategy and Conflict Phase

Strategic Communication in the
Military Context – some lessons from
the recent past
Colonel Jon Hazel
Strategic Studies Cell, Royal College of
Defence Studies
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Military strategy and strategic communication
• The relationship between strategy-making and
strategic communication.
• The search for the compelling strategic narrative.
• Knowledge and insight in support of strategy-making.
• The role of junior military voices in strategic
communication.
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On Afghanistan
• “The UK Armed Forces have yet to incorporate fully
strategic communications and ‘information and
influence’ operations into their campaigns….”
• “We have found that the Government’s description of
the nature of the mission and its importance to UK
interests have varied throughout the campaign, lacking
a consistent narrative.”
House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of
Session 2010-12, Vol I, 17 Jul 2011.
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On Iraq
• “It is disappointing that the coalition is widely perceived
to have come “second” in perception management.”
House of Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of Iraq – Third Report Session 2003-2004
• “The absence of a coherent strategic narrative and the
increasing unpopularity of the war created a very
challenging environment…”Op Telic (June 2005-June 2009) General Staff
Analysis.
• [Iraq has highlighted that] “the possession and
communication of the more convincing narrative can
become a key instrument of ‘victory’.” Lt Gen Brown, MOD Iraq Study
Team Observations, May 2010.
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The relationship between strategy-making and
strategic communication
• Do EUMISOM’s strategic communication staff serve strategic
planning or drive it?
• “If we understand strategy to be a course of action that
integrates ends, ways and means to meet policy goals, then
strategic communication, by words and deeds, must now be
understood as a means with influence as its product.” MOD
Enhancing Strategic Capability Study, August 2011.
• MOD Joint Doctrine Note: Strategic Communication: the
Defence Contribution (www.mod.uk/dcdc).
• We must place strategic communication expertise
permanently at the heart of our planning and execution.
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The search for the compelling strategic narrative
• ‘‘Only the compelling national story, consistently supported by
action, will survive the test of the contemporary information
environment.” Royal College of Defence Studies booklet, Thinking Strategically,
October 2011.
• Compelling story lines, which can explain events convincingly
and from which inferences can be drawn. Professor Sir Lawrence
Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 2006.
• “A statement of identity, cause and intent around which
government, people and armed forces (and perhaps even some
allies) can unite. It must be convincing, transparent, adaptive
and above all attractive. “ Professor Paul Cornish, The US and Counterinsurgency,
International Affairs, 2009.
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UK strategic narrative for Afghanistan 2005/2006
“A stable and secure Afghanistan returned to its rightful place
in the community of nations and enjoying mature relations
with its neighbours: with a self-sustaining economy, strong
institutions and a broad-based, multi-ethnic regime committed
to eradicating terrorism and eliminating opium production;
reducing poverty; respecting human rights, especially those of
women and minority groups; and honouring Afghanistan’s
other international obligations.” MOD Top Level Messages.
UK strategic narrative for Afghanistan 2010/2011
“British Forces are in Afghanistan to prevent Afghan territory
from again being used by Al Qaeda as a base from which to
plan attacks on the UK and it allies. The presence of NATO
forces is preventing AQ or the Taliban regime from returning
while Afghanistan’s security forces are trained to take over the
tasks for themselves. We do not seek a perfect Afghanistan,
but a stable and Afghanistan, able to maintain its own security
and prevent AQ from returning.” MOD Top Level Messages.
The search for the compelling strategic narrative
• “Strategies are stories told in the future tense…” Professor Sir Lawrence
Freedman.
•
We need an early appreciation of what strategic narrative is
likely to provide campaign success, domestically as well as
internationally, and an estimation of how and whether we can
sustain such a narrative by our actions.
•
Narratives need to address:
–
macro mentalities of resentment, appetite and fear. Tzvetal Todorov, Fear of
the Barbarian.
–
–
logos, pathos and ethos. Aristotle, Rhetoric.
winning an argument at the local level; “not a philosophical argument,
but a practical one”. General McChrystal.
Knowledge and insight in support of strategy
•
What do we really know of Somalia?
•
The requirements of “Fast Strategy”. Professor Hew Strachan
• A Strategic Analysis and Assessment Network (SAAN) fit for the
unknown unknowns.
• Military and government strategy-making needs to listen closely
to the noise of local realities.
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The role of junior military voices in strategic
communication
• “To compete whole-heartedly in the global information
environment requires the use of collective voices, each telling
their part, using a wide variety of traditional and new media.
One consequence is that we need not just a compelling narrative,
but one that is accompanied by the delegation of authority for
decentralised execution.”
• “Commanders and their people must be confident to use all
means of communication in pursuit of objectives at their level
and through training and example are emboldened to do so.
Individual discipline to the narrative is required.”
MOD Joint Doctrine Note, Strategic Communication: the Military Contribution
The role of junior military voices in strategic
communication
•“Really smart organisations are able to decentralise and
communicate effectively not only because they are brought
together by a philosophy…., but because they have the judgement
and discipline to practise it.” MOD Joint Doctrine Note, Strategic Communication: the
Military Contribution
•How do we empower all military and civilian staff in EUMISOM to
compete, with discipline, in the information environment against
those who oppose us?