Transcript Y-12 Integration of Security and Safety Basis, Including Firearms

Y-12 Integration of Security and Safety
Basis, Including Firearms Safety
David Sheffey
Safety Analysis, Compliance, and
Oversight Manager
B&W Technical Services Y-12, LLC
August, 2009
BIO
• B&W Technical Services Y-12
– Manager Safety Analysis Compliance and Oversight
• 22 years (B&W Y-12 and predecessor operating contractor
companies) managing Facility Safety programs in Oak Ridge
• DOE, Oak Ridge Operations Office
–
10 years as a Facility Safety Engineer
• Omaha Public Power
– Licensing Manager Calhoun 2
• USAF
– 27 years Command Pilot (active + guard)
• Education
– U of Tenn: BS Engineering Physics, MS Nuclear Physics
– U of Neb: MA Business Management, graduate Air War College
– USAF: Air War College
In the Beginning….
• No significant weapons changes for years
• Outdated analysis primarily focused on muzzle
velocities and penetration capabilities with
consequences not quantified
• One nuclear facility safety basis had evaluated the
potential for accidental discharge of firearms–
Analysis did not indicate consequences of concern
• No real recognition of need to evaluate security
changes against safety basis
Safeguards
and
Security
Nuclear
Operations
and Facility
Safety
Whoa! ….Lessons Learned
• Several security related changes
were made that affected
assumptions in safety basis
documents.
Aha!
• Recognized the need to evaluate the potential
for nuclear related consequences from the
accidental discharge of firearms during routine
operations in light of increased firepower
needs, e.g., armor piercing, DBT needs, etc.
• Recognized the potential for physical security
changes to impact nuclear facilities and the
associated safety bases
Actions Taken
• Communication
– B&W Facility Safety Engineering & Site
Security organizations
– Wackenhut (WSI)
– Y-12 Site Office
• Hazard Evaluation Study (HES)
prepared to evaluate accidental
discharges of weaponry
Focus/Assumptions of HES
• Focus
– Increased consequences of currently analyzed
accidents resulting from new initiators
– Creation of new, unanalyzed accidents
– Impacts on credited controls
– Adequacy of existing firearm controls
• Assumptions
– Any and all containment structures penetrated
– Weapon can fire multiple rounds
– Projectile goes anywhere
– Projectile impacts SSCs
Key Elements of Safety/Security Measures
• WSI Firearms Safety Program and HES for Accidental
Discharge treated as part of the Y-12 Safety Basis
• Integrated configuration management, software QA,
change control, and USQ processes
• Captured key programmatic elements of firearm safety
(training, live round excluders, etc.)
• Key safety assumptions and controls for securityrelated activities protected (No difference between
application of the change control/USQ processes for
security modifications than for any other facility
modification)
• Required surveillances on design features highlighted
Firearms Accidental
Discharge Hazard
Analysis
Maintenance job
requests for
security now
subject to USQ
Process
Safeguards
and Security
Firearms Safety
Management
Program
Security Projects
Subject to USQ
Process and Change
Control
Nuclear
Operations
and Facility
Safety
Present
• Sitewide analysis of accidental discharge of
firearms:
– Analyzes impacts to all Category 2 and 3 nuclear
facilities
– Firearms safety program credited and summarized
in the Y-12 Site SAR
– Configuration management applied to trigger the
USQ process for changes to the firearms safety
procedure
Present (Cont.)
• All security projects follow site configuration
management, software QA, and USQ
processes
• All security maintenance activities follow site
maintenance process, including application of
the USQ process
– Maintenance procedure requires application of USQ
process on work within 200 ft of nuclear facility
• Data base established for information sharing
among sites
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