Transcript Document

Managing the reader’s load: a
cognitive theory for legal writers
Andrew M. Carter
O’Connor College of Law
Arizona State University
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States
troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance
congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments
and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional
authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take
into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent
risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result
of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed
deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a
“war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.”
Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States
had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping
forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets
and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other
specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States
Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to
Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders
on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on
Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994);
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994);
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17,
1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586
(Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air
Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This
Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type
of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater
difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not
sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
24
+
44
248
+
443
5,489,378
+
6,897,953
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
24 + 44 =66
Searches at the international border are
excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
248 + 443
Searches at the international border are
excepted from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement because the United States, like any
sovereign, has a deeply rooted right to stop and
inspects persons and goods entering the
country.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
5,489,378 + 6,897,953
The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at the time
of the making by the defendants of the promises hereinafter
mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and
mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and occupiers of
the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and were possessed
of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked the said mills,
and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into meal, and
dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion
of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said steamengine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the said steamengine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs were
desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill, and had
ordered the same of certain persons trading under the name of W.
Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who had
contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs . . . .
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
5,489,378 + 6,897,953
• Searches at the international border are excepted from the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and may be
conducted with no suspicion whatsoever because the United
States, like any sovereign, has a long-recognized right to
question those entering the country without administering
Miranda.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Fluency
• “Fluency” = the reader’s subjective experience
of ease or difficulty in processing a writer’s
sentences and paragraphs (Oppenheimer
2008)
• It is well-established that readers are
conscious of how difficult it is to process the
writer’s sentences and paragraphs.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
24
248
+
+
44
443
Fluent
5,489,378
+
6,897,953
Disfluent
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Fluency cues positive judgments
• Readers encountering fluent writing think positive
things about the writer and the writer’s ideas.
• Readers find the fluent writer more credible and
intelligent (supports ethos)
• Readers have more confidence in fluent arguments
(supports logos)
• Readers have more positive reactions to the
arguments presented (supports logos)
• (Oppenheimer 2008)
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Cognitive Load Theory and Legal Writing
• Basic Theory: A legal reader’s working memory is limited with
respect to the amount of new information it can process at
one time.
• Cognitive Load: The amount of cognitive activity imposed on
a legal reader’s working memory by a particular sentence
• Schema Formation: To transfer information from working
memory to long-term memory, readers organize and
categorize the new information into a “memorable”
framework, or schema.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Thesis: Fluency is a function of the
demands placed on the reader’s working
memory capacity.
• Fluent: sentence/paragraph does not exceed
reader’s working memory capacity.
• Disfluent: sentence/paragraph exceeds
reader’s working memory capacity.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
24
248
+
+
44
443
Fluent
5,489,378
+
6,897,953
Disfluent
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Disfluent: Exceeds working memory capacity
The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at
the time of the making by the defendants of the promises
hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of
millers and mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and
occupiers of the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and
were possessed of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked
the said mills, and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into
meal, and dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a
certain portion of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of
the said steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the
said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs
were desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill,
and had ordered the same of certain persons trading under the
name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who
had contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs . . . .
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
The legal reader’s total cognitive load =
• Intrinsic Load: The inherent complexity of the
information/knowledge to be transferred to the reader.
+
• Germane Load: The reader’s working memory
required to categorize and organize information into a
framework (schema) for long term memory processing.
+
• Extraneous Load: The reader’s working memory
needlessly consumed by the legal writer’ poor writing.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Legal writing/analysis entails a heavy
intrinsic load
• The legal principles expressed will involve
numerous abstract and complex elements.
• In addition, there are important relationships
between and among these elements.
• It is this “elemental interactivity” that is
uniquely burdensome on the reader’s
cognitive resources.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
“If a Department component denies an
employee a security clearance—that is, if the
component determines that the employee is
not eligible for access to classified
information—or if the component revokes
such eligibility, the component must provide
the employee with a comprehensive and
detailed written explanation of the basis for
the decision, to the extent that the national
security interests of the United States and
other applicable law permit.”
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Basic rules to ensure that the reader’s
working memory is not overburdened
• The legal writer must monitor and manage the
intrinsic load (sentence level).
• The legal writer must bear as much of the
reader’s germane load as possible by
providing an accessible organizational
framework.
• The legal writer must eliminate extraneous
load (editing, editing, editing).
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Monitoring the intrinsic load
• Pay attention to the number of elements in a
sentence and the number of interactions
between and among these elements
(elemental interactivity)
• Three elements and two interactions will near
the limits of your reader’s working memory.
• If the sentence may exceed the reader’s
working memory, you must “chunk” it into
smaller loads.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Chunked
“Generally, if a Department component denies
an employee a security clearance—that is, if the
component determines that the employee is not
eligible for access to classified information—or if
the component revokes such eligibility, the
component must provide the employee with a
comprehensive and detailed written explanation
of the basis for the decision. This requirement
may be superseded, however, by the national
security interests of the United States and other
applicable law.”
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Carrying the germane load
To reduce the reader’s germane load, the legal
writer must provide the reader with an
organizational framework that the reader can
use to categorize and organize the new
information presented in the text. The legal
writer does this with headings, subheadings,
paragraph breaks (segmentation cues) and
topic sentences.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States
troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance
congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments
and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional
authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take
into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent
risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result
of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed
deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a
“war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.”
Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States
had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping
forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets
and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the
foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other
specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States
Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to
Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders
on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on
Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994);
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994);
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17,
1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586
(Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air
Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This
Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type
of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater
difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not
sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States
troops to Haiti to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance
congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments
and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional
authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take
into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent
risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result
of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179.
Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a
peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the
United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two
years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared
“no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week
operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the
President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress.
The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. Letter to Congressional
Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J.
Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699,
1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia,
30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly
Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at
328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000),
available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446.
This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more
problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and
the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks
were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C.
at 333-34.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti
to oust military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174
n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales
& Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional
Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,”
we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and
in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict
substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179.
Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace
agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States
[would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this
deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United
Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds
of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior
approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995).
The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. See e.g., Letter to Congressional
Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina,
30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO
Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over
Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate
Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446.
This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic,
type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of
withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the
deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
A.
The 1994 Haiti deployment did not require prior Congressional approval.
Applying this fact-specific analysis, we concluded in 1994 that a planned deployment of up to 20,000 United States troops to Haiti to oust
military leader sand reinstall Haiti’s legitimate government was not a “war” requiring advance congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10;
see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong.
Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior
Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account
the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would
encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179.
B. The 1995 Bosnia deployment did not require prior Congressional approval.
Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict)
casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had
undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas”
for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all
based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the
Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995).
The President’s assertion of this authority during the Bosnian conflict is well-documented. See e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on
Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia- Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406,
406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994);
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia
Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000),
available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446.
C. Even the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia did not require prior Congressional approval.
This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of
intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United
States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the
word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Eliminating Extraneous Load
• Proof each sentence for “local coherence”.
• Search out and “chunk” sentences that will
push the reader’s working memory capacity;
note not just the number of ideas in the
sentence but also their interactions.
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University
Tools for chunking: Generic
Transitions
“Generally, if a Department component denies an employee
a security clearance—that is, if the component determines
that the employee is not eligible for access to classified
information—or if the component revokes such eligibility, the
component must provide the employee with a comprehensive
and detailed written explanation of the basis for the decision.
This requirement may be superseded, however, by the
national security interests of the United States and other
applicable law.”
Andrew Carter, O'Connor College of Law,
Arizona State University