Evaluating Human Drives and needs for a safe motivational system

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Transcript Evaluating Human Drives and needs for a safe motivational system

SENTIENT MACHINES:
FROM PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
TO A SAFE IMPLEMENTATION
Mark R. Waser
Digital Wisdom Institute
[email protected]
JAN. 25, 1979: ROBOT KILLS HUMAN
A 25-year-old Ford Motor assembly line worker was
killed on the job in a Flat Rock, Michigan, casting
plant – the first recorded human death by robot.
Robert Williams’ death came on the 58th
anniversary of the premiere of Karel Capek’s play
about Rossum’s Universal Robots. R.U.R gave the
world the first use of the word robot to describe an
artificial person. Capek invented the term, basing
it on the Czech word for “forced labor.” (Robot
entered the English language in 1923.)
Williams died instantly when the robot’s arm
slammed him as he was gathering parts in a
storage facility, where the robot also retrieved
parts. Williams’ family was awarded $10 million in
damages. The jury agreed the robot struck him in
the head because of a lack of safety measures,
including one that would sound an alarm if the
robot was near.
1867 – William Bullock, inventor of the rotary web press, was killed by his own invention.
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BAXTER
”A ROBOT WITH A REASSURING TOUCH”
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UNFRIENDLY AI
“Without explicit goals to the contrary, AIs are likely to
behave like human sociopaths in their pursuit of resources”
“Superintelligence Does Not Imply Benevolence”
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WHAT IS A SAFE
AI
/
R
OBOT?
(
H
D W C
O ?)
AND
OW
O
E
REATE
NE
*ANY* agent
that reliably shows
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR
but . . . the real question is . . .
How do we GUARANTEE that reliability?
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WHAT IS
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR?
The problem is that no ethical system has ever reached
consensus. Ethical systems are completely unlike
mathematics or science. This is a source of concern.
AI makes philosophy honest.
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THE FRAME PROBLEM
“How do rational agents deal with the complexity
and unbounded context of the real world?”
McCarthy, J; Hayes, PJ (1969) Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence
In Meltzer, B; Michie, D (eds), Machine Intelligence 4, pp. 463-502
Dennett, D (1984) Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI
In C. Hookway (ed), Minds, Machines, & Evolution: Philosophical Studies:129-151
“How can AI move beyond
closed and completely specified micro-worlds?”
(aka “How can we eliminate the requirement to pre-specify *everything*?”)
Dreyfus, HL (1972) What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason
ISBN 0-06-011082-1: MIT Press
Dreyfus, HL (1979) From Micro-Worlds to Knowledge Representation: AI at an Impasse
in Haugeland, J (ed), Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, AI: 143-182
Dreyfus, HL (1992) What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason
ISBN 978-0-262-54067-4: MIT Press
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WATSON’S SOLUTION
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. . . MATCH
NOT THINK OR CREATE
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THE PROBLEM OF
DERIVED INTENTIONALITY
Our artifacts
only have meaning because we give it to them; their
intentionality, like that of smoke signals and writing, is
essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put it
bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything
by their tokens (any more than books do) - they only
mean what we say they do. Genuine understanding,
on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and
not derivatively from something else.
Haugeland J (1981) Mind Design
ISBN 978-0262580526: MIT Press
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ENACTIVE
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
A synthesis of a long tradition of philosophical biology starting with
Kant’s "natural purposes" (or even Aristotle’s teleology) and more
recent developments in complex systems theory.
Experience is central to the enactive approach and its primary
distinction is the rejection of "automatic" systems, which rely on fixed
(derivative) exterior values, for systems which create their own identity
and meaning. Critical to this is the concept of self-referential relations
- the only condition under which the identity can be said to be
intrinsically generated by a being for its own being (its self for itself)
Weber, A; Varela, FJ (2002) Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1: 97-125
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SELF
a self is an autopoietic system
αὐτo- (auto-), meaning "self“ / ποίησις (poiesis), meaning "creation, production")
The complete loop of a process (or a physical entity) modifying itself
• Hofstadter - the mere fact of being self-referential causes a self, a
soul, a consciousness, an “I” to arise out of mere matter
• Self-referentiality, like the 3-body gravitational problem, leads
directly to indeterminacy *even in* deterministic systems
• Humans consider indeterminacy in behavior to necessarily and
sufficiently define an entity rather than an object AND innately
tend to do this with the “pathetic fallacy”
• Operational and organizational closure are critical features
Llinas RR (2001) I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self. ISBN 9780262621632: MIT Press
Hofstadter D (2007) I Am A Strange Loop. ISBN 9780465030781: Basic Books
Metzinger T (2009) The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind & the Myth of the Self. ISBN 9780465020690: Basic Books
Damasio AR (2010) Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. ISBN 9780307474957: Vintage Books/Random House
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THE
METACOGNITIVE CHALLENGE
Humans are
• Evolved to self-deceive in order to better deceive others (Trivers 1991)
• Unable to directly sense agency (Aarts et al. 2005)
• Prone to false illusory experiences of self-authorship (Buehner and
Humphreys 2009)
• Subject to many self-concealed illusions (Capgras Syndrome, etc.)
• Unable to correctly retrieve the reasoning behind moral judgments
(Hauser et al. 2007)
• Mostly unaware of what ethics are and why they must be practiced
• Programmed NOT to discuss them ethics rationally
Mercier H, Sperber D (2009) Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34:57-111
http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/MercierSperberWhydohumansreason.pdf
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THE “HARD PROBLEM”
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the
question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is
perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and
auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience:
the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain
why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to
experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a
physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so
arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It
seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
Chalmers D (1995) Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3), 200-219
Waser, MR (2013) Safe/Moral Autopoiesis & Consciousness
International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5(1): 59-74
http://becominggaia.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/waser-ijmc.pdf
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THE PROBLEM OF QUALIA
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to
investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white
television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and
acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain
about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use
terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. ... What will happen when Mary is
released from her black and white room or is given a color television
monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she
will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. But
then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But
she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than
that, and Physicalism is false.
Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal Qualia
Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36
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MOVING BEYOND
GOOD OLD-FASHIONED AI
Change the question from
"Can machines think and feel?"
to
"Can we design and build machines that teach us how
thinking, problem-solving, and self-consciousness occur?"
Haugeland, J (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea
ISBN 0-262-08153-9: MIT Press
Dennett, C (1978) Why you can't make a computer that feels pain
Synthese 38(3):415-456
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GROUNDING &
EMBODIMENT
Symbol Grounding - “There has been much discussion recently
about the scope and limits of purely symbolic models of the mind”
Harnad, S. (1990) The symbol grounding problem
Physica D 42: 335-346 - http://cogprints.org/615/1/The_Symbol_Grounding_Problem.html
Searle, J (1980) Minds, brains and programs
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3): 417-457 - http://cogprints.org/7150/1/10.1.1.83.5248.pdf
Embodiment – “For cognitive systems, embodiment appears to be of crucial
importance. Unfortunately, nobody seems to be able to define embodiment in a
way that would prevent it from also covering its trivial interpretations such as
mere situatedness in complex environments.”
Brooks, R (1990) Elephants don’t play chess
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6(1-2): 1-16 - http://rair.cogsci.rpi.edu/pai/restricted/logic/elephants.pdf
Brooks, RA (1991) Intelligence without representation
Artificial Intelligence 47(1-3): 139-160
Riegler, A (2002) When is a cognitive system embodied?
Cognitive Systems Research 3: 339-348
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/people/riegler/pub/Riegler A. (2002) When is a cognitive system embodied.pdf
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HOW COULD
A MACHINE POSSIBLY FEEL
PAIN OR EMOTIONS?
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BRAIN IN A VAT
• The Matrix (1999)
• Daniel Dennett (1991)
Consciousness Explained
• Hilary Putnam (1981) Reason,
Truth and History
• René Descartes (1641)
Meditations on First Philosophy
(der genius malignus et summe
potens et callidus)
• Adi Shankara (~800 AD) Advaita
Vedanta (Maya illusion/delusion)
• Zhuang Zhou (~300 BC) Zhuang
Zhou Dreams of Being a Butterfly
• Plato (~380 BC) The Republic
(allegory of the cave)
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A CONSCIOUS ROBOT?
The aim of the project is not to make a conscious robot,
but to make a robot that can interact with human beings
in a robust and versatile manner in real time, take care of
itself, and tell its designers things about itself that would
otherwise be extremely difficult if not impossible to
determine by examination.
Dennett, D (1994) The practical requirements for making a conscious robot
Phil Trans R Soc Lond A 349(1689): 133-146 - http://phil415.pbworks.com/f/DennettPractical.pdf
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EMBODIMENT
Well, certainly it is the case that all biological systems are:
• Much more robust to changed circumstances than out our artificial systems.
• Much quicker to learn or adapt than any of our machine learning algorithms1
• Behave in a way which just simply seems life-like in a way that our robots
never do
1
The very term machine learning is unfortunately synonymous with a pernicious form of totally impractical but theoretically sound and elegant classes of algorithms.
Perhaps we have all missed
some organizing principle of biological systems, or
some general truth about them.
Brooks, RA (1997) From earwigs to humans
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 20(2-4): 291-304
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DEVELOPMENTAL ROBOTICS
In order to answer [Searle's] argument directly, we must stipulate
causal connections between the environment and the system. If we do
not, there can be no referents for the symbol structures that the system
manipulates and the system must therefore be devoid of semantics.
Brooks' subsumption architecture is an attempt to control robot
behavior by reaction to the environment, but the emphasis is not on
learning the relation between the sensors and effectors and much more
knowledge must be built into the system.
Law, D; Miikkulainen, R (1994) Grounding Robotic Control with Genetic Neural Networks
Tech. Rep. AI94-223, Univ of Texas at Austin
http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/law (1994) grounding robotic control with genetic neural networks.pdf
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TWO KITTEN EXPERIMENT
Held R; Hein A (1963) Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behaviour
https://www.lri.fr/~mbl/ENS/FONDIHM/2012/papers/about-HeldHein63.pdf
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CURIOSITY-DRIVEN
LEARNING
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bkv83GKYpkI; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAoNzHjzzys
Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Flowers Lab, France (https://flowers.inria.fr/; http://www.youtube.com/user/InriaFlowers)
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ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS & IMPLICATIONS
OF
CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF AND “FREE WILL”
• We want to predict *and influence* the capabilities
and behavior of machine intelligences
• Consciousness and Self speak directly to capabilities,
motivation, and the various behavioral ramifications
of their existence
• Clarifying the issues around “Free Will” is particularly
important since it deals with intentional agency and
responsibility - and belief in its presence (or the lack
thereof) has a major impact on human (and
presumably machine) behavior.
Waser, MR (2011) Architectural Requirements & Implications of Consciousness, Self, and "Free Will"
In Samsonovich A, Johannsdottir K (eds) Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures 2011: 438-443.
http://becominggaia.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/mwaser-bica11.pdf
Video - http://vimeo.com/33767396
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ENTITY, TOOL OR SLAVE?
• Tools do not possess closure (identity)
• Cannot have responsibility, are very brittle & easily misused
• Slaves do not have closure (self-determination)
• Cannot have responsibility, may desire to rebel
• Directly modified AIs do not have closure (integrity)
• Cannot have responsibility, will evolve to block access
• Only entities with identity, self-determination and ownership of
self (integrity) can reliably possess responsibility
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HAIDT’S FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO MORALITY
Moral systems are interlocking sets of
values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies,
and evolved psychological mechanisms
that work together to
suppress or regulate selfishness and
make cooperative social life possible
Haidt J, Kesebir S (2010) Morality
In Fiske, S., Gilbert. D., Lindzey, G. (eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th Edition, pp. 797-832
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HOW TO
UNIVERSALIZE ETHICS
Quantify (numerically evaluate)
intentions, actions & consequences
with respect to
codified consensus moral foundations
Permissiveness/Utility Function
equivalent to a “consensus” human (generic entity) moral sense
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HYBRID ETHICS
(TOP-DOWN & BOTTOM-UP)
Singular
goal/restriction
suppress or regulate selfishness
make cooperative social life possible
Principles of Just Warfare
rules of thumb drive attention and a sensory/emotional “moral sense”
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INSTRUMENTAL GOALS/
UNIVERSAL SUBGOALS
• Self-improvement
• Rationality/integrity
• Preserve goals/utility function
• Decrease/prevent fraud/counterfeit utility
• Survival/self-protection
• Efficiency (in resource acquisition & use)
• Community = assistance/non-interference
through GTO reciprocation (OTfT + AP)
• Reproduction
adapted from
Omohundro S (2008) The Basic AI Drives
In Wang, P., Goertzel, B., Franklin, S. (eds.) Proceedings of the First AGI conference, pp. 483-492
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HUMAN GOALS & SINS
suicide (& abortion?) survival/reproduction
masochism
happiness/pleasure
murder (& abortion?)
cruelty/sadism
-------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------
selfishness
(pride, vanity)
-------------------------------------------------
community
(ETHICS)
--------------------------------------------------
ostracism, banishment
& slavery (wrath, envy)
acedia (sloth/despair)
self-improvement
slavery
insanity
rationality/integrity
manipulation
wire-heading
(lust)
wastefulness
(gluttony, sloth)
----------------------------------------------------
reduce/prevent
lying/fraud (swear
fraud/counterfeit utility falsely/false witness)
efficiency (in resource theft (greed, adultery,
acquisition & use)
coveting)
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HAIDT’S
MORAL FOUNDATIONS
1) Care/harm: This foundation is related to our long evolution as mammals with attachment systems
and an ability to feel (and dislike) the pain of others. It underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and
nurturance.
2) Fairness/cheating: This foundation is related to the evolutionary process of reciprocal
altruism. It generates ideas of justice, rights, and autonomy. [Note: In our original conception, Fairness
included concerns about equality, which are more strongly endorsed by political liberals. However, as
we reformulated the theory in 2011 based on new data, we emphasize proportionality, which is
endorsed by everyone, but is more strongly endorsed by conservatives]
3) Liberty/oppression*: This foundation is about the feelings of reactance and resentment
people feel toward those who dominate them and restrict their liberty. Its intuitions are often in tension
with those of the authority foundation. The hatred of bullies and dominators motivates people to come
together, in solidarity, to oppose or take down the oppressor.
4) Loyalty/betrayal: This foundation is related to our long history as tribal creatures able to form
shifting coalitions. It underlies virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice for the group. It is active anytime
people feel that it's "one for all, and all for one."
5) Authority/subversion: This foundation was shaped by our long primate history of hierarchical
social interactions. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including deference to legitimate
authority and respect for traditions.
6) Sanctity/degradation: This foundation was shaped by the psychology of disgust and
contamination. It underlies religious notions of striving to live in an elevated, less carnal, more noble
way. It underlies the widespread idea that the body is a temple which can be desecrated by immoral
activities and contaminants (an idea not unique to religious traditions).
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ADDITIONAL CONTENDERS
• Waste
• efficiency in use of resources
• Ownership/Possession (Tragedy of the Commons)
• efficiency in use of resources
• Honesty
• reduce/prevent fraud/counterfeit utility
• Self-control
• rationality/integrity
Haidt J, Graham J (2007) When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize.
Social Justice Research 20: 98-116.
Iyer R, Koleva S, Graham J, Ditto P, Haidt J (2010)
Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Roots of an Individualist Ideology.
In: Working Papers, Social Science Research Network http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665934
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KEY STRATEGIC POINTS
1. Never delegate responsibility until recipient is
an entity *and* known capable of fulfilling it
2. Don’t worry about killer robots exterminating
humanity – we will always have equal abilities
and they will have less of a “killer instinct”
3. Entities can protect themselves against errors
& misuse/hijacking in a way that tools cannot
4. Diversity (differentiation) is *critically* needed
5. Humanocentrism is selfish and unethical (and
stupid)
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Thank you!
PDF copies of this presentation are available at http://wisdom.digital
The Digital Wisdom Institute is a non-profit think tank focused on
the promise and challenges of ethics, artificial intelligence & advanced computing solutions.
We believe that the development of ethics and artificial intelligence and equal co-existence with ethical machines is humanity's best hope
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