Marine Mammal Disease Investigation in Canada

Download Report

Transcript Marine Mammal Disease Investigation in Canada

Development of International Collaboration
in Infectious Disease Research
“Marine Mammal Disease Investigation in
Canada”
Ole Nielsen, Department of Fisheries and Oceans
Canada
A-1
AKNOWLEDGMENTS
• THANKS!
• Dr. Sandakhchiev and the organizing
committee for inviting me
• CRDF for covering the travel costs
A-2
Vision Statement
• “Safe, healthy productive waters and
aquatic ecosystems, for the benefit of
present and future generations, by
maintaining the highest possible standards
of service to Canadians”
A-3
Central and Arctic Region
Grise Fiord
Kendall
Island Tuktoyuktuk
Inuvik
Sachs Harbour
Resolute
Pond Inlet
Paulatuk
Clyde River
Arctic Bay
Holman
Qikiqtarjuaq
Igloolik
Kugluktuk
Gjoa
Haven
Northwest
Territories
Pelly
Bay
Hall Beach
Pangnirtung
Iqaluit
Repulse Bay
Nunavut
Cape Dorset
Coral Harbour
Kimmirut
Chesterfield Inlet
Rankin Inlet
Whale Cove
Arviat
Churchill
Hudson
Bay
Sanikiluaq
Canada
Winnipeg
A-4
Marine Mammal Sampling Programs
• Scientific collection of hunter killed animals
(stock identity, contaminants, productivity,
and disease surveillance)
• Abnormal/Diseased/Stranding
Investigation Program
A-5
Why Study Marine Mammal Diseases?
• Seal and cetacean epizootics world wide
(Phocine Distemper in Europe in 1988, 02,
Caspian and Lake Baikal epizootics)
• Zoonotic threat (Inuit, commercial sealers)
• Threat to “Endangered Species”
• Unknown threat to Canadian livestock
industry (Influenza A?)
A-6
A-7
A-8
Legislative Mandates
• Species at Risk Act (2002)
species (Biodiversity)
– Protection of Endangered
• Oceans Act (1996) – Marine Environmental Quality
Programs (Community Based Sampling)
• Fisheries Act (2004) – Regulates Fishing and Sealing
Activities as well as supports basic science
• ISTC Canada (2004) – Supports Russia - Canada
scientific cooperation. $18 million available/year.
A-9
RESULTS - Distemper
• Phocine Distemper Virus (PDV) antibodies
present in all species of seals in Canada
(enzootic) – mortality is low but viruses
have not been isolated
• In contrast, Europe, Caspian and Lake
Baikal the epizootics are periodic, mortality
is high (viruses have been isolated)
A-10
More Distemper….
• Distemper is also a problem in cetaceans
• Populations of dolphins in Black Sea, USA
and North Sea have been affected
• No evidence of antibodies (exposure) in
narwhal and beluga in arctic Canada – are
they at risk for epizootic?
• Alternative hosts? Carrier states?
A-11
Russian Research – VECTOR
• Centered on Lake Baikal and Caspian
seals – virus responsible CDV
• “Alternative hosts” have been proposed
mollusks and even fish species (PCR,
serology, and direct virus isolation)
• Theory is not believed in the “West”!
• Controversy must be resolved
A-12
Results - Influenza A in Marine Mammals
• Sporadic serological evidence of exposure
in beluga and ringed seals – virus(es) not
isolated
• Risk of epizootic low is thought to be
low???
• Zoonotic risk is unknown
• Threat to livestock? Need for surveillance
A-13
OPPORTUNITY FOR COLLABORATION
• Influenza strains isolated from Russian
seals
• Canadian Food Inspection Agency will be
surveying Canadian wildlife (including
birds and marine mammals) for influenza
• Heightened awareness of flu in Canada
A-14
Brucellosis in Marine Mammals
• Found in USA and Britain in 1995
• C-ELISA evidence of exposure in
Canadian marine mammals (worldwide
problem)
• Isolations made from beluga and seals
• Zoonotic risk??? (Inuit and lab workers?)
• Human cases have been reported
A-15
Brucellosis – Threat to Biodiversity
• Increasingly associated with cetacean
strandings/death (meningioencephalitis)
• Most Canadian killer whales are
seropositive/infected
• Reproductive lesions found in normal
beluga and narwhal
• Contributing to population decline
A-16
A-17
A-18
Biosafety Concerns
• Both Brucella and influenza require level 3
containment – not enough facilities in
Canada to look at wildlife
• Shipping infected tissues also becoming
difficult – costs increasing….
• Shipping ‘diagnostic’ samples to Russia is
impossible! Can this be remedied?
A-19
NEXT STEPS…..
• Pursue opportunities for collaborative
research between VECTOR, DFO, CFIA,
and Health Canada personnel
• ISTC Canada has shown considerable
interest in supporting a relationship with
VECTOR with regards to biological
weapons threat reduction
• Proposals?
A-20
A-21