Transcript Slides - Rosella Nicolini

Competition, mergers and antitrust policies
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
1
Market Size Matters
• European leaders always viewed integration as
compensating small size of European nations.
– Implicit assumption: market size good for economic
performance.
• Facts: integration associated with mergers,
acquisitions, etc.
– In Europe and more generally, ‘globalisation.’
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
2
Facts
• M&A activity is high in EU.
• much M&A is mergers within member state.
– about 55% ‘domestic.’
– Remaining 45% split between:
• one is non-EU firm (24%),
• one firm was located in another EU nation (15%),
• counterparty’s nationality was not identified (6%).
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
3
Facts
• Distribution of M&A
quite varied:
– Big 4: share M&As
much lower than share
of the EU GDP.
– I, F, D 36% of the
M&As, 59% GDP.
• Except UK.
– Small members have
disproportionate share
of M&A.
M&A activity by nation, 1991-2002
B, 2.8%
UK, 31.4%
DK, 2.6%
EL, 1.1%
S, 5.3%
IRL, 1.7%
NL, 6.5%
L, 0.5%
I, 6.2%
A, 2.1%
P, 1.2%
F, 13.5%
D, 16.3%
E, 5.0%
FIN, 3.9%
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
4
Facts
• Why M&A mostly within EU?
• Why UK’s share so large?
– Non harmonised takeovers rules.
• some members have very restrictive takeover practices, makes
M&As very difficult.
• others, UK, very liberal rules.
• Lack of harmonisation means restructuring effects
very impact by member states.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
5
Theory: Economic Logic Verbally
•
•
•
•
•
liberalisation 
de-fragmentation 
pro-competitive effect 
industrial restructuring (M&A, etc.)
RESULT: fewer, bigger, more efficient firms
facing more effective competition from each
other.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
6
Economic logic: background
Monopoly case
Demand
Curve
Price
P’
P”
C
Marginal Revenue
Curve
Marginal
P*
Cost Curve
A
B
Price
Demand
Curve
D
Marginal
Cost
E
Q’ Q’+1
Sales
Q*
Sales
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
7
Economic logic: background
Duopoly case, example of non-equilibrium
price
price
Firm 1’s expectation of
sales by firm 2, Q2
p1’
Firm 2’s expectation of
sales by firm 1, Q1
Demand
Curve (D)
p2’
Residual Demand
Curve firm 1 (RD1)
A1
MC
x1’
Firm 1 sales
Residual Marginal Revenue
Curve firm 1 (RMR1)
Demand
Curve (D)
Residual Demand
Curve firm 2 (RD2)
A2
x2’
MC
Firm 2 sales
Residual Marginal Revenue
Curve firm 2 (RMR2)
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
8
Economic logic: background
Duopoly & oligopoly case, equilibrium outcome
price
Typical firm’s expectation
of the other firm’s sales
p*
Typical firm’s expectation
of other the other firms’
sales
price
D
D
p**
RD
RD’
A
MC
A
RMR
x*
Duopoly
MC
RMR’
2x* sales
x**
sales
3x**
Oligopoly
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
9
BE-COMP diagram
Mark-up (m)
mmono
mduo
BE (break-even) curve
m’
COMP
curve
n=1 n=2
n’
Number
of firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
10
Details of COMP curve
Mark-up
price
p'
mmono
A’
p"
mduo
B’
D
Monopoly
mark-up
Duopoly
mark-up
MC
COMP
curve
R-D (duopoly)
B
Marginal cost
curve
A
R-MR
xduo
n=1
n=2
Number of
firms
MR (monopoly)
xmono
Typical firm’s sales
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
11
Details of BE curve
euros
price
Mark-up
(i.e., p-MC)
Home market
po=mo+MC
BE
Demand curve
AC>po
A
ACo=po
mo
po
AC<po
B
A
B
AC
MC
Sales
per firm
x’= Co/n’
x”= Co/n”
xo= Co/no
n” no
Co
n’
Number
of firms
Total
sales
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
12
Equilibrium in BE-COMP diagram
euros
Price
Mark-up
Home market
Demand curve
E’
p’
p’
BE
E’
m'
E’
AC
COMP
MC
x’
Sales
per firm
n’
C’
Number
of firms
Total
sales
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
13
No-trade-to-free-trade integration
euros
price
Mark-up
Home market only
Demand curve
BE
BE
p’
p”
E’
E’
p’
E”
p”
C
m'
E’
A
1
E”
E”
pA
mA
A
AC
COMP
MC
x’ x”
Sales
per firm
FT
n’
C’ C”
n”
2n’
Number
of firms
Total
sales
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
14
Economic Logic
• Integration: no-trade-to-free-trade: BE curve shifts out (to point 1).
• Defragmentation:
– PRE typical firm has 100% sales at home, 0% abroad; POST: 50-50 ,
– Can’t see in diagram.
• Pro-competitive effect:
– Equilibrium moves from E’ to A: Firms losing money (below BE).
– Pro-competitive effect = markup falls.
– short-run price impact p’ to pA.
• Industrial Restructuring:
–
–
–
–
–
–
A to E”,
number of firms, 2n’ to n”.
firms enlarge market shares and output,
More efficient firms, AC falls from p’ to p”,
mark-up rises,
profitability is restored.
• Result:
– bigger, fewer, more efficient firms facing more effective competition.
• Welfare: gain is “C”.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
15
Competition & Subsidies
•
2 immediate questions:
– “As the number of firms falls, isn’t there a tendency for the
remaining firms to collude in order to keep prices high?”
– “Since industrial restructuring can be politically painful, isn’t
there a danger that governments will try to keep money-losing
firms in business via subsidies and other policies?”
•
The answer to both questions is “Yes”.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
16
EU’s role
• Exclusive competency of EU; Commission controls.
• 2 aspects: mergers & anti-competitive behaviour.
• Look at justification for putting competition policy
at the EU level.
– Spillovers (negative effects of one Member’s subsidies
on other Members’ industry).
– Need belief in ‘fair play’ if integration is to maintain its
political support.
• Witness recent ‘protectionist’ tendency of Member States to
prevent foreign takeovers.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
17
Recall: Economic Logic
• Integration: no-trade-to-free-trade: BE curve shifts out (to point 1).
• Defragmentation:
– PRE typical firm has 100% sales at home, 0% abroad; POST: 50-50 .
– Can’t see in diagram.
• Pro-competitive effect:
– Equilibrium moves from E’ to A: Firms losing money (below BE),
– Pro-competitive effect = markup falls,
– short-run price impact p’ to pA.
• Industrial Restructuring”
–
–
–
–
–
–
A to E”,
number of firms, 2n’ to n”,
firms enlarge market shares and output,
More efficient firms, AC falls from p’ to p”,
mark-up rises,
profitability is restored.
• Result:
– bigger, fewer, more efficient firms facing more effective competition.
• Welfare: gain is “C”.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
18
Competition & State aid (subsidies)
•
2 immediate questions
–
–
•
•
“As the number of firms falls, isn’t there a tendency for the
remaining firms to collude in order to keep prices high?”
“Since industrial restructuring can be politically painful, isn’t
there a danger that governments will try to keep money-losing
firms in business via subsidies and other policies?”
The answer to both questions is “Yes”.
Turn first to the economics of subsidies and EU’s policy
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
19
Anti-competitive behaviour
•
Collusion is a real concern in Europe.
–
•
Collusion in the BE-COMP diagram.
–
–
•
dangers of collusion rise as the number of firms falls.
COMP curve is for ‘normal’, non-collusive competition
Firms do not coordinate prices or sales.
Other extreme is ‘perfect collusion’.
–
–
–
Firms coordinate prices and sales perfectly.
Max profit from market is monopoly price & sales.
Perfect collusion is where firms charge monopoly price and split
the sales among themselves.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
20
Economic effects
•
Collusion will not in the end
raise firm’s profits to abovenormal levels.
–
–
•
2n’ is too high for all firms to
break even.
Industrial consolidation
proceeds as usual, but only to
nB. Point B Zero profits
earned by all.
prices higher, pB> p”,
smaller firms, higher
average cost.
Mark-up
BEFT
Perfect
A
collusion
mmono
pB
p”
B
E”
Partial
collusion
COMP
n=1 n” nB
2n’
Number of
firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
21
Economic effects
•
The welfare cost of collusion (versus no collusion).
– four-sided area marked by pB, p”, E” and B.
price
Mark-up
Demand curve
mono
mmono
p
pB
BEFT
Perfect
A
collusion
B
B
E”
E”
p”
Partial
collusion
COMP
n=1 n” nB
CB
Total
sales
Number of
firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
22
EU Competition Policy
•
•
To prevent anti-competitive behavior, EU policy focuses
on two main axes:
Antitrust and cartels. The Commission tries:
–
to eliminate behaviours that restrict competition (e.g. pricefixing arrangements and cartels),
– to eliminate abusive behaviour by firms that have a dominant
position.
•
Merger control. The Commission seeks:
– to block mergers that would create firms that would dominate
the market.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
23
Economics of cartels
• Suppose price without
cartel would be P.
• Cartel raises price to P’.
• DCS=-a-b; ‘ripoff’
• DPS=+a-c
• Net welfare = -b-c ;
“technical inefficiency”
euros
P’
a
P
b
c
AC
Demand
curve
C’
C
Quantity
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
24
The vitamin cartels (Box 11-1)
• In 2001, Commission fined 8 companies for vitamins cartels
– vitamins A, E, B1, B2, B5, B6, C, D3, Biotin, Folic acid, Beta Carotene and
carotinoids
• The European vitamins market is worth almost a billion euros a year.
• The firms fixed prices, allocated sales quotas, agreed on and
implemented price increases and issued price announcements in
according to agreed procedures.
• They set up a mechanism to monitor and enforce their agreements and
participated in regular meetings to implement their plans.
– Formal structure with senior managers to ensure the functioning of the cartels:
the exchange of sales values, volumes of sales and pricing information on a
quarterly or monthly basis at regular meetings, and the preparation, agreement
and implementation and monitoring of an annual "budget" followed by the
adjustment of actual sales achieved so as to comply with the quotas allocated.
• Hoffman-La Roche of Switzerland (cartel ringleader) received the
largest fine (462m euros); BASF and Merck (Germany), Aventis SA
(France), Solvay Pharmaceuticals (the Netherlands), Daiichi
Pharmaceutical, Esai and Takeda Chemical Industries (Japan).
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
25
Exclusive territories
• More common anti-competitive
practice is ‘exclusive territories’.
• Nintendo example; high prices in
Germany vs UK.
euros
DGermany
MRGermany
– Germany’s inelastic demand meant
Nintendo wanted to charge a higher
price than in UK.
– Normally Single Market limits this
sort of price discrimination
(arbitrage by firms).
• Nintendo implemented a system
that prevented arbitrage within
the EU (illegal).
– European Commission fined
Nintendo and the 7 distributors 168
million euros.
PGermany
PUK
MC
MRUK
DUK
Quantity
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
26
Abuse of dominant position
• Firms that are lucky or possess excellent products can
establish very strong positions in their market.
• Not a problem, per se:
– position may reflect superior products and/or efficiency,
– e.g. Google’s triumph.
• However dominance may tempt firm to extract extra profits
from suppliers or customers.
• Or arrange the market to shield itself from future
competitors.
• Illegal under EU law ‘abuse of dominant position.’
• e.g. Microsoft with media software:
– Charge high price of Word, etc. where the competition has been
driven out of biz (WordPerfect, etc.), but give for free all software
where there is still competition.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
27
Merger control
• Initially P=AC.
Williamson diagram
euros
• Merger implies lower AC to
AC’, but raises the price to P’.
Demand
curve
• DCS=-a-b; ‘ripoff’.
P’
• DPS=+a+c.
• Net welfare = -b+c ;
a
b
P=AC
ambiguous, ‘efficiency
defence’.
c
AC’
• Laissez-faire (in US and
increasingly in EU); if free
entry then eventually P driven
C’ C
Quantity
down to AC’.
– As in BE-COMP diagram.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
28
State aid economics
Look at two cases:
• Restructuring prevention.
• Unfair competition.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
29
Restructuring prevention
•
•
Consider subsidies that prevent
restructuring.
Specifically, each government
makes annual payments to all
firms exactly equal to their
losses:
–
–
•
i.e. all 2n’ firms in Figure 6-9
analysis break even, but not new
firms.
Economy stays at point A.
This changes who pays for the
inefficiently small firms from
consumers to taxpayers.
Mark-up
BE
BE
m'
E’
FT
1
E”
mA
A
COMP
n’
n”
2n’
Number
of firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
30
restructuring prevention: size of subsidy
•
Pre-integration:
–
•
•
fixed costs = operating profit = area “a+b”.
Post-integration: operating profit = b+c.
ERGO: Breakeven subsidy = a-c .
–
NB: b+c+a-c=a+b.
euros
Price
Mark-up
COMP
Demand curve
pA
A
E’
E’
p’
AC
BEFT
a
b
A
A
pA
c
MC
Sales
x’
xA= 2CA/2n’per firm
2n’
C’ CA
Total
sales
Numbe
r of
firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
31
restructuring prevention: welfare impact
•
•
•
•
Change producer surplus = zero (profit is zero pre & post).
Change consumer surplus = a+d.
Subsidy cost = a-c.
Total impact = d+c.
euros
Price
Mark-up
COMP
Demand curve
pA
A
E’
E’
p’
AC
BEFT
a
pA
b
d
A
A
c
MC
Sales
x’
xA= 2CA/2n’per firm
2n’
C’ CA
Total
sales
Numbe
r of
firms
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
32
Only some subsidise: unfair competition
•
•
•
•
•
If Foreign pays ‘break even’ subsidies to its firms,
All restructuring forced on Home,
2n’ moves to n”, but all the exit is by Home firms.
Unfair.
Undermines political support for liberalisation.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
33
EU policies on ‘State Aids’
•
•
1957 Treaty of Rome bans state aid that provides firms
with an unfair advantage and thus distorts competition.
EU founders considered this so important that they
empowered the Commission with enforcement.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
34
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
35
Microsoft case
Source: European Commission & Financial Times
Chronology
- 1998: Complaint from Sun Microsystems. Microsoft was
refusing it information necessary to interoperate with
Microsoft’s dominant PC operating system
- 2000: The Commission sent Microsoft a Statement of
Objections.
- 2001: The Commission sent a second Statement of
Objections.
- 2003: A third Statement was sent.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
36
Microsoft case
Microsoft reacted to each Statement and requested an Oral
Hearing (2003)
2004: “The decision” (by the Commission)
Microsoft abused its dominant position
in the PC operating system
a. Refusing to supply competitors information.
Then, Microsoft has to disclose information in 120 days
a. Harming competition through the tying of its separate Windows
Media Player
Then, Microsoft has to provide (in 90 days) a version of Windows
without Windows Media Player.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
37
Microsoft case
In June 2004, Microsoft lodged an action for
annulment of the Decision.
Why ? Microsoft would suffer from serious and
irreparable damage:
a. Harm its intellectual property rights
b. Interfere with its commercial freedom
c. Alter market conditions.
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
38
Microsoft case
The Court of First Instance delivered its judgement on
September 2007...The Commission was right
Microsoft has to pay a fine: 497 million €
Microsoft reaction:
. Allow access to interoperability information
. Information will cost € 10.000 one-off fee rather than a
percentage of revenues
Failing to comply with 2004 decisions, the European
Commission fined Microsoft a record € 899 m (2008)
© Baldwin & Wyplosz 2006. The Economics of European Integration, 2 nd Edition
39