Transcript Slide 1

IP & R&D in Developing Countries
Sean Flynn
Washington College of Law
WIPIP 2007
Monopoly Economics
Monopoly Econ (Simple)
Norway ARV Demand
Profit Maximizing
Norway
Figure 5.2 Revenue per Quantity Sold
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Quantity (units of 210 people)
8
9
10
South Africa
Figure 3.1 Income by Decile
Annual Income, USD
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Income Decile
7
8
9
10
SA ARV Demand
Figure 4.1 ARV Demand if Price = 5% Income
1,600
Price Per Year, USD
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Quantity (100,000s people)
8
9
10
Profit Maximizing SA
Figure 4.2 Revenue per Quantity Sold (USD)
160,000,000
140,000,000
120,000,000
100,000,000
80,000,000
60,000,000
40,000,000
20,000,000
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Quantity (100,000s of people)
8
9
10
Monopoly vs.
Competition: AIDS drugs
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0
2000
2001
2002
2003
Other Problems
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Inefficient R&D investments
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Neglected meds
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Poor consumers
Antibiotics
Unpooled buyers
Marketing costs
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2/13 approvals are “significantly better”
Corruption of evidence (phrma detailing)
Costly IP system
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Administration, litigation
Anticompetitive uses
IGWG
Fifty-ninth World Health Assembly 2006 calls
for study of “needs-driven, essential health
research and development” proposals
 31 Developing countries call for R&D Treaty
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Big Idea
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Global patent pools
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Prize funds for improving health care
outcomes [developing countries]
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Essential medical inventions, tamiflu
Only inventions licensed to the pool are eligible
Global agreement to support funding
Base on country income
 Release from TRIPS/IP pressure
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S 2210 v. TRIPS
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Elimination of exclusive
right in return for prize
based on health outcomes
Applies to drugs &
biological products
Payments for 10 years
Remuneration from prize
fund “in lieu of”
remuneration from
exclusivity
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27. patents in all fields of
technology w/out
“discrimination”
30: limited exceptions
not unreasonably conflict
w/ normal exploitation
31: CL- Individual merits,
negotiation
Extra Credit
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Can you argue that S 2210 complies with
TRIPS?
Limited
 Normal exploitation
 As a CL
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