Near Misses: The Importance of Looking Below the Waterline.

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Transcript Near Misses: The Importance of Looking Below the Waterline.

Patient Safety and Event
Reporting
Surveillance and Using the Data
Below the Water-Line
HS Kaplan, M.D.
Columbia University
AHRQ U18 Demonstration Grant
Annual Accidental Deaths
“To Err is Human “
Institute of Medicine Report
1999
• Identify and learn
from errors
through reporting
systems
- both mandatory
and voluntary.
Types of Analysis Means
• Audit
– Chart review
– Observation
• Simulation
• FMEA
• Event reporting and analysis
Looking Below the Waterline
• Misadventures
• Events without harm
• Near miss events
• Dangerous situations
Management and Control of Safety
of Medical Care
Surveillance
Management
and Control
Operations
Goals of the System of
Management
•
•
•
•
Prevent failure
Make failure visible
Prevent adverse effects of failure
Mitigate the adverse effects
Types of Errors/Failures
• Active— are errors committed by those in
direct contact with the human-system
interface (human error)
• Latent —are the delayed consequences of
technical and organizational actions and
decisions
Active Human Error Forms
• Skill Based
– Know what you’re doing
• Rule Based
– Think you know what you’re doing
• Knowledge Based
– Know you don’t know what you’re doing
Does Practice Make Perfect?
Error
Skill / Error
Relationship:
• Decreased errors taken
as measure of
increasing proficiency
-
SB
KB
%
RB
• But type of error is
critical
Skill
“Over-learned” Unmindful
Task Performance
• Often performed
without thought,
routine, habitual
• Little attention to
components of
routine
• Less able to modify if
interrupted or novel
task elements arise
Langer, E.
The Titanic — Latent Failures:
• Inadequate number
of lifeboats
• No horizontal
bulkheads
• No dry run
• Single radio
channel
Events Happen When:
Blunt end actions and decisions — latent underlying
conditions
+
Sharp end actions and decisions — active human
failure
= Event
Active
Error
Event
Latent
Conditions
Types of Events
MERS-TH is
designed to
capture all
types of events.
Misadventures
The event actually happened and some level
of harm — possibly death — occurred.
No Harm Events
The event actually occurred but no harm
was done.
Near Miss Events
The potential for harm may have been
present, but unwanted consequences were
prevented
because some
recovery action
was taken.
The Two Elements of Risk:
LOW
HIGH
HIGH
1
2
LOW
Consequences
Probability
3
4
Prioritization
A Consequence-Based Focus
• Don’t focus only on what caused the event.
• Focus on factors influencing the
consequences.
• Safety is all about consequences
– Types: death, damage, dollars, disgrace …
– Classes: actual, expected (pipeline), potential
(averted)
Modified from W. Corcoran:
Firebird Forum
Event Classification by
Organizations
Event classification affects availability of
information for learning:
• Organizations tend to disregard events outside
classification scheme
• Classifications trigger information processing
routines that channel decision maker’s attention
“Believing is Seeing”
Event Classification by Organizations
• Organizations disregard events outside
classification scheme
• Compliance sets limits of visibility
Our Classifications Define What
We See
Different definitions of NEAR MISS
Pilots
Air Traffic
Controllers
Different Definitions of Near Miss
Air Traffic Controller
Possible Causative Factors:
• “Fanny Factor”
– Pilot first on the scene.
• ATC: Three strikes
and you’re out.
Benefits of Near Miss Reporting
• Tell us why misadventures didn’t happen
– Allows for the study of recovery
• Greater number of events allows
quantitative analysis
– Near misses and no harm events: relative
proportions of classes of system failures help define risk
Recovery — planned or unplanned
Study of recovery actions is
valuable.

Planned recovery
– Built into our processes

Unplanned recovery
– Lucky catches
Promoting Recovery
Current emphasis: Prevention of errors
Actually desired: prevention of negative
consequences, not errors per se.
Prevent
Detect
Localize
Prevent
Mitigate
______Van der Schaaf and Kanse 1999
Use of Near Miss Reports
• Portal to view
potential system
dangers
– Safe lessons learned
• Exemplar cases in
support of
mindfulness
Perception of Failure vs. Success
Is the glass half full - or half empty?
HRO:
• Near-miss is seen as a
kind of failure
revealing potential
danger.
Other organizations:
• See Near-miss as
evidence of success.
Karl Weick
Conventional Wisdom?
Beware the surgeon who is very experienced
in getting out of bad situations.
________Anonymous
Errors are Ubiquitous
• Errors are frequent in high criticality
fields such as medicine and
commercial aviation.
• Yet serious harm is relatively
infrequent.
• Why? Error recovery is virtually
continually in play.
Errors are Ubiquitous
Direct observation of 165 Pediatric Arterial
Switch procedures at centers throughout UK:
On average 7 events / procedure from surgical team
error
• 1 major (life threatening)event ,
• 6 minor events
Event recovery in majority of life threatening
events
• no impact on baseline fatality risk (4-5
deaths per 100)
(de Leval 2,000)
Reported Rates of Fatal AHTR
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Kildufe, Debakey‘42
Wiener ‘43
Binder et al ‘59
Baker et al ‘69
Pineda et al ‘73
Myhre ‘80
Sazama ‘90
Linden 2000, HV 2002
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1/935
1/915
1/11,625
1/8,035
1/33,500
1/500,000
1/800,000
1/1,800,000
Estimated Rates of ABO
Incompatibility
~1/50,000 Transfusions
Hemovigilance, SHOT, NYDOH
Precursor Definition
“one that precedes and indicates
the approach of another”
Merriam-Webster
Secret Precursors?
The Concorde Tragedy
Some precursors don’t
indicate the approach
of a misadventure
• 6 prior take-off events
involved foreign objects and
the Concorde
• No recognition that a foreign
object could destroy the
aircraft upon takeoff
Six-Year Old Killed by Flying O2
Cylinder in MRI Suite
A Unique “one off” event?
• VA experience
• FDA and other
reports
• Near misses - “almost”
unlikely to be reported
Near Misses Or No Harm Events
With MRI
• MRI instrument
dismantled at U
Texas:
• Dozens of pens,
paper clips, keys and
other metal objects
clustered inside. ...
Heinreich’s
1
Ratio
It has been proposed that reporting systems could be evaluated
on the proportion of minor to more serious incidents reported 2
• 1 Major injury
1
• 29 Minor injuries
• 300 No-injury
accidents
29
300
1. Heinreich HW Industrial Accident Prevention, NY And London 1941
TM Current Data: 36 Hospitals
40 Harm
10,303 Total
1,304 No Recovery No Harm
7,163 Recovery No Harm
Unplanned 573
Planned 6,590
TM Current Data: 36 Hospitals
1 Harm
10,000 Total
33 No Recovery No Harm
179 Recovery No Harm
Unplanned 14
Planned 165
Four Major Reasons for Not
Reporting
• The error was fixed before anything bad
happened.
• It’s easier to just fix the error than tell
anyone about it.
• The error might be written in a personnel
file.
• Not wanting to get themselves or anyone
else in trouble.
Mail Survey to Assess Safety
Culture and Event Reporting
53 Hospital Transfusion Services
(945 employees) – 73% response
• Uncorrected mistakes, potential for patient
harm - NOT always reported: 40%.
• Deviations from procedures potential for
patient harm - NOT always reported: 52%.
• Mistakes self-corrected by employees NOT always reported: 92% (73% NEVER).
Westat/MERS-TM 2000-1
Adoption vs Compliance
Compliance
Adoption
Critical Elements of Adoption
To adopt event reporting rather than to simply
comply -trust and motivation:
• Promote open communication with a “just”
system of accountability.
– Less than reckless culpability should not warrant
punitive discipline
• Timely and effective feedback and
• Demonstrable local usefulness.
Optimal Reporting
Environment
Movement in
Reporting as
Culture
Changes
Other
Departments
Equipment
Ones’ Self
Other
People
One’s Own
Rule Violation
Event
Failure side
Primary action
or decision
Recovery side
and
Primary action
or decision
Antecedents
Root Cause
Codes
Causal Tree
Root Cause
Primary recovery
action to stop
adverse outcome
and
and
Root Cause
Antecedent
recovery
action
Antecedent
recovery
action
A Consequence-Based Focus
• Don’t focus only on what caused the event.
• Focus on factors influencing the
consequences.
• Safety is all about consequences
– Types: death, damage, dollars, disgrace …
– Classes: actual, expected (pipeline), potential
(averted)
Modified from W. Corcoran:
Firebird Forum
Four Types Of Factors
Mitigating
Factors
Vulnerability
Factors
Triggering
Factors
Exacerbating
Factors
Consequences
Eight Questions For Insight Into An
Event
• Impact:
– What were the consequences?
– What is the significance?
• Causation Factors:
– What set us up for it?
– What triggered it?
– What made it as bad as it was?
– What kept it from being a lot worse?
• Closeout:
– What should be learned from it?
– What should be done about it?
Modified from W. Corcoran: Firebird Forum
Surprises Most Likely to Occur at
H/S Interface
3 Questions to assess where unforeseen
events would surface:
• The “hands-on” question
• The “criticality” question
• The “frequency” question
James Reason
The “Hands-on” Question:
• What activities involve the most direct
human contact with the system and
thus offer the greatest opportunity for
human decisions or actions to have an
immediate direct adverse effect on the
system?
James Reason
The “Criticality” Question:
• What activities, if performed less
than adequately, pose the greatest
threat to the well-being of the
system ?
The “Frequency” Question:
• How often are these activities
performed in the day-to-day
operations of the system as a
whole?
Three Strikes and You’re Probably
Out.
An activity scoring high on all
three questions is more likely
vulnerable to unexpected events.
Medical protocols may score high in
all three
James Reason
“Over-learned” Unmindful
Task Performance
• Often performed
without thought,
routine, habitual
• Little attention to
components of
routine
• Less able to modify if
interrupted or novel
task elements arise
Langer, E.
Betsy Lehman, a science writer
for the Boston Globe, died of a
drug overdose while undergoing
an experimental treatment
protocol for breast cancer.
Sound Information Handling
JG Williams
Toward an Electronic Patient
Record '96 , Vol.. 2, pp. 348-355,
Ambiguous form:
Vulnerability
Drug manufacturer's treatment summary
specified 4,000 mg in four days in a
way that could have meant either 4g
each day for four days or 4g total over
a four-day treatment cycle.
Error Form – Latent (Organizational Procedure)
10X Error in Prescribed Dose:
Trigger
The amount prescribed for Ms. Lehman
was inconsistent with what she had
received in a previous treatment cycle.
• Consistency-Validation Checks
Error Form – Active (Rule Based error)
Higher Credibility for Error
Signals: Exacerbation
Although dosage questioned by a
pharmacist, the error report was
overridden by the physician.
Error Form - Active (Rule Based error)
Latent (Organizational Culture)
Higher Credibility of Corroborated Data:
Exacerbation
Two other pharmacists corroborated the
original error report. These reports
were also dropped in favor of the
original erroneous interpretation of the
ambiguous treatment summary.
Error Form - Latent (Organizational Culture)
Signal Detection – Classification:
Exacerbation
Patient reported something wrong - a
very different reaction to first dose of
chemotherapy than she previously
experienced. Report not considered of
concern for investigation in-depth .
Error Form - Active (Rule Based – lack of verification)
Signal Detection – Classification:
Exacerbation
Laboratory results revealed an
abnormal spike in administered
drug levels. This did not trigger
investigation for a possible antecedent
error.
Error Form - Latent (Organizational Procedure)
Dissemination of Lessons Learned
Six months later, the same semantic
ambiguity in daily versus treatmentcycle doses killed a cancer patient at
the University of Chicago Hospital.
“Safety Is Not Bankable”
• Safety and reliability have to be reaccomplished over and over.
• Safety and reliability are dynamic nonevents
• They are not static nonevents
• Weak signals do not require weak responses
Weick K, Sutcliffe K, 2001
Barriers to Event Reporting
• Potential recriminations
– Self image, peers and management,
external agents.
• Motivational issues
– Lack of incentive, feedback, actual
discouragement
• Management commitment
– Inconsistent, ambivalent, fearful
• Individual confusion
– Definition, usefulness
Near Miss Event Reporting
• Done properly, unique information about
system dangers.
• Supports study of recovery
• Mindfulness - can actively counter rather
than increase complacency.
• Means of engaging staff directly in patient
safety.
• No direct burden of patent harm
Thank You For Your Attention
Are there any questions?
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