Transcript Special Lecture Series (1) Reflections of the Korea

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Special Lecture Series (1)
Amb. YIM Sung-joon
Distinguished Professor together with
Mr. AHN Yung-jip
Deputy Director-General MOFAT
And Mr. James WAYMAN Minister-Counselor US Embassy, Seoul
Table of Contents
1. Introduction & Overview
Amb. YIM Sung-joon
2. Korean Perspective
Mr. AHN Yung-jip
3. American Perspective
Mr. James WAYMAN
1. Introduction & Overview
1. Introduction:
“ What the US Means for Korea Now? ”
 The ROK-US Alliance
- To defend South Korea against North Korea
- To address regional and global security challenges
 The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement
- To reboot a new bilateral & global trade effort
- To increase 6% of Korea’s GDP ($ 7.5 b.)
- +$10-12 billion to US GDP
 Global Partnership
- UN PKO, ODA, Green Growth
2. An Historical Overview of the Korea-US relations
“ How the US - Korea First Met? ”
 The Korea-US War (1871)
- The General Sherman Incident (1866)
- The first US naval expedition to Choseun by Adm. Rogers
 The Korea-US Treaty of Friendship and Amity of 1882
- Negotiations between Li Hung-chang and Commodore
Shufeldt
- The “good offices” clause (Article 1) and
“ the dependence issues ”
- Signing Ceremony (May 22, 1882)
- Dispatch of the first Korean diplomatic delegation
(Jul, 1883)
“ How the US Abandoned Korea? ”
 King Gojong’s diplomatic policy
- To use the US to check the influence of Japan, Russia
and China
<Photo of King Gojong>
 The US policy of neutrality and non-intervention
in the Korean affaire
- The US considered Korea unimportant and American
interests minimal
- American diplomats in Seoul sympathetic with King
Gojong: Dr. Horace Allen (1884-1905)
<Dr. Horace Allen>
 President T. Roosevelt’s pro-Japanese policy gave a
clear-cut green signal and a “free hand” to the
Japanese in Korea
- To mediate the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5
- The Taft - Katsura Memorandom (Jul. 1905)
<President Theodore Roosevelt>
<Illustration of the Russo-Japanese war>
 “ The Imperial Cruise ” by James Bradley, 2009
- Alice Roosevelt (21) landed
on Incheon on Sep.19.1905
- Gojong tried to ask ‘Teddy’
to exercise his good offices
and save Korea from Japan
<Alice Roosevelt>
『The Imperial Cruise』 by James Bradley, 2009
 Gojong, the helpless Korean Emperor signed the
Treaty of Protection in Nov.17.1905
- The Treaty of Annexation of 1910 ended the first 28 years
of American-Korean relations
3. Korea’s “Second Unfortunate Encounter” with the US
(1945-50)
 Allied Nations discussed about the Korean
Independence issue
- The Cairo Declaration by the US, UK and China,
Dec. 1943 “……in due course, Korea shall become
free and independent ”
- The Yalta Conference Feb. 1945: President Roosevelt
Proposed a Trusteeship for Korea to Stalin
- The Potsdam Declaration Jul. 1945: The US, UK and China
reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration and invited the USSR to
participate in the war against Japan in the Far East
 The US armed forces under Gen. McArther entered
Seoul on Sep. 9 ending 35 years of Japanese
occupation
<General Douglas McArther>
 The US preseated the deadlocked Korean issue to the
UN, calling for the establishment of a united Korean
Government
- But the Soviet Command denied the UN Commission :
the establishment of the separate Governments of
South and North Korea in 1948
 The US, seeking to transfer the burden to the UN,
viewed the Korean problem as an “unhappy burden”
and “a needless liability to the free world ”
 The Acheson line : Secretary of State
Acheson ….implied on Jan. 1950 that the defense
perimeter of the US in Asia no longer included either
Formosa or Korea
<The Acheson line>
- As of the outbreak of the war on June.25.1950, the US
armed forces were pulled out except 500 military advisors
4. Conclusion:
Why the US abandoned Korea twice? 1882-1950
 Korea fell primarily because of her own weakness and
ineptitude
 Roosevelt’s lack of sympathy and respect for Korea
and pro-Japanese stance on Japan’s role in Korea
encouraged the Japanese to nurture their ambitions
in Korea
 The lack of positive economic interests in Korea led to
the absence of strong actions against the Japanese
 As early as 1947, US concluded that from the point of
view of its own military security, it had little strategic
interest in Korea
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that in the event of
hostilities in the Far East, American forces in Korea
would be a military liability
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