Chapter 6 The International Monetary System

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Transcript Chapter 6 The International Monetary System

«The built-in destabilizer of the
International Monetary System - or the
Triffin Dilemma – is at the origin of the
global crisis. The SDR could fix it»
or “How to create a more symmetrical system
that provides a better control of international
liquidities »
Christian Ghymers
Robert Triffin International - UCL
U de Namur - Session 29 April 2016
Overview
1) The right question: the global crisis and the IMS
2) What is International Monetary System (IMS) ?
- The failure of the “floating dollar-standard” as a system
and the impact upon demand-for-money
- The move to a managed float under $ standard
- The “Bretton Woods 2 & 3”: the Greenspan’s
monetary bubbles leading to financial crisis
3) The Triffin’s IMS = “International Monetary Scandal” and
the need for deeper reforms
4) The “Bretton Woods-1” system, the Triffin’s dilemma
and is persistence (asymmetries)
5) What to do for solving the asymmetry chain? The first
best
6) What is feasible right now?
1. The global crisis and the IMS
RTI is raising an embarrassing question: what kind of IMS
reforms could help to get out of the present crisis?
RTI tries to contribute to progress in the IMS reform with
Triffin’s main idea: to create an IMS based upon a
multilateral reserve currency
Right moment for focusing again upon the main IMS caveats:
status quo unsustainable, rising risks with the persistence
of the imbalances, international rebalance of macrofinancial power, currency-war prospects, overindebtedness, inefficiency of monetary policies ...
The coming deepening in the global crisis opens a window of
opportunities for deeper reforms on the systemic features
The G-20 under Chinese Presidency in 2016…
1. The global crisis and the IMS
In particular, the hypothesis of a causal link between the
asymmetry in the present IMS based upon the US $ as the
main reserve currency and the global crisis deserves more
attention.
The presented thesis: the inability of IMS to provide
adequate degree of global liquidities => global creditboom => global crisis => need for radical monetary reform
for ensuring a symmetrical IMS
This thesis is not new: Robert Triffin developed it untiringly
as soon as the 1950s, inclusive in the US (White House),
IMF (creation of the SDR and Art. VII), and other
international tribunes
I draw intensively upon Triffin’s analysis and spirit for
creating a global “win-win game” through the IMS
2. What is an International Monetary System ?
“System” means an agreed and structured way for organizing
international payments (“n” currencies).
= Public good for ensuring the main “coordinating” functions:
1) providing adequate liquidity for fluctuating levels of trade
(i.e. preventing international waves of excess or scarcity of
international currency)
2) providing means or tools for correcting global imbalances
without net contraction in global demand and preventing
conflicting practices (unfair protections damaging trade
and capital movements);
3) Issuing a set of coherent rules, tools, institutions for
warranting a minimum of coordination for preserving the
public good of stable monetary and economic conditions
2.1. IMS main role is solving the “n-1” issue
n currencies = n-1 “degrees of freedom” = n-1 exchange rates = n-1
current-account balances = n-1 domestic policies
Indeed: when the US spends more than it earns, the Rest of the World
becomes automatically a net saver making loans to the US economy,
alternatively when China wants to save more than it invests, the Rest
of the World becomes automatic debtor of China:
(Y  A) i  0  (Y  A)ni  0
In fact the same is true in a single economy between n individual agents:
if one spends less, held monetary balances rise => less liquidity for
the rest which has to borrow it
This is why the Central Bank emerged as an additional agent (n+1)
charged to “validate” (without creating inflation) the net result of n
choices with respect to liquidity by issuing or destroying passively its
own liquid debt used by n = the lender of last resort i.e. no net debt
for the Central Bank contrary to a private one issuing the national
currency
2.2. … but most economists seem to reject for IMS
what they accept at national level…
Economists do fully agreed at national level upon the need for a
Central Bank above all the others banks
But not at world level in spite of facing the same n-1 issue and the
same need for a systemic “external” n+1 agent
= denying to tackle the basic issue of the mechanical spillover of any
national macroeconomic development => opposite changes in the
Rest of the World
“n” economies = n-1 “degree of freedom” => need to find some
institutionalized consensus and a nominal anchor.
This is the role of any IMS: for example, the Gold standard created an
“external” n+1 currency (Gold) for establishing “n” degrees of
freedom in relative prices (exchange rates), Bretton Woods 1
pretended to solve this thanks to IMF monitoring, but with n
currencies, the $ was supposed to abandon any domestic objective
=> inevitable failure by its inner logics
2.3 …and opted for floating as an automatic
pilot after the failure of Bretton Woods 1
• The need for international currency is the same as for national money:
there is a demand for a liquid asset universally accepted for payments
(easier to chose an external one to the parties: a 3rd one + network
externalities = tends to a single standard)
• Getting liquidity is conflicting: not all agents could get more if no one
accepts to issue more liquid debts (not all able)
• This is valid for individual agent as well as any individual economy: there is a
th
need either for a n passive economy or for a n+1 currency in order to
clear net conflicting decisions
• => need for regulating international liquidity in the same way as for any
domestic liquidity
• Monetarist response (M. Friedman): floating rates => impede external
spillovers => makes each Central Bank to control effectively its domestic
liquidity => world liquidity under control => both external and internal
stability
• Facts show the contrary: floating fails to internalize national policies
2.4 The (strong) implicit conditions
for a floating regime becoming an IMS
1.Pure floating across all the n currencies => total segmentation between
the “n” money supplies, “any policy mistake would remain domestic”
2. Stable demand for domestic money (no impact of currency fluctuations)
and no demand for international reserves (float makes unnecessary
key-currency) for not creating links between currencies through their
respective demands : this implies that big international portfolio
adjustments (with wild move in R) would not affect any national
demand for money! = to assume no financial globalization !
3. Perfect symmetry among currencies (no key-currency, no “fear-forfloating” i.e. economies with similar weights and policy credibility)
4. No spillover effects from one economy to others (R supposes to
internalize all), and no policy divergence or good policy coordination
5. Speculation would always be stabilizing (no herding, no self-validating
speculation, no-chartist)
A pure floating is an unrealistic doctrine (not for individual economies, but
as a generalized “system”): markets cannot provide stability without
institutions and rules, $ floating creates strong spillovers upon the
world, floating looks coherent but relies upon unrealistic assumptions
•
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
2.4. The floating experience failure as a
System: doctrinal illusion
“$ float” 1973-1985 showed existence of strong $ spillovers which
explain world monetary waves:
Supply-side monetary links subsisted since pure float impossible:
exchange-rate interventions by non-US central banks ($ fluctuations =>
debt values => “fear-to-float”) => additional demand for $ reserves
Demand-side links in the “domestic-demand-for-money” (Mc Kinnon):
currency substitution => effects upon domestic demands for money =
floating could not internalize but amplified $ spillovers and $ needs
Global gross capital flows in $ => a single financial cycle (Shin, Rey)
=> Contrary to academic theory, the demand for international reserve
increased with the floating regime (need to protect against uncertainty
costs + need to prevent pro-cyclical changes in R => pro-cyclical
national policies (globalization => too big K inflows => overvaluation =>
credit boom=> debts => financial crisis + exchange rate crisis)
Feedback of $ international status upon US monetary policy through
lower US long-term interest rates
The international demand for money tends to be concentrated upon a
single currency for operational reasons: monetary standard searches
2.5. The persistent asymmetry of
the $ standard under floating regime
•
•
•
•
•
Under a “peg” => 2 different demands for money: domestic one, demand for
$ liquid assets, CB stabilizes them by intervening
Under floating  currency competition/substitution => domestic and
international demands are confused =>  uncertainty and  demand for
reserves as demand for money are unstable (R expectations)
Mc Kinnon argument: when the $/€ was expected to depreciate,  $ yields
and  € yields => changes in both demands for domestic moneys:  for $ 
for € since interest rate moves make holders of $ liquid assets to ask for $
bonds (slowing upward adjustment of $ yields) and € holders to sell € bonds
(slowing downward adjustment in € yields) => capital outflows from the $ to
the € equivalent to shift in domestic demand for money
So this money-demand-side link acts in a destabilizing way:  effective
liquidity in the US and  effective liquidity in the € area => monetary
management more difficult
When the $ went up (1980-85), the restrictive US monetary stance was
amplified in the rest of the world through the same destabilizing link
2.6. The pragmatic move to a managed
float under a persistent $-standard regime
• As academic theories proved to be wrong and as the dollar remained dominant
(“dollar-standard” regime) but IMS still incoherent (rather a “non-system”) policy
makers move to a complex architecture:
• After the failure of the floating-rates leading the world to a deep recession in
1981-82, the US recognized in early 1985 the need for interventions and
coordination: Reagan II (James Baker) organized the first attempt of a collegial
monitoring of world liquidity and exchange rates through the G-5/7 and 3
successive ad-hoc agreements: the “Plaza” (February 1985) G-7 Tokyo Summit
(1986) and “Le Louvre” (February 1987)
• These 3 agreements (G-5/G-7) put in place a “multilateral surveillance” with
indicators through only peer pressures among the main players (in fact for
isolating the German Bundesbank, the only independent Central Bank on that
time)
• The IMS became so a “managed exchange-rate regime” with “soft-target-zones”
(not binding) and (voluntary) policy mix coordination in a G-7 directory
• PROGRESS; the link was now two-ways: external stability <=> internal stability at
the same time for being mutually supportive (like in the EMS since 1979)
2.7. The Bretton Woods-2/3: the de facto
floating-dollar standard remains asymmetric …
• However, this new system failed too: the massive interventions for stabilizing
the $ (Louvre) created a new international monetary wave in 1987 with a new
world inflationary wave in 1989 (same link through money supplies as BW I),
the Japanese financial/real estate bubble, and same pro-cyclical fiscal policies
everywhere
• Lack of nominal anchor and remaining dominance of the US monetary policy
=> preparing the next monetary wave, with Alan Greenspan piloting it in a
strengthened “Keynesian way” (“cheap money”).
• The $ remained indisputably the major key-currency and the only one
providing all the features for being the international money.
• The other reserves currencies (DM, FF, £, ¥, CHF) increased their financial
shares but not the monetary one (insufficient scales on the interbank market)
• The emergence of the € has been changing slowly the financial weight of the $
but not its monetary weight (in the monetary segment i.e. for very-short term
exchange-rate markets)
2.8. …leading to the Asian crisis 1997 and to
Bretton Woods-3 by developing huge demand for US $
liabilities by emerging countries.
• The Asian crisis = result of US monetary expansion evacuated
towards Asian financial markets
• Since it affected both economies-without- sound-policies and
economies-with-sound-fiscal and monetary policies => need for
pilling-up reserves for preventing “sudden-stop” in capital flows and
for self-protection against pro-cyclical waves
• => demand for $ assets => maintaining a “BW” i.e. an amplification of
money creation + exempting the “world’s banker” from any discipline
(exorbitant privilege: external deficit financed with its own currency)
• => back to Triffin Dilemma again: world growing demand for “safe”
US T-Bills =>debt overhang => destroying trust in $ assets
• + exorbitant privilege: US assets in foreign currencies but US debt in
depreciating $ = net gain of $1 trillion 2002-2007 (R. Clarida)
3. The Triffin’s IMS or the “International Monetary Scandal”
• The inner nature of the $-standard IMS explains that the US is pushed
towards overconsumption financed by emerging (and poorer)
economies. + recurrent credit-boom => boom-bust crisis
• = paradox that the richest becomes the net savers benefitting from
resource transfer from poorest economies
• Current paradigms in economics impede to explain this paradox and
the IMS defects
• = IMS is at odds with the orthodox paradigm of rational expectations,
efficient markets and optimizing agents (DSGE); academic research
assumes credit/financial cycles away (ex. Modigliani-Miller theorem), there
was a doctrinal obstruction for integrating credit cycles into
macroeconomic frameworks and the need for an IMS
3. 2. The “International Monetary Scandal” is a time-bomb
for the world economy
• Triffin dilemma = the mechanism explaining that the US plays the role
of the “consumer-of-last-resort”, useful for emerging economies, but
implying a depreciation trend for the $ which is undermining its role
• This “system” works as far as the emerging countries wins more from
their undervaluation that what reserve accumulation costs them
(lower yields + sterilization + transfer of real resources to the US)
• Anyway, the system is flawed by a logical incoherence = time-bomb it
is our common interest to stop it
• But problem if US becomes a normal debtor, who would play the
“deficit-economy –of-last-resort” ? Rational and orderly way = being
cooperative => changing the IMS by creating a WCB and a n+1 new
standard for preventing contractionary adjustments or “beggar-myneighbor” measures
3.3. The solution: a symmetric system with a neutral
standard (SDR) and a regulated multilateral issuance
• The present SDR is not adequate since it has nor market circulation
neither market attractiveness
• However easy to transform present SDR basket into a genuine global
money: merely a multilateral decision (needs 85% of IMF votes)
• IMF could issue SDRs and spur their use for international clearing
while private sector would develop it in parallel (increasing scales)
• The reason for private use is that the average would necessarily be
better than the $ alone as key-currency
• The reason for public use (reserve and standard unit) is to be
symmetrical, sharing better the exchange-rate risk between debtors
and creditors, and to provide a tool for managing world liquidities (=
Keynes 1944/Triffin 1960)
• Issuance of SDRs would allow for a counter-cyclical policy worldwide
solving the deflationary bias of external adjustments and the
inflationary bias of the $ standard
4. The Bretton Woods I
(1944-1971/73)
The Bretton Woods Conference July
1944
• John Maynard Keynes (Bancor = n+1th) a new
currency issued by a World Central Bank for
symmetrical adjustments, opposed to Harry
White (Unitas = n+1th) a mere basket but without
WCB (for obliging deficit economies
adjust). US government refused
a supranational currency, imposing
the $ as the nth currency, offering to
to play the role of anchoring the
system with the $ convertibility in
gold at $35 $
The main defect of national key-currency
system:
The Triffin Dilemma (1957, 1960)
• Robert Triffin was the only one making clear since the beginning that
the “BW-I” would collapse (soon or later) for deep incoherence (lack
of a supranational currency making unsustainable a dual role for the
$)
• Triffin Dilemma expresses the incompatibility between a national
currency and a key- international currency: impossibility for a
national currency to ensure credible domestic stability and feeding
the world with needed liquidities: meeting the global demand for
reserves is done through a permanent increase in US liquid
indebtedness => BoP deficit destroying credibility as a key-reserve. So
meeting its international role leads to losing credibility that this role
requires, meeting domestic role makes impossible the international
one without endangering the domestic one and vice-versa
Robert Triffin (1911-1993) in UCL,
Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium
Triffin’s dilemma is still alive: universal value
of the Triffin’s asymmetry
• Triffin’dilemma was shaped initially for condemning the use of a
national currency as the main international reserve instrument in a
peg-system against the US $
• Majority of the profession believed that moving to a general floatingregime would eradicate the dilemma
• But this was an academic illusion
• Triffin alone continues to explain that the “$-regime” was based upon
a “built-in destabiliser” for the world economy
• The reason is a simple, basic principle:
money is a pure liquid liability of the central bank “US-economy”
the demand for foreign reserves in $ from the (n-1) non-$ economies
=> cheap, automatic capital inflows to the US economy
=> chain of asymmetries creating imbalances and w monetary waves
Back to the core of the problem: Triffin dilemma is
still acting as a “built-in destabilizer”
• Triffin dilemma is independent of the exchange-rate regime: any
general use of a national currency as the main international reserve
instrument creates big asymmetries and spillovers
• Majority of the profession still believes that moving to a general
floating-regime would eradicate the dilemma
• But this is an academic illusion: for 2 reasons: 1) demand for US $
reserves increased with floating (linking monetary bases and reinjecting capital into the US economy) 2) monetary spillovers do exist
even in pure floating through banking system: endogenous response
of leverage and pro-cyclicality of cross border credit flows (recent
empirical proofs by Shin & Hélène Rey, 2013, 2015)
• After Bretton Woods-1 (1973) Triffin continued to claim in the desert
that floating was no solution as a “non-system” of the US $-regime
based upon a “built-in destabilizer” for the world economy driven by
academic illusions impeding rational issuance of global liquidities
1) Demand for $ reserves => chain of
asymmetries =>“Triffin built-in destabilizer”
• The inner nature of money as a liability makes asymmetric any
system using one of the “n” national currencies even in a floating
regime (by the very nature of a Foreign reserve = $ asset )
• This Triffin asymmetry encompasses several biases through 2 main
mechanisms :
1) the softening of the external constraint for the
US resulting from the “automatic loans” by the (n-1) others => global
imbalances (de-saving => US becomes the “consumer/borrower of
last resort”);
2) the US monetary stance generates automatic
liquidity spillover: multiplication abroad, any excess of US monetary
base is duplicated by n-1 when they re-inject it in US economy, (not
in the FED since they buy US T-Bills and CD on the market)
• => Triffin dilemma = not just the “exorbitant privilege” but also an
exorbitant management of world liquidity, incoherent with a rational
IMS, although able to produce positive growth effects but at raising
imbalances and risk costs
The Triffin “built-in destabilizer”
• These 2 channels are inter-related, forming a vicious circle:
• channel 1 : Demand for $ reserves => lower US interest-rate => less
fiscal discipline => excess of absorption => global imbalances
• channel 2 => less US jobs => FED must react and apply Keynesian
stimulates => multiplication abroad => + demand for reserves for
resisting $ depreciation & growing financial risks: FED feeds
imbalances and the excess of saving by some emerging economies
=> + imbalances => + demand for US Keynesian policies => + liquidity
creation (FED feeds the imbalances) => + demand for reserves
=> pyramid of asymmetries: in external constraint as far as growing
demand of US $ assets, in policy stances: can sustain longer Keynesian
impulses with current account deficits, in cost of financing fiscal/
external deficits, in exchange-rate risks (invoicing and borrowing in $
shift the burden to Foreigners), in yields and valuation effects: excess
return on US assets over US liabilities = big resource transfer to the US
2) Additional monetary spillovers due to growing
gross cross-border credits, leverages and spreads
• Even without interventions and reserves accumulation the US
monetary stance impacts other Central Banks policies: fear of
appreciation tends to diffuse monetary expansion (following FED
policies with interest rates or money supply)
• Even without CB followers, monetary spillovers from the FED affect
liquidity through pro-cyclical movement in bank flows, leverages and
spreads as a result of the dramatic increase in the gross cross-border
operations of banks combined to pre-eminent role that the US dollar
plays in global banking: depreciation of the US $ increases leverage
outside and vice-versa (Shin Hyun Song 2012, 2014)
• Therefore domestic financial conditions are affected by the FED: “the
US shape the global financial cycle via the endogenous response of
leverage and the pro-cyclicality of cross border credit flows,
cross‐border flows and leverage of global institutions transmit
monetary conditions globally, even under floating exchange‐rate
regimes” (H. Rey 2013)
The Joke of the “world saving glut”
• The so-called “world-saving-glut” (WSG, Bernanke/Greenspan) is
merely a “banking glut” when the US $ spillovers are considered
• WSG is wrongly presented as an exogenous shift in Asian saving
which lowers US long-term interest rates on which the FED would
have no control, this relies upon academic assumptions of a perfect
symmetry among currencies !!
• Recognizing the existence of strong spillovers due to the asymmetries
of the US $ as main international currency makes easy the
explanation: the FED policies affect both other Central Banks and the
global financial market conditions (especially in emerging economies)
through asymmetry in Banking flows and leverage, creating an "international credit channel" that propagates the global financial cycle (as
shown by the BIS, Shin, Rey and others) even more with pure floating
• There is a positive feedback loop between loose monetary policy, fall
in the volatility, rise in credit, capital flows and leverage, exchange
rate movements and further fall in volatility (H. Rey, 2013)
5. What to do for solving the asymmetry
chain? The final solution…
• Principle very simple: updating of Keynes/Triffin plans
• Let’s do worldwide what was done at national level = to
create a n+1 liquid asset as the debt of a Multilateral
Central Bank (MCB) issued against “n” domestic earning
assets, and using it as reserve for official settlements
• Concretely swapping a % of the domestic component of
each national monetary base against this international
currency, and imposing conventionally it for Central Bank
settlements
• Naming it “Multilateral Drawing Rights” MDR, as it
corresponds to a closed basket made up with fixed amount
of each participating currency
The issuance mechanisms
• Two kinds: 1) central banks swap a part of their domestic
assets against the MDR which replaces the domestic assets
in the counterpart of their monetary base at the same
market value = no monetary creation: the world monetary
base remains constant, the debit and credit are equivalent
= no un-hedged position for the MCB
• 2) MCB is allowed for issuing its own liability by accepting
(limited and regulated) overdrafts in the national central
bank accounts as a % of their deposits = pure monetary
creation (increase the assets and liability sides of MCB)
• The MCB overdraft facility is strictly regulated: not just as a
% of the quotas but has to be voted, and is submitted to
The issuance mechanisms
• …assessment of the adjustments: for example, when
inflationary pressures, the overdraft is cut for shifting the
burden to the deficit economies, the reverse when facing
negative output gaps.
• => managed adjustment burden for reducing its impact on
growth and job (basic idea from Keynes and Triffin)
• On top of this room for multilateral technical management
the MDR allows for a purely symmetric IMS, getting rid of
the exorbitant privilege without any risk for world activity
level
• This symmetry comes from the neutrality of the issuance of
the n+1 MDR with respect to the key-currencies: MDR is
not anymore a debt of an economy but of the world
The inner symmetry of the MDR
• This symmetry comes from the rational neutrality of the
issuance of the n+1 MDR with respect to the keycurrencies: each economy faces eventually the same
degree of scarcity of the international liquidity (after the
temporary flexibility of the multilateral overdraft facility)
• This requires an additional condition: to regulate sterilized
interventions for preventing to resist durably to the
symmetric movement in monetary bases of deficit/surplus
economies
• Ex: CB of China substitutes (stable) MDR for (unstable) US $
T-bills; it sells T-bills on the market, shifts the $ from its US
bank to its account at the FED (US monetary base is cut),
The inner symmetry of the MDR
• The MDR amount is taken from the FED deposit (or the FED
overdraft) and increases the MDR deposit of the CB of
China: no increase in global monetary base (as far as no
sterilization in the US by increasing domestic assets of the
FED), the US faces a debt in MDR and China accumulates
MDR but increase its own monetary base = perfect
symmetry easing the adjustment
• Of course this is the perfect world to reach at the end of
the reform, but these principles are applicable by steps and
with progressive concentric circles
• Concretely through strengthening the SDR
The reasons for hope: world is changing fast
and institutions do exist
• Attractive win-win game when the risks are too high for all
the stakeholders (US and China are in the same boat)
• In 1944, Keynes fails because he advocated as the major
debtor facing the major creditor (=> US reluctance)
• Now, the US are the major debtor too big too fail but
obliged to find a way-out facing the major creditor obliged
to share responsibility for continuing to sell abroad
• All the institutional devices needed for creating the MCB
and the MDR are already there: IMF, SDR, Board, Art.. VII,
• The precedent of the move from the ECU (SDR) to the €
(MDR) helps and opens the way of progressive steps:
transforming the SDR in an attractive asset, used as a
parallel currency: the ELEC/LECE made a proposal in 1978
6. What is feasible right now?
• IMS deficiencies expose the global economy to
accumulating risks; in particular over-concentration of the official
reserves on the dollar leads inevitably to the need for a
diversification of reserve currencies; the potential massive currency
substitution expose to the growing risks of destabilizing reserve
composition arbitrages, of currency wars and of erratic fluctuations in
global liquidity
• It is therefore getting urgent to strengthen international
cooperation for building a consensual path on how to move
out of the present status quo
• The IMF should be at the very centre of this enhanced
cooperation and the key tool to move ahead should be the
SDR, which is not a national liability and is managed
collegially at the multilateral level
What is feasible now?
• Operationally, an IMF Substitution Account is the first
necessary step as it provides an appropriate instrument to convert
into SDRs reserve currencies (mainly dollars) in excess, making
possible a consensual reserve composition shift without exposing the
world economy to risky tensions in foreign exchange markets. Its
working principles are simple and its creation does not require any
change in the IMF statute. It allows for a shift away from the dollar as
reserve-currency while maintaining the network externalities
necessary for ensuring no breakdown in its role as a day-to-day
transaction-currency
• However, this necessary condition is far from being sufficient. Indeed,
for the shift in reserve composition to be significant, some parallel
actions are required: providing legal certainty, increasing rapidly
depth, liquidity and volume of the SDR market, supporting the
creation of the required market infrastructures for developing a
private SDR market, in particular an interbank clearing arrangement.
What is feasible now?
• For the private SDR market to develop, a strong signal is needed from
the official side and first of all from the IMF , which should multiply
operations in SDRs. Second the World Bank and the other multilateral
development banks, including the newly created ones, should lead
the way in issuing SDR denominated liabilities and in promoting SDR
denominated loans. National Treasuries and private borrowers will
start issuing SDR denominated debt once the transaction costs will be
competitive. All these actions are feasible in the present state of the
IMF Statute.
• The existence of a liquid private SDR market will allow Central banks
to hold reserves in private SDR and to use them for exchange market
interventions.
• The next step consists in adapting the IMF Articles of Agreement for
making a direct link between the private and the official SDR and
making more attractive the interest rates paid on SDR assets.
•
Annex
• Details about the main steps in IMS evolution
• Way of a solution
• Facts with charts
Schéma analytique: solution du DTM. Bilan de la
Banque Centrale Mondiale
ACTIF
A1 + A2 =total des avoirs
de la BCM sur “n” pays:
PASSIF (dettes)
= Base Monétaire Mondiale
P1+P2 = total des
engagements liquides
A1. “Bonds” nationaux (n
pays) libellés en “n”
monnaies nationales
P1. Dépôts des « n »
banques centrales en DTM
en contrepartie des « n »
bonds nationaux cédés à la
BCM (la contrevaleur change tous les
(valorisées au cours du marché contre
le panier global du DTM)
+
A2. Prêts en DTM aux BC
nationales des pays en
déficit (en fonction de la
conjoncture mondiale après vote
jours selon le cours de change: 2.1 actif =
2.1 Passif, donc pas de risque de change)
+P2. Dépôts de réserve en
DTM des BC nationales
(contrepartie des prêts de la BCM)
Commentaires au schéma analytique du DTM au Bilan
de la Banque Centrale Mondiale
A1 Par swap la BCM reçoit une
fraction convenue (20%) des
avoirs internes des « n » BC des
P1 En contrepartie des 20% d’avoirs
cédés par les BC, la BCM émet des
DTM en faveur des BC qui les
gardent auprès de la BCM et les
pays participants et les enregistre
utilisent exclusivement pour
au cours du jour en DTM (panier)
solder les paiements entre BC. En
tous les jours:
cas d’épuisement pour l’une,
ce swap ne crée pas de nouvelles
possibilité de prêt par la BCM (2)
liquidités mondiales
A1 = P1 à tout moment
A2 La BCM a la faculté de créer des
P2 Les DTM créés en contrepartie
DTM en prêtant aux BC des pays
sont inscrits aux comptes des BC:
en déficits lorsque ceux-ci ne sont
celles en déficit paient celles en
pas en inflation et que les « n »
surplus: les pays en déficit
membres approuvent (majorité
s’exposent à un risque de change
qualifiée): il y a création nette de
car leurs prêts sont en DTM mais
liquidité mondiale et possibilité
leurs DTM partent vers les pays
d’agir sur la conjoncture mondiale
en surplus (symétrie pour tous face à
A2 =P2 à tout moment, le monde ne
la rareté des DTM fixée par
s’endette pas par définition, donc peut
collégialement par la BCM)