Transcript David Backer

Nuclear Japan
1945 - 1965
LT David A. Backer
NS 3041
24 August 2007
Outline
Issue / Argument
 Chapters
 Rough outline of time periods
 Political Factors
 Social Factors
 Economic Factors
 Results
 Conclusion

Issue

There have been four instances in Japan’s
history where it considered developing
nuclear weapons. These four instances
were:
◦ 1) Mid 1960’s: Following China’s nuclear test
◦ 2) Mid 1970’s: Ratification of NPT
◦ 3) Mid 1990’s: Signing indefinite extension of
NPT
◦ 4) Today
Argument


My thesis argues that Japan will continue to
abstain from developing a nuclear weapons
program because the incentives to remain a
non-nuclear state outweigh the incentives to
do otherwise.
To support this argument, my thesis will look
at the three previous cases and develop
trends based on national, regional, and global
factors that fueled the policy debates that
had prevented Japan from developing nuclear
weapons in the past.
Chapters
Introduction
 Chapter Two – Development of Capabilities
 Chapter Three – 1945-1965

◦ China Nuclear Test

Chapter Four – 1968 – 1976
◦ Signing and Ratification of NPT

Chapter Five – 1991 – 1995
◦ Indefinite Extension of NPT

Chapter Six – Current Debates
◦ Increasing China/Regional Instability/Faith in security

Conclusion
Post WW II

What happened to Japan in World War II?
Japan - 1965

How did Japan recover?
How did they recover?



Political
◦ Alliances
◦ Treaties
◦ Documents
Social
◦ Physical and psychological effects of the bombs were still fresh in
the Japanese psyche
◦ Strong influence over politicians
◦ Re-focused on a new goal
Economics
◦ Results
Political

Alliances
◦ SCAP
◦ U.S. – Japan security alliance

Treaties
◦ 1951 U.S-Japan Security Treaty
◦ 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security

Documents
◦ Constitution (Article 9)
◦ Atomic Energy Basic Law
Political

Alliances
◦ Supreme Commander Allied Forces
 Occupied Japan after war
 Intentions were to stand up political structures
focused on economic development
 Created a new constitution
 Japan was forced to renounce its right as a
sovereign state
◦ U.S. – Japan alliance
Political

Treaties
◦ 1951 U.S. Security Treaty






Removed SCAP organization
Terminated the “state of war”
Withdrawal of occupational troops w/in 90 days
Restoration of Japan’s sovereignty
Right to self-defense
Access to international markets
◦ 1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation
 Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes.
Political

Documents / Laws
◦ Constitution Art. 9
 “The Japanese people forever renounce war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use
of force as a means of settling international
disputes.” Furthermore, “…land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained.”
◦ Atomic Energy Basic Law
 Created in 1955 and stated, “The research,
development, and utilization of atomic energy shall
be limited to peaceful purposes.”
Social
◦ Physical and psychological effects of the
bombs were still fresh in the Japanese psyche
◦ Strong influence over politicians
Social
• Physical and psychological effects of the bombs
were still fresh in the Japanese psyche
◦ Physical Destruction
 Hugh M. Gloster’s account of Hiroshima in 1953
◦ Psychological Destruction
 Perceived “Japanese faces as Oriental masks which
conceal all emotion” and concealing these emotions
was something the Japanese was good at.
Social

Perceptions
◦ Public opinion polls conducted by major papers in 1952
 38% : Favored creation of a SDF
 Of that 38%, 60% consisted of post-war youth
◦ Directly attacked
 41% : Would fight back
 11% : Would not fight back
 5% : Would flee
◦ Should nuclear weapons be used in Korean War
 85% : Wanted to end the war early
 73% : Opposed nuclear weapons





55% : Consider them inhuman
12% : Did not want a repeat of Hiro/Naga
9% : Avoid human extermination
5% : Feared they were a catalyst for World War III
3% : Feared a retaliatory attack
Social

Strong influence over politicians
◦ The belief was that if Japan possessed nuclear
weapons and if it were involved in another
war, nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be
used.
◦ If Prime Ministers failed to support initiatives
that promoted economic development, they
were promptly replaced.
 PM Kishi (1960 Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and
Security)
 PM Hayato (Promoted Economic development)
Economic

Results
◦ Compare Pre-War II to Post WWII (1945) to
end of studied Period (1965)
◦ Same institutions, theories, and mechanisms in
1965 as Pre-War II?
Comparison of GDP per capita between East-Asian Nations and the U.S. in 1935:
Economic: Pre-WWII

Despite the Great
Depression, the Japanese
economy recovered
during the 1930’s
◦ Rearmament
 Military controlled drastically
focused spending
 31% in 1932-1934
 47% in 1936-1937
 10 carriers, 3000 aircraft, 3500
pilots
 Technologically advanced
weapons
 By start of War, had 1,000,000
men and 2,000,000 reservists
◦ Exploitation of captive East
Asian Markets
Economic: World War II

Japan continued to concentrate its economy of
supplying its war machine.
USA
UK
France
Italy
USSR
Germany
Austria
Japan
Wartime GDP of the Great Powers
1938 to 1945 in International Dollars and 1990 Prices (billions)*
Country
1938
1939 1940 1941
800
869
943 1094
284
287
316
344
186
199
164
130
141
151
147
144
359
366
417
359
351
384
387
412
24
27
27
29
169
184
192
196
Allied/Axis GDP
2.4
2.3
2.1
2.0
1942
1235
353
116
145
274
417
27
197
2.1
1943
1399
361
110
137
305
426
28
194
2.3
1944
1499
346
93
117
362
437
29
189
3.1
1945
1474
331
101
92
343
310
12
144
5.0
Economic: World War II

What Japan was able to produce from 1939-1945 as
compared to other countries.
United
States
Soviet
Union
Germany
Japan
Tanks
88410
105251
45857
2515
Fighter A/C
99950
63087
55727
30447
Recon A/C
3918
0
6229
5654
Carriers
22
0
0
16
Battleships
8
0
2
2
Cruisers
48
2
0
9
Destroyers
349
25
17
63
Submarines
422
52
1337
167
Economic: Post World War II (1945)

SCAP replaced the military run government
with a democratic government
◦ Disestablished the “thought police”
◦ Break up of landlord holdings
 Given to peasant proprietors
 Productive capacity channeled into programs that
provide peasants with life necessities
◦ Worked w/ Japan to recover from




Near starvation
Soaring inflation
Innumerable strikes
Rampant criminality
Economic: Post World War II (1955)

Post
◦ Occupation
◦ Creation of U.S. alliance
◦ Korean War

Initiated programs that
centered on:
◦ High rates of personal savings
◦ Private-sector facilities
investment
◦ Strong work ethic
◦ Supply of cheap oil
◦ Innovative technology
◦ Effective intervention in privatesector
◦ Progressive income tax schedules
◦ Social Security Programs
Economic: Up to 1965


By 1955, production
rated matched pre-War
levels
1955-1965
◦ GDP: +9% / year
◦ Manufacturing/Mining:
+13%/ year
◦ Construction: +11%/year
◦ Infrastructure: +14%/year

Sectors employed by:
◦ 41% labor force
◦ 26% remain in agriculture
Conclusion

The political and social focus on
economic development was the genesis
that prevented Japan from developing
nuclear weapons during the period
between 1945 – 1965.
Conclusion

Economic development
◦ Politically
 Alliances – initial framework and security
 Treaties and laws – forced Japan to concentrate on
non-military development
◦ Socially
 Preserving status within international markets
 Society focused on a new goal
 Nothing new, just given the mechanisms
“If we establish any goal we will proceed to attain it without considering
any other factors. For if we are set in motion toward any direction, we
have just too much energy and no mechanism to check its direction…”
Professor Chie Nakane, University of Tokyo