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Democratic Transitions David Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, Sharyn O’Halloran In the News… Building democracy is getting new levels of scrutiny in the popular press Afghanistan Built off existing institutions (loya jirga) Still, no real national government (“warlords”) Iraq One justification for war was to establish a democratic government in the Middle East But a long interim gov’t may be needed first Big Questions How do you establish democracy? What keeps democratic governments from sliding into autocracy/chaos? “Home-grown” vs. Imported democracy How do you get non-violent transitions? If democracy=elections, is this even a good thing for developing polities? Zakaria – “Illiberal Democracies” Institutions vs. institutions We have certain outcomes that we want a political system to deliver Policy that reflects public opinion Public officials responsive to their constituents Protection for minorities, esp. ethnic Rule of Law via a fair, efficient court system Uncorrupt bureaucracy These are Institutions Really, objectives of the system Institutions vs. institutions We know little about what institutions can provide these in different settings Parliamentary vs. Presidential systems Federalism and/or corporatism Electoral rules and campaign finance laws Like economic institutions in China We have some examples of what fully developed, stable democracies look like But how to reach this destination? This Paper Try to look at how countries have democratized in the past Review existing theories Present some new data and methods Look at the results and their implications Speculate about how these trends are changing in the 21st Century What, if anything, can the international community do to help? Quick Peek at the Results Results Modernization theory holds up well Positive income effects at all levels of democratization Also some support for inequality effects Casts spotlight on partial democracies Numerous Most volatile Hardest to predict/understand Modernization Theory Lipset (1959) – Money matters Higher income per capita is associated with democratic governance Supported by evidence until… Przeworski, et. al. (PACL, 2000) Positive results were due to overaggregation of data Separate into democracies and all others Nothing predicts transitions up Once up, per capita income of over $4,000 helps keep things stable Other Theories Acemoglu & Robinson (2003) Rosendorff (2001) Inequality as well, plus increases in workforce and capital stock make revolutions less likely Haggard & Kaufman (1995) Transitions are economically based, as they redistribute income from rich to poor Nonlinear impact of inequality on transitions Inflation & low growth: transitions out of autocracy Schmitter, O’Donnell – Consolidation Factors promoting transition could make it fragile Data: Partial Democracies PACL employ a dichotomous regime type Democracy if: Chief executive elected Legislature exists and is elected More than one political party At least one successful transition of power Autocracy otherwise We employ a trichotomous measure, including partial democracy Distribution of Polity Scores Fraction .2 .1 0 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Polity Score 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Distribution of Polity Scores .2 Fraction Autocracy .1 0 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Polity Score 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Distribution of Polity Scores Full Democ. .2 Fraction Autocracy .1 0 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Polity Score 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Distribution of Polity Scores Full Democ. .2 Partial Democ. Fraction Autocracy .1 0 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 Polity Score 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 World Democratization Trends, 1955-2000 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% Democracy 20% Partial 10% Autocracy Year 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 1977 1975 1973 1971 1969 1967 1965 1963 1961 1959 1957 1955 0% Regional Democratization Trends, 1955-2000 Africa Asia Australia Europe North & Central America South America Transition Frequencies 1-Year A P D A 97.47 1.89 0.63 P 5.12 91.97 2.90 D 1.00 0.87 98.13 Transition Frequencies 5-Year 1-Year A P D A P D A 97.47 1.89 0.63 A 89.64 7.13 3.24 P 5.12 91.97 2.90 P 20.43 65.76 13.81 D 1.00 0.87 98.13 D 3.84 4.13 92.03 Transition Frequencies by Type and Year 8 6 Autocracy 8 66 obs. 6 4 4 2 2 0 22 obs. 0 1956 1960 1970 1980 year 1990 2000 1956 1960 AP 1980 year 1990 2000 AD 8 8 44 obs. 6 25 obs. 6 Partial Dem. 4 4 2 2 0 0 1956 1960 1970 1980 year PA 1990 2000 1956 1960 1970 1980 year 1990 PD 8 6 1970 8 16 obs. 6 4 4 2 2 0 14 obs. Democracy 0 1956 1960 1970 1980 year DA 1990 2000 1956 1960 1970 1980 year DP 1990 2000 2000 Data: Previous Transitions Previous attempts at transition may affect success of current attempt Is it like: Trying to quite smoking (+); or A sign of structural instability (-) Hard to capture this systematically We use “Sumdown,” the sum of previous downward Polity movements Example: Turkey, 1955-2000 Illustration of PrevTrans Variable for Turkey, 1955-2000 Polity Score PrevTrans 30 26 25 27 Polity Scale 20 11 9 10 8 9 4 0 9 7 0 8 7 1 -2 -5 -10 1955 1965 1975 Year 1985 1995 2000 Data: Inequality Plays a big role in many stories, including Acemoglu and Robinson Previous measures are rather incomplete Even Denninger and Squire agree with this We create a new measure Idea: infant mortality is caused by both health conditions & inequality So regress IM on health correlates and take the residual as a measure of inequality Infant Mortality Residual vs. Gini Coefficient Econometric Approaches Tobit Markov Traditional regression approach, using full data range But with limits at –10 and 10 Breaks data into three categories: autocracy, partial democracy, full democracy Looks at impact of variables on transition probabilities Duration Analysis Analyzes length of time until a given transition occurs Predictions Modernization: GDP/capita (+) Acemoglu & Robinson: Inequality (-), Inequality2 (-) Rosendorff: Inequality (-), DWorkforce (-), DCapitalStock (-) Haggard & Kaufmann: GDP growth (+), inflation(-) Consolidation: non-monotone hazard Markov Analysis 1 0 .5 1 .5 9.659036 .5 1.452754 .5 1 -1.379472 0 .5 43 10.73535 0 .5 1.25747 1 -1.641473 0 .5 0 0 5.209844 1 4.597264 0 .5 0 1.74149 1 -1.45599 Previous Attempts Democracy 1 10.69568 1 4.338934 Inequality Partial 0 0 GDP/cap .5 1 Autocracy 0 43 0 27 Duration Analysis Question: What prevents newly democratized countries from backsliding? Can ask this for full or partial democracies Different from the question of what gets them democratic in the first place I.e., most newly democratized nations will start off as partial democracies Tricky estimation, since we have repeated events (can democratize more than once) 1 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0 0 50 0 50 analysis time Observed: highgdp = 0 Predicted: highgdp = 0 Graphs by highgdp Observed: highgdp = 1 Predicted: highgdp = 1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 Smoothed Hazard Estimate, Adjusted for Per Capita GDP 10 20 30 analysis time 40 50 Conclusion Modernization theory holds up well With 3-way dependent variable, income level does predict transitions out of autocracy Helps keep partials from backsliding Acemoglu and Robinson get some support Focus debate on partial democracies Increasingly common Most volatile Hardest to predict Markov Analysis Probability Autocracy Partial Dem. Full Democracy Variable