Transcript Slide 1

The Logics of Separatism in
Southeast Asia and Beyond:
Geography, Demography,
Economics and Politics
Dr Graham K. Brown
Research Officer, Centre for Research on Inequality,
Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE)
University of Oxford
The Cases
Mindanao
Pattani
Aceh
Sabah
Malay/Muslim
Muslim
minority
minority
concentrated
• Non-Malay,
Ethnic
Acehnese
mostly
minority
Christian
in four regions
3 provinces
concentrated
minorities
in province
• Relatively
Oil/gas reserves
poor area
the Malay
Borneo
and
• Historic links with Mindanao
Malay
peninsula
Brunei
peninsular
and
the Brunei
& Ottoman
Sultanate
Empire
Four Logics




Geography: Historical processes of state
formation and border-drawing
Demography: State migration policies and
‘minoritization’
Economics: Inter- and intra-regional
horizontal inequalities
Politics: Politicization of resentment
Measuring Ethnic Difference (i)

Subnational Group Difference (SGD): In a
population of n ethnic groups, which
constitute proportion si of the subnational
region S in question and proportion pi of
the rest of the population P
n
n
i 1
i 1
SGD  1  min( pi ,s i )  
pi  s i
2
Distributions of PADs by Maximum
Subnational Group Difference
100%
90%
Percent of Cases (cum.)
80%
70%
60%
All Cases
50%
Separatist Cases
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Maximum Subnational Group Difference Measure
0.8
0.9
1.0
Ethnic Peripheries
10%
Annual Probability of Separatism
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18
Inter-Regional Difference (SGD), 20 quantiles
19 20
Non-Separatist Regions in Q20
COUNTRY
REGION
DIFF
FRAC
COUNTRY
REGION
DIFF
FRAC
Kenya
Western Region
0.737
0.433
Guinea
Central Region
0.572
0.121
Indonesia
W. Java
0.654
0.360
Indonesia
C. Java
0.562
0.062
Philippines
W. Visayas
0.675
0.376
Laos
Sekong
0.675
0.168
Ethiopia
Amhara
0.625
0.303
India
Himachal Pr.
0.659
0.089
Pakistan
NWFP
0.743
0.410
Indonesia
Bali
0.872
0.224
Uganda
West Nile
0.924
0.521
Indonesia
W. Sumatra
0.869
0.215
Indonesia
W. Nusateng.
0.911
0.510
Indonesia
Gorontalo
0.909
0.181
Indonesia
Bangka-Belitung
0.812
0.437
Ethiopia
Tigray
0.913
0.122
Indonesia
S. Kalimantan
0.761
0.398
India
Lakshadweep
0.886
0.087
Indonesia
Yogyakarta
0.551
0.154
Pakistan
FATA
0.837
0.018
Namibia
Caprivi
0.854
0.448
Kenya
North East
0.958
0.012
Geographic Logic: Fuzzy Borders
and Ethnic Peripheries



Precolonial maṇḍala ‘states’: Porous
borders, ‘spheres of influence’, mountain
boundaries
Colonial state formation: Hard borders,
centre-periphery relations, water
boundaries
Postcolonial state formation: Geo-politics
Ethnohistories




Our fatherland, Acheh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent
sovereign State since the world begun. Holland was the first foreign power to
attempt to colonize us when it declared war against the sovereign State of Acheh,
on March 26, 1873, and on the same day invaded our territory, aided by Javanese
mercenaries… [After World War II] our fatherland was turned over by the Dutch to
the Javanese by hasty fiat. (ASNLF, 1976)
For many centuries, the Bangsamoro people were a free, sovereign and
independent nation. In the early 15th century no less than the reigning Emperor of
China had written with his own hand an epitaph on the Mausoleum of one of our
Kings, saying: "That he was a brave King and he was the Master of the East!" But
owing to the centuries of war and turmoil wrought by endless waves of foreign
conspiracy and aggressions, we've lost our freedom. Consequently, our sovereignty
is being exercised by people other than the Bangsamoro people themselves. (Nur
Misuari, 2000)
Patani, Jala, Narathiwat have always been Malay territory, as long as history goes
back and even before the establishment of Bangkok.(Che Man, 2005)
Throughout the centuries from the dawn of history the Sinhalese and Tamil nations
have divided between them the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese inhabiting the
interior of the country in its Southern and Western parts from the river Walawe to
that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the Northern and Eastern districts (TULF,
1976)
Ethnohistories

Contrast from Sabah:
Sabah was a land of freedom until the middle of the
nineteenth century in the sense that there was no
organised form of government and a state did not exist
until 1881. Before that, geographically Sabah had
existed since time immemorial. But there was no
community, no overall administration, no state
economy, no state government; only mountains,
jungles, rivers, the surrounding seas, and isolated
villages scattered over the more than 29,000 square
miles of tropical and warm equatorial land.
(Ongkili 1981)
The discourse of ‘decolonization’



The question of Acheh-Sumatra is not a question of "separatism" - as
alleged by the Indonesian Javanese neo-colonialists - but a question of
self-determination of the people of Acheh-Sumatra and a question of
decolonization of the former Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) which has not
been decolonized legally and properly in accordance with the purpose and
the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations, and with the United
Nations Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples. (Hassan di Tiro, 1976)
Petition for the Decolonization of the Bangsamoro Homeland in Southern
Philippines, and Request for United Nations Assistance in its
Establishment as the Independent Bangsamoro Republic Of Mindanao…
those who continued to tenaciously pursue their demand for independence
have been discredited as international ‘terrorists’ or ‘secessionists’ or
‘separatists’. (MNLF, 2001)
Before a succession of western nations (including the Portuguese, Dutch
and the British) ruled the island, there were two distinct kingdoms on the
island, the Tamil Kingdom in the north and the Sinhala kingdom in the
South. Sinhala colonisation of traditional Tamil areas was started in the
fifties, and was intensified in the eighties... Colonisation continues
unabated. (LTTE, n.d.)
Atavism, Mobilization and Islam



Many scholars, particularly Westerners and particularly
recently (i.e. post 9/11), tend to focus on the Islamic
dimension in separatist movements, drawing purported
links between various regional groups and ‘Al-Qaeda’
(Chalk, Gunaratna, Abuza, etc.).
Problematic nature of these claims: myopic, ahistorical,
based on poor or simply inaccurate data (Hamilton-Hart
2006; Brown 2007; Connors 2007; Sidel 2007).
Alternative explanation may focus on the historical role
of Islam in early pre-colonial state formation in SE Asia
and its concomitant atavistic appeal.
Demographic Logic
Many of the post-second world war states of Southeast
Asia faced ethnic peripheries, left over from the mismatch
between colonial border-drawing and the patterns of precolonial settlement and state-formation. A typical response
of these newly independent states and, in some cases their
colonial predecessors, to the potential problems was to
encourage in-migration to the ethnic peripheries by more
‘loyal’ representative of the putative nation-state, often in
the name of development. Far from undermining the
likelihood of secession, such policies typically exacerbated
local grievances by adding to the sense of marginalization
among peripheral communities.
20
100%
18
90%
16
80%
14
70%
12
60%
1994
1987
0%
1980
0
1973
10%
1966
2
1959
20%
1952
4
1945
30%
1938
6
1931
40%
1924
8
1917
50%
1910
10
1903
Population of Mindanao (millions)
Population of Mindanao by religion:
1903-2000
Non-Muslim
Muslim
Year of Arrival
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
1951
1949
1947
1945
No. migrants ('000s)
Migrants living in Aceh, 1990
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Population of Southern Region of
Thailand, 1960 & 2000
1960
Buddhist
Muslim
2000
Other
Buddhist
Muslim
Other
Chumphon
98.8%
0.1%
1.1%
98.9%
0.7%
0.4%
Krabi
61.3%
38.1%
0.6%
65.2%
34.7%
0.1%
Nakhon Si Thammarat
94.4%
4.9%
0.7%
93.1%
6.2%
0.7%
Narathiwat
20.7%
78.2%
1.1%
17.9%
82.0%
0.1%
Pattani
21.8%
77.8%
0.4%
19.2%
80.7%
0.1%
Phangnga
80.8%
17.9%
1.3%
76.3%
23.2%
0.5%
Phatthalung
91.5%
8.0%
0.5%
88.3%
11.1%
0.6%
Phuket
81.2%
17.1%
1.7%
81.6%
17.1%
1.3%
Ranong
87.2%
11.9%
0.9%
88.5%
10.9%
0.6%
Satun
16.8%
82.9%
0.3%
31.9%
67.8%
0.3%
Songkhla
77.9%
18.6%
3.5%
76.6%
23.2%
0.2%
Surat Thani
96.5%
2.0%
1.5%
97.3%
2.0%
0.7%
Trang
86.2%
12.1%
1.7%
86.0%
13.7%
0.3%
Yala
28.5%
61.1%
10.4%
31.0%
68.9%
0.1%
Southern Region
72.9%
25.3%
1.8%
71.6%
28.0%
0.4%
Population dynamics Sabah, 19512000
1951
Dusun
1960
1970
1980
35.3%
32.0%
28.2%
Murut
5.6%
4.9%
4.8%
Bajau
13.4%
13.1%
11.8%
Malay
-
-
18.5%
Kadazan
1990
12.5%
6.0%
2000
18.4%
2.9%
3.3%
11.7%
13.2%
2.8%
6.2%
11.7%
17.5%
19.2%
14.7%
15.0%
-
-
6.1%
8.0%
-
22.3%
23.0%
21.4%
16.2%
11.5%
10.1%
5.0%
9.5%
5.7%
0.8%
1.9%
4.8%
-
-
-
-
24.5%
23.6%
8.7%
16.6%
27.2%
27.8%
Muslim
34.5%
37.9%
51.3%
63.7%
Other (Mostly animist)
56.8%
45.5%
21.5%
8.5%
334
454
Other Indigenous
Indonesian
Chinese
Others
Non-Malaysian Citizens
Christian
TOTAL POPULATION (000s)
653
83.0%
1,239
1,734
2,603
Economic Logic: Horizontal
Inequalities


Horizontal inequalities (HI) defined as socioeconomic inequalities between ethnic, religious,
or regionally-defined groups.
Strong econometric evidence of link between HI
and conflict, both in terms of regional
disaggregation of conflict intensity in specific
case studies, e.g. Indonesia (Mancini 2007) and
Nepal (Gates & Murshed 2005), and of
incidence of conflict in cross-country datasets,
e.g. Østby 2007.
Economic Logic: Horizontal
Inequalities



Focus here on two dimensions:
‘Inter-regional HIs’: Disparities in regional
socio-economic performance between
(would-be) separatist region and the rest
of the country
‘Intra-regional HIs’: Disparities in ethnoreigious socio-economic performance
within (would-be) separatist region
Effect of relative GDP per capita
conditional on group difference
35.0%
Probability of violent separatism
30.0%
25.0%
SGD
20.0%
0.6
15.0%
0.8
1.0
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Relative GDP per capita
Notes: Logistic regression, N=21,343; pseudo-R2=0.3200. Other variables,
including political system (Polity index; federal dummy) and national economic
performance (GDP per capita; GDP per capita growth), held at mean values.
Economic Logic (i): Inter-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Thailand
2,000
1,500
Thailand
Songkhla
Malay Provinces
1,000
500
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
0
1978
GDP per capita (USD PPP, 2000)
2,500
Economic Logic (i): Inter-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities - Mindanao


1972: GDP per capita at outbreak of
conflict (1972) >20% lower than national
average and barely half that of Luzon
1990: Mindanao as a whole remains at
around 80% of national rate but ARMM
much worse, barely 30% of national rate.
ARMM provinces bottom of every national
HDR since 1992; further decline in late
1990s precedes resumption of violence.
Economic Logic (i): Inter-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities - Aceh


1970s: Discovery of oil and natural gas
keeps provincial GDP per capita well
above national average. Low poverty: in
1980, Aceh ranked 24 out of 26 provinces
in terms of poverty
1990: poverty rate increased over 200%,
now ranked 8 out of 26; GDP per capita
remains among the highest
Economic Logic (i): Inter-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Sabah
Ratio: Sabah-West Malaysia
10
Poverty
1
GDP per capita
0.1
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Economic Logic (ii): Intra-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Thailand
Rural &
Urban
Region,
Religion &
Language
Female Education
Buddhist
Central
7.807
South’n
5.253
Rural
Malay
Buddhist
6.809
South’n
4.948
Muslim
9.197
3.627
6.140
2.920
Central
Malay
Muslim
Male Education
2.785
Buddhist
4.079
0.443
3.524
5.788
Muslim
0.736
8.151
3.546
Household Assets
0.400
0.405
0.541
4.091
3.401
0.331
0.317
0.316
Economic Logic (ii): Intra-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Mindanao
70%
12
50%
8
40%
6
30%
4
20%
2
10%
Age at Outbreak of Conflict (1972)
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
45
47
0
49
0%
Ratio of Muslims to Christians
10
51
Proportion of group age cohort with no
education
60%
Muslims
Christians
Ratio
Economic Logic (ii): Intra-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Mindanao
No. Casuaties During Estrada Era
350
300
R2 = 0.7139
250
200
150
100
50
0
0
0.5
1
1.5
Muslim-Christian Educational Inequality
2
2.5
Economic Logic (ii): Intra-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Aceh




Two ‘types’ of Javanese in-migrants – urban professionals; rural
settlers (transmigration)
Lhokseumawe Industrial Zone ‘came to assume the obtrusive
character of a high-income, capital-intensive, urban, non-Muslim,
non-Acehnese enclave in a basically low-income, labor-intensive,
rural, Muslim, Acehnese province’ (Emmerson 1983)
1990: Urban unemployment rate among ethnic Acehnese twice that
of Javanese; among those educated to Senior High or above,
Acehnese unemployment stands at 13.1%; Javanese at 2.7%.
1990: Among rural population, Javanese landholdings significantly
larger than Acehnese; 50% of Javanese in agricultural occupations
have landholdings larger than 2 Hectares; equivalent rate among
ethnic Acehnese less than 30%
Economic Logic (ii): Intra-Regional
Horizontal Inequalities – Sabah
1982
1987
1989
Malay
1.44
1.44
1.41
Kadazan/Dusun
0.78
0.66
0.69
Bajau
0.70
0.83
0.80
Murut
0.41
0.57
0.67
Other Bumiputera
0.77
n.a.
n.a.
Chinese
1.67
2.00
1.95
Others
2.94
n.a.
n.a.
Political Logic: The role of the
state (i)


Aceh: Initial, relatively small scale insurgency
easily dealt with by the military but ushers in a
period of high repression and discrimination
(including preferential in-migration) which
fosters wider resentment
Mindanao: Inter-religious land conflicts emerge
in the 1960s; turn to explicitly separatist
violence comes after Jabidah Massacre, biased
police intervention in land conflicts and
declaration of Martial Law
Political Logic: The role of the
state (ii)


Thailand: First wave of insurgency comes after
Phibul virtually outlaws Malay language,
customs and practices; Recent wave linked to
disestablishment of bodies for Muslim
grievances and harsh police response to
Muslim protests.
Sabah: 1985 state election focal point for nonMuslim grievances; Muslims parties ‘steal’ the
election; protest rallies, bombings; Federal
government intervenes, accepting non-Muslim
victory, despite political antipathy
Three tenses of separatism: Past
perfect


Separatism (unsurprisingly) is associated with
ethnic peripheries, often ‘left over’ from colonial
state formation. But this is insufficient to
explain the incidence of separatism: necessary
but not sufficient?
Pre-colonial (ethno)histories can provide strong
mobilizing potential through atavistic (and often
glamourized or sanitized) depictions of a past
‘Glorious Age’
Three tenses of separatism:
Present imperfect


Demographic minoritization and socio-economic
marginalization and/or perceptions of exploitation
provide substantial ‘fuel’ for separatist discontent
‘During these last thirty years the people of Acheh,
Sumatra, have witnessed how our fatherland has been
exploited and driven into ruinous conditions by the
Javanese neo-colonialists: they have stolen our
properties… Acheh, Sumatra, has been producing a
revenue of over 15 billion US dollars yearly for the
Javanese neo-colonialists, which they used totally for
the benefit of Java and the Javanese’ (ASNLF
Declaration of Independence, 4/12/1976).
Three tenses of separatism: Future
progressive

These conditions have tended to create
localized discontent and low-level
violence. But it has been the intervention
of the state in ways perceived as directly
and deliberately discriminatory that have
prefigured the emergence of mass-based
movements seeking a separate future
from the existing nation state.
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